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With Big Data, decisions made by machine learning algorithms depend on training data generated by many individuals. In an experiment, we identify the effect of varying individual responsibility for the moral choices of an artificially intelligent algorithm. Across treatments, we manipulated the sources of training data and thus the impact of each individual's decisions on the algorithm. Diffusing such individual pivotality for algorithmic choices increased the share of selfish decisions and weakened revealed prosocial preferences. This does not result from a change in the structure of incentives. Rather, our results show that Big Data offers an excuse for selfish behavior through lower responsibility for one's and others' fate.

Why do some dynasties maintain the fortune of their founders while others completely squander it in few generations? To address this question, we use a simple deterministic microfounded model based on two main elements: the “hunger for accumulation” and the “willingness to exert effort”. Contrary to models with capital market imperfections, our setting points to the crucial role of our two key ingredients, rather than of initial wealth or transitory shocks to wealth or inflation, on the long-run process of wealth accumulation within a family lineage. In addition, in a context with heterogeneous dynasties, we show that our model can provide a novel interpretation for some macroeconomics issues such as the demise of the rich bourgeoisie, class structure, social mobility, and wealthy inequalities. For example it predicts that those who take the effort to innovate and take advantage of new profitable opportunities are agents who are neither too poor nor too rich. Obviously, this simple framework is a great starting point for further empirical analysis.

International audience; We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no-pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in terms of increased endowment dispersion) for both private and public pledge situations, although donations with private pledges remain higher than donations with public pledge.

This paper shows how the role of the market, the state and the family in providing financial support at old age has evolved over time with changes in factors such as the reliability and the effectiveness of family support, the rate of interest, the cost of public funds and earning inequality. We model a society in which agents with different productivity are asked to vote over the existence of a Beveridgian pension system. We show that when children assistance is certain and large, agents may rely exclusively on family to finance old-age consumption and prefer to vote for a zero tax rate. Only if income inequalities are very large, a majority will be in favor of a pension system. However, when the size and the likelihood of family generosity decreases, a pension system is more likely to emerge. In that case, agents supplement children assistance with pension benefits. A pension system is also more likely to emerge when the cost of public fund is small and the return from private savings is high.

In this research project we aim to understand the role of institutional entrepreneurship across multiple levels - field, organization, and micro levels - in the institutionalization of a new professional role within organizations. Specifically, we study the rise of the "corporate philanthropy manager," a position inspired by nonprofit values and goals which developed within large French corporations during the period 1979 to 2011. The process of creating, maintaining and legitimizing this new role - philanthropy as a new business function - is the central focus of our study, and we explore how elements of the nonprofit and for-profit worlds came together in this new role, as well as the role of various actors across multiple levels in influencing this combination.

This paper asks whether a gap in spouses' subjective happiness matters per se, i.e. whether it predicts divorce. We use three large panel surveys to explore this question. Controlling for the life satisfaction levels of spouses, we find that a larger happiness gap, even in the first year of marriage, increases the likelihood of a future separation. This association even holds for couples where both spouses are identified as being better off than in their outside option. We interpret this observation as reflecting a concern for relative utility. To the best of our knowledge, this effect has not been taken into account by any existing economic models of the household. The relationship between happiness gaps and divorce is consistent with the fact that couples who are unable to transfer utility are more at risk than others. It is also possible that assortative mating by happiness baseline level reduces the risk of separation. However, assortative mating cannot entirely explain the finding, as a widening of the happiness gap over time increases the risk of separation. We also uncover an asymmetry in the effect of happiness gaps: couples are more likely to break-up when the difference in life satisfaction is unfavorable to the woman. De facto, divorces appear to be initiated predominantly by women who are less happy than their husband. This asymmetry suggests that the effect of happiness gaps is grounded on motives of relative deprivation, rather than on a preference for equal happiness. The presence of this new argument in spouses' utility is likely to modify their optimal behavior, e.g. in terms of labor supply. It should also be taken into account for public policy measures concerning gender-based labor incentives., Cet article montre que plus la différence de bien-être subjectif entre conjoints est grande, plus leur risque de divorcer est élevé (en contrôlant pour le niveau de bien-être des conjoints). Même mesuré au cours de la première année de mariage, un écart de bien-être prédit un divorce ultérieur. Cette relation tient même pour les couples dont les deux membres sont identifiés comme étant plus heureux que dans une série de situations alternatives hors-mariage. Mise en évidence à l'aide de trois grandes enquêtes de panel, cette observation témoigne de l'importance des comparaisons de bien-être et de la notion d'utilité relative. Il est possible que la divergence de bien-être soit plus dangereuse lorsque les transferts d'utilité sont plus difficiles. Il est également possible que les mariages fondés sur un appariement sélectif soient plus stables. Mais cela n'explique pas entièrement notre découverte. En effet, une augmentation de l'écart de bien-être au cours du temps accroît également le risque de divorce. Enfin, l'effet mis en évidence est asymétrique: seuls les couples au sein desquels la femme est moins heureuse que l'homme sont menacés de dissolution. L'effet observé semble donc relever de comparaison de bien-être plutôt que d'une aversion pour l'inégalité (sans quoi les femmes plus heureuses divorceraient elles aussi). Cet argument n'a jamais été pris en compte dans les modèles économiques du mariage. Il est pourtant de nature à éclairer les choix individuels au sein de la famille et devrait être pris en considération par les mesures de politique publiques qui influencent les décisions individuelles, notamment d'offre de travail, susceptibles de faire diverger les niveaux d'utilité des conjoints.

