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To understand why some firms export while others do not, it is necessary to understand major determinants which lead some firms to engage in exporting. A large base of empirical literature provides evidence that firms which trade are systematically different from those which do not trade in size, productivity, and the involvement of multinational corporations. In this paper, we introduce a financial dimension as an additional source of firm heterogeneity to understand export market participation, and examine how the impact of leverage on firms' exporting decisions varies depending on financial constraints, using a panel of 3,353 Korean manufacturing firms over the period of 1994-2011. First, we find that leverage for financially-constrained firms is negatively associated with the probability of exporting while leverage for financially-unconstrained is not. Also, we find that in the sample of financially-constrained firms, future exporters have higher leverage before they begin to export, while in the sample of financially-unconstrained firms, firms with ex-ante lower leverage self-select to export. Finally, it is found that export market participation decreases leverage for both financially-constrained and financially-unconstrained firms, but the magnitudes of decreases in leverage are larger for financially-constrained firms.

International audience; In contrast to a large strand of the literature that focuses on multi-product firms, this paper examines multi-destinations firms and the effects of financial constraints on newly served and newly exited destinations. Intuitively, financial constraints have a negative impact on firm expansion in new destinations by limiting firm ability to finance entry costs. The effect on exit from existing destinations is ambiguous. Due to financial constraints, a firm may face difficulties financing the recurrent costs of maintaining her market presence. But if financial constraints also affect entry, the firm may have strong incentives to stay in a given destination since it may not be able to fund the fixed entry costs associated to the reallocation of her portfolio of destinations. We develop a simple theoretical model which includes these two effects. We use a unique longitudinal dataset on French firms that contains information on export destinations of individual firms and allows to construct various firm-level measures of financial constraints to test these predictions. The empirical results suggest that financial constraints hamper a firms’s ability to cover fixed entry costs as well as recurrent costs associated with maintaining the presence in a foreign market, thereby reducing the probability of entering into a new foreign markets and increasing the probability of exiting from an existing foreign market.

This article analyzes the impact of incomplete contracts’ length on investment in a bilateral relationship. The seller has the power to set the contract terms whereas the buyer decides on the investment level, which acts as a cap on future demand. Two-part tariffs succeed at implementing the optimal investment and consumption even if commitment is limited, and the contract’s duration is irrelevant. Interestingly, this efficient solution is rendered possible by subsidies on consumption during the contract. In other terms, duration matters hugely for the contract details (the timing of transfers), not for its performance. Under certain circumstances that we discuss, linear pricing may have to be used, which leads to suboptimal investment. We show that longer contracts are less efficient, meaning that a degree of completeness (pricing width) may be strictly complementary to another one (contract length). The buyer’s surplus increases with respect to the contract duration, whereas the seller loses more in profit than the social surplus decreases. A longer contract actually protects expropriable investors rather than investment itself.

We study the transition between non renewable and renewable energy sources with adjustment costs over the production capacity of renewable energy. Assuming constant variable marginal costs for both energy sources, convex adjustment costs and a more expensive renewable energy, we show the following. With sufficiently abundant non renewable energy endowments, the dynamic equilibrium path is composed of a first time phase of only non renewable energy use followed by a transition phase substituting progressively renewable energy to non renewable energy before a last time phase of only renewable energy use. The investment into renewable energy may either begin before actual production of renewable energy or be delayed until the energy price achieves a sufficient gap with respect to the renewable energy cost. With an initially abundant non renewable resource, the features of the transition between non renewable and renewable energy do not depend upon the initial resource stock.

If the relation between investment and economic growth is well established in the macroeconomic literature, the existence of a similar link at the level of the firm has been challenged by empirical work. This paper investigates the channels linking investment and firm performance in the French and Italian manufacturing industries. It does so by putting forth a novel methodology to identify investment spikes that corrects for size dependence. While maintaining the desired properties of a spike measure, our chosen proxy retrieves the expected relation between investment and firm performance. Ex-ante, more efficient and fast growing firms display a higher probability to invest; in turn, after an investment spike has taken place the group of investing firms shows further gains in performance. Finally, expansionary investment episodes, as proxied by the opening of new plants, have a negative effect on profitability while they are associated with higher sales and employment levels.

International audience; We show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment dynamics. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g., an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input to serve a growing but uncertain demand, and if the supplier has market power, investment occurs too late from an industry standpoint. The distortion in firm decisions is characterized by a Lerner-type index. Despite the underlying investment option, greater volatility can result in a lower value for both firms. We examine several contractual alternatives to induce efficient timing, a novel vertical restraint being for the upstream to sell a call option on the input. We also extend the model to allow for downstream duopoly. When downstream firms are engaged in a preemption race, the upstream firm sells the input to the first investor at a discount such that the race to preempt exactly offsets the vertical distortion, and this leader invests at the optimal time. These results are illustrated with a case study drawn from the pharmaceutical industry.

