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A recession often forces you to cut R&D as you refocus on your core. But innovation need not go by the wayside. By placing certain assets and projects outside your walls, you can actually preserve opportunities for future growth while you shore up the fortress. Chesbrough, of Haas School of Business, and Garman, of New Venture Partners, identify five strategic moves that open the door to innovation by, ironically, letting it out of the house. Some inside-out moves permit outside firms to invest in and develop your projects; others call for spinning off projects as separate ventures that still allow you to retain some equity. Whatever the specific approach, you can meet the inherent cultural and organizational challenges of inside-out open innovation by approaching it holistically and placing it under the leadership of senior executives in strategic roles.

Workplace weight-loss programs are a win-win tool that companies can use to boost both health and wealth. The financial payoff-for one Texas employer, about $2.50 in return for every dollar spent--stems from lower health care costs and reduced absenteeism.

When products become commodities, manufacturing companies may seek to differentiate themselves with value-added services--a potentially profitable strategy. Unfortunately, companies often stumble in the effort. Reinartz and Ulaga conducted in-depth studies of 18 leading companies in a broad variety of product markets to learn what distinguished the successes from the rest. They discovered four steps to developing a profitable services capability. RECOGNIZE THAT YOU ALREADY HAVE A SERVICE COMPANY: You can identify and charge for simple services--as Merck did when it stopped quietly absorbing shipping costs. Switching services from free to fee clarifies their value for managers as well as for customers. INDUSTRIALIZE THE BACK OFFICE: To prevent delivery costs from eating up service-offering margins, build flexible service platforms, closely monitor process costs, and exploit new technologies that enable process innovations. The Swedish bearings manufacturer SKF provided off-site access to an online monitoring tool that could warn of potential failure in customers' machines. CREATE A SERVICE-SAVVY SALES FORCE: Services require longer sales cycles and, often, decisions from high up in a customer's hierarchy; what's more, product salespeople may be inimical to change. Schneider-Electric did a major overhaul of its sales organization and trained its people to switch from cost-plus pricing to value-based pricing. FOCUS ON CUSTOMERS' PROCESSES AND THE OPPORTUNITIES THEY AFFORD FOR NEW SERVICE OFFERINGS: You may need to acquire new capabilities to take advantage of those opportunities: The industrial coatings specialist PPG had to learn how painting robots function after it offered to take over Fiat's Torino paint shop. Services can both lock in customers and help acquire new accounts. They should be developed with care and attention.

Sustainability, defined by natural scientists as the capacity of healthy ecosystems to function indefinitely, has become a clarion call for business. Leading companies have taken high-profile steps toward achieving it: Wal-Mart, for example, with its efforts to reduce packaging waste, and Nike, which has removed toxic chemicals from its shoes. But, says Unruh, the director of Thunderbird's Lincoln Center for Ethics in Global Management, sustainability is more than an endless journey of incremental steps. It is a destination, for which the biosphere of planet Earth--refined through billions of years of trial and error--is a perfect model. Unruh distills some lessons from the biosphere into three rules: Use a parsimonious palette. Managers can rethink their sourcing strategies and dramatically simplify the number and types of materials their companies use in production, making recycling cost-effective. After the furniture manufacturer Herman Miller discovered that its leading desk chair had 200 components made from more than 800 chemical compounds, it designed an award-winning successor whose far more limited materials palette is 96% recyclable. Cycle up, virtuously. Manufacturers should design recovery value into their products at the outset. Shaw Industries, for example, recycles the nylon fiber from its worn-out carpet into brand-new carpet tile. Exploit the power of platforms. Platform design in industry tends to occur at the component level--but the materials in those components constitute a more fundamental platform. Patagonia, by recycling Capilene brand performance underwear, has achieved energy costs 76% below those for virgin sourcing. Biosphere rules can teach companies how to build ecologically friendly products that both reduce manufacturing costs and prove highly attractive to consumers. And managers need not wait for a green technological revolution to implement them.

Incoming CEOs and general managers don't have much time to show what they can do to improve a business's performance. (In 2006, for instance, about 40% of CEOs who left their jobs had lasted an average of just 1.8 years--and many of them were ushered out the door.) Within a few years at most, leaders must find ways to boost profitability, increase market share, overtake a competitor--whatever the key tasks may be. But they can't map out specific objectives and initiatives until they have accurately assessed their companies' distinctive strengths and weaknesses and the particular threats and opportunities they face. In this article, Bain consultants Gottfredson, Schaubert, and Saenz provide a diagnostic template to help organizations figure all that out so they can decide which goals are reasonable and where to focus performance-improvement efforts. The template is built on four widely accepted principles. First, costs and prices almost always decline; second, your competitive position determines your options; third, customers and profit pools don't stand still; and fourth, simplicity gets results. Along with each principle, the authors offer diagnostic questions and analytic tools. Of course, each manager will emphasize certain elements of the template and de-emphasize others, based on his or her business situation. This process will show incoming CEOs and general managers where they are starting from (their point of departure) and help them establish their performance objectives (their point of arrival) as well as the change initiatives that will take them where they want to go.

In 1979, a young associate professor at Harvard Business School published his first article for HBR, "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy." In the years that followed, Michael Porter's explication of the five forces that determine the long-run profitability of any industry has shaped a generation of academic research and business practice. In this article, Porter undertakes a thorough reaffirmation and extension of his classic work of strategy formulation, which includes substantial new sections showing how to put the five forces analysis into practice. The five forces govern the profit structure of an industry by determining how the economic value it creates is apportioned. That value may be drained away through the rivalry among existing competitors, of course, but it can also be bargained away through the power of suppliers or the power of customers or be constrained by the threat of new entrants or the threat of substitutes. Strategy can be viewed as building defenses against the competitive forces or as finding a position in an industry where the forces are weaker. Changes in the strength of the forces signal changes in the competitive landscape critical to ongoing strategy formulation. In exploring the implications of the five forces framework, Porter explains why a fast-growing industry is not always a profitable one, how eliminating today's competitors through mergers and acquisitions can reduce an industry's profit potential, how government policies play a role by changing the relative strength of the forces, and how to use the forces to understand complements. He then shows how a company can influence the key forces in its industry to create a more favorable structure for itself or to expand the pie altogether. The five forces reveal why industry profitability is what it is. Only by understanding them can a company incorporate industry conditions into strategy.

