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14 results on '"beauty contest"'

1. Central Bank Transparency with (semi-)public Information: Laboratory Experiments

Author

Emna Trabelsi, Walid Hichri, Université de Tunis, Université de Sousse, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)

Subjects
040101 forestry, Economics and Econometrics, Public information, 050208 finance, Transparency (market), Computer science, 05 social sciences, General Social Sciences, Social Welfare, 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences, Semi public, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Beauty contest, Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, Central bank, Nash equilibrium, 0502 economics and business, symbols, 0401 agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, Public disclosure, Applied Psychology, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
Abstract

Strategies of public announcements pose challenges to central banks. Theory shows that full transparency is not always good. In this paper, we propose to assess two forms of partial public disclosure by central banks (“fragmented information” and “partially hidden information” strategies) in two beauty contest games, as well as a scenario where public information is fully disclosed. Based on laboratory experiments, we offer original evidence that the “fragmented information” strategy outperforms the “partially hidden information” strategy in terms of social welfare, as central banks can better control the mean squared distance of agents’ actions from the true state of fundamentals (i.e., Mean squared action error) and the dispersion of agents’ behavior with “fragmented information”, while both partial transparency strategies similarly alleviate agents’ overreaction to fully disclosed public information. We also find that divergence from the Nash equilibrium emphasizes heterogeneity of behavior that is entailed by boundedly rational reasoning, especially in early periods of a game. Further, we build on choice reinforcement and belief-based learning models to better understand how subjects learn over time to improve their performance. How well those learning models fit the data depends on the game played by the subjects.

Published
2021
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2. The social value of information and the competition motive: price versus quantity games

Author

Camille Cornand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), AgroParisTech-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar (Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA))-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), and ANR-11-IDEX-0007,Avenir L.S.E.,PROJET AVENIR LYON SAINT-ETIENNE(2011)

Subjects
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, Strategic substitutability and complementarity, Economics and Econometrics, Bridging (networking), Substitutability, Social Welfare, Profit (economics), Value of information, Microeconomics, (Anti-)coordination, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Beauty contest, 050207 economics, Private information retrieval, Industrial organization, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 050205 econometrics, Competition, Public and private information, 05 social sciences, Perfect information, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Imperfect, Team, Public finance, Price and quantity competition
Abstract

International audience; We propose a unified framework bridging the gap between team and competition issues in price and quantity games, played by producers of either substitutes or complements, when information is imperfect and dispersed. We reconsider the social value of private and public information in this context and compare the outcomes of the two types of games in terms of equilibrium and social welfare. By parting with full cooperation, the competition motive fitted into the payoffs introduces a strategy distortion and, when information is dispersed, an informational distortion, both increasing with the intensity of competition. The former affects the response to the expected value of the fundamental, and the latter translates into an inefficiently low (high) weight on public information under strategic complementarity (substitutability). Contrary to the latter, which vanishes in the absence of the competition motive, the former is eliminated, under strategic complementarity and dispersed information, at some positive strength of the competition motive, decreasing with the information quality. This disparity creates a trade-off between the minimization of each distortion. As to the social value of public information, it is always positive, while that of private information may be negative, again under strategic complementarity, if competition is intense and the quality of private information relatively poor. Finally, it is more profitable to play under strategic substitutability, except possibly for an intermediate range of the intensity of competition if the quality of private information is again relatively poor.

Published
2020
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3. The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games

Author

Yukio Koriyama, Angela Sutan, Marc Willinger, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG), Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) (UNS), COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA), Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO), École polytechnique (X), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), CODIREM, ANR-15-ORAR-0004,BEAM,Analyses comportementales et exp?rimentales en macro-finance(2015), ANR-11-LABX-0047,ECODEC,Réguler l'économie au service de la société(2011), ANR-15-IDEX-0001,UCA JEDI,Idex UCA JEDI(2015), Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), ANR: BEAM,ANR-15-ORAR-0004, ANR: 11-LABX-0047,ECODEC,Réguler l'économie au service de la société(2011), ANR: 15-IDEX-0001,UCA JEDI,Idex UCA JEDI(2015), and Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, strategic complementarity, Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, Environment effect, 0502 economics and business, Economics, strategic substitutability, iterative reasoning, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, 050207 economics, Robustness (economics), 050205 econometrics, Strategic complements, Welfare economics, 05 social sciences, Nominal rigidity, Rational agent, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Beauty contest, Nash equilibrium, symbols, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, Finance, beauty contest games
Abstract

Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly morefrom the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This "strategic environment effect" offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment effect, and we use both theory and experiments to shed light on its effectiveness. Based on cognitive hierarchy and level-K models, we show theoretically that the effect is operative for interactions among three or more agents. Our experimental results show a statistically significant strategic environment effect for groups of five or more agents, establishing its robustness against the increase in the population size. Our results bolster other experimental ndings on the strategic environment effects that are relevant for macroeconomic issues such as price fluctuations and nominal rigidity.

