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The Kyoto Protocol, in its present form, is quantitatively and structurally totally inadequate to combat dangerous climate change. That is--to the authors of this paper--the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from three careful scientific studies on behalf of the Ministry of Environment of the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, two published in Beyond Kyoto--A New Global Climate Certificate System. Continuing Kyoto Commitments or a New Global Climate "Cap-and-Trade Scheme" for a Sustainable Climate Policy? (Wicke 2005) and one in Cost Impacts of a "Beyond Kyoto"-Global Cap and Trade Scheme (Wicke 2006) However, as the cited publications demonstrate, by a "structural evolution" of the climate regime, there can and should be an efficient and internationally acceptable beyond-Kyoto system. It is only necessary to combine some brilliant ideas that have already been proposed: the flexible Kyoto cap-and-trade mechanisms (emission trading between states, joint implementation, and the clean development mechanism) "invented" by US scientists and implemented in the Kyoto Protocol should be enlarged to a global cap-and-trade system, while the idea of equal per capita emission rights from India and Pakistan--which has been unfairly written off as not a serious proposal--can be the basic key to fair distribution of emission rights. Additionally, there must be economic corrections and mechanisms within such a free-market-oriented cap-and-trade scheme to make it economically acceptable for all countries to combat successfully dangerous climate change. This system would give incentives for climate-efficient behavior and structures worldwide and provide adequate means and incentives for sustainable, climate-friendly development and for the elimination of poverty--especially in developing countries. This paper attempts to prove both the inadequacy of the current Kyoto system and the feasibility and necessity of such a global cap-and-trade scheme--being nearly completely in line with a recent urgent call for a global cap-and-trade scheme by the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum 2005). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International climate-control or environmental agreements have substantial impacts on international terms of trade. This would seem to suggest that international environmental coalitions cooperating on climate control could penalize non-cooperating countries through trade sanctions. However, alternative approaches exist in which cooperating nations provide incentives for non-cooperating nations to join their coalition. This paper investigates potential impacts of trade sanctions against non-cooperating nations. It compares different climate coalitions and their impacts on trade and international spillover effects if free-riding countries are sanctioned with trade restrictions. Specifically, the paper looks at the Kyoto Protocol as the prime example of a climate-policy coalition, and the United States as the most important noncooperating country. Modeling indicates that trade restrictions are not the right tool to induce noncooperating nations to join a coalition. The United States could most likely be persuaded to cooperate if developing nations participated in a climate-policy coalition in which they both benefited from technology transfer and from emissions trading. Further, it appears that developing countries would benefit most if they participated in international emissions trading without binding emission-reduction targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany is the leader among countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in reducing its emissions of the Kyoto basket of greenhouse gases (GHGs), having accomplished an emissions reduction of 18.9 percent from 1990 to 2000. This paper aims to explain the reasons for this success and to examine the impacts of the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on the development of Germany's climate policy. In order to identify the factors that determined this outcome, we divide our examination of the policy process in Germany since 1987 into five periods and will evaluate it with a focus on policy measures implemented and actors as well as the institutions involved. It concludes that domestic factors, including the participation of the Greens in the coalition government, mainly determined Germany's success in developing advanced climate policies and measures to reduce its GHG emissions. The paper also highlights the importance of the linkage of climate policy with other policies, which provided incentives to those who would otherwise have opposed or remained neutral on the development of climate policy. As such, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol did not have a direct impact on climate policy development in Germany, but it did have an indirect impact in that it triggered the development of common and coordinated policies and measures at the European Union (EU) level in order to achieve its quantified GHG reduction target of 8 percent committed to under the Kyoto Protocol, as seen in the introduction of an EU-wide emissions trading scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely agreed that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a useful international instrument that encourages and reinforces the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and also that it should be further promoted as a way to fill the gap in energy and GHG efficiency between industrialized and developing countries. A number of problematic issues have become apparent, however, during the past two and a half years of experience with the CDM. This paper identifies some of these and provides possible insights into their nature and possible resolution. While some technical aspects such as baseline setting are crucial and are being resolved gradually through accumulated experience, other political aspects such as the utilization of public funding need more discussion (rather than formal negotiations). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Convincing the United States to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions is critical to spurring a stronger and more durable international response to climate change. This paper focuses on current US action on climate change and the potential for future US emissions targets in both domestic and international arenas. Five topics are covered: (1) the evolving politics of climate change in the United States; (2) the impact of climate change on the US presidential election; (3) lessons learned from the Kyoto process; (4) the prospects for the United States re-engaging internationally; and (5) how to design an international regime that would encourage US participation. While federal mandatory emission targets will take more time, a great deal is happening in the United States at the state and local level. These actions are changing the politics of climate change in the United States in ways that lead many US experts to believe that a stronger national policy is inevitable. Even so, climate change is not playing a significant role in the November 2004 US presidential election campaigns, although a related issue, energy policy, features more prominently. Regardless of who wins the election, the United States will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol and may not return to the Kyoto process to negotiate emission targets beyond 2012. To secure US participation, any international climate treaty must build on prior US domestic regulation and start with exceptionally modest targets for the United States that become more stringent over time. Countries seeking to engage the United States on climate change should keep an open mind about non-Kyoto approaches, given lingering skepticism in the United States about the United Nations and the Kyoto process. The international community should encourage the United States to do more by making good on the emission mitigation pledges they have undertaken and by giving priority to convincing the United States to act at home rather than negotiating... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last years, when the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol became dependent on its ratification by Russia, the protocol's prospects appeared quite uncertain. To a great extent this uncertainty was reinforced by the contradictory declarations of Russian officials--promises of imminent ratification that alternated with critiques of the Kyoto regime, including comments that it is discriminatory in character and unacceptable for Russia. The decision-making process on ratification in Russia has not been transparent and elements of uncertainty are dominant. How has the situation changed as a result of the European Union--Russia Summit held in Moscow in May 2004? The answer to that question suggested in this paper is based on the fact that the compromise reached at the summit had the following impacts: (1) it placed the ratification process within a new institutional framework; (2) it had a number of positive implications for facilitating ratification, speeding it up, and reducing uncertainties and risks; (3) it consolidated the positions of the supporters of the Kyoto Protocol in Russia and weakened its opponents; (4) at the same time, the new institutional framework for ratification has led to a number of new uncertainties and risks that may hinder ratification; and (5) the problem, so far, is that that the new risks are not yet fully recognized and protocol supporters continue to counteract the former threats without realizing that the new front lines deviate significantly from the former ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the role of the European Community (EC) in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol and then focuses on the progress of the European Union (EU) towards meeting its Kyoto commitments. The EC ratified the Kyoto Protocol on May 31, 2002. It has pledged to meet the implied target of an 8 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and 2012 compared to 1990 levels. The European Union, as well as its Member States, is putting in place a set of policies and measures to achieve this. An analysis of greenhouse gas projections by the Member States themselves and Europe-wide model projections, however, show that this target is unlikely to be met with the envisaged domestic policies alone. The remaining gap would have to be closed using the Kyoto mechanisms or by developing and implementing additional domestic policies. So far, few EU Member States have yet taken concrete steps to realise this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine the repercussions in Japan wrought by the Kyoto Protocol, which it signed in 1997, and to point the way for the country's response in the next and future rounds of protocol-related negotiations. This challenge is met by first reviewing Japan's past negotiating positions at the international level and relevant movements inside the country prior to and after it signed the protocol, and then by examining the protocol's effects on Japan. This review finds that the following points are important to be aware of when attempting to understand Japan's dynamics relating to the Kyoto Protocol: (1) it is the only internationally agreed text to address climate change; (2) it is the only major multilateral environmental agreement ever adopted in Japan, giving it special significance to domestic actors; (3) the negotiation process represented a new approach to foreign policy; and (4) its negotiation was part of a learning process for Japan on multilateral negotiations on climate change. Japan has now begun to prepare for a new round of climate change negotiations, and the learning that has occurred is now reflected in two very distinct views within Japan as to the ways to move forward. As Japan's government works to merge the demands of all ministries concerned, its position in future negotiations is likely to remain vague externally; internally, on the other hand, the Japanese people will be increasingly concerned about climate change policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kyoto Protocol is a landmark in international environmental law. As the first derived legal instrument of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, its negotiation has been pioneering, and consequently the path has not always been smooth. This paper outlines the international political history of the Kyoto Protocol, placing the key events in the negotiation process in the context of the national and interest group politics that have characterized the climate regime for the past decade. The key aims, intervening politics, and subsequent outcomes of the pivotal Conferences of the Parties (COPs) pertaining to the Kyoto Protocol--The Hague, Bonn, and Marrakech--are described. An evaluation of the Protocol is then made, using a mix of public choice and international relations theories. The final section takes a broader perspective, placing the Kyoto Protocol within the international climate regime and other multilateral environmental negotiations, which may affect its operationalization and effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States' new Global Climate Change initiatives, proposed by the Bush Administration on 14 February 2002, reveal the attitude of the U.S. toward future efforts to address climate change. In this paper, the author clarifies this “attitude” by analyzing the content of these new initiatives, and discusses the inititiatives' theoretical consistency, feasibility, and so on. The examination of these initiatives reveals that—value judgements aside—they contain inherent theoretical inconsistencies. A future challenge for the U.S.'s new climate policy will be to make these initiatives effective by ensuring follow-up actions— something that cannot be realized sufficiently by the current scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper assessed the rationality of the "official" reasons why the Bush Administration opposes the Kyoto Protocol and judges the Kyoto Protocol to be "fatally flawed". Most of the reasons why the Bush Administration made this judgment--lack of long-term goals, exclusion of developing countries and lack of linkages between the scientific base and policy--can be dealt with in the process of the development of the Kyoto Protocol much more easily than through the establishment of an alternative from scratch. We find some rationality in the Bush Administration's opposition to the ratification of the Protocol by the United States based on recognition of increases in US greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions above the "payable" level, in addition to security concerns involved in purchasing permits from EIT countries. Other stances of the Bush administration, such as devaluing or neglecting the existing international framework which the international community has achieved through a decade of intense negotiations, e.g. the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, may cause delays in addressing climate change issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]