Minor innovations make up most of a company's development portfolio, on average, but they never generate the growth companies seek. The solution, says Day--the Geoffrey T. Boisi Professor of Marketing and a codirector of the Mack Center for Technological Innovation at Wharton--is for companies to undertake a systematic, disciplined review of their innovation portfolios and increase the number of major innovations at an acceptable level of risk. Two tools can help them do this. The first, called the risk matrix, graphically reveals the distribution of risk across a company's entire innovation portfolio. The matrix allows companies to estimate each project's probability of success or failure, based on how big a stretch it is for the firm to undertake. The less familiar the product or technology and the intended market, the higher the risk. The second tool, dubbed the R-W-W (real-win-worth it) screen, allows companies to evaluate the risks and potential of individual projects by answering six fundamental questions about each one: Is the market real? Explores customers' needs, their willingness to buy, and the size of the potential market. Is the product real? Looks at the feasibility of producing the innovation. Can the product be competitive? and Can our company be competitive? Investigate how well suited the company's resources and management are to compete in the marketplace with the product. Will the product be profitable at an acceptable risk? Explores the financial analysis needed to assess an innovation's commercial viability. Last, Does launching the product make strategic sense? examines the project's fit with company strategy and whether management supports it.

As the dust settles on the recent frenzy of private equity deals (including transactions topping $20 billion), what lessons can companies glean? Directors and executives of public companies may now be slightly less fearful of imminent takeover, yet the pressure remains: They face shareholders who wonder why they aren't getting private-equity-level returns. Rather than dismiss the value private equity has created as manipulated or aberrant, public company leaders should recognize the disciplined management that often underlies it. Pozen, a longtime leader in the financial services industry, finds that in the aftermath of buyouts, companies undergo five major thrusts of reform. These translate into five key questions that directors should pose to senior management: Have we left too much cash on our balance sheet instead of raising our cash dividends or buying back shares? Do we have the optimal capital structure, with the lowest weighted after-tax cost of total capital, including debt and equity? Do we have an operating plan that will significantly increase shareholder value, with specific metrics to monitor performance? Are the compensation rewards for our top executives tied closely enough to increases in shareholder value, with real penalties for nonperformance? Finally, does our board have enough industry experts who have made the time commitments and been given the financial incentives necessary to maximize shareholder value? The era of private equity is far from over - the top funds have become very large and are likely to play an influential role in future market cycles. Boards that ask these questions, and act on them, won't just beat the takeover artists to the punch. They will build stronger businesses.

The high failure rate among new business ventures is usually chalked up to the fundamental uncertainty of the process. In actuality, say McGrath and Keil, flawed ways of assessing and managing ventures may account for the disappointing amount of value they generate. Instead of taking the go/no-go approach, whereby a project either advances toward launch or is killed, decision makers should consider a range of alternatives: recycling the venture by aiming it at a new target market; spinning it off to other owners or a joint venture; spinning it in to an established business unit; or salvaging useful elements such as technologies, capabilities, knowledge, and patents. Firms that excel in value extraction--the "value captors" whose practices and mind-set this article explores--have created formal processes to systematically mine successes, failures, and everything in between. They know that a venture should be treated like a scientific experiment, in which learning plays a critical role. They are ready to seize new opportunities if a venture falters on its original course. They foster networks to promote cooperation and collaboration between established business leaders and venture teams and involve people from throughout the company in the venture review process. They don't allow financial criteria to dominate the reviews, and they recognize that the best people to launch a business may not be the ones who developed the idea. If your innovation pipeline is dry, your promising projects are being strangled for lack of a speedy payback, or someone else has made a fabulous business out of a slightly altered idea that you abandoned, consider the value captor's path.

How do you know when your core needs to change? And how do you determine what should replace it? From an in-depth study of 25 companies, the author, a strategy consultant, has discovered that it's possible to measure the vitality of a business's core. If it needs reinvention, he says, the best course is to mine hidden assets. Some of the 25 companies were in deep crisis when they began the process of redefining themselves. But, says Zook, management teams can learn to recognize early signs of erosion. He offers five diagnostic questions with which to evaluate the customers, key sources of differentiation, profit pools, capabilities, and organizational culture of your core business. The next step is strategic regeneration. In four-fifths of the companies Zook examined, a hidden asset was the centerpiece of the new strategy. He provides a map for identifying the hidden assets in your midst, which tend to fall into three categories: undervalued business platforms, untapped insights into customers, and underexploited capabilities. The Swedish company Dometic, for example, was manufacturing small absorption refrigerators for boats and RVs when it discovered a hidden asset: its understanding of, and access to, customers in the RV market. The company took advantage of a boom in that market to refocus on complete systems for live-in vehicles. The Danish company Novozymes, which produced relatively low-tech commodity enzymes such as those used in detergents, realized that its underutilized biochemical capability in genetic and protein engineering was a hidden asset and successfully refocused on creating bioengineered specialty enzymes. Your next core business is not likely to announce itself with fanfare. Use the author's tools to conduct an internal audit of possibilities and pinpoint your new focus.

Anyone who has signed up for cell phone service, attempted to claim a rebate, or navigated a call center has probably suffered from a company's apparent indifference to what should be its first concern: the customer experiences that culminate in either satisfaction or disappointment and defection. Customer experience is the subjective response customers have to direct or indirect contact with a company. It encompasses every aspect of an offering: customer care, advertising, packaging, features, ease of use, reliability. Customer experience is shaped by customers' expectations, which largely reflect previous experiences. Few CEOs would argue against the significance of customer experience or against measuring and analyzing it. But many don't appreciate how those activities differ from CRM or just how illuminating the data can be. For instance, the majority of the companies in a recent survey believed they have been providing "superior" experiences to customers, but most customers disagreed. The authors describe a customer experience management (CEM) process that involves three kinds of monitoring: past patterns (evaluating completed transactions), present patterns (tracking current relationships), and potential patterns (conducting inquiries in the hope of unveiling future opportunities). Data are collected at or about touch points through such methods as surveys, interviews, focus groups, and online forums. Companies need to involve every function in the effort, not just a single customer-facing group. The authors go on to illustrate how a cross-functional CEM system is created. With such a system, companies can discover which customers are prospects for growth and which require immediate intervention.

Of all the competing objectives every company faces, three pairs stand out: profitability versus growth, the short term versus the long term, and the whole organization versus the units. In each case, progress on one front usually comes at the expense of progress on the other. The authors researched the performance of more than 1000 companies worldwide over the past two decades and found that most struggle to succeed across the three tensions. From 1983 to 2003, for example, only 32% of these companies more often than not achieved positive profitability and revenue growth at the same time. The problem, the authors discovered, is not so much that managers don't recognize the tensions--those are all too familiar to anyone who has ever run a business. Rather, it is that managers frequently don't focus on the tension that matters most to their company. Even when they do identify the right tension, they usually make the mistake of prioritizing a "lead" objective within it-for example, profitability over growth. As a result, companies often end up moving first in this direction, then in that, and then back again, never quite resolving the tension. The companies that performed best adopted a very different approach. Instead of setting a lead objective, they looked at how best to strengthen what the two sides of each tension have in common: For profitability and growth,the common bond is customer benefit; for the short term and the long, it is sustainable earnings; and for the whole and its parts, it is particular organizational resources and capabilities. The authors describe how companies can select the right tension, what traps they may fall into when they focus on one side over the other, and how to escape these traps by managing to the bonds between objectives.