This paper focuses on the effects of financial factors on manufacturing firms' export participation. Using a simple dynamic discrete choice model, we first present the intuition according to which financial constraints reduce the probability of exporting. Then, based on a panel of Egyptian manufacturing firms over the 2003-2008 period, we estimate the impact of financial constraints on export market participation. Our main results show that, unlike financial liquidity, financial constraints reduce the export participation of Egyptian firms. In addition, financial constraints equally have a negative impact on alternative measures of the export activity, namely the export intensity and the time firm take before starting to export

AD; International audience; Work significantly affects human life and health. Overworking may decrease the quality of life and cause direct economic losses. Technological innovations encourage modernization of firms' capital and improve labor productivity in the workplace. The paper investigates the optimal individual choice of work intensity under improving technology embodied in new equipment leading to shorter lifetime of capital goods (obsolescence). The balanced growth trajectories are analyzed in this context to find out, in particular, how the optimal choice of work intensity is tied to the rate of embodied technological change. The impact of embodied technological advances on the work/life balance problem is discussed and their macroeconomic consequences are highlighted.

Are financial constraints preventing firms from importing capital goods? Sourcing capital goods from foreign countries is costly and requires internal or external financial resources. A simple model of foreign technology adoption shows that credit constraints act as a barrier to importing capital goods under imperfect financial markets. In our study, we investigate this prediction using detailed balance-sheet data from Indian manufacturing firms having reported information on financial statements and imports by type of good over the period 1997-2006. Our empirical findings shed new light on the micro determinants of firms' choices to import capital goods. Baseline estimation results show that firms with a lower leverage and higher liquidity are more likely to source their capital goods from foreign countries. Quantitatively, a 10 percentage point improvement of the leverage or liquidity ratio increases the probability of importing capital goods by 11 percent to 13 percent respectively. Different robustness tests demonstrate that these results are not driven by omitted variable bias related to changes in firm observable characteristics as well as ownership status. These findings are also robust to alternative specifications dealing with the potential reverse causality issues. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

When an agent invests in new industrial activities, he has a limited initial knowledge of his project's returns. Acquiring information allows him both to reduce the uncertainty on the dangerousness of this project and to limit potential damages that it might cause on people's health and on the environment. In this paper, we study whether there exist situations in which the agent does not acquire information. We find that an agent with time-consistent preferences, as well as an agent with hyperbolic ones, will acquire information unless its cost exceeds the direct benefit they could get with this information. Nevertheless, a hyperbolic agent may remain strategically ignorant and, when he does acquire information, he will acquire less information than a time-consistent type. Moreover, a hyperbolic-discounting type who behaves as a time-consistent agent in the future is more inclined to stay ignorant. We then emphasize that this strategic ignorance depends on the degree of precision of the information. Finally, we analyse the role that existing liability rules could play as an incentive to acquire information under uncertainty and with regard to the form of the agent's preferences.

Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 865/2007; The investment procedure prescribes the stages and tests through which all investment projects must pass before being accepted or not. It governs the conditions of acceptability and constitutes a powerful device of a priori control. In this paper, we intend to understand how investment procedures enable grand ideals regarding investment to be institutionalised. In particular, over and above the assumed effectiveness and rationale of these procedures, we identify the mechanisms through which these procedures construct social roles. In this respect, this research goes beyond the procedures' technical functions and focuses on the very form of procedures. Indeed, the form of a procedure presents two features: it is written, generally consigned to a "manual"; and it relies on "cognitive artefacts" (Norman, 1991) or "technologies of the intellect" (Goody, 1977) such as lists, tables and formulae like Discounted Cash Flow. This paper shows how this specific form takes effect during the process of institutionalisation, through which grand investment ideals (e.g. competitiveness, value creation) are transformed into concrete devices and into roles (Miller, 1991). Thanks to an enquiry conducted in 2003 and 2004, investment procedures in six large companies in a French context are analysed. It is argued that (1) the formalisation of the objectives of the procedures, as well as the definitions of investment through typologies shape the actors' boundaries of action; (2) valuation methods based on the domination of economic-mathematical formula favour short-term over long-term reflection; (3) the setting of decision-making thresholds formalise individuals' tasks and responsibilities. Therefore, the very form of procedures shape each phase of the institutionalisation process as defined by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) and contribute to creates a singular world - that of investment decisions.

The paper analyzes the link between financial constraints and firm export behavior. Our main finding is that firms enjoying better financial health are more likely to become exporters. The result contrasts with the previous empirical literature which found evidence that export participation improves firm financial health, but not that export starters display any ex-ante financial advantage. On the contrary, we find that financial constraints act as a barrier to export participation. Better access to external financial resources increases the probability to start exporting and also shortens the time before firms decide to serve foreign customers. This finding has important policy implications as it suggests that, in presence of financial markets imperfections, public intervention can be called for to help efficient but financially constrained firms to overcome the sunk entry costs into export markets and expand their activities abroad.

