Search

Do private entrepreneurs in China support democracy? This paper finds that in general private entrepreneurs find democracy desirable, but their concerns with the feasibility of democracy predispose them toward maintaining the status quo. This research employs a mixed method. On one hand, it draws on a national survey to show that Chinese private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, controlling the effects of relevant political, regional and demographic factors. In-depth interviews, on the other hand, suggest that capitalists who demonstrate democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in China, at least in the near future. As a result, they adopt a pro-government stance in their economic, social and political activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, China has been under frequent attacks by nature. Due to high population, low economic development, wide climate range and vulnerable environment, China would adopt appropriate adaptive and reduction actions according to the basic situation of the country and under the framework of sustainable development. the PRC government released its first policy report on climate change in June 2007, China's National Plan for Climate Change. In 2008 and 2009, China followed up with the release of a white paper titled China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change, which points out that "as a responsible developing country, China is fully aware of the importance and urgency of addressing climate change and has adopted a series of policies and measures in this regard." This essay addresses China's policy responses towards climate change. This paper discusses China's policy response to climate change. The discussion begins with the influences of climate change on China's environment and then moves on to discuss China's concern, guiding principle, goal and policy action in reaction to the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the emerging 'triangle' in commercial relations between the EU, China and the United States, using the concepts of 'complex interdependence' and 'bi-multilateralism' as organising and evaluative devices. The paper argues that in the 'triangle' there are important areas of unevenness and variation reflecting differences of power, institutional factors and norms, but that nonetheless there can be discerned important elements of 'complex interdependence' as defined by Keohane and Nye. This can be observed in the bilateral relationships between the three parties; at the same time, however, the EU-China-US relationship is central to power, institutions and norms in the changing multilateral commercial system, centred on the World Trade Organisation. This means that many of the commercial policy negotiations between the three parties are essentially 'bi-multilateral': on the one hand, the management of bilateral relations creates externalities for the multilateral system, and on the other hand the evolution of the multilateral system creates new forces shaping the management of bilateral relationships. The paper explores two cases, China's entry into the WTO and the management of trade disputes over textiles, to illuminate the ways in which 'bi-multilateral' elements enter into the EU-China-US 'triangle'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines global and national responses to the challenge of HIV/AIDS for young people. With reference to Thailand and China, the paper also introduces an on-going study into HIV/AIDS at community level in Chiang Mai and Kunming. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that IR has tended to mischaracterise the 'social' basis of international society. States and other actors orient their behaviour towards shared understandings of cooperation not because of a prior common identity but because the provision of public goods provides a high value pay-off in terms of status. In the early part of the paper, we draw on Wittgenstein's ideas on rule indeterminacy to critique the idea of the causal power of norms, a view which animates a great deal of mainstream constructivism. Working with an alternative sociology of norms, it becomes possible to view the international social system as being produced through 'recognition games' played on many different boards. The goal of international social action is recognition of rightful membership of institutions and alliances, an argument familiar to English school writings in IR. China's struggle for status in contemporary international society provides an illustrative case study, one which avoids the stark choice between managing China's imminent threat (realism) or liberal socialization (constructivism). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite discussions about China's rise as a global manufacturing titan and the world's third largest trading economy, few notice the unevenness of China's integration into the world economy. While some Chinese export producers have shown signs of climbing up the global value chain, most others are still trapped in a downward spiral of "race to the bottom" competition based on cheap prices. What accounts for this local variation despite the availability of cheap labor throughout coastal areas? Based on comparative case studies, the paper finds that contrary to the expectation of both neoclassical economics and state-led development theory, export upgrading was neither a natural product of market competition nor a sheer outcome of deliberate government promotion of capital-intensive investment. Rather it resulted from the complex interaction between foreign capital on the one hand and local export institutions that took root before the entrance of FDI on the other hand. While local institutions heavily influenced the direction and the magnitude of FDI's impact on local export activities, the influx of FDI at a particular period also revised the institutional arrangements governing the behavior of local governments and export businesses. This produced intended and unintended effects on the likelihood of ruinous competition or export upgrading. The paper concludes that in a transformed eraâ??one in which outsourcing and offshore production has increasingly segregated the source of proprietary knowledge from manufacturing, one should go beyond the pure focus on the amount of capital-intensive exports and high-tech investment, and should devote more attention to the important role of social coordination in overcoming ruinous competition and in nurturing the indigenous capacity for innovation and upgrading. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractSince 2000, China has a major economic player in Africa. China's role in Africa has manifested not only in trade but in investments in different sectors of the African economy, and in the provision of aid. There has been a significant increase in the flow and stock of China's FDI in Africa since 2000. The increase is largely driven by expansion in China-Africa trade, the search for new energy sources and the need to elevate China's international stature in the world. This paper examines the major policy changes in China which acted as fillip to Chinese firms; the characteristics and patterns of China's FDI; and the salience of Africa. The paper also assesses whether China's FDI is a catalyst to generate industrial development or a Trojan horse that will create a dependent linkage between the African economy and China ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some leaders choose foreign policies that flout the constraints posed by international structures? This paper argues that leaders possess varying beliefs about their state's proficiency in different areas of foreign policy, or "national efficacy beliefs." When sufficiently strong, these beliefs inspire leaders to act boldly, even when international structures offer incentives for restraint. Strong martial efficacy beliefs inspire leaders to challenge more powerful opponents on the battlefield, while strong moral efficacy beliefs prompt leaders to engage in costly forms of cooperation even when the relevant international institutions are weak. In constrast, weaker senses of martial and moral efficacy produce policies that are much more sensitive to structural constraints. The paper outlines how this framework can explain why the foreign policies of both China and India have become more conservative over the past six decades. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Foucault (1980; 2003) started to work on bio-power - which might be summarized as the maximization of state/national resources, including human resources -- he was clearly linking the state to the rounding out of the population as a whole. The focus on the intimate linkage of sovereign power and bio-power was made even more important since 9/11, when the exercise of sovereign power is used to justify the protection of population at home.The importance of state sovereign power in China is certainly unquestioned, even amidst economic reform. What is new in the governmental reasoning in China is that the full development of the individual now constitutes the source of the strength of the state, and that the full development of the individual involves, among other things, self-steering of the individual. The rationality behind this shifting is that the state realizes the knowledge economy is about competing globally for talents. This might be interpreted in terms of Foucault’s security (sécurité), “the future-oriented management of risk” (Valverde 2007, 172). "Knowledge economy", as a new concept, started to circulate in newspapers, magazines, media and Chinese leaders' speeches in 1998 since it first appeared in the 15th Communist Party Congress report. According to the rationalities of the state, the individual has to improve his/her physical, mental, psychological quality to prepare for and act as integral part of the new knowledge economy. This is fully in line with an emerging global elite consensus that is also evident in popularizers here in the West. Thomas Friedman's latest book The World is Flat (2005), popularizes the stakes in what he describes as a race to the top, one in which human capital/resources are identified as the deciding factor. Although Friedman does not say this, it is thus a global biopolitical race. Friedman pointedly identifies China, together with India and Brazil, as three most important players in the global race to the top.The proposed paper thus argues that China, although not a liberal society, is increasingly using governance techniques that remarkably resemble those used in the liberal society. In Foucault’s notion of governmentality, freedom is necessary to government. Individual's freedom is not a pre-given entity, but is a product of governmental steering through the desires, needs, interests, rights, and choices of individuals (Dean 1999, 149-175). Empirical materials for this paper derive from personal interviews I conducted in China and document analyses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a heuristic model for the international development of nonproliferation education programs. The paper draws on the examples of five nonproliferation education programs at U.S. universities, plus a program currently being developed at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. Three phases of the developmental process are studied for both international and domestic programs: program development, curriculum development, and sustainability. Lessons learned from each of the three phases are combined into a developmental model, intended to serve as a guide to the further development of these programs by practitioners. The factors that contribute to program development, where the focus is on creating a viable institution of learning, are much the same for domestic and international programs alike. The factors that contribute to curriculum development are different for domestic and international programs. For domestic programs, the locus of development is the organization. For international programs, the center of gravity is a collaborative network. In the latter, the central challenge is maintaining the commitment of multiple participants, all in the pursuit of a shared intellectual enterprise. As a curriculum matures and comes to be recognized as the hallmark of a program, the need for a robust international collaborative network diminishes. Domestic and international programs eventually converge in their developmental paths, with each facing similar sustainability issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do private entrepreneurs in China support democracy? This paper finds that in general private entrepreneurs find democracy desirable, but their concerns with the feasibility of democracy predispose them toward maintaining the status quo. This research employs a mixed method. On one hand, it draws on a national survey to show that Chinese private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, controlling the effects of relevant political, regional and demographic factors. In-depth interviews, on the other hand, suggest that capitalists who demonstrate democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in China, at least in the near future. As a result, they adopt a