In 1976, Genentech, the first biotechnology company, was founded by a young venture capitalist and a university professor to exploit recombinant DNA technology. Thirty years and more than 300 billion dollars in investments later, only a handful of biotech firms have matched Genentech's success or even shown a profit. No avalanche of new drugs has hit the market, and the long-awaited breakthrough in R&D productivity has yet to materialize. This disappointing performance raises a question: Can organizations motivated by the need to make profits and please shareholders successfully conduct basic scientific research as a core activity? The question has largely been ignored, despite intense debate over whether business's invasion of basic science-long the domain of universities and nonprofit research institutions- is limiting access to discoveries, thereby slowing advances in science. Biotech has not lived up to its promise, says the author, because its anatomy, which has worked well in other high-tech sectors, can't handle the fundamental challenges facing drug R&D: profound, persistent uncertainty and high risks rooted in the limited knowledge of human biology; the need for the diverse disciplines involved in drug discovery to work together in an integrated fashion; and barriers to learning, including tacit knowledge and murky intellectual property rights, which can slow the pace of scientific advance. A more suitable anatomy would include increased vertical integration; a smaller number of closer, longer collaborations; an emphasis by universities on sharing rather than patenting scientific discoveries; more cross-disciplinary academic research; and more federal and private funding for translational research, which bridges basic and applied science. With such modifications, science can be a business.

For years, sales managers at many companies have relied on top performers and sheer numbers of sales reps to stay competitive. But while they may have squeaked by on this wing-and-a-prayer technique, their sales teams haven't thrived the way they once did. Today's most successful sales leaders are taking a more scientific approach. Savvy managers are reshaping their tactics in response to changing markets. They are reaching out to new customers in innovative ways. And they are increasing productivity by helping the reps they already have make the most of their skills and resources. Leaders who take a scientific approach to sales force effectiveness have learned to use four levers to boost their reps' productivity in a predictable and manageable way. First, they systematically target their firms' offerings, matching the right products with the right customers. Second, they optimize the automation, tools, and procedures at their disposal, providing reps with the support they need to boost sales.Third, they analyze and manage their reps' performance, measuring both internal processes and results to determine where their teams' strengths and weaknesses are. Fourth, they pay close attention to sales force deployment--how well sales, support, marketing, and delivery resources are matched to customers. These four levers can help sales leaders increase productivity across the board, the authors say, though they have the greatest impact on lower-ranked performers. The overall effect of increasing the average sales per employee can be exponential; it means a company won't have to rely on just a few talented individuals to stay competitive. This is especially important because finding and keeping star salespeople is more difficult than ever. What's more, managers who optimize the sales forces they already have can see returns they never thought possible.

Executives have developed tunnel vision in their pursuit of shareholder value, focusing on short-term performance at the expense of investing in long-term growth. It's time to broaden that perspective and begin shaping business strategies in light of the competitive landscape, not the shareholder list. In this article, Alfred Rappaport offers ten basic principles to help executives create lasting shareholder value. For starters, companies should not manage earnings or provide earnings guidance; those that fail to embrace this first principle of shareholder value will almost certainly be unable to follow the rest. Additionally, leaders should make strategic decisions and acquisitions and carry assets that maximize expected value, even if near-term earnings are negatively affected as a result. During times when there are no credible value-creating opportunities to invest in the business, companies should avoid using excess cash to make investments that look good on the surface but might end up destroying value, such as ill-advised, overpriced acquisitions. It would be better to return the cash to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks. Rappaport also offers guidelines for establishing effective pay incentives at every level of management; emphasizes that senior executives need to lay their wealth on the line just as shareholders do; and urges companies to embrace full disclosure, an antidote to short-term earnings obsession that serves to lessen investor uncertainty, which could reduce the cost of capital and increase the share price. The author notes that a few types of companies--high-tech start-ups, for example, and severely capital-constrained organizations--cannot afford to ignore market pressures for short-term performance. Most companies with a sound, well-executed business model, however, could better realize their potential for creating shareholder value by adopting the ten principles.

Although companies devote considerable time and money to managing their sales forces, few focus much thought on how the structure of the sales force needs to change over the life cycle of a product or a business. However, the organization and goals of a sales operation have to evolve as businesses start up, grow, mature, and decline if a company wants to keep winning the race for customers. Specifically, firms must consider and alter four factors over time: the differing roles that internal salespeople and external selling partners should play, the size of the sales force, its degree of specialization, and how salespeople apportion their efforts among different customers, products, and activities. These variables are critical because they determine how quickly sales forces respond to market opportunities, they influence sales reps' performance, and they affect companies' revenues, costs, and profitability. In this article, the authors use timeseries data and cases to explain how, at each stage, firms can best tackle the relevant issues and get the most out of their sales forces. During start-up, smart companies focus on how big their sales staff should be and on whether they can depend upon selling partners. In the growth phase, they concentrate on getting the sales force's degree of specialization and size right. When businesses hit maturity, companies should better allocate existing resources and hire more general-purpose salespeople. Finally, as organizations go into decline, wise sales leaders reduce sales force size and use partners to keep the business afloat for as long as possible.

Of all the meetings top executives go to in a year, none is more important than the strategy off-site, where the most essential conversations for the future of the business occur. Yet it is the rare management team that can say its strategy off-site truly changed the way the business is run. At best, participants do some vague direction setting and work on team-building skills; at worst, they write off the retreat as a waste of time and resources. It needn't be like that. From their two decades of experience designing and facilitating strategy off-sites in companies large and small around the world, the authors have distilled a set of best practices that businesses can use to make the most of this annual opportunity. Essentially, the problem with most strategy off-sites is that they're insufficiently structured. People think that if you schedule a meeting, invite top leaders (and perhaps an outside expert), and block off units of time to discuss big subjects, the rest will take care of itself. In reality, formlessness leads to aimlessness. Oddly enough, only rigorously designed meetings give rise to truly candid strategy discussions. That rigor starts before the meeting, when the scope of the matters discussed must be limited, the participant list drawn up accordingly, the relevant materials (and only those) sent out and absorbed, and a detailed agenda established. During the meeting, the pace and quality of the conversation can be managed through attention to politics and by using carefully tailored frameworks, decision points, and group exercises. After the meeting, an action plan ensures clear accountability and follow-through. If you and your executive team spend four days a year rafting down rivers together, you'll eventually get good at rafting down rivers. Spend four days a year having well -designed strategy conversations together, and you will transform your annual off-site from a meaningless junket into a genuine turning point for your business.

