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This study utilizes a controlled experimental design to investigate the influence of a virtual reality experience on empathy, compassion, moral reasoning, and moral foundations. With continued debate and mixed results from previous studies attempting to show relationships between virtual reality and empathy, this study takes advantage of the technology for its ability to provide a consistent, repeatable experience, broadening the scope of analysis beyond empathy. A systematic literature review identified the most widely used and validated moral psychology assessments for the constructs, and these assessments were administered before and after the virtual reality experience. The study is comprised of two pre-post experiments with student participants from a university in the United States. The first experiment investigated change in empathy and moral foundations among 44 participants, and the second investigated change in compassion and moral reasoning among 69 participants. The results showed no significant change in empathy nor compassion, but significant change in moral reasoning from personal interest to post-conventional stages, and significant increase in the Care/harm factor of moral foundations. By testing four of the primary constructs of moral psychology with the most widely used and validated assessments in controlled experiments, this study attempts to advance our understanding of virtual reality and its potential to influence human morality. It also raises questions about our self-reported assessment tools and provides possible new insights for the constructs examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study utilizes a controlled experimental design to investigate the influence of a virtual reality experience on empathy, compassion, moral reasoning, and moral foundations. With continued debate and mixed results from previous studies attempting to show relationships between virtual reality and empathy, this study takes advantage of the technology for its ability to provide a consistent, repeatable experience, broadening the scope of analysis beyond empathy. A systematic literature review identified the most widely used and validated moral psychology assessments for the constructs, and these assessments were administered before and after the virtual reality experience. The study is comprised of two pre-post experiments with student participants from a university in the United States. The first experiment investigated change in empathy and moral foundations among 44 participants, and the second investigated change in compassion and moral reasoning among 69 participants. The results showed no significant change in empathy nor compassion, but significant change in moral reasoning from personal interest to post-conventional stages, and significant increase in the Care/harm factor of moral foundations. By testing four of the primary constructs of moral psychology with the most widely used and validated assessments in controlled experiments, this study attempts to advance our understanding of virtual reality and its potential to influence human morality. It also raises questions about our self-reported assessment tools and provides possible new insights for the constructs examined.

Introduction: The objective of the study was to examine the role of social value orientation and future time perspective to account for individual differences in pro-environmental behaviors, intentions, and opinions about the link between pro-environmental action and pandemic threat (three separate models) in Polish and Swedish samples expected to differ in rate of pro-environmental behaviors (higher in Sweden). We hypothesized that for Poland, future time perspective would be linked to pro-environmental outcomes only when social value orientation is average or high. In contrast, for Sweden, we expected a significant link between these variables regardless of social value orientation. Methods: In total, 301 (150 Polish, 151 Swedish) participants completed online surveys via Prolific.co research panel. We controlled for individualizing/binding moral foundations, present time perspectives, and selected demographic variables in the analyses. Results: In line with expectations, the individualizing moral foundations were a significant predictor across all three models. The data did not support our focal hypothesis regarding the interaction between future time perspective and social value orientation. For pro-environmental behaviors in the past 6months, the future time perspective was a predictor only when social value orientation was low. Discussion: The results suggest that when encouraging more competitive (compared to altruistic) people to behave in a green way, it might be crucial to underline the future consequences and benefits, consistent with the future time perspective. The pro-environmental campaigns could, therefore, highlight how green behavior may bring personal gains in the future, which are typically valued by individualistic people, such as savings or social status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IntroductionThe objective of the study was to examine the role of social value orientation and future time perspective to account for individual differences in pro-environmental behaviors, intentions, and opinions about the link between pro-environmental action and pandemic threat (three separate models) in Polish and Swedish samples expected to differ in rate of pro-environmental behaviors (higher in Sweden). We hypothesized that for Poland, future time perspective would be linked to pro-environmental outcomes only when social value orientation is average or high. In contrast, for Sweden, we expected a significant link between these variables regardless of social value orientation.MethodsIn total, 301 (150 Polish, 151 Swedish) participants completed online surveys via Prolific.co research panel. We controlled for individualizing/binding moral foundations, present time perspectives, and selected demographic variables in the analyses.ResultsIn line with expectations, the individualizing moral foundations were a significant predictor across all three models. The data did not support our focal hypothesis regarding the interaction between future time perspective and social value orientation. For pro-environmental behaviors in the past 6 months, the future time perspective was a predictor only when social value orientation was low.DiscussionThe results suggest that when encouraging more competitive (compared to altruistic) people to behave in a green way, it might be crucial to underline the future consequences and benefits, consistent with the future time perspective. The pro-environmental campaigns could, therefore, highlight how green behavior may bring personal gains in the future, which are typically valued by individualistic people, such as savings or social status.

