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In the period following World War II, the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, experienced a pivotal moment in its history due to the split with the Cominform and the subsequent break in relations with the Soviet Union, leading to a profound military and foreign policy transformation in Belgrade. This period can be seen as a continuation of the rebellious pragmatic line that had already been outlined during World War II, when Yugoslav communists, in contrast to the Eastern Bloc countries, gained power almost independently through their own struggle. The realization that external powers, in this case the Soviet Union, could not simply dictate domestic or foreign policy decisions was crucial for Belgrade's strategic shift. Threats of a military attack from the Eastern Bloc forced the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia to seek aid and support, particularly military, from the West. These activities were particularly evident on the diplomatic front. This research reveals the complexity and dynamism of Yugoslav foreign policy, which Belgrade faced in its efforts to maintain its sovereignty. In this context, the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia gradually became an example of how to maintain a delicate balance between the superpowers. This shift and the steps taken by Belgrade are key to understanding Yugoslavia's role in international relations and its status during that period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution examines the work of Josip Smodlaka, a Croatian lawyer and diplomat who travelled to Rome at the end of the Second World War on a secret mission under the instructions of Josip Broz - Tito and Edvard Kardelj. The purpose of the mission was to assess whether there could be a direct agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy regarding the new border and, above all, the allegiance of Trieste. His mission, however, proved to be fruitless as no agreement was reached. None of the parties involved was prepared to make any compromises. While Italy refused to recognise or at least repent for the crimes they had committed during the Second World War, Yugoslavia was unwilling to accept the terms laid out by Italy, which insisted on first resolving the issue of the deportations from the Julian March. The failure of Josip Smodlaka's mission, which lasted from October 1945 to January 1946, was thus also the failure of the first attempt to reach a direct agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses Slovenian–German relations, with a particular focus on the period between December 1990 and June 1991. The author takes a look at the positions that the Federal Republic of Germany assumed with regard to the plebiscite in Slovenia and recognition of Slovenian independence, as well as the circumstances (national and international) that led Germany to these positions. The article finds that as late as the spring of 1991 the official German policy was preserving the integrity of Yugoslavia, while it was already aware this might be an unrealistic wish. This is why it foresaw Slovenian and Croatian independence as one of the possibilities. When war in Slovenia broke out, Germany saw that Yugoslavia was gone, so it took a completely different stance than only weeks before. This was also reflected in its active engagement for swift international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on an analysis of mostly unpublished primary sources held by the British National Archives in London, this paper shows the work of the Inter-allied Plebiscite Commission, which operated between July and November 1920 in the area where the Carinthia plebiscite was held, and problems, it was facing. The Plebiscite Commission successfully carried out its primary job, which was defined by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, that was to conduct the plebiscite. At its meetings the Commission passed provisions and agreements that interfered especially in the administration of the plebiscite area, which it was not allowed to do by the Treaty. On the other hand it had the power to take measures to ensure free, fair and secret ballot. At the meetings, it is observed agreements on several occasions the Yugoslav representative disagreement with the passed agreements as well as the disparity between the French and the Italian representative. The doings of General Rudolf Maister were also troubling to the Commission, what was repeatedly complained by the British representative of the Commission Sydney Capel Peck, who was also its president. He also demanded his removal from the plebiscite area. There are no reports of Maister's presence in October and that suggests that Peck was successful in his request. In addition to the minutes of the Commission's meetings, British sources also provide us with an insight into the correspondence between the British representative and the Foreign Office. On this basis there is possible to determine the consistency of the British representative regarding the sending of data of the situation in the plebiscite area, his observations and internal comments by the officials of the British Foreign Office. This is especially interesting due to the fact that the British representative often had a key role by the passing of the Commission's agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into the process of setting up an independent diplomatic apparatus of the Republic of Slovenia. It aims to shed light on the role of Slovenian paradiplomats (particularly business representatives) in the country's independence process, as well as highlight the importance of diplomats who worked in the Yugoslav service and helped lay the foundations for the diplomacy of independent Slovenia. The article brings three fi ndings. First, business representations abroad played an extremely important role in the outset of forming Slovenia's diplomacy. Second, Slovenians in the federal foreign ministry provided great support by working hard to provide Slovenia with as much information as possible for shaping its position in the independence process and the mustering of international support for recognition. Third, the beginning of independent Slovenia's diplomacy required much enthusiasm and diplomatic innovation, which faded into history when they were limited by the framework of the entire system, once the diplomatic apparatus was formed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article picks up the documents kept in the main British archives in London (The National Archives), with the intent to look back for hundred years and trace some considerations on the context that brought Italy, Great Britain, Russia and France to sign the Memorandum of London (known as the Pact of London) on April 26, 1915. