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Introduction: Hypoxia due to reduced partial pressure of oxygen from highaltitude exposure affects the cognitive function of high-altitude migrants. Executive function is an important component of human cognitive function, characterized by high oxygen consumption during activity, and its level can be measured using cognitive control capacity (CCC). In addition, there is evidence for the potential value of hyperbaric oxygen (HBO) interventions in improving cognitive decline on the plateau. Therefore, the objective of this study was to investigate the effect of long-term high-altitude exposure on CCC in highaltitude newcomers and whether hyperbaric oxygen intervention has an ameliorative effect. Methods: This study measured the magnitude of participants' CCC using a Backward Masking Majority Function Task (MFT-M). Study 1 was a controlled study of different altitude conditions, with 64 participants in the high-altitude newcomer group and 64 participants in the low-altitude resident group, each completing the MFT-M task once. Study 2 was a controlled HBO intervention study in which newcomers who had lived at a high altitude for 2 years were randomly divided into the HBO group (n = 28) and control group (n = 28). 15 times hyperbaric oxygen interventions were performed in the HBO group. Subjects in both groups completed the MFT-M task once before and once after the intervention. Results: Study 1 showed that CCC was significantly higher in the low-altitude resident group than in the high-altitude newcomer group (p = 0.031). Study 2 showed that the CCC in the HBO group was significantly higher after 15 hyperbaric interventions than before (p = 0.005), while there was no significant difference in the control group (p = 0.972). The HBO group had significantly higher correct task rates than the control group after the intervention (p = 0.001). Conclusion: This study confirms that long-term high-altitude exposure leads to impairment of CCC in high-altitude newcomers and that hyperbaric oxygen intervention is effective in improving CCC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subthreshold Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is defined as a neurobiological condition with some core inattentive or hyperactive/impulsive symptoms of ADHD which do not meet the full diagnosis clinically. Although it has been well documented that deficits in cognitive control, a high-level cognitive construct closely related to attention, are frequently found among children with ADHD, whether subthreshold ADHD is also associated with similar deficits remains unclear. In this study, we examined the attention functions and the cognitive control capacity (CCC) in children with ADHD (n = 39), those with subthreshold ADHD (n = 34), and typically developing peers (TD, n = 36). The results showed that the ADHD and subthreshold ADHD groups exhibited similar patterns of the impaired executive function of attention (revealed as an augment in flanker conflict effect) and reduced cognitive control capacity, and no significant difference was found between the two groups. These findings suggest that although children with subthreshold ADHD have not met the full criteria of ADHD, they showed reduced efficiency in cognitive control and attention function, similar to children with ADHD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subthreshold Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is defined as a neurobiological condition with some core inattentive or hyperactive/impulsive symptoms of ADHD which do not meet the full diagnosis clinically. Although it has been well documented that deficits in cognitive control, a high-level cognitive construct closely related to attention, are frequently found among children with ADHD, whether subthreshold ADHD is also associated with similar deficits remains unclear. In this study, we examined the attention functions and the cognitive control capacity (CCC) in children with ADHD (n = 39), those with subthreshold ADHD (n = 34), and typically developing peers (TD, n = 36). The results showed that the ADHD and subthreshold ADHD groups exhibited similar patterns of the impaired executive function of attention (revealed as an augment in flanker conflict effect) and reduced cognitive control capacity, and no significant difference was found between the two groups. These findings suggest that although children with subthreshold ADHD have not met the full criteria of ADHD, they showed reduced efficiency in cognitive control and attention function, similar to children with ADHD.

Paradoxically, some individuals who experience pathological worry also have good capacity for top-down control over their thoughts. Why such individuals would nevertheless worry excessively remains unclear. One explanation is suggested by research showing that those experiencing pathological worry are set apart from healthy controls by their beliefs that worry has utility and that effective worrying requires them to consider all possibilities before terminating a worry bout. This suggests that worriers with good capacity for cognitive control may engage in prolonged worry because they believe it is adaptive to do so. In a sample of 109 college students, among whom individuals reporting pathological worry were overrepresented, we tested this hypothesis using an objective index of top-down control capacity (i.e., resting vagally mediated heart rate variability [vmHRV]) and self-report measures of beliefs about worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptom severity/status. As predicted, GAD symptom severity and vmHRV interacted to predict beliefs about worry. Specifically, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with beliefs that worry has utility at higher levels of vmHRV. Furthermore, this pattern was mostly a function of the belief that worry serves to distract the worrier from more emotional things. Similarly, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with endorsement of an ‘as many as can’ (AMAC) problem-solving rule when vmHRV was high. From the opposite perspective, both worry utility beliefs and AMAC rule endorsement were associated with the highest GAD symptom severity at higher levels of vmHRV. This was also true for the belief that worry distracts from more emotional things predicting analog GAD status. These results suggest that worriers who have higher levels of top-down control capacity may initiate and persist in worry, at least initially, because they value it. However, why they nevertheless rate their worry as excessive and uncontrollable is an important question for future research.

Paradoxically, some individuals who experience pathological worry also have good capacity for top-down control over their thoughts. Why such individuals would nevertheless worry excessively remains unclear. One explanation is suggested by research showing that those experiencing pathological worry are set apart from healthy controls by their beliefs that worry has utility and that effective worrying requires them to consider all possibilities before terminating a worry bout. This suggests that worriers with good capacity for cognitive control may engage in prolonged worry because they believe it is adaptive to do so. In a sample of 109 college students, among whom individuals reporting pathological worry were overrepresented, we tested this hypothesis using an objective index of top-down control capacity (i.e., resting vagally mediated heart rate variability [vmHRV]) and self-report measures of beliefs about worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptom severity/status. As predicted, GAD symptom severity and vmHRV interacted to predict beliefs about worry. Specifically, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with beliefs that worry has utility at higher levels of vmHRV. Furthermore, this pattern was mostly a function of the belief that worry serves to distract the worrier from more emotional things. Similarly, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with endorsement of an 'as many as can' (AMAC) problem-solving rule when vmHRV was high. From the opposite perspective, both worry utility beliefs and AMAC rule endorsement were associated with the highest GAD symptom severity at higher levels of vmHRV. This was also true for the belief that worry distracts from more emotional things predicting analog GAD status. These results suggest that worriers who have higher levels of top-down control capacity may initiate and persist in worry, at least initially, because they value it. However, why they nevertheless rate their worry as excessive and uncontrollable is an important question for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One puzzle in high worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is the heterogeneity in the level of autonomic arousal symptoms seen among affected individuals. While current models agree that worry persists, in part, because it fosters avoidance of unpleasant internal experiences, they disagree as to whether worry does so by suppressing activation of autonomic arousal or by fostering persistent autonomic hyperarousal. Our Cognitive Control Model predicts that which pattern of autonomic arousal occurs depends on whether or not a worrier has sufficient cognitive control capacity to worry primarily in a verbal versus imagery-based manner. Because this model has been supported by only one study to date, the present study sought to replicate and extend that study's findings. Results from an online survey in an unselected sample of over 900 college students provide further support for our model's central tenet and initial support for its prediction that higher effortful control is associated with a higher percentage of verbal thought during worry. Finally, we report tentative evidence that autonomic arousal symptoms in worry and GAD vary as a function of individual differences in cognitive control capacity because higher capacity is linked to a greater predominance of verbal thought during worry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]