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This paper investigates the major drivers of governmental redistribution. Extended and harmonised data on effective redistribution recently provided by the newest version of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database allows for the assessment of the origins of governmental redistribution for a broad sample of countries. Our findings confirm the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, pointing to a robust positive relationship between market inequality and redistribution. We show that perceptions of inequality are often biased and that the redistribution-enhancing effect of gross inequality is even stronger when individuals are aware of national income disparities. The results also suggest that top income shares tend to impede redistributive policies.

Lohnsubventionen und Kombilöhne sind ein fester Bestandteil des arbeitsmarktpolitischen Instrumentariums industrieller Länder. Sie haben das Ziel, Arbeitslose zu motivieren, auch Beschäftigungen mit geringerem Marktlohn anzunehmen sowie den Lebensstandard der Geförderten zu erhöhen und damit das Armutsrisiko zu senken. An diesen beiden Zielen setzen auch der US-amerikanische Earned Income Tax Credit und das deutsche Arbeitslosengeld II an. Die Autoren zeigen, dass das US-amerikanische Modell in beiden Evaluationsfragen ein besseres Ergebnis aufweist. 'Make work pay' strategies are an integral part of labour market policy instruments in developed countries. There are two considerations behind these measures. Firstly, subsidizing employment at the bottom of the income distribution should motivate the unemployed to accept jobs with lower market wages. Secondly, the wage supplement should increase the living standards of the recipients and reduce the risk of poverty. The U.S. EITC and the German UB II based on these two goals. Our paper begins with an overview of these two wage top-up schemes. This is followed by an empirical evaluation of the two instruments regarding their capacity to prevent in-work poverty and to strengthen labour market participation. The EITC obtains better results compared to UB II in both regards.

Are managers entrepreneurs? What motivates them to run a firm? Are managers different from self-employed firm owners? In which points do they differ? And why is it that they are different? The following article examines these questions based on a survey of German engineering firms in which managers and self-employed owners answer why they are motivated to run a firm and what hinders their firms from growing more rapidly.