Introduction: Harm and offense are two important notions in legal discussions on the extent to which one's freedom may be limited. Prior research on the third-person effect found that perceived media harm on others, not perceived media harm on the self, is a robust positive predictor of support of censoring socially undesirable media content (e.g., pornography). In comparison, how offensiveness perceptions predict censorship support is not clear. Drawing on moral foundations theory, we test here how perceived media offensiveness to the self compared with 1) perceived media offensiveness to others and 2) perceived media harm on others would predict censorship support. Method: We conducted two cross-sectional survey studies in the U.S. to address this question with sexual, alcoholic, and violent media content as test cases. In Study 1 (N = 544 undergraduates), we measured perceived media offensiveness to the self, that to others, and censorship support. In Study 2 (N = 727 non-student adults), we also measured perceived media harm on the self and others. Results: As in prior research, we found that people perceive sexual, alcoholic, and violent media content to harm other viewers more strongly than it harms themselves, and the perception of how much others are harmed predicts perceivers' censorship support. In contrast, while people also perceive the three types of media content to offend other viewers more strongly than they offend the self, the perception of how much others are offended predicts censorship support to a significantly lesser extent or does not predict this at all. Instead, the perception of how much the self is offended does. Discussion: These findings add to the work on moral foundations theory that distinguishes between how the care/harm and sanctity/degradation foundations relate to moral judgments. These findings also suggest that the current theorizing of the third-person effect needs to expand to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent results on how harm and offensiveness perceptions differently relate to censorship support. The care/harm and sanctity/degradation foundations may underlie how harm and offensiveness perceptions predict censorship support. However, several "anomalous" findings need to be accounted for before moral foundations provide a comprehensive explanation of the third-person effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its relatively brief history, cryptocurrency has already had a profound impact on the economy, with some predicting that it will eventually replace traditional fiat currencies. Historically, it had dark associations with illegal activities in the early days, although perceptions and associations likely have, in recent years, changed for the better. Thus, understanding how people perceive the morality of cryptocurrency currently forms the motivation of the current research. We, in particular, examine associations dependent on political ideology. Across both a large-scale analysis of Twitter posts (N = 959,393) and controlled survey research (N = 487), we find that cryptocurrency is currently best understood as being more strongly linked to conservative vs. liberal moral foundations. Cryptocurrencyrelated posts were more likely to express conservative moral foundations (Authority, Purity, and Loyalty) rather than liberal moral foundations (Fairness and Care), and individual endorsement of these conservative moral foundations was associated with increased interest in crypto investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its relatively brief history, cryptocurrency has already had a profound impact on the economy, with some predicting that it will eventually replace traditional fiat currencies. Historically, it had dark associations with illegal activities in the early days, although perceptions and associations likely have, in recent years, changed for the better. Thus, understanding how people perceive the morality of cryptocurrency currently forms the motivation of the current research. We, in particular, examine associations dependent on political ideology. Across both a large-scale analysis of Twitter posts (N = 959,393) and controlled survey research (N = 487), we find that cryptocurrency is currently best understood as being more strongly linked to conservative vs. liberal moral foundations. Cryptocurrency-related posts were more likely to express conservative moral foundations (Authority, Purity, and Loyalty) rather than liberal moral foundations (Fairness and Care), and individual endorsement of these conservative moral foundations was associated with increased interest in crypto investment.

Structural balance theory assumes triads in networks to gravitate toward stable configurations. The theory has been verified for undirected graphs. Since real-world social networks are often directed, we introduce a novel method for considering both transitivity and sign consistency for calculating balance in signed digraphs. We test our approach on graphs that we constructed by using different methods for identifying edge signs: natural language processing to infer signs from underlying text data, and self-reported survey data. Our results show that for various social contexts and edge sign detection methods, balance is moderately high, ranging from 61% to 96%. This paper makes three contributions: First, we extend the theory of structural balance to include signed digraphs where both transitivity and sign consistency are required and considered for calculating balance in triads with signed and directed edges. This improves the modeling of communication networks and other organizational networks where ties might be directed. Second, we show how to construct and analyze email networks from unstructured text data, using natural language processing methods to infer two different types of edge signs from emails authored by nodes. Third, we empirically assess balance in two different and contemporary contexts, namely remote communication in two business organizations, and team-based interactions in a virtual environment. We find empirical evidence in support of structural balance theory across these contexts.

