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Marine ecological aquaculture is considered a robust scientific farming model, but it has not been widely promoted in China. Although some studies have examined stakeholders' interests in ecological transformation, few studies to date have analyzed the interaction mechanism of the stakeholders in ecological transformation. Therefore, drawing on evolutionary game theory, this study analyzed the different behavioral strategies and evolutionary mechanisms of the government, marine aquaculture farmers, and aquatic enterprises engaged in marine farming processes. Furthermore, a numerical simulation was conducted to evaluate the rationality of the theoretical model. The results show that several factors affected the ecological transformation of mariculture. Government subsidies reduced farmers' and aquatic enterprises' costs of adopting ecological farming. The government's increasing fines for aquaculture pollution slowed down the speed of the system to a stable point. The cost of adopting ecological farming by farmers and aquatic enterprises will affect their decision to adopt or invest in it. The increase in the market price of eco-aquatic products helped accelerate the ecological transformation of mariculture. The brand effect obtained by aquatic enterprises by investing in ecological farming helped increase participation to further improve this practice. In terms of policy implications, we recommend the promotion and guidance of marine aquaculture technology, government support and investment, environmental control of the aquaculture industry, and brand building of eco-aquatic products to transform and upgrade marine aquaculture farming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Green innovation is an important way for enterprises to achieve high-quality economic development, and it is also the way to achieve the goal of double carbon. Green innovation has therefore become a research hotspot. With the acceleration of the digitalization process in equipment enterprises, intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises located at the top of the industrial chain are in urgent need of green core technology innovation activities. In order to explore the internal mechanism of core green technology innovation, this research introduces reputation theory into the evolutionary game analysis process. By constructing an evolutionary game model between the government and intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises, this research analyzes the dynamic factors that affect the selection and evolution of the main strategies of the players in the evaluation game. The results show that corporate reputation, core green technology innovation profit, government subsidies, government reputation, and the cost for the government to support core technology, among other factors, importantly affect the game between the government and the enterprises. At the same time, since both the government and the enterprises are affected by the initial state and the maximization of the interests of both sides of the game, it is difficult for them to spontaneously reach an ideal stable and balanced state through a virtuous circle. The greater the profits and the reputation premium the core green technology innovation brings to the enterprises, the more favorable it is for the enterprises to choose core green technology innovation; government subsidies within a certain range will also drive enterprises to choose core green technology innovation. When the value of enterprise core green technology innovation is low, the cost for the government to support core green technology innovation is lower, enterprises will lose more opportunities and decline in global competitiveness, and it will become more favorable for the government to evolve towards supporting core green technology innovation. On the contrary, the government will gradually transfer its tangible hand to the intangible hand of the market based on the consideration of subsidies, innovation costs, and reputation. The results of this research are intended to provide a theoretical basis and practical reference for Chinese intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises to better achieve green core technology innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government subsidies (GSs) have triggered a remarkable increase in the production capacity of photovoltaic (PV) electricity in China. However, the lack of core technologies has limited PV enterprises' competitiveness in the global market. This research investigates the impacts of R&D subsidies and non-R&D subsidies on the innovation in PV enterprises. With samples of Chinese listed PV enterprises from 2010 to 2019, this study finds R&D subsidies exert a notable positive impact on the innovation in PV enterprises. In small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and enterprises without state-owned shares, both R&D subsidies and non-R&D subsidies have positive impacts on the innovation. Considering the policy orientation, R&D subsidies granted under demand-orientation policies promote the innovation in PV enterprises. The government should increase the amount of R&D subsidies, optimize the R&D subsidies' evaluation mechanism, and reasonably grant R&D subsidies from the demand side. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]