The prospect of offshoring and outsourcing business processes has captured the imagination of CEOs everywhere. In the past five years, a rising number of companies in North America and Europe have experimented with this strategy, hoping to reduce costs and gain strategic advantage. But many businesses have had mixed results. According to several studies, half the organizations that have shifted processes offshore have failed to generate the expected financial benefits. What's more, many of them have faced employee resistance and consumer dissatisfaction. Clearly, companies have to rethink how they formulate their offshoring strategies. A three-part methodology can help. First, companies need to prioritize their processes, ranking each based on two criteria: the value it creates for customers and the degree to which the company can capture some of that value. Companies will want to keep their core (highest-priority) processes in-house and consider outsourcing their commodity (low-priority) processes; critical (moderate-priority) processes are up for debate and must be considered carefully. Second, businesses should analyze all the risks that accompany offshoring and look systematically at their critical and commodity processes in terms of operational risk (the risk that processes won't operate smoothly after being offshored) and structural risk (the risk that relationships with service providers may not work as expected). Finally, companies should determine possible locations for their offshore efforts, as well as the organizational forms--such as captive centers and joint ventures--that those efforts might take. They can do so by examining each process's operational and structural risks side by side. This article outlines the tools that will help companies choose the right processes to offshore. It also describes a new organizational structure called the extended organization, in which companies specify the quality of services they want and work alongside providers to get that quality.

Senior executives typically delegate the responsibility for managing a firm's derivatives portfolio to in-house financial experts and the company's financial advisers. That's a strategic blunder, argues this Nobel laureate, because the inventiveness of modern financial markets makes it possible for companies to double or even triple their capacity to invest in their strategic assets and competencies. Risks fall into two categories: either a company adds value by assuming them on behalf of its shareholders or it does not. By hedging or insuring against non-value-adding risks with derivative securities and contracts, thereby removing them from what the author calls the risk balance sheet, managers can release equity capital for assuming more value-adding risk. This is not just a theoretical possibility. One innovation-the interest rate swap, introduced about 20 years ago-has already enabled the banking industry to dramatically increase its capacity for adding value to each dollar of invested equity capital. With the range of derivative instruments growing, there is no reason why other companies could not similarly remove strategic risks, potentially creating billions of dollars in shareholder value. The possibilities are especially important for private companies that have no access to public equity markets and therefore cannot easily increase their equity capital by issuing more shares. The author describes how derivative contracts of various kinds are already being employed strategically to mitigate or eliminate various risks. He also shows how companies can use the risk balance sheet to identify risks they should not bear directly and to determine how much equity capacity they can release for assuming more value-adding risk.

Most industrial manufacturers realize that the real money isn't in products but in services. Companies such as General Electric and IBM have famously made the transition: A large proportion of their revenues and margins come from providing value-added services to customers. But other companies attempting to do the same might miss the boat. It is not enough, the authors say, just to provide services. Businesses must now provide "smart services"--building intelligence (awareness and connectivity) into the products themselves. Citing examples such as Heidelberger Druckmaschinen's Internet-connected printing presses and Eaton Electrical's home-monitoring service, the authors demonstrate how a product that can report its status back to its maker represents an opportunity for the manufacturer to cultivate richer, longer-term relationships with customers. Four business models will emerge in this new, networked world. If you go it alone, it may be as an embedded innovator- that is, your networked product sends back information that can help you optimize service delivery, eliminate waste and inefficiency, and raise service margins. Or, you may pursue a more aggressive solutionist business model- that is, you position your networked product as a "complete solution provider," able to deliver a broader scope of high-value services than those provided by the embedded innovator's product. In the case of a system that aggregates and processes data from multiple products in a building or home, you may be either an aggregator or a synergist, partnering with others to pursue a smart-services opportunity. An aggregator's product is the hub, collecting and processing usage information- and creating a high-value body of data. A synergist's product is the spoke, contributing valuable data or functionality. Woe to the company that takes none of these paths; it'll soon find its former customers locked in--and happily--to other smart service providers.

Despite the much-ballyhooed increase in outsourcing, most companies are in do-it-yourself mode for the bulk of their processes, in large part because there's no way to compare outside organizations' capabilities with those of internal functions. Given the lack of comparability, it's almost surprising that anyone outsources today. But it's not surprising that cost is by far companies' primary criterion for evaluating outsourcers or that many companies are dissatisfied with their outsourcing relationships. A new world is coming, says the author, and it will lead to dramatic changes in the shape and structure of corporations. A broad set of process standards will soon make it easy to determine whether a business capability can be improved by outsourcing it. Such standards will also help businesses compare service providers and evaluate the costs versus the benefits of outsourcing. Eventually these costs and benefits will be so visible to buyers that outsourced processes will become a commodity, and prices will drop significantly. The low costs and low risk of outsourcing will accelerate the flow of jobs offshore, force companies to reassess their strategies, and change the basis of competition. The speed with which some businesses have already adopted process standards suggests that many previously unscrutinized areas are ripe for change. In the field of technology, for instance, the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute has developed a global standard for software development processes, called the Capability Maturity Model (CMM). For companies that don't have process standards in place, it makes sense for them to create standards by working with customers, competitors, software providers, businesses that processes may be outsourced to, and objective researchers and standard-setters. Setting standards is likely to lead to the improvement of both internal and outsourced processes.

When people are your most important asset, some standard performance measures and management practices become misleading or irrelevant. This is a danger for any business whose people costs are greater than its capital costs-that is, businesses in most industries. But it is particularly true for what the authors call "people businesses": operations with high employee costs, low capital investment, and limited spending on activities, such as R&D, that are aimed at generating future revenue. If you run a people business-or a company that includes one or more of them how do you measure its true performance? Avoid the trap of relying on capital-oriented metrics, such as return on assets and return on equity. They won't help much, as they'll tend to mask weak performance or indicate volatility where it doesn't exist. Replace them with financially rigorous people-oriented metrics-for example, a reformulation of a conventional calculation of economic profit, such as EVA, so that you gauge people, rather than capital, productivity. Once you have assessed the business's true performance, you need to enhance it operationally (be aware that relatively small changes in productivity can have a major impact on shareholder returns); reward it appropriately (push performance-related variable compensation schemes down into the organization); and price it advantageously (because economies of scale and experience tend to be less significant in people businesses, price products or services in ways that capture a share of the additional value created for customers).

Corporate treasurers and chief financial officers have become adept at quantifying and managing a wide variety of risks: financial (for example, currency fluctuations), hazard (chemical spills), and operational (computer system failures). To defend themselves, they use tried-and-true tools such as hedging, insurance, and backup systems. Some companies have even adopted the concept of enterprise risk management, integrating available risk management techniques in a comprehensive, organization-wide approach. But most managers have not addressed in a systematic way the greatest threat of all--strategic risks, the array of external events and trends that can devastate a company's growth trajectory and shareholder value. Strategic risks go beyond such familiar challenges as the possible failure of an acquisition or a product launch. A new technology may overtake your product. Gradual shifts in the market may slowly erode one of your brands beyond the point of viability. Or rapidly shifting customer priorities may suddenly change your industry. The key to surviving these strategic risks, the authors say, is knowing how to assess and respond to them. In this article, they lay out a method for identifying and responding to strategic threats. They categorize the risks into seven major classes (industry, technology, brand, competitor, customer, project, and stagnation) and describe a particularly dangerous example within each category. The authors also offer countermeasures to take against these risks and describe how individual companies (American Express, Coach, and Air Liquide, among them) have deployed them to neutralize a threat and, in many cases, capitalize on it. Besides limiting the downside of risk, strategic-risk management forces executives to think more systematically about the future, thus helping them identify opportunities for growth.