People vary on their desire for strict norms, and the moral underpinnings of these differences have yet to be explored. The current research examined whether and how moral beliefs held by individuals would affect the extent to which they want their country to be tight (i.e., having strict social norms) or loose (i.e., having more permissive social norms). In particular, the effects of the "binding" and "individualizing" foundations, which are moral beliefs focused on the importance of groups and individuals, respectively, were examined. We hypothesized that the binding foundations could predict people's desire for cultural tightness. We also hypothesized that the perception that one's society is threatened may drive this effect. Three studies were conducted using both cross-sectional (Studies 1 and 3) and two-wave (Study 2) designs. Demographic variables and participants' political orientation effects were controlled. In Study 1, only the binding foundations significantly predicted higher desired tightness. In Study 2, binding foundations predicted desired tightness measured at follow-up. In Study 3, the positive effect of perceived threat on desired tightness via the binding foundations was confirmed. From additional within-paper analyses we also have some evidence of significant relationships, albeit unstable across studies, between desired tightness and individualizing foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic has become highly politicized and highly moralized. The current study explored whether participants' (N = 118) endorsements of binding (promoting group cohesion) versus individualizing (promoting care for individuals) moral foundations explained partisan differences in views and behaviors regarding COVID-19. Participants completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire before they indicated how morally permissible they thought it was to violate COVID-19 mandates, report others' violations, or not get vaccinated. Additionally, they indicated their own prevention behaviors. Results show that endorsement of both individualizing and binding foundations explain partisan differences in moral permissibility ratings. Political conservatism predicted greater endorsement of binding foundations which in turn predicted seeing COVID-19 violations and not getting vaccinated as more morally permissible, and predicted fewer self-reported prevention behaviors. Endorsement of individualizing foundations predicted seeing violations as less morally permissible and reporting others' violations as more morally permissible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People vary on their desire for strict norms, and the moral underpinnings of these differences have yet to be explored. The current research examined whether and how moral beliefs held by individuals would affect the extent to which they want their country to be tight (i.e., having strict social norms) or loose (i.e., having more permissive social norms). In particular, the effects of the “binding” and “individualizing” foundations, which are moral beliefs focused on the importance of groups and individuals, respectively, were examined. We hypothesized that the binding foundations could predict people’s desire for cultural tightness. We also hypothesized that the perception that one’s society is threatened may drive this effect. Three studies were conducted using both cross-sectional (Studies 1 and 3) and two-wave (Study 2) designs. Demographic variables and participants’ political orientation effects were controlled. In Study 1, only the binding foundations significantly predicted higher desired tightness. In Study 2, binding foundations predicted desired tightness measured at follow-up. In Study 3, the positive effect of perceived threat on desired tightness via the binding foundations was confirmed. From additional within-paper analyses we also have some evidence of significant relationships, albeit unstable across studies, between desired tightness and individualizing foundations.

In the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic has become highly politicized and highly moralized. The current study explored whether participants’ (N = 118) endorsements of binding (promoting group cohesion) versus individualizing (promoting care for individuals) moral foundations explained partisan differences in views and behaviors regarding COVID-19. Participants completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire before they indicated how morally permissible they thought it was to violate COVID-19 mandates, report others’ violations, or not get vaccinated. Additionally, they indicated their own prevention behaviors. Results show that endorsement of both individualizing and binding foundations explain partisan differences in moral permissibility ratings. Political conservatism predicted greater endorsement of binding foundations which in turn predicted seeing COVID-19 violations and not getting vaccinated as more morally permissible, and predicted fewer self-reported prevention behaviors. Endorsement of individualizing foundations predicted seeing violations as less morally permissible and reporting others’ violations as more morally permissible.

