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1. Legally Fair Contract Signing Without Keystones

Author

Diana Maimuț, David Pointcheval, David Naccache, Rémi Géraud, Houda Ferradi, Laboratoire d'informatique de l'école normale supérieure (LIENS), Département d'informatique - ENS Paris (DI-ENS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Ingenico Group S.A., Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities (CASCADE), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Mark Manulis, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Steve Schneider, ANR-12-INSE-0014,SIMPATIC,SIM et théorie des couplages pour la sécurité de l'information et des communications(2012), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Département d'informatique de l'École normale supérieure (DI-ENS), and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)

Subjects
Computer science, business.industry, Internet privacy, 0102 computer and information sciences, 02 engineering and technology, Computer security model, Trusted third party, 16. Peace & justice, Computer security, computer.software_genre, 01 natural sciences, Cheque, Random oracle, [INFO.INFO-CR]Computer Science [cs]/Cryptography and Security [cs.CR], Digital signature, 010201 computation theory & mathematics, Discrete logarithm, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing, business, computer
Abstract

International audience; In two-party computation, achieving both fairness and guaranteed output delivery is well known to be impossible. Despite this limitation , many approaches provide solutions of practical interest by weakening somewhat the fairness requirement. Such approaches fall roughly in three categories: " gradual release " schemes assume that the aggrieved party can eventually reconstruct the missing information; " optimistic schemes " assume a trusted third party arbitrator that can restore fairness in case of litigation; and " concurrent " or " legally fair " schemes in which a breach of fairness is compensated by the aggrieved party having a digitally signed cheque from the other party (called the keystone). In this paper we describe and analyse a new contract signing paradigm that doesn't require keystones to achieve legal fairness, and give a concrete construction based on Schnorr signatures which is compatible with standard Schnorr signatures and provably secure.

Published
2016
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2. From Selective to Full Security: Semi-Generic Transformations in the Standard Model

Author

Michel Abdalla, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Dario Fiore, Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities (CASCADE), Département d'informatique de l'École normale supérieure (DI-ENS), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Laboratoire d'informatique de l'école normale supérieure (LIENS), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institute IMDEA Software [Madrid], Marc Fischlin and Johannes Buchmann and Mark Manulis, Département d'informatique - ENS Paris (DI-ENS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Scheme (programming language), Theoretical computer science, business.industry, Hash function, 0102 computer and information sciences, 02 engineering and technology, Encryption, 01 natural sciences, Identity (music), Random oracle, Memory leak, [INFO.INFO-CR]Computer Science [cs]/Cryptography and Security [cs.CR], Transformation (function), 010201 computation theory & mathematics, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing, business, computer, Mathematics, computer.programming_language, Standard model (cryptography)
Abstract

International audience; In this paper, we propose an efficient, standard model, semigeneric transformation of selective-secure (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption schemes into fully secure ones. The main step is a procedure that uses admissible hash functions (whose existence is implied by collision-resistant hash functions) to convert any selective-secure wildcarded identity-based encryption (WIBE) scheme into a fully secure (H)IBE scheme. Since building a selective-secureWIBE, especially with a selective-secure HIBE already in hand, is usually much less involved than directly building a fully secure HIBE, this transform already significantly simplifies the latter task. This black-box transformation easily extends to schemes secure in the Continual Memory Leakage (CML) model of Brakerski et al. (FOCS 2010), which allows us obtain a new fully secure IBE in that model. We furthermore show that if a selective-secure HIBE scheme satisfies a particular security notion, then it can be generically transformed into a selective-secure WIBE. We demonstrate that several current schemes already fit this new definition, while some others that do not obviously satisfy it can still be easily modified into a selective-secure WIBE.

Published
2012
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3. Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

Author

David Pointcheval, Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities (CASCADE), Département d'informatique - ENS Paris (DI-ENS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Marc Fischlin and Johannes Buchmann and Mark Manulis, Département d'informatique de l'École normale supérieure (DI-ENS), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL)

Subjects
Password, 0303 health sciences, Authentication, Encrypted key exchange, Dictionary attack, Strong key, Computer science, Group setting, 02 engineering and technology, Computer security, computer.software_genre, Authenticated Key Exchange, 03 medical and health sciences, [INFO.INFO-CR]Computer Science [cs]/Cryptography and Security [cs.CR], 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing, computer, 030304 developmental biology
Abstract

International audience; Authenticated Key Exchange protocols enable several parties to establish a shared cryptographically strong key over an insecure network using various authentication means, such as strong cryptographic keys or short (i.e., low-entropy) common secrets. The latter example is definitely the most interesting in practice, since no additional device is required, but just a human-memorable password, for authenticating the players. After the seminal work by Bellovin and Merritt, many settings and security notions have been defined, and many protocols have been proposed, in the two-user setting and in the group setting.

Published
2012
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