Most executives would say that adding a point of growth and gaining a point of operating-profit margin contribute about equally to shareholder value. Margin improvements hit the bottom line immediately, while growth compounds value over time. But the reality is that the two are rarely equivalent. Growth often is far more valuable than managers think. For some companies, convincing the market that they can grow by just one additional percentage point can be worth six, seven, or even ten points of margin improvement. This article presents a new strategic metric, called the relative value of growth (RVG), which gives managers a clear picture of how growth projects and margin improvement initiatives affect shareholder value. Using basic balance sheet and income sheet data, managers can determine their companies' RVGs, as well as those of their competitors. Calculating RVGs gives managers insights into which corporate strategies are working to deliver value and whether their companies are pulling the most powerful value-creation levers. The author examines a number of well-known companies and explains what their RVG numbers say about their strategies. He reviews the unspoken assumption that growth and profits are incompatible over the long term and shows that a fair number of companies are effective at delivering both. Finally, he explains how managers can use the RVG framework to help them define strategies that balance growth and profitability at both the corporate and business unit levels.

To find the secrets of business success, what could be more natural than studying successful businesses? In fact, nothing could be more dangerous, warns this Stanford professor. Generalizing from the examples of successful companies is like generalizing about New England weather from data taken only in the summer. That's essentially what businesspeople do when they learn from good examples and what consultants, authors, and researchers do when they study only existing companies or--worse yet--only high-performing companies. They reach conclusions from unrepresentative data samples, falling into the classic statistical trap of selection bias. Drawing on a wealth of case studies, for instance, one researcher concluded that great leaders share two key traits: They persist, often despite initial failures, and they are able to persuade others to join them. But those traits are also the hallmarks of spectacularly unsuccessful entrepreneurs, who must persist in the face of failure to incur large losses and must be able to persuade others to pour their money down the drain. To discover what makes a business successful, then, managers should look at both successes and failures. Otherwise, they will overvalue risky business practices, seeing only those companies that won big and not the ones that lost dismally. They will not be able to tell if their current good fortune stems from smart business practices or if they are actually coasting on past accomplishments or good luck. Fortunately, economists have developed relatively simple tools that can correct for selection bias even when data about failed companies are hard to come by. Success may be inspirational, but managers are more likely to find the secrets of high performance if they give the stories of their competitors'failures as full a hearing as they do the stories of dazzling successes.

If company leaders were granted a single wish, it would surely be for a reliable way to create new growth businesses. Business practitioners'overwhelming interest in this subject prompted the authors to conduct a three-year study of organizational growth--specifically, to find out which growth strategies were most successful. They discovered, somewhat to their surprise, that even companies in mature industries found rich new sources of growth when they reconfigured their unit of business (what they bill customers for) or their key metrics (how they measure success). In this article, the authors outline these and other moves companies can make to redefine their profit drivers and realize low-risk growth. They offer plenty of real-world examples. For instance: CHANGING YOUR UNIT OF BUSINESS: Once a conventional printing house, Madden Communications not only prints promotional materials for customers but also manages the distribution and installation of those materials on-site. Its revenues grew from dollars 1o million in 1990 to dollars 133 million in 2004, in an industry that many had come to regard as hopelessly mature. IMPROVING YOUR KEY METRICS-PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVITY: Lamons Gasket, with dollars 80 million in revenues, built a Web site that radically improved its customers' ability to find, order, and pay for goods. The firm's market share rose along with its customer retention rate. The authors also suggest ways to identify your unit of business and associated key metrics and recognize the obstacles to changing them; review the key customer segments you serve; assess the need for new capabilities and the potential for internal resistance to change; and communicate to internal and external constituencies the changes you wish to make in your unit of business or key metrics.

Customer Strategy Solutions, a California-based developer of order-fulfillment systems, is facing a shakedown. Six months after the firm's CEO, Pavlo Zhuk, set up a software development center in Kiev, local bureaucrats say the company hasn't filed all the tax schedules it should have. Moreover, Ukrainian tax officials claim that the company owes the government tax arrears. Zhuk is shocked; he and his colleagues have done everything by the book. This isn't the first time Zhuk has encountered trouble in Ukraine. In the process of getting the development center up and running, a state-owned telecommunications utility had made it difficult for Zhuk to get the phone lines his company needed. Senior telecom manager Vasyl Feodorovych Mylofienko had told Zhuk it would take three years to install the lines in his office-but for a certain price, Mylofienko had added, the lines could be functioning the following week. Even as the picture of rampant bribery and corruption in Ukraine becomes clear, Zhuk still doesn't want to pull out of the country. Of Ukrainian descent, he has dreams of helping to modernize the country. By paying his programmers more than they could make at any local company, he hopes to raise their standard of living so they can afford three meals a day without having to barter, stand in queues for hours, or moonlight. And yet, he isn't sure he can keep compromising his principles for the sake of the greater good. Should Customer Strategy Solutions pay off the Ukrainian tax officials? Commenting on this fictional case study are Alan L. Boeckmann, the chairman and CEO of Fluor Corporation; Rafael Di Tella, a professor at Harvard Business School; Thomas W. Dunfee, the Kolodny Professor of Social Responsibility and a professor of legal studies at Wharton; and Bozidar Djelic, the former finance and economy minister of Serbia.

As globalization changes the basis of competition, sourcing is moving from the periphery of corporate functions to the core. Always important in terms of costs, sourcing is becoming a strategic opportunity. But few companies are ready for this shift. Outsourcing has grown so sophisticated that even critical functions like engineering, R&D, manufacturing, and marketing can-and often should-be moved outside. And that, in turn, is changing the way companies think about their organizations, their value chains, and their competitive positions. Already, a handful of vanguard companies are transforming what used to be purely internal corporate functions into entirely new industries. Companies like UPS, Solectron, and Hewitt have created new business models by concentrating scale and skill within a single function. As these and other function-based companies grow, so does the potential value of outsourcing to all companies. Migrating from a vertically integrated company to a specialized provider of a single function is not a winning strategy for everyone. But all companies need to rigorously reassess each of their functions as possible outsourcing candidates. Presented in this article is a simple three-step process to identify which functions your company needs to own and protect, which can be best performed by what kinds of partners, and which could be turned into new business opportunities. The result of such an analysis will be a comprehensive capabilities-sourcing strategy. As a detailed examination of 7-Eleven's experience shows, the success of the strategy often hinges on the creativity with which partnerships are organized and managed. But only by first taking a broad, strategic view of capabilities sourcing can your company gain the greatest benefit from all of its sourcing choices.

