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The paper sets out to present a (rationalist) theoretical model, which predicts and explains behavioral changes that different institutional designs of CSR-PPPs in weak states cause on participating companies. It asks: Which institutional design of CSR-PPPs causes what behav-ioral changes on participating companies? The model focuses on three independent variables: Institutional design of CSR-PPPs, the pre-ference structure of companies that participate in CSR-PPPs, and the strategic environment (consisting of competitors, NGOs and business associations; their preferences and action al-ternatives) within which companies make decisions. A set of hypotheses is generated â€" each focusing on the effects of one variable while the other two are held constant â€", which define minimum requirements for, as well as conditions for more and less, behavioral changes of participating companies. To illustrate how constellations of these variables translate into hy-potheses, consider:H1: If companies face a cooperative collective action problem with respect to CSR-policies, a necessary condition for the institutional design of a CSR-PPP for behavioral change is â€" in case that no other relevant actors like NGOs and business associations are present â€" that it entails CSR-standards which are formulated with high degrees of precision and obligation and that it employs monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms.H2: If participating companies can achieve competitive advantages through a CSR-policy (e.g. in certain cases of HIV-treatment programs), CSR-PPPs need to offer "legitimate" benchmarks or managerial support (e.g. management systems) to have an impact.The applicability of the model will be demonstrated by illustrating examples. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]