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The marginal value of transmission lines in the dispatch is widely used in the literature and has relevant practical applications related to planning the expansion of the transmission grid and computing the remuneration of merchant lines. This paper presents a general formulation of the marginal value of a line in the dispatch that highlights the dependence of this value on the link between line admittance and capacity. We discuss the value of a line according to marginal principles following a general approach and prove that only if the admittance of a line can be expressed as a linear function of its capacity, or when admittance and capacity can be deemed independent, is this value equal to the product of the difference between marginal electricity prices at both ends of the line and the flow through this line. Afterwards, we show that under a set of stylized conditions the remuneration of efficient network investments according to their marginal value in the dispatch should result in an exact recovery of their cost. Finally, we compute the marginal value of lines in a stylized, though representative, system for several relationships between line capacities and admittances to illustrate the theoretical results obtained. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Focuses on a study that developed a regulatory framework to address the issue of long-term guarantee of supply in deregulated power systems. Discussion on electricity supply problems experienced by generators and consumers; Details on the appropriate format of a reliability contract; Results and implications.

Studies the production cost minimization approach in electricity pools, including the long-term economic signals it provides and their impact on future investments. Significance of auction design for microeconomic theory; Effect of the payment minimization strategy on final dispatches; Interdependence between short-term price determination and long-term decisions.

Transmission charges aim to recover the cost of transmission network investments and provide efficient locational signals to new generators. In this paper, we investigate the effect of these charges on the development of new generation capacities in the system. Generation expansion planning is decided by strategic generation planners (SGPs) trying to maximize their profits, while transmission line investments are planned by a central planner and regulatory body aimed at minimizing the overall operation and network investment costs of the system. Regulatory transmission charges (RTCs) are calculated according to the marginal responsibility of generation investment on transmission network investment costs. An iterative algorithm is proposed to model the interaction taking place between the central planner and SGPs. The developed methodology is applied to a 2-node illustrative example and the IEEE-RTS96, and effects of RTCs on investment decisions of SGPs are analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An unprecedented process of reforms has shaken the power industry during the last two decades. In order to sell the energy produced by their plants, many generation companies are now forced to prepare and submit daily offers to an electricity market under uncertainty about the offers submitted by their rivals. In this paper, we describe a methodology to prepare optimal offers for a generation company operating in a day-ahead market organized as a series of 24 hourly uniform-price multiunit double auctions. We explicitly consider the ability of the company to affect the price of electricity as well as the company's uncertainty about rival's behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]