The present study aims to extend research on the role of values for the perceived legitimacy of legal authorities by focusing on (1) supranational legal authorities and (2) a broad range of values. We examine how (alignment between) people’s personal values and their perception of the values of the European Union (EU) are related to perceived legitimacy of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the EU more broadly. Inspired by moral foundations theory, we distinguish between individualizing (i.e., “democracy”, “liberty”, and “fairness”) and binding values (i.e., “rule of law”, “respect for national authority”, and “respect for tradition”). An online survey was conducted in six EU member states (N = 1,136). A factor analysis confirmed a two-factor model (individualizing vs. binding values) for both personal values and perceived EU values. Four regression models were run for each of the value factors, including personal values, perceived EU values, and their interaction, on each of the outcomes (i.e., perceived CJEU and EU legitimacy). Perceived endorsement by the EU of both individualizing and binding values predicted higher legitimacy perceptions of the CJEU and EU. Furthermore, personal binding values had a negative effect on perceived EU legitimacy when participants perceived the EU to weakly support binding values, but a positive effect when the EU was perceived to strongly support binding values. The results suggest that value alignment plays an important role in perceived legitimacy of the CJEU and EU, and that better representing binding values might be a strategy to improve perceived EU legitimacy.

The present study aims to extend research on the role of values for the perceived legitimacy of legal authorities by focusing on (1) supranational legal authorities and (2) a broad range of values. We examine how (alignment between) people's personal values and their perception of the values of the European Union (EU) are related to perceived legitimacy of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the EU more broadly. Inspired by moral foundations theory, we distinguish between individualizing (i.e., "democracy", "liberty", and "fairness") and binding values (i.e., "rule of law", "respect for national authority", and "respect for tradition"). An online survey was conducted in six EU member states (N = 1,136). A factor analysis confirmed a two-factor model (individualizing vs. binding values) for both personal values and perceived EU values. Four regression models were run for each of the value factors, including personal values, perceived EU values, and their interaction, on each of the outcomes (i.e., perceived CJEU and EU legitimacy). Perceived endorsement by the EU of both individualizing and binding values predicted higher legitimacy perceptions of the CJEU and EU. Furthermore, personal binding values had a negative effect on perceived EU legitimacy when participants perceived the EU to weakly support binding values, but a positive effect when the EU was perceived to strongly support binding values. The results suggest that value alignment plays an important role in perceived legitimacy of the CJEU and EU, and that better representing binding values might be a strategy to improve perceived EU legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior work has suggested that existential threats in the form of terror attacks may shift liberals’ reliance on moral foundations to more resemble those of conservatives. We therefore hypothesized that endorsement of these moral foundations would have increased when the COVID-19 epidemic became a salient threat. To examine this hypothesis we conducted a longitudinal study with 237 American participants across the liberal-conservative spectrum, in which their endorsement of various moral foundations were measured before and after the advent of the pandemic. We did not find evidence of any systematic change in the endorsement of any moral foundation, neither in general nor specifically among liberals or specifically among those who perceived the greatest threat from COVID-19. We conclude that the threat from the pandemic does not seem to have had any substantial effect on the moral foundations that people rely on. We discuss how this finding relates to other longitudinal studies of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on measures related to conservatism.

Frames—discursive structures that make dimensions of a situation more or less salient—are understood to influence how people understand novel technologies. As technological agents are increasingly integrated into society, it becomes important to discover how native understandings (i.e., individual frames) of social robots are associated with how they are characterized by media, technology developers, and even the agents themselves (i.e., produced frames). Moreover, these individual and produced frames may influence the ways in which people see social robots as legitimate and trustworthy agents—especially in the face of (im)moral behavior. This three-study investigation begins to address this knowledge gap by 1) identifying individually held frames for explaining an android’s (im)moral behavior, and experimentally testing how produced frames prime judgments about an android’s morally ambiguous behavior in 2) mediated representations and 3) face-to-face exposures. Results indicate that people rely on discernible ground rules to explain social robot behaviors; these frames induced only limited effects on responsibility judgments of that robot’s morally ambiguous behavior. Evidence also suggests that technophobia-induced reactance may move people to reject a produced frame in favor of a divergent individual frame.