Most companies serve customers through a broad array of interfaces, from retail sales clerks to Web sites to voice-response telephone systems. But while the typical company has an impressive interface collection, it doesn't have an interface system. That is, the whole set does not add up to the sum of its parts in its ability to provide service and build customer relationships. Too many people and too many machines operating with insufficient coordination (and often at cross-purposes) mean rising complexity, costs, and customer dissatisfaction. In a world where companies compete not on what they sell but on how they sell it, turning that liability into an asset is what separates winners from losers. In this adaptation of their forthcoming book by the same title, Jeffrey Rayport and Bernard Jaworski explain how companies must reengineer their customer interface systems for optimal efficiency and effectiveness. Part of that transformation, they observe, will involve a steady encroachment by machine interfaces into areas that have long been the sacred province of humans. Managers now have opportunities unprecedented in the history of business to use machines, not just people, to credibly manage their interactions with customers. Because people and machines each have their strengths and weaknesses, company executives must identify what people do best, what machines do best, and how to deploy them separately and together. Front-office reengineering subjects every current and potential service interface to an analysis of opportunities for substitution (using machines instead of people), complementarity (using a mix of machines and people), and displacement (using networks to shift physical locations of people and machines), with the twin objectives of compressing costs and driving top-line growth through increased customer value.

In the past few years, companies have become aware that they can slash costs by offshoring: moving jobs to lower-wage locations. But this practice is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how globalization can transform industries, according to research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI). The institute's yearlong study suggests that by streamlining their production processes and supply chains globally, rather than just nationally or regionally, companies can lower their costs-as we've seen in the consumer-electronics and PC industries. Companies can save as much as 70% of their total costs through globalization--50% from offshoring, 5% from training and business-task redesign, and 15% from process improvements. But they don't have to stop there. The cost reductions make it possible to lower prices and expand into new markets, attracting whole new classes of customers. To date, however, few businesses have recognized the full scope of performance improvements that globalization makes possible, much less developed sound strategies for capturing those opportunities. In this article, Diana Farrell, director of MGI, offers a step-by-step approach to doing both things. Among her suggestions: Assess where your industry falls along the globalization spectrum, because not all sectors of the economy face the same challenges and opportunities at the same time. Also, pay attention to production, regulatory, and organizational barriers to globalization. If any of these can be changed, size up the cost-saving (and revenue-generating) opportunities that will emerge for your company as a result of those changes. Farrell also defines the five stages of globalization-market entry, product specialization, value chain disaggregation, value chain reengineering, and the creation of new markets-and notes the different levers for cutting costs and creating value that companies can use in each phase.

The strength of the American economy does not rest on its manufacturing prowess, its natural resources, or the size of its market. It turns on one factor--the country's openness to new ideas, which has allowed it to attract the brightest minds from around the world and harness their creative energies. But the United States is on the verge of losing that competitive edge. As the nation tightens its borders to students and scientists and subjects federal research funding to ideological and religious litmus tests, many other countries are stepping in to lure that creative capital away. Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, and others are spending more on research and development and shoring up their universities in an effort to attract the world's best--including Americans. If even a few of these nations draw away just a small percentage of the creative workers from the U.S., the effect on its economy will be enormous. In this article, the author introduces a quantitative measure of the migration of creative capital called the Global Creative-Class Index. It shows that, far from leading the world, the United States doesn't even rank in the top ten in the percentage of its workforce engaged in creative occupations. What's more, the baby boomers will soon retire. And data showing large drops in foreign student applications to U.S. universities and in the number of visas issued to knowledge workers, along with concomitant increases in immigration in other countries, suggest that the erosion of talent from the United States will only intensify. To defend the U.S. economy, the business community must take the lead in ensuring that global talent can move efficiently across borders, that education and research are funded at radically higher levels, and that we tap into the creative potential of more and more workers. Because wherever creativity goes, economic growth is sure to follow.

Despite a long-term decline in the circus industry, Cirque du Soleil profitably increased revenue 22-fold over the last ten years by reinventing the circus. Rather than competing within the confines of the existing industry or trying to steal customers from rivals, Cirque developed uncontested market space that made the competition irrelevant. Cirque created what the authors call a blue ocean, a previously unknown market space. In blue oceans, demand is created rather than fought over. There is ample opportunity for growth that is both profitable and rapid. In red oceans--that is, in all the industries already existing--companies compete by grabbing for a greater share of limited demand. As the market space gets more crowded, prospects for profits and growth decline. Products turn into commodities, and increasing competition turns the water bloody. There are two ways to create blue oceans. One is to launch completely new industries, as eBay did with online auctions. But it's much more common for a blue ocean to be created from within a red ocean when a company expands the boundaries of an existing industry. In studying more than 150 blue ocean creations in over 30 industries, the authors observed that the traditional units of strategic analysis--company and industry--are of limited use in explaining how and why blue oceans are created. The most appropriate unit of analysis is the strategic move, the set of managerial actions and decisions involved in making a major market-creating business offering. Creating blue oceans builds brands. So powerful is blue ocean strategy, in fact, that a blue ocean strategic move can create brand equity that lasts for decades.

Employers are beginning to realize that they face a nearly invisible but significant drain on productivity: presenteeism, the problem of workers' being on the job but, because of illness or other medical conditions, not fully functioning. By some estimates, the phenomenon costs U.S. companies over 150 billion dollars a year--much more than absenteeism does. Yet it's harder to identify. You know when someone doesn't show up for work, but you often can't tell when, or how much, poor health hurts on-the-job performance. Many of the health problems that result in presenteeism are relatively benign. Research in this emerging area of study focuses on such chronic or episodic ailments as seasonal allergies, asthma, headaches, depression, back pain, arthritis, and gastrointestinal disorders. The fact is, when people don't feel good, they simply don't perform at their best. Employees who suffer from depression may be fatigued and irritable--and, therefore, less able to work effectively with others. Those with migraine headaches who experience blurred vision and sensitivity to light, not to mention acute pain, probably have a hard time staring at a computer screen all day. A number of companies are making a serious effort to determine the prevalence of illnesses and other medical conditions that undermine job performance, calculate the related drop in productivity, and find cost-effective ways to combat that loss. Indeed, researchers have discovered that presenteeism-related declines in productivity sometimes can be more than offset by relatively small investments in screening, treatment, and education. So organizations may find that it pays to make targeted investments in employees' health care--by covering the cost of allergy medication, for instance, or therapy for depression.