Published
2018
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4. Speculation rather than enterprise? Keynes' beauty contest revisited in theory and experiment

Author

Boun My, Kene, Cornand, Camille, dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR-12-FRAL-0013,StabEX,Stabilisation des chocs macroéconomiques: Expériences sur l'interaction entre banque centrale et secteur privé(2012), ANR-11-IDEX-0007-02/11-LABX-0042,CORTEX,Construction, Fonction Cognitive et Réhabilitation du Cerveau(2011), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Dao, Taï, Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)

Subjects
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, dispersed information, coordination, experiment, beauty contest, public information, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E1 - General Aggregative Models/E.E1.E12 - Keynes • Keynesian • Post-Keynesian
Abstract

In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fundamental value and the conventional value expected to be set by the market. They thus respond to fundamental and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either being set exogenously. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a valuation game in which agents strategically choose how to weight each motive. This game emphasises public information leads agents to favour the coordination motive. Second, we test the game through a laboratory experiment. Subjects tend to conform to theoretical predictions, except when fundamental uncertainty is low relative to strategic uncertainty. Abstract In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fun

Published
2017

5. Speculation Rather than Enterprise ? Keyness Beauty Contest Revisited in Theory and Experiment

Author

Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Kene Boun My, Camille Cornand, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, Public information, 05 social sciences, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations, Beauty contest, Test (assessment), Dispersed information, Experiment, Coordination, 0502 economics and business, Value (economics), Economics, [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, 050207 economics, Laboratory experiment, Positive economics, Speculation, Set (psychology), JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E1 - General Aggregative Models/E.E1.E12 - Keynes • Keynesian • Post-Keynesian, 050205 econometrics, Valuation (finance)
Abstract

International audience; In Keynes’ beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fundamental value and the conventional value expected to be set by the market. They thus respond to fundamental and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either being set exogenously. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a valuation game in which agents strategically choose how to weight each motive. This game emphasises public information leads agents to favour the coordination motive. Second, we test the game through a laboratory experiment. Subjects tend to conform to theoretical predictions, except when fundamental uncertainty is low relative to strategic uncertainty.

Published
2017
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6. The social value of information and the competition motive: Price vs. quantity games

Author

Camille Cornand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE), Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines (ENS LSH)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, dispersed information, coordination, JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, anti-coordination, beauty contest, Perfect information, quantity game, Social Welfare, strategic complementarity, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Profit (economics), JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection, Value of information, Competition (economics), Microeconomics, Value (economics), Economics, strategic substitutability, public information, Distortion (economics), [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Private information retrieval, competition, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Abstract

We propose a unified framework bridging the gap between team and competition issues, in order to reconsider the social value of private and public information in price and quantity games under imperfect and dispersed information, and to compare the corresponding outcomes in terms of equilibrium and social welfare. The informational distortion associated with the competition motive may lead to a negative social value of private information and reverse the perfect information result in favor of strategic substitutability as the source of higher profit and social welfare. Abstract We propose a unified framework bridging the gap between team and competition issues, in order to reconsider the social value of private and public information in price and quantity games under imperfect and dispersed information, and to compare the corresponding outcomes in terms of equilibrium and social welfare. The informational distortion associated with the competition motive may lead to a negative social value of private information and reverse the perfect information result in favor of strategic substitutability as the source of higher profit and social welfare.

Published
2017

7. The predominant role of signals’ precision in experimental beauty contest

Author

Cornand, Camille, Baeriswyl, Romain, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Swiss National Bank, École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
heterogeneous information, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, experiment, beauty contest, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, public information, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
Abstract

International audience

Published
2016

8. The predominant role of signals’ precision

Author

Cornand, Camille, Baeriswyl, Romain, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Swiss National Bank, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
heterogeneous information, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, experiment, beauty contest, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, public information, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
Abstract

National audience

Published
2015

9. Playing the Game the others want to play: Keynes’ beauty contes

Author

Cornand, Camille, Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Dao, Taï

Subjects
JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E1 - General Aggregative Models, JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, beauty contest, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, strategic complementarities, financial markets, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E4 - Money and Interest Rates, oligopolistic competition, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, indeterminacy, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
Abstract

National audience

Published
2015

10. Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination

Author

Camille Cornand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Dao, Taï, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and AgroParisTech-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar (Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA))-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Subjects
coordination, Sociology and Political Science, JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, beauty contest, L21, cooperation, Duopoly with heterogeneous information, Oligopoly, Microeconomics, Competition (economics), Component (UML), 0502 economics and business, Economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Private information retrieval, Duopoly, General Psychology, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E1 - General Aggregative Models/E.E1.E12 - Keynes • Keynesian • Post-Keynesian, 050205 econometrics, L13, dispersed information, JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E4 - Money and Interest Rates/E.E4.E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy, 05 social sciences, Perfect information, General Social Sciences, dispersed information JEL codes: D43, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations, Beauty contest, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection, D82, differentiated duopoly, delegation game, public information, 050206 economic theory, Imperfect, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, beauty contest, competition, cooperation, coordination, differentiated duopoly, dispersed information, public information, competition
Abstract