Prior work has suggested that existential threats in the form of terror attacks may shift liberals' reliance on moral foundations to more resemble those of conservatives. We therefore hypothesized that endorsement of these moral foundations would have increased when the COVID-19 epidemic became a salient threat. To examine this hypothesis we conducted a longitudinal study with 237 American participants across the liberal-conservative spectrum, in which their endorsement of various moral foundations were measured before and after the advent of the pandemic. We did not find evidence of any systematic change in the endorsement of any moral foundation, neither in general nor specifically among liberals or specifically among those who perceived the greatest threat from COVID-19. We conclude that the threat from the pandemic does not seem to have had any substantial effect on the moral foundations that people rely on. We discuss how this finding relates to other longitudinal studies of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on measures related to conservatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral foundations research suggests that liberals care about moral values related to individual rights such as harm and fairness, while conservatives care about those foundations in addition to caring more about group rights such as loyalty, authority, and purity. However, the question remains about how conservatives and liberals differ in relation to group-level moral principles. We used two versions of the moral foundations questionnaire with the target group being either abstract or specific ingroups or outgroups. Across three studies, we observed that liberals showed more endorsement of Individualizing foundations (Harm and Fairness foundations) with an outgroup target, while conservatives showed more endorsement of Binding foundations (Loyalty, Authority, and Purity foundations) with an ingroup target. This general pattern was found when the framed, target-group was abstract (i.e., ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’ in Study 1) and when target groups were specified about a general British-ingroup and an immigrant-outgroup (Studies 2 and 3). In Studies 2 and 3, both Individualizing-Ingroup Preference and Binding-Ingroup Preference scores predicted more Attitude Bias and more Negative Attitude Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), more Implicit Bias (Study 3), and more Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). We also demonstrated that increasing liberalism was associated with less Attitude Bias and less Negative Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), less Implicit Bias (Study 3), and less Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). Outgroup-individualizing foundations and Ingroup-Binding foundations showed different patterns of mediation of these effects.

People often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It is unfair if homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals marry is against our traditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.

Moral foundations research suggests that liberals care about moral values related to individual rights such as harm and fairness, while conservatives care about those foundations in addition to caring more about group rights such as loyalty, authority, and purity. However, the question remains about how conservatives and liberals differ in relation to group-level moral principles. We used two versions of the moral foundations questionnaire with the target group being either abstract or specific ingroups or outgroups. Across three studies, we observed that liberals showed more endorsement of Individualizing foundations (Harm and Fairness foundations) with an outgroup target, while conservatives showed more endorsement of Binding foundations (Loyalty, Authority, and Purity foundations) with an ingroup target. This general pattern was found when the framed, target-group was abstract (i.e., 'ingroups' and 'outgroups' in Study 1) and when target groups were specified about a general British-ingroup and an immigrant-outgroup (Studies 2 and 3). In Studies 2 and 3, both Individualizing-Ingroup Preference and Binding-Ingroup Preference scores predicted more Attitude Bias and more Negative Attitude Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), more Implicit Bias (Study 3), and more Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). We also demonstrated that increasing liberalism was associated with less Attitude Bias and less Negative Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), less Implicit Bias (Study 3), and less Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). Outgroup-individualizing foundations and Ingroup-Binding foundations showed different patterns of mediation of these effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., "It is unfair if homosexuals are not allowed to marry!" vs. "Letting homosexuals marry is against our traditions !"). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this study is to explore and to verify the utility of the five moral foundations (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity) to differentiate between two understudied groups, namely, young offenders who use violence against their parents or dating partners, as well as to predict the extent to which these young people justify violence and perceive themselves as aggressive. Although both types of violence imply, by definition, harming someone (low care) and adopting a position of authority (high authority), we hypothesize a very different role for at least these two moral foundations. Our results support this idea and show a much lower regard for the five moral foundations, including care and authority, in the child-to-parent violence group (CPV; N = 65) than in the dating violence group (DV; N = 69). Additionally, the authority foundation was able to increase the effectiveness of correctly classifying the participants in one group or the other by 29%. Finally, care and authority, along with fairness, served to predict justification of violence and self-perceived aggressiveness. The moral foundations approach provides preliminary evidence to better understand two specific types of youth violence and extract preventive educational and treatment strategies.