The headlines are filled with the sorry tales of companies like Vivendi and AOL Time Warner that tried to use mergers and acquisitions to grow big fast or transform fundamentally weak business models. But, drawing on extensive data and experience, the authors conclude that major deals make sense in only two circumstances: when they reinforce a company's existing basis of competition or when they help a company make the shift, as the industry's competitive base changes. In most stable industries, the authors contend, only one basis--superior cost position, brand power, consumer loyalty, real-asset advantage, or government protection--leads to industry leadership, and companies should do only those deals that bolster a strategy to capitalize on that competitive base. That's what Kellogg did when it acquired Keebler. Rather than bow to price pressures from lesser players, Kellogg sought to strengthen its existing basis of competition--its brand--through Keebler's innovative distribution system. A company coping with a changing industry should embark on a series of acquisitions (most likely coupled with divestitures) aimed at moving the firm to the new competitive basis. That's what Comcast did when changes in government regulations fundamentally altered the broadcast industry. In such cases, speed is essential, the investments required are huge, and half-measures can be worse than nothing at all. Still, the research shows, successful acquirers are not those that try to swallow a single, large, supposedly transformative deal but those that go to the M&A table often and take small bites. Deals can fuel growth--as long as they're anchored in the fundamental way money is made in your industry. Fail to understand that and no amount of integration planning will keep you and your shareholders from bearing the high cost of your mistakes.

It's time to rethink global branding. More than two decades ago, Harvard Business School professor Theodore Levitt argued that corporations should grow by selling standardized products all over the world. But consumers in most countries had trouble relating to generic products, so executives instead strove for global scale on backstage activities such as production while customizing product features and selling techniques to local tastes. Such "glocal" strategies now rule marketing. Global branding has lost more luster recently because transnational companies have been under siege, with brands like Coca-Cola and Nike becoming lightning rods for antiglobalization protests. The instinctive reaction of most transnational companies has been to try to fly below the radar. But global brands can't escape notice. In fact, most transnational corporations don't realize that because of their power and pervasiveness, people view them differently than they do other firms. In a research project involving 3,300 consumers in 41 countries, the authors found that most people choose one global brand over another because of differences in the brands'global qualities. Ratherthan ignore the global characteristics of their brands, firms must learn to manage those characteristics. That's critical, because future growth for most companies will likely come from foreign markets. Consumers base preferences on three dimensions of global brands--quality (signaled by a company's global stature); the cultural myths that brands author; and firms' efforts to address social problems. The authors also found that it didn't matter to consumers whether the brands they bought were American--a remarkable finding considering that the study was conducted when anti-American sentiment in many nations was on the rise.

By making the most of organizational capabilities--employees' collective skills and fields of expertise--you can dramatically improve your company's market value. Although there is no magic list of proficiencies that every organization needs in order to succeed, the authors identify 11 intangible assets that well-managed companies tend to have: talent, speed, shared mind-set and coherent brand identity, accountability, collaboration, learning, leadership, customer connectivity, strategic unity, innovation, and efficiency. Such companies typically excel in only three of these capabilities while maintaining industry parity in the other areas. Organizations that fall below the norm in any of the 11 are likely candidates for dysfunction and competitive disadvantage. So you can determine how your company fares in these categories (or others, if the generic list doesn't suit your needs), the authors explain how to conduct a "capabilities audit," describing in particular the experiences and findings of two companies that recently performed such audits. In addition to highlighting which intangible assets are most important given the organization's history and strategy, this exercise will gauge how well your company delivers on its capabilities and will guide you in developing an action plan for improvement. A capabilities audit can work for an entire organization, a business unit, or a region--indeed, for any part of a company that has a strategy to generate financial or customer-related results. It enables executives to assess overall company strengths and weaknesses, senior leaders to define strategy, midlevel managers to execute strategy, and frontline leaders to achieve tactical results. In short, it helps turn intangible assets into concrete strengths.

Intangible assets--patents and know-how, brands, a skilled workforce, strong customer relationships, software, unique processes and organizational designs, and the like--generate most of a company's growth and shareholder value. Yet extensive research indicates that investors systematically misprice the shares of intangibles-intensive enterprises. Clearly, overpricing wastes capital. But underpricing raises the cost of capital, hamstringing executives in their efforts to take advantage of further growth opportunities. How do you break this vicious cycle? By generating better information about your investments in intangibles, and by disclosing at least some of that data to the capital markets. Getting at that information is easier said than done, however. There are no markets generating visible prices for intellectual capital, brands, or human capital to assist investors in correctly valuing intangibles-intensive companies. And current accounting practices lump funds spent on intangibles with general expenses, so that investors and executives don't even know how much is being invested in them, let alone what a return on those investments might be. At the very least, companies should break out the amounts spent on intangibles and disclose them to the markets. More fundamentally, executives should start thinking of intangibles not as costs but as assets, so that they are recognized as investments whose returns are identified and monitored. The proposals laid down in this article are only a beginning, the author stresses. Corporations and accounting bodies should make systematic efforts to develop information that can reliably reflect the unique attributes of intangible assets. The current serious misallocations of resources should be incentive enough for businesses to join--and even lead--such developments.

During the dot-com boom, many people saw the potential for new communication technologies to enable radically new business models, but they were far too optimistic about the speed with which the revolution would occur. Now, as the bitter disillusionment of the dot-com bust begins to fade, we have a chance to think again--this time more rationally--about how best to take advantage of the remarkable changes these new technologies are gradually making possible. One such change is the ability to create markets inside companies, allowing decision making to be decentralized and introducing some of the efficiency, flexibility, and motivating influence of free markets. In this article, the author examines this nascent form of business organization, exploring the benefits as well as the potential risks. BP, for example, met its goal of reducing the company's greenhouse gas emissions nine years ahead of schedule, not by setting and enforcing targets for each division but by allowing business unit heads to buy and sell emissions permits among themselves using an electronic trading system. And Hewlett-Packard recently experimented with a system that allowed employees to buy and sell predictions about likely printer sales, using a kind of futures contract. The markets ended up predicting the actual printer sales with much more accuracy than official HP forecasts. At a fundamental level, these changes are enabled by the fact that electronic technologies allow information to be widely shared at little cost. This simple fact has a profound implication for organizing businesses. When more people have more information, they can use it to make their own well-informed decisions, appropriate to local circumstances, instead of following orders from above. As a result, even very large companies can benefit from the collective wisdom of their employees.

Deal making is glamorous; due diligence is not. That simple statement goes a long way toward explaining why so many companies have made so many acquisitions that have produced so little value. The momentum of a transaction is hard to resist once senior management has the target in its sights. Companies contract "deal fever," and due diligence all too often becomes an exercise in verifying the target's financial statements rather than conducting a fair analysis of the deal's strategic logic and the acquirer's ability to realize value from it. Seldom does the process lead managers to kill potential acquisitions, even when the deals are deeply flawed. In a recent Bain & Company survey of 250 international executives with M&A responsibilities, only 30% of them were satisfied with the rigor of their due diligence. And fully a third admitted they hadn't walked away from deals they had nagging doubts about. In this article, the authors, all Bain consultants, emphasize the importance of comprehensive due diligence practices and suggest ways companies can improve their capabilities in this area. They provide rich real-world examples of companies that have had varying levels of success with their due diligence processes, including Safeway, Odeon, American Sea-foods, and Kellogg's. Effective due diligence requires answering four basic questions: What are we really buying? What is the target's stand-alone value? Where are the synergies--and the skeletons? And what's our walk-away price? Each of these questions will prompt an even deeper level of querying that puts the broader, strategic rationale for acquisitions under a microscope. Successful acquirers pay close heed to the results of such in-depth investigations and analyses--to the extent that they are prepared to walk away from a deal, even in the very late stages of negotiations.

