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Adults diagnosed with autism experience difficulties with understanding the mental states of others, or themselves (mentalizing) and with adequately sequencing personal stories (narrative coherence). Given that the posterior cerebellum is implicated in both skills, as well as in the etiology of autism, we developed a narrative sequencing and mentalizing training for autistic adults. Participants with an official autism diagnosis were randomly assigned to a Training group (n = 17) or a waiting-list Control group (n = 15). The Training group took part in six weekly sessions in groups of three participants lasting each about 60 min. During training, participants had to (re)tell stories from the perspective of the original storyteller and answer questions that required mentalizing. We found significant improvements in mentalizing about others’ beliefs and in narrative coherence for the Training group compared to the Control group immediately after the training compared to before the training. Almost all participants from the Training group expressed beneficial effects of the training on their mood and half of the participants reported positive effects on their self-confidence in social situations. All participants recommended the current training to others. Results are discussed in light of cerebellar theories on sequencing of social actions during mentalizing. Further improvements to the program are suggested. Our results highlight the potential clinical utility of adopting a neuroscience-informed approach to developing novel therapeutic interventions for autistic populations.

To investigate whether people can implicitly learn regularities in a social context, we developed a new implicit sequence learning task combining elements from classic false belief and serial reaction time tasks. Participants learned that protagonists were offered flowers at four locations. The protagonists' beliefs concerning the flowers were true or false, depending on their orientation, respectively, toward the scene (so that the flowers could be seen) or away from it. Unbeknown to the participants, there was a fixed belief-related sequence involving three dimensions (identity of the two protagonists, true-false belief orientation held by the protagonists, and flower location as believed by the protagonists). Participants had to indicate as fast as possible where the flowers were located (Experiment 1), or how many flowers were given (Experiment 2) according to the protagonists. Experiment 1 combined perceptual and motor processes (as both the belief-related sequence and motor responses referred to location), whereas Experiment 2 unconfounded the sequence and motor responses, allowing to investigate pure perceptual implicit learning. For reasons of comparison, two non-social conditions were created in Experiment 2 by replacing the protagonists with two non-social objects—colored cameras or shapes. Results revealed significant implicit sequence learning of all belief-related dimensions in Experiment 1, and of true-false belief orientation in Experiment 2, even without a motor confound. Importantly, there were faster reaction times and stronger sequence learning effects in the social than in the non-social conditions. The present findings demonstrate for the first time that people are able to implicitly learn belief-related sequences.