International audience; The paper contribution is twofold. It introduces heterogeneous information in a strategic delegation game of a differentiated oligopoly with price competition and it thus provides a micro-founded illustration of a beauty contest, in which the relative weight put on the competition motive of the payoffs is not exogenous but may be manipulated by the players. The conflict between the competition and the fundamental motives, already present in an oligopolistic setting under perfect information, is exacerbated when information is dispersed. A conflict arises also in this case between the competition and the coordination motives, ending up in the undervalueing of public information. We show how firm owners ease these conflicts by opting for some cooperation, thus moderating the competitive toughness displayed by their managers. By doing so, they also enhance the managers' concern for coordination and consequently heighten the weight put on public relative to private information.

Published
2015
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11. The 2012 interferometric imaging beauty contest

Author

Ferréol Soulez, Karl Heinz Hofmann, Dieter Schertl, W. D. Cotton, David Mary, Peter R. Lawson, Florentin Millour, Sridharan Rengaswamy, G. Weigelt, Alicia Aarnio, Martin Vannier, John Young, John D. Monnier, Fabien Baron, S. T. Ridgway, Éric Thiébaut, Henrique R. Schmitt, N. M. Elias, Cavendish Laboratory, University of Cambridge [UK] (CAM), Max-Planck-Institut für Radioastronomie (MPIFR), Centre de Recherche Astrophysique de Lyon (CRAL), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS), Laboratoire Hippolyte Fizeau (FIZEAU), Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) (UNS), COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Observatoire de la Côte d'Azur, Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Joseph Louis LAGRANGE (LAGRANGE), Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) (UNS), COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Observatoire de la Côte d'Azur, Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) (UNS), and COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
aperture synthesis, [PHYS.ASTR.IM]Physics [physics]/Astrophysics [astro-ph]/Instrumentation and Methods for Astrophysic [astro-ph.IM], Computer science, FOS: Physical sciences, imaging, optical infrared interferometry, Astronomical software, CONTEST, 01 natural sciences, Beauty contest, [SDU.ASTR.IM]Sciences of the Universe [physics]/Astrophysics [astro-ph]/Instrumentation and Methods for Astrophysic [astro-ph.IM], 010309 optics, T Tauri star, Interferometric imaging, Computer graphics (images), 0103 physical sciences, closure phase, Red supergiant, Astrophysics - Instrumentation and Methods for Astrophysics, 010303 astronomy & astrophysics, Instrumentation and Methods for Astrophysics (astro-ph.IM)
Abstract

ISBN: 9780819491466; International audience; We present the results of the fifth Interferometric Imaging Beauty Contest. The contest consists in blind imaging of test data sets derived from model sources and distributed in the OIFITS format. Two scenarios of imaging with CHARA/MIRC-6T were offered for reconstruction: imaging a T Tauri disc and imaging a spotted red supergiant. There were eight different teams competing this time: Monnier with the software package MACIM; Hofmann, Schertl and Weigelt with IRS; Thiebaut and Soulez with MiRA ; Young with BSMEM; Mary and Vannier with MIROIRS; Millour and Vannier with independent BSMEM and MiRA entries; Rengaswamy with an original method; and Elias with the radio-astronomy package CASA. The contest model images, the data delivered to the contestants and the rules are described as well as the results of the image reconstruction obtained by each method. These results are discussed as well as the strengths and limitations of each algorithm.

Published
2012
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12. Committing to transparency to resist corruption

Author

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Frédéric Koessler, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), and Ce travail a bénéficié d'une aide de l'Etat gérée par l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche au titre du programme ' Investissements d'avenir ' portant la référence ANR-10-LABX-93-01. This work was supported by the French National Research Agency, through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10--LABX-93-01.