This paper analyzes the impact of remittances on household consumption instability in developing countries on a large panel of developing countries. The four main results are the following: Firstly, remittances significantly reduce household consumption instability. Secondly, the insurance role played by remittances is highlighted: remittances dampen the effect of various sources of consumption instability in developing countries (natural disasters, agricultural shocks, discretionary fiscal policy). Thirdly, the insurance role played by remittances is more important in less financially developed countries. Fourthly, the overall stabilizing effect of remittances is mitigated when remittances over GDP exceed 8.5%.

We reconsider the optimal population size problem in a continuous time economy populated by homogenous cohorts with a fixed life span. This assumption is combined with a linear production function in the labor input and standard rearing costs. A general social welfare function is specified, admitting the Millian and Benthamite cases as polar parameterizations. It is shown that if the lifetime is low enough, population is asymptotically driven to extinction whatever the utility function and the level of inter-generational altruism. Moreover, population is driven to extinction at finite time whatever the values of lifetime and altruism provided the utility function is negative. When the utility function is positive, it is shown that the Millian welfare function leads to optimal extinction at finite time whatever the lifetime. In contrast, the Benthamite case is much more involved: for isoelastic positive utility functions, it gives rise to two threshold lifetime values, say T_0 < T_1: below T_0, finite time extinction is optimal; above T_1, balanced growth paths are optimal. In between, asymptotic extinction is optimal. Last, intermediate welfare functions are studied, resulting in more complex optimal consumption and fertility dynamics compared to the two polar cases but delivering similar optimal extinction features.

Long-term care (LTC) concerns people who depend on help to carry out daily activities. It is delivered informally by families - mainly spouses, daughters and step-daughters - and to a lesser extent formally by professional care assistants. Formal care is given at home or in an institution (such as care centers and nursing homes).The governments of most EU member states are involved in some way in the provision or financing of long-term care services. However, the extent and nature of their involvement differs widely across countries.

This paper compares the social norms of distributive transfers within village communities in the north and south of Vietnam by analyzing household survey and experimental data. The results of household data analysis show private transfers flow from high-income households to low-income households in the south where social safety net is limited. In contrast, private transfers do not correlate with pre-transfer income in the north where public transfers are more widespread. In addition, public transfers crowd out private transfers in the north. We conducted trust game in both regions and found consistent results. People in the south are more altruistic toward the poor: they send more to the poor without expecting higher repayment. This pattern is consistent with the idea that private norms of redistribution from rich to poor are active in the south but are crowded out in the north, possibly by communist public institutions, although we observe a strong overall positive effect of communism on reciprocity in the north.

This study uses the contingent valuation method to elicit individuals' preferences for their own and others' safety in road-tra±c. Whereas one group is asked about a private safety device for themselves, other groups are asked about safety devices for their children, household, relatives and the public. Support is found for the hypothesis that individuals are not purely sel¯sh when it comes the safety of others. Key words Safety; Willingness to pay; Altruism; Road-tra±c JEL codes

We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this affects economic outcomes. (JEL D13, D64, J12, Z13)

International audience

Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort.

We develop an overlapping generations growth model in which the individuals care about the environment. Many environmental policies suffer from institutional failures. We focus on the failure resulting from the delegation by the government of the exercise of the environmental policy to an administrative department. Though motivated by the department's expertise, the delegation principle may give rise to a conflict with social welfare maximization. This paper proposes an original policy mechanism of transfers of pollution rights capable of circumventing these failures and decentralizing optimal growth at competitive equilibrium.

Increasingly, the assessment of health prevention policies is evaluated through willingness to pay (WTP) surveys. When the evaluation deals with policies with a public dimension, the individual's stated WTP can reflect an altruistic component, which may alter the results of the economic valuation. By applying an expected utility framework in a contingent valuation survey on Q fever, we can determine the individuals who integrate an altruistic component in their stated WTP (or not) that we further explain by explanatory variables. The main result is that 66 percent of respondents express an altruistic component when they state their WTP for the collective program. The part devoted to an altruistic motive is on average equal to 3,6 euro, nearly 25 percent of the considered WTP., L'évaluation de politiques de prévention sanitaire par le recours à des Consentements A Payer (CAP) issus d'enquêtes auprès de la population est de plus en plus fréquent. Lorsque ces politiques revêtent une dimension collective, les CAP déclarés par les individus peuvent refléter une composante altruiste, ce qui rend problématique le calcul économique. A partir d'une enquête d'évaluation contingente portant sur deux politiques de prévention de la Fièvre Q, l'une collective et l'autre individuelle, nous mobilisons le cadre théorique de l'utilité espérée pour déterminer le caractère altruiste (ou non) des individus, que nous expliquons ensuite par certaines de leurs caractéristiques socio-économiques. Le principal résultat est que 66% des répondants incluent une composante altruiste lors de la révélation du CAP pour le programme collectif. Elle représente 3,6 euro en moyenne, soit environ 25% du CAP considéré.