The objective of this study is to explore and to verify the utility of the five moral foundations (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity) to differentiate between two understudied groups, namely, young offenders who use violence against their parents or dating partners, as well as to predict the extent to which these young people justify violence and perceive themselves as aggressive. Although both types of violence imply, by definition, harming someone (low care) and adopting a position of authority (high authority), we hypothesize a very different role for at least these two moral foundations. Our results support this idea and show a much lower regard for the five moral foundations, including care and authority, in the child-to-parent violence group (CPV; N = 65) than in the dating violence group (DV; N = 69). Additionally, the authority foundation was able to increase the effectiveness of correctly classifying the participants in one group or the other by 29%. Finally, care and authority, along with fairness, served to predict justification of violence and self-perceived aggressiveness. The moral foundations approach provides preliminary evidence to better understand two specific types of youth violence and extract preventive educational and treatment strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have found that “disgust-sensitive” individuals have negative attitudes toward gay and lesbian people, but the underlying mechanisms for such attitudes remain unclear. Based on moral foundations theory, the current paper assumes that the relationship between disgust sensitivity and attitudes toward homosexuality are mediated by moral foundations. In order to test this assumption, the current authors examined the questionnaire answers from a total of 452 Chinese undergraduates who participated in this study. The results showed that disgust sensitivity was positively correlated with negative attitudes toward homosexuality, and positively correlated with moral concerns in five domains (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity). Authority and sanctity were both associated with attitudes toward homosexuality, while only sanctity mediated the relationship between disgust sensitivity and attitudes toward homosexuality. Overall, the results suggest that considering moral foundations (especially sanctity) may lend more insight to the associations between disgust sensitivity and negative attitudes toward gay and lesbian people.

Previous studies have found that "disgust-sensitive" individuals have negative attitudes toward gay and lesbian people, but the underlying mechanisms for such attitudes remain unclear. Based on moral foundations theory, the current paper assumes that the relationship between disgust sensitivity and attitudes toward homosexuality are mediated by moral foundations. In order to test this assumption, the current authors examined the questionnaire answers from a total of 452 Chinese undergraduates who participated in this study. The results showed that disgust sensitivity was positively correlated with negative attitudes toward homosexuality, and positively correlated with moral concerns in five domains (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity). Authority and sanctity were both associated with attitudes toward homosexuality, while only sanctity mediated the relationship between disgust sensitivity and attitudes toward homosexuality. Overall, the results suggest that considering moral foundations (especially sanctity) may lend more insight to the associations between disgust sensitivity and negative attitudes toward gay and lesbian people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Online advertising is an important tool that can be utilized by charities to elicit attention and funding. A critical examination of advertisement strategies is thus necessary to increase the efficacy of fundraising efforts. Previous studies have shown that individuals’ moral views and perceptions of social norms can play important roles in charitable behavior. Thus, the current protocol describes a study to examine whether framing charitable advertisements in line with participants’ morality and increasing the salience of descriptive social norms increases subsequent charitable behavior. We describe experimental, online methods, whereby participants are provided with a framed call-to-action and normative information within a custom-developed application or existing survey platform. Furthermore, in the exploratory fashion, we discuss the possibility of collecting participants’ Facebook data and predicting moral profiles from this data. If there is an increased rate of donations as a result of moral compatibility and/or increased norm salience, charities can leverage this knowledge to increase the donations by tailoring their campaigns in a more appealing way for their prospective donors. Moreover, if it turns out to be possible to predict one’s moral profile from Facebook footprints, charities can use this knowledge to find and target people that are more likely to support their cause. However, this introduces important ethical questions that are discussed within this protocol.

Within an agent-based model where moral classifications are socially learned, we ask if a population of agents behaves in a way that may be compared with conservative or liberal positions in the real political spectrum. We assume that agents first experience a formative period, in which they adjust their learning style acting as supervised Bayesian adaptive learners. The formative phase is followed by a period of social influence by reinforcement learning. By comparing data generated by the agents with data from a sample of 15000 Moral Foundation questionnaires we found the following. 1. The number of information exchanges in the formative phase correlates positively with statistics identifying liberals in the social influence phase. This is consistent with recent evidence that connects the dopamine receptor D4-7R gene, political orientation and early age social clique size. 2. The learning algorithms that result from the formative phase vary in the way they treat novelty and corroborative information with more conservative-like agents treating it more equally than liberal-like agents. This is consistent with the correlation between political affiliation and the Openness personality trait reported in the literature. 3. Under the increase of a model parameter interpreted as an external pressure, the statistics of liberal agents resemble more those of conservative agents, consistent with reports on the consequences of external threats on measures of conservatism. We also show that in the social influence phase liberal-like agents readapt much faster than conservative-like agents when subjected to changes on the relevant set of moral issues. This suggests a verifiable dynamical criterium for attaching liberal or conservative labels to groups.