International audience; This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations.

Cahier de recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 907; This paper investigates why firms choose to undertake product expansion through alliances with competitors rather than on their own. We argue that both firm and product heterogeneity influence this expansion mode choice. Building on and expanding Penrose's theory of firm growth, we propose that resource conditions influence not only the decision to grow but also the choice of expansion mode: firms turn to horizontal alliances in order to implement product expansion projects that require greater resources than those available to them. More precisely, we hypothesize that a firm is more likely to launch a new product in a given business domain through a horizontal alliance rather than autonomously, when the resource requirements of the project are greater, when the resources available to the firm are more limited, when there is a mismatch between resource endowment and requirement, and when the firm's collaborative competence allows it to better cope with the inter-organizational concerns that collaboration with competitors raises. We find support for our arguments on a sample of 310 new aircraft developments launched between 1945 and 2000, either by a single prime contractor or as a horizontal alliance in which prime contractorship is shared with another industry incumbent. This paper highlights the importance of developing an integrated perspective which combines production and exchange aspects of governance decisions.

The paper analyzes the link between financial constraints and firms' export decisions, using a large micro-level data set on French manufacturing firms over the 1996-2004 period. Our main finding is that firms enjoying better ex-ante financial heath are more likely to start exporting. This results contrasts with the previous empirical literature which found evidence that participation to exports market improves a firm financial health but not that export starters display specific ex-ante financial advantages. By contrast, our result supports the view that financial constraints act as a barrier to export participation. This finding has important policy implications as it suggests that, in presence of financial markets imperfections, public intervention can be called for to help efficient but financially constrained firms to overcome the sunk entry costs into export markets and expand their activities abroad.

The fashionable analysis of financial crisis accentuates on the role of corporate debt composition bearingthe maturity and currency mismatch. Using 226 listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange, this paperinvestigates the role of currency and maturity mismatches in propagating the negative effects of currency depreciation. By nature, depreciation could enhance export performance by its “competitiveness effect”, since price of goods should be cheaper. Nevertheless, due to the effects of maturity and currency mismatch, depreciation decreases net worth of the firms through “balance sheet effect”. This paperfocuses on the impact of currency depreciation on firm-level investment. By panel data analysis, we findthat firms with more dollar debt invest less in both long and short-term investment. Unfortunately, thispaper fails to provide empirical evidence on the impact of currency depreciation on firm-level investmentand other firm performance. However, it seems that the extreme currency depreciation followed by financial and economic crisis destroys structurally investment condition in Indonesia. Therefore, even though currency depreciation is not related significantly to firm-level investment, it is likely not true that the depreciation does not matter on firm as well as economic performance.

International audience; Dans ce papier, nous chercherons à comprendre, au-delà de ses fonctions techniques, comment les procédures d'investissement permettent d'institutionnaliser les grands idéaux et discours ayant trait à l'investissement. En analysant, dans le contexte français, les procédures d'investissement de six grandes entreprises, nous chercherons à montrer comment ce dispositif vise à produire un manager idéal : créateur de valeur et responsable. Pour ce faire, nous adopterons une démarche de recherche s'appuyant sur les travaux de Miller (1991), de Miller et O'Leary (1987) et de Hasselbladh et Kallinikos (2000).

This Paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success diminishes gradually with the arrival of additional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert them. We distinguish between relationship financing, meaning that the entrepreneur's allocation of the funds is observable, and arm's length financing, where it is unobservable. We find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes. We characterize the optimal contracts and equilibrium funding decisions. The financial constraints will typically become tighter over time under relationship finance, and looser under arm's length financing. The trade-off is that while relationship financing may require smaller information rents, arm's length financing amounts to an implicit commitment to a finite funding horizon. The lack of such a commitment under relationship financing implies that the sustainable release of funds eventually slows down. We obtain the surprising result that arm's length contracts are preferable in a Pareto sense.

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive payments linked to attaining the next benchmark, which must be increasing in the funding horizon of each stage. Benchmarking reduces agency costs, directly by shortening the agent's guaranteed funding horizon, and indirectly via an implicit incentive effect of information rents in future financing rounds. The ex ante need to provide incentives and the venture capitalist's desire to cut information rents ex post create a hold-up conflict, which can be overcome by providing all funds in every stage in a single up-front payment. Empirical patterns of the evolution of financing rounds and research intensity over the lifetime of a project are explained as optimal choices: the optimal capital allocated and the funding horizon are increasing from one stage to the next. This emphasizes the notion that early stages are the riskiest in an innovative venture.