Subjects
competitive procedures, Economics and Econometrics, Transparency (market), media_common.quotation_subject, bribery, Commit, Development, commitment,bribery,competitive procedures,transparency, Microeconomics, Information asymmetry, 0502 economics and business, Economics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption, 050207 economics, 050205 econometrics, media_common, transparency, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D44 - Auctions, 05 social sciences, commitment, 16. Peace & justice, Discretion, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Beauty contest, Extortion, Incentive, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies/H.H5.H57 - Procurement, Profitability index
Abstract

This paper examines firms' incentives to commit to a transparent behavior (that precludes bribery) in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange of a bribe. It is shown that a conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption when it is pure extortion. Otherwise, when corruption can affect allocation and the market's profitability is small, a low quality firm may prefer not to commit. In that situation, the existence of a separating equilibrium in which only the high quality firms commit is guaranteed when commitment decisions are kept secret, but requires some conditions on firms' beliefs when commitment decisions are publicly announced. Generally, a unilateral commitment mechanism that rewards commitment with a bonus performs less well. A mechanism combining both conditional commitment and a bonus has the potential to fully eliminate corruption., Cet article examine les incitations des firmes à s'engager à une conduite transparente (qui exclue la corruption) dans des procédures compétitives gérées par un agent corrompu. Ces procédures sont modélisées comme un concours de beauté avec information asymétrique. L'agent a un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire dans l'évaluation des offres. Il peut favoriser une firme en échange d'un pot-de-vin. Nous montrons que l'engagement conditionnel peut éliminer la corruption lorsque celle-ci est de l'extorsion pure. Sinon, lorsque la corruption peut affecter l'allocation du contrat et que le marché est peu profitable, une firme de basse qualité peut préférer ne pas s'engager. Dans cette situation l'existence d'un équilibre séparateur où seules les firmes de haute qualité s'engagent est garantie si les décisions d'engagement sont gardées secrètes. Par contre si les décisions sont publiques des conditions supplémentaires deviennent nécessaires. Généralement, un mécanisme d'engagement unilatéral qui récompense la décision d'engagement avec un bonus est moins efficace en termes de réduction de la corruption. Finalement nous montrons qu'un mécanisme qui combine conditionnalité et bonus a le potentiel d'éliminer complètement la corruption.

Published
2010
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13. Raisonnement divinatoire en feedback négatif : une expérience

Author

Marc Willinger, Angela Sutan, Burgundy School of Business, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Control and Optimization, Strategic complements, STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES VS. STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS, Applied Mathematics, 05 social sciences, New variant, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, complex mixtures, Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Beauty contest, Negative feedback, 0502 economics and business, Line (geometry), Economics, 050207 economics, Rational expectations equilibrium, GUESSING GAMES, NEGATIVE FEEDBACK, human activities, Mathematical economics, 050205 econometrics
Abstract

International audience; We investigate experimentally a new variant of the beauty contest game (BCG) in which players’ actions are strategic substitutes (a negative feedback BCG). Our results show that chosen numbers are closer to the rational expectation equilibrium than in a strategic complements environment (a positive feedback BCG). We also find that the estimated average depth of reasoning from the cognitive hierarchy model does not differ between the two environments. We show that the difference may be attributed to the fact that additional information is more valuable when players’ actions are strategic substitutes rather than strategic complements, in line with other recent experimental findings.

Published
2009
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14. Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

Author

Frank Heinemann, Camille Cornand, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Technische Universität Berlin (TUB), ANR: MPICK,MPICK, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU), Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin (TU), Technische Universität Berlin (TU), and MPICK

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Transparency (market), media_common.quotation_subject, transparency, public information, private information, common p-beliefs, coordination, strategic complementarity, jel:D82, Transparency, Microeconomics, Information asymmetry, Public information, Strategic complementarity, Information, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Coordination game, Private information, Beauty contest, 050207 economics, Private information retrieval, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, media_common, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games, 050208 finance, Public economics, Financial market, JEL: F - International Economics/F.F3 - International Finance/F.F3.F31 - Foreign Exchange, 05 social sciences, jel:C73, jel:F31, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, public information, private information, coordination, strategic complementarity, Common p-beliefs, Coordination, Welfare, Publicity, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, Externality
Abstract

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive external- ities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare: public announcements serve as focal points for higher-order beliefs and affect agentsbehaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that reducing public signalsprecision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare. This article shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision but, under certain conditions, not to all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are. There is a general presumption that higher central bank transparency in terms of information disclosure to a wider audience improves the effectiveness of monetary policy and is beneficial to markets as it reduces information asymmetries, helps to assess risk better and arrive at more informed decisions, thus enhancing market efficiency. While practitioners (in central banks and international institutions) agree on the desirability of informative announcements and promote higher transparency on the ground that any information is valuable to markets, recent academic literature distin- guishes private and public information and argues that public announcements may destabilise markets and reduce efficiency by their effects on higher-order beliefs, if markets are characterised by positive externalities. Morris and Shin (2002) (henceforth M-S) have shown that noisy public announcements may be detrimental to welfare from an ex ante point of view. They conclude that a commitment to withholding relevant information or deliberately reducing its precision may be welfare enhancing. In this article we challenge this conclusion by distinguishing two components of transparency:precision ofinformationanddegreeofpublicity.The degreeof publicity is the proportion of agents who receive a signal. Using a stylised coordination game introduced by M-S, we show that information should always be provided to the market

Published
2008
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