Ask senior managers to pare costs by 10%, and they know just what to do. Ask them to boost growth by 10%, and they're stymied, assuming that growth is not really something they can influence. But managers can control their company's growth if they have better information about where their revenues are coming from. Rather than sort sales by geographic market, business unit, or product line, they should break them out in a way that reveals which part of their strategy is responsible for what part of their revenue. This article presents a tool--the sources of revenue statement (SRS)--that does just that. Through straightforward calculations using data taken from a company's balance sheet, along with estimations of customer-churn and industry growth rates, the SRS enables managers to classify their revenue according to five sources of growth: continuing sales to established customers (base retention); sales won from the competition (share gain); sales that fell into their laps because the market was expanding (market position); sales from moves into adjacent markets; and sales from entirely new lines of business. Once sorted in this way, revenue can be viewed as the outgrowth of manageable circumstances. At one company, seemingly healthy 10% total revenue growth masked substantial customer defections counter-balanced only by sales in a fast-expanding market--a market that actually grew faster than the company did. Rather than doing well, the company was ceding customers and market share to competitors. Comparing the sources of revenue across divisions can uncover similarly profound insights, which can suggest smart ways to change strategy or set stretch goals. Hundreds of companies are perched atop enormous potential that they can't see and so don't exploit. The SRS can endow them with sight and, more important, with understanding.

Multinational companies are the driving force behind globalization, but they are also the source of many of its most painful consequences, including currency crises, cross-border pollution, and overfishing. These problems remain unsolved because they are beyond the scope of individual governments; transnational organizations have also proved unequal to the task. Nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations have leaped into the breach. To force policy changes, they have seized on all forms of modern persuasion to influence public sentiment toward global traders, manufacturers, and investors. By partnering with NGOs instead of opposing them, companies can avoid costly conflict and can use NGOs' assets to gain competitive advantage. So far, however, most companies have proved ill equipped to deal with NGOs. Large companies know how to compete on the basis of product attributes and price. But NGO attacks focus on production methods and their spillover effects, which are often noneconomic. Similarly, NGOs are able to convert companies' standard competitive strengths--such as size and wide market awareness of their brands--into liabilities. That's because the wealthier and better known a company is, the juicier the target it makes. Emboldened by their successes, NGOs continue to take on new causes. By partnering with NGOs instead of reflexively opposing them, companies could draw on NGOs' key strengths--legitimacy, awareness of social forces, distinct networks, and specialized technical expertise--which most companies could use more of. And with NGOs as allies and guides, companies should also be able to accelerate innovation, foresee shifts in demand, shape legislation affecting them, and, in effect, set technical and regulatory standards for their industries.

Most brands don't make much money. Year after year, businesses generate 80% to 90% of their profits from less than 20% of their brands. Yet most companies tend to ignore loss-making brands, unaware of the hidden costs they incur. That's because executives believe it's easy to erase a brand; they have only to stop investing in it, they assume, and it will die a natural death. But they're wrong. When companies drop brands clumsily, they antagonize loyal customers: Research shows that seven times out of eight, when firms merge two brands, the market share of the new brand never reaches the combined share of the two original ones. It doesn't have to be that way. Smart companies use a four-step process to kill brands methodically. First, CEOs make the case for rationalization by getting groups of senior executives to conduct joint audits of the brand portfolio. These audits make the need to prune brands apparent throughout the organization. In the next stage, executives need to decide how many brands will be retained, which they do either by setting broad parameters that all brands must meet or by identifying the brands they need in order to cater to all the customer segments in their markets. Third, executives must dispose of the brands they've decided to drop, deciding in each case whether it is appropriate to merge, sell, milk, or just eliminate the brand outright. Finally, it's critical that executives invest the resources they've freed to grow the brands they've retained. Done right, dropping brands will result in a company poised for new growth from the source where it's likely to be found--its profitable brands.

In late 2001, the directors of Pfizer asked that very question. And with good reason. After its 2000 merger with rival Warner-Lambert, the New York-based pharmaceutical giant found itself sitting on a net cash position of $8 billion, which seemed extraordinarily conservative for a company whose products generated $30 billion in revenues. Most large companies with revenues that healthy would increase leverage, thereby unlocking tremendous value for shareholders. But knowledge-intensive companies like Pfizer, this author argues, are in a class apart. Because their largely intangible assets (like R&D) are highly volatile and cannot easily be valued, they are more vulnerable to financial distress than are firms with a preponderance of tangible assets. To insure against that risk, they need to maintain large positive cash balances. These companies' decisions to run large cash balances is one of the key reasons their shares sustain consistent premiums. Only by investing in their intangible assets can knowledge-based companies hope to preserve the value of those assets. A company that finds itself unable to do so because unfavorable market conditions reduce its operating cash flows will see its share price suffer almost as much as if it were to default on its debts. By the same token, with the right balance sheet, knowledge companies can profitably insure against the risk of failing to sustain value-added investments in difficult times. An optimal capital structure that calls for significant cash balances is certainly at odds with the results of a traditional capital structure analysis, the author demonstrates, but it explains the financial policies of many well-run companies, from Pfizer to Intel to ChevronTexaco.

Most multinationals see globalization as a matter of replication--spreading a single business model as widely as possible to maximize economies of scale. From this perspective, the key strategic challenge is choosing how much of the model to keep standard and how much to grudgingly adapt to local tastes. But focusing exclusively on that choice is a mistake, for it blinds companies to the very real opportunities they can still gain from arbitrage--from exploiting differences as opposed to similarities. Indeed, the scope for arbitrage is as wide as the differences that remain among countries, and those differences continue to be broad and deep. They can, in fact, be divided into four main categories--cultural, administrative, economic, and geographic. In each category, old opportunities persist and new ones are arising, sometimes very quickly. Consider the continued cachet of French culture in its wines and haute couture. Witness, too, how swiftly the Finns have become known for their expertise in wireless communications. Clearly, legal and other administrative differences, particularly in tax laws and the cost of capital, remain large. So do purely economic wage differentials, especially for knowledge workers and other skilled employees. And if modern transportation and other technologies have reduced geographic advantages and brought down the price of spices, they've also made possible expanded trade in other goods like perishable flowers and out-of-season produce. Both the differences that make arbitrage valuable and the similarities that make replication important will remain with us for the foreseeable future, and combining the two, while necessary, is tricky. But that spells competitive advantage for those companies that have the imagination to see the full range of possibilities.