pro-government stance in their economic, social and political activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on the seminal work of Keck and Sikkink, recent years have witnessed an explosion of scholarly research on transnational advocacy networks-- globalized groups of activists bound and driven by a common commitment to principled ideas or values and working to promote, monitor, and enforce compliance with them at the state level. Most of the time, fidelity to core values within these networks is assumed to be unwavering and non-negotiable. Indeed, fixity in the moral commitments of advocacy networks is implicit in their very definition. This paper, however, argues that the principles motivating advocacy networks are not always stable or constant, and suggests conditions under which some networks may alter or retreat from the original stance taken. The argument is probed empirically through an examination of the transnational campaign for Tibetan independence, whose central objective has evolved from sovereign statehood for Tibet toward its greater inclusion within a multinational or quasi-federal Chinese state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's emergence as a powerful and confident international actor presents both a challenge and an opportunity for states worldwide. Assessments of how international actors have responded to China's rise have typically focused on rival great powers or on China's Asian neighbours. In these cases, relative power, geographic proximity, and regional institutions have conditioned elements of actors' relationships with China. China's relationship with the developing world has largely been defined by power asymmetry and the appeal of the Chinese governance model to authoritarian regimes. Absent from this discussion is an understanding of how Western middle power democracies are responding to the rise of China. This paper compares how Canada and Australia are responding to the rise of China. The two case studies are similar in many respects. Both are Western democratic states with prominent middle power foreign policy traditions. Both are resource based economies that have a track record of bilateral and institutional engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, both states are key US allies. These similarities allow the authors to isolate differences in the Canadian and Australian response to China's rise in the fields of political, economic and military engagement. China's rise challenges Ottawa and Canberra to adopt policies that balance often conflicting international and domestic priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the efforts made by the international community on climate change, since the 1990s, the world has not yet reached an acceptable solution to tackle the problem. Disputes existed not only between the advanced economies and the emerging powers, such as the BRICS states, but also between the emerging developing nations and the least developed nations. The key issue was not about "whether" the climate change should be tackled, but rather on "how" to tackle it, namely, "what" should be done and "who" should make the decisions. As one of the greatest carbon emitters, China has often been blamed being responsible for the failure of reaching a binding international treaty at the Copenhagen Conference, yet China insists that it has the legitimated rights to develop its economy and that the Western nations should take more responsibilities. This paper aims to examine the current international architecture on climate change, and to explore the obstacles that prevented reaching a "fair" solution to tackle the issue, taking China's position as an example. It argues that although the approaches taken by the relevant parties are legitimate under their own circumstances, they are not beneficial to help reach a global solution to save the earth. To ensure more effective governance on climate change, some reform may be required to strengthen the global institutions and rules; but the emerging powers, including China, should also be prepared to bear more responsibilities at the international stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of the other great power - India, and how these two Asian great powers - India and China - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet how these two very different Asian giants with a complex relationship view each other and consequently negotiate their paths in substantially changed international milieus will be important for scholarly interest and policy making. This paper examines how Indian elites - in political, security, and economic arenas - perceive the rise of China and their assessment of the feasibility of Indo-Chinese partnership ("Chindia") or rivalry by employing a mixed-method research strategy, combining secondary literature research, elite interviewing, and direct observation conducted over the summer of 2008. It analyzes the Indo-Chinese relationship through three paradigms - geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up on the commanding heights, at the pinnacle of the state, China's top leaders agree that law should serve the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Down in the trenches, at the frontlines of decision-making, Chinese judges in civil environmental cases decipher this directive and attempt to diffuse local discontent. Faced with ambiguous legal standards, they enjoy limited discretion to decide cases as they see fit. But why do judges make the decisions they do? This paper looks at legal decisions (panjueshu) as a window onto judges as strategic actors as well as the everyday practice of law. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates crises in which the Chinese government requested an apology from the United States, and the official and popular reactions to these incidents. Two contentious episodes are studied: the 2001 EP-3E airplane collision near Hainan Isl ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 30 years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has transformed itself into a major actor in the international economy. This paper considers the extent to which China's growing economic power translates into political influence over the foreign policy priorities, behavior, and perceptions of its economic partners. I test quantitatively whether different types of economic exchange with China are correlated with a particular country's leadership travel to China, that country's willingness to recognize China as a market economy, and its public perceptions of China. Findings are mixed, but suggest on balance that bilateral economic ties are more closely correlated with behavior (recognition of China as a market economy) and public perceptions than they are with priorities (leadership travel to China). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By the end of 2008, after 30 years of opening to the outside world, China will have accumulated close to 1.5 million students and scholars who have studied overseas. In the past decade, many of them have decided to return to China; and many of those who have not returned play an active role in technology transfer, trade and investment in China. These Chinese returnees, and those who have remained as Diasporas, play an increasingly significant role in China's globalization. There is a great shift from focus in China on what China wants. China has become the number two export country in the world and it has become the endpoint of an enormous amount of foreign investment, now second only to the United States in the yearly FDI fare. China now has the largest foreign reserve in China and China now is not that hungry for money anymore, instead China needs more international talents, especially the returnees and diaspora, as they are emerging as the new important changing forces in China. This paper is the first of its kind to comprehensively examine the roles and contributions made by returnees in the Chinese economic and business front and their impact on the China globalization process and going out strategy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprecedented economic growth and development in China over the past two decades has been as impressive as it has been daunting. Surpassing all expectations, China's GDP continues to grow at an average of 6 to 8 percent annually since 1999. However such growth has not been without consequences including: 1) increased migration; 2) the increased gap between rural and urban development; 3) and the changing place of women in the economy and society as they are among the number of those migrating. The changing political economy of China has increased the costal-interior, urban-rural as well as gendered economic inequalities while exposing the inadequacies of social and labour policies to accommodate the changing needs of Chinese citizens. As a result, the rural and migrant women who have traditionally been marginalized continue to be vulnerable to the forces of market reform and globalization. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to show that while the changing political economy in China has afforded rural women an opportunity to enter the off-farm labour market with the hope of improved economic security, policy deficiencies continue to marginalize migrant rural women by categorically framing them as second-class citizens within the cities they move into. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The old debate of whether regional trade agreements are a stepping stone or a stumbling block for global trade liberalisation has become particularly pertinent today with East Asia's largest economies joining the rush to preferential trade. China is currently studying, negotiating or implementing FTAs with over 20 countries or regions. This notable development in China's economic diplomacy has caused other countries, especially those in the Asia Pacific, to embark on preferential trade agreements as well, causing concern from the WTO over the proliferation of discriminatory FTAs. This paper analyzes China's bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) and discusses their implications for the WTO. The focus will be on Chinese perspectives on the relationship between FTAs and the WTO, Beijing's motivations behind its activism in FTAs, China's approach to FTA negotiations, and the domestic roots of China's FTA policies. The implications of China's FTAs for the WTO include whether China has abandoned multilateralism for bilateralism for its international trade cooperation, whether Beijing hopes to facilitate trade liberalization under the WTO through the FTAs, and whether Beijing has tried to keep its FTAs compliant with WTO rules. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The necessity of using the law to address unrest has pushed "lawful environmental rights and interests"—the government-preferred formulation of environmental rights—towards an uncontroversial entitlement. Indeed, environmental rights look benign when even human rights are written into the Chinese constitution. But what exactly is a "lawful environmental right" and where did rights language come from? This paper explores both how elites talk about environmental rights and how these rights are translated into action. China's upwardly mobile classes have begun using environmental rights language to justify opposition to nearby high voltage towers, highways and railroad lines. I look at one NIMBY dispute, opposition to the Shanghai-Hangzhou magnetic levitation (maglev) train in 2006-2007, to explore how rights fit into a kaleidoscope of frames designed to elicit response from an opaque state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese penetration in the trade and investments field in South America in the XXI century has changed national actors's expectations in the region during a transition period, after economic crises of the neo liberal development model. Based on the Chinese economy's own dynamics in today's global economic context, we believe that China's penetration in South America tends to consolidate, in short to medium term at the least, as part of a world strategy from that superpower seeking energy resources and other commodities, aiming food and energy security. Therefore this paper has as goal to evaluate political implications of Chinese economic penetration in South America in the global economic context of the XXI century, indicating the regional outspreads of the new world geopolitics of energy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has become a major institutional linkage within the ASEAN Plus Three framework. This paper will employ an historical institutional approach to examine the development of the ASEAN-China linkage. The origins of the ACFTA and the sequence of events that has promoted the linkage will be analysed. The extent to which the positive economic and political feedback process as well as the timing and sequence of events have helped to reinforce the relationship will be assessed. It is argued that the resulting trajectory of the ACFTA underscores the political nature of the emerging association and makes it difficult, although not impossible, for other relationships to supersede the ASEAN-China linkage at the centre of the APT framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IFew items being monitored by the international development assistance community have caused as much consternation as the emergence of China as a significant source of official development assistance (ODA). 