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Yugoslavia's relationship with India during the early Cold War years represents one of the most important and most understudied research topics. This article primarily deals with the professional biography of Ambassador Dušan Kveder, one of Yugoslavia's most gifted and capable diplomats. His life is largely observed in the light of Indo-Yugoslav relations during the late 1950s and early 1960s. During this period, Ambassador Kveder was closely associated with the process of developing Yugoslavia's ties with leading Afro-Asian countries. At fi rst, for a short period of time he was ambassador to Ethiopia, while in 1958 he became Yugoslavia's fi fth ambassador to India. Essentially, Kveder was closely connected with all important events that took place in the history of Yugoslavia's relations with India, as well as in contemporary Indian history. He was a shrewd and analytical observer of such events like the Sino-Indian border conflict and India's peculiar relationship with other nonaligned countries. He also made a significant personal contribution to the successful evolution of Indo-Yugoslav relations to a full strategic partnership. This article is based on newly declassified documents from the Serbian, Indian, Chinese, and Russian archives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The beginning of war in Korea in the summer of 1950 caused the most serious Cold War crisis since the end of the Second World War which threatened to overgrow the local frames and turn into a global confrontation. In these moments, Yugoslavia was in unenviable international position. It faced political, economic and military pressures of its former allies - the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern bloc and it had uncertain and difficult dialogues on possible economic and military assistance. Even though it was politically and economically drained, Yugoslavia took a neutral position which was based on the distance from the attitudes of two confronted military blocs and insistence on the respect of principles of sovereignty, inviolability of borders, non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign countries, disapproval of international interventionism and aggressive moves in international relations in the organs of the United Nations where it was a non-permanent member of the Security Council during 1950. In the beginning it was lonely in this attitude, however, a certain number of countries which were not engaged in blocs supported Yugoslav attitude. The proclaimed principles of Yugoslav foreign policy became basic postulates of its approach to international problems until it disintegrated in 1991/92. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article, the author presents diplomatic activities of diplomats of Slovene origin, serving at the Royal Yugoslav Legations during the Second World War. Particular attention is paid to the correspondence between Slovene diplomats and politicians, presenting insights into different political opinions within the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile. Due to the increasing strength of Tito and the communist leadership, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia continued to exist only in the correspondence of its ministers and diplomats. But the question as to what policy was to replace it was a great perplexity to all. The two most prominent Slovene diplomats were Izidor Cankar and Vladimir Rybá?, both serving during the World War in North America, the former as Royal Envoy in Canada, the latter as "Nr. 2" at the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington. Being originally ardent anti-Communists, they soon noticed that the armed resistance against the Axis Powers in Yugoslavia launched by Tito's communists was well received with the Western Allies. After the political agreement Tito-Šubašić in 1944, they were both included in the combined team of old and new diplomats who were ready to accommodate to the coming communist regime. However, Rybář suddenly died in 1946, whereas Cankar was able to stay in the diplomatic service only for a brief period of time. Nevertheless, the new team of communist-oriented diplomats was ready to take over. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While struggling for power in Yugoslavia during WWII, the CPY strove to purge the diplomatic apparatus of those people whom it considered enemies of the Party and to replace them by reliable persons. Thus, some Yugoslav diplomatic missions had been taken over by the partisans already during the war and staffed with its men, particularly after the Tito-Šubašić agreement. During November 1944 the commissioner for foreign affairs of the NKOJ (the partisan interim government), Josip Smodlaka, took over the post of Yugoslav delegate with the Allied Advisory Council for Italy. In March 1944 the representative in the USSR, ambassador Stanoje Simić, renounced loyalty to the Royal Government. Until the end of 1944 Šubašić's government replaced ambassadors in the USA, Konstantin Fotić, the ambassador to London, Bogoljub Jeftić, in Sweden, Aleksandar Avakumović, the representative in Bern, Momčilo Jurišić, as well as the delegate with De Gaulle's Committee, Jovan Đonović. After Tito's government had been formed, new ambassadors in several important countries were appointed (Stanoje Simić in the USA, Vladimir Popović in the USSR, Ljubo Leontić in the UK, Marko Ristić in France, Božin Simić in Turkey). Although people loyal to the CPY were appointed, it didn't have dominance among diplomatic staff immediately after the war. However, after the conflict with the Comminform, full dominance of Party cadres was established in the diplomatic service. This was achieved through recalling politically unreliable officials and those communists who no longer enjoyed confidence of the CPY and through appointing new officials who were members of the Communist Party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]