40 years ago, similar criticisms were being made about Japan's ODA, which was considered a mere offshoot of its mercantilist trade policies. Yet today Japan is arguably a strong adherent to the prevailing international norms that guide (though perhaps do not govern) official giving, especially on positions with respect to tied aid, non-military aid, economic development, environmental impact, and monitoring and evaluation standards. This paper looks at international aid norms and how they came to be accepted in Japan despite domestic political opposition. It also places Japanese and Chinese aid in global perspective. There is a lesson to be learned from the Japanese experience: China will also one day converge towards international norms on aid. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's transition is drawing world-wide attention. China started market economic reform since 1978 and rapidly closes up the gap economically with world industrialized nations. The 1990s witnessed the downfall of Communist political system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, yet the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule continued. However, the Chinese public and leaders have started to debate and explore where China should go politically and how to get there. Through examining the merits and weaknesses of four prevailing democratization theories: modernization theory, social mobilization model, cultural argument, and negotiation-pact transition theory, this paper intends to design an appropriate model for China's political future. It argues that (1) the conflict between the reform and conservative groups inside the communist regime will shape the process of China's democratization; and (2) the hope of China's political future may lie in continued economic development, a mature civil society, and the building of democratic political culture in society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysts have made efforts to explore the motivations behind China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific. Some are concerned that China is strategically motivated and China's growing influence poses a major threat to the West. This paper assesses the strategic value of the South Pacific in China's grand strategy, China's soft power in the region and some constraints to China's hegemonic rise. It concludes that China's policy toward the South Pacific is not mainly driven by its security strategy and that China's soft power in the region is limited. It also casts doubt on China's hegemonic rise in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Africa has embarked on a new phase of capitalist development, powered in large part by Chinese investment. After three decades of stagnation, the continent as a whole is witnessing growth rates of five percent per year and becoming once again a focal point of geopolitical dispute. This paper will focus on the Sino-African relationship and ask two questions in particular: what is China's strategy in Africa? And what is its likely developmental impact? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the strategic outlook of the world's largest yet understudied armed force ? China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). With its sheer size, rapidly increasing capabilities, and uncertain intentions, the PLA's assessment of the country's external security environment entails profound implications for international relations. China has the world's largest military (with a manpower of over 2.3 million), second highest defense spending ($90 billion in 2004, by Pentagon's estimates; or $25.6 billion, by China's Defense White Paper), and one of the fastest-growing economies serving as the resource base for double-digit increases in defense spending for each of the past 15 years and for rapidly expanding its military capabilities. Yet, studying China's strategic intentions faces methodological challenges. China's decision-making process is opaque; its top leadership is not accountable to the electorate. A peculiar "civilian control of the military" ensures that the military will protect the party's interests. Access is guarded. Top generals rarely give interviews and their public statements echo top party leaders' statements. Discussions with "think tanks" affiliated with PLA tend to be formalistic. Moreover, a "strategic culture" of realism and a "cult of defense" combine to give Chinese an edge in deception and asymmetry. For a question crucial to U.S. national security, these problems have confounded scholars and policy-makers.The PLA's stated raison d'être is to "safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and preventing Taiwan's formal independence for now (or, in the future, incorporating Taiwan through force) has provided the impetus for the modernization of this armed force. But will China's aspirations increase with growing capabilities? The "Taiwan issue" thus provides a good angle to understand and evaluate China's perception and assessment of its security environment in the first decade of the 21st century.This paper tackles four questions: (1) How to disentangle the PLA's worldviews from those of China's civilian party leaders? (2) Compared to civilian leaders, is the military more hardline on issues perceived to pertain to sovereignty and territorial integrity but also more cautious on the use of force? (3) Are there subtle differences within the PLA -- by services, cohorts, doctrines -- on key strategic issues? (4) How does China's military development coalesce with the current leadership's stated strategy of "peaceful rise"? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the process and challenge of financial market opening in the People?s Republic of China. It will investigate particularly China?s progress in financial liberalization as well as liberalization?s potential costs and benefits. Since joining the WTO, China has integrated into the global economy and has enjoyed remarkable economic success. Under the WTO negotiations, China expects to deregulate restrictions for foreign financial institutions and liberalize its financial market. However, the legacy of the old state-planned economy?s restrictions and strict financial repression may hamper financial sector development, posing a serious challenge to establish a more market-oriented financial system. This paper argues that financial liberalization should be implemented carefully since haphazard liberalization tends to encourage financial instability, as many emerging economies have experienced. Successful financial market reforms that would guarantee sustained strong economic growth and avoid instability will depend on how well China implements economic reforms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lately there has been increasing interest among IR scholars in Chinese thought both as an alternative to Eurocentric IR and because the PRC as an emerging power will soon have the institutional power to promote its view of the world. Rather than look for suitable Chinese parallels to 'international', 'security' or other mainstream concepts, this paper will examine the concept of 'Tianxia' to understand Chinese visions of world order. Tianxia is interesting both because it was key to the governance and self-understanding of three millennia of Chinese empire, and also because discussion of Tianxia is becoming popular again in the 21st century as a Chinese model of world order that is universally valid. Firstly, the paper will examine Zhao Tingyang's popular discussion of how the all-inclusive Tianxia system would solve the world's problems through a world institution that embraces difference according to a 'magnanimous' social grammar. Then it will examine some of the philosophical and historical problems raised by this reading of Tianxia: its relation to classical Chinese philosophy and modern social theory, particularly how it deals with 'Otherness'. And finally, it will conclude that Tianxia's most important impact will not be on the world stage, but in China's domestic politics. The paper will examine how Tianxia has been redeployed by China's intellectuals of the state and public intellectuals among the Chinese diaspora in ways that blur the conceptual boundaries between empire and globalism, hierarchy and cosmopolitanism. Yet rather than guide us towards a post-hegemonic IR, Tianxia presents a new hegemony that reproduces China's hierarchical empire in an updated form. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research question of this paper is: “Does economic growth make China a threat?” Bearing this question in mind, I review the “China threat” literature and its counter-arguments since the early 1990s. This paper examines the offensive realist theoretical basis for the “China threat” literature, and it outlines several oversimplifications that the “China threat” arguments often suffer. Moreover, it is argued that while the “China threat” literature tends to support its arguments by rejecting the liberalist interdependence peace hypothesis and democratic peace hypothesis in the China context, a Marxist dependency framework may be more relevant to explore China’s capabilities and intention to pose a threat to the United States. And, in order to fully assess the strategic implications of China’s economic growth, we need to place the economic growth in the background of economic globalization as well as to take China’s domestic social relations in the process of economic growth into consideration. My conclusion is that economic growth will not make China a threat. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an overview of China’s international security cooperation diplomacy with the states of Southeast Asia. China has pursued international security cooperation both multilaterally and bilaterally. In March 1997, China broached for the first time what it termed its “New Concept of Security” at a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). In 2003, in a major development, China and ASEAN reached agreement on a “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” that included cooperation in security matters. Between 1999 and 2000, China negotiated long-term cooperative framework agreements with ten of the region’s states (East Timor excepted). Six of these agreements included a clause covering security cooperation. The six signatories included: Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. China already had long-standing defense links with Myanmar. In addition, China developed security cooperation ties with, Cambodia, Vietnam and Indonesia. The paper reviews the nature and scope of China’s bilateral international security cooperation in the period after 2002 when China revised this concept and began a renewed effort to promote security cooperation on a multilateral basis within the ARF. . ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the mid 1990s, China was skeptical about the value of participating in regional multilateral organizations. However, since the late 1990s China has changed its previous attitude toward Asian regionalism and has pursued a proactive policy toward regional integration. How should we explain China’s adaptation of policy toward Asian regionalism? Within the literature on regionalism, various theoretical approaches (liberalism, realism, domestic politics and constructivism) have different interpretations on rationales behind economic regional integrations. This paper follows the proposition of “analytical eclecticism” in explaining foreign policy issue. By using an integrated framework of micro-macro linkage approach and a case study of China’s rationales of building China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA), this paper investigates “how” and “why” China has actively participated in Asian regionalism. The data collection includes both primary data of interviews, government documents and official statistics, and secondary data of news reports, policy analysis and other scholar’s studies. No single theoretical approach can explain the complexity of China’s motivations for Asian regionalism. To some extent, China’s active participation into Asian regional institutions can be explained as a way of solving a realist problem with the policy prescriptions of liberalism and constructivism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we discuss the significance of the UN for the development of Chinese environmental policies. First, we discuss the global conferences, primarily in terms of agenda setting and institutional growth. Then we turn to China’s relation to UNEP and CSD and discuss the extent to which these institutions have made any difference to China, and if so in what respect. In the fourth section we turn to Chinese experiences and perceptions of the GEF in terms of implementation of climate change – and biodiversity projects. In the final section we discuss briefly the significance these UN fora combined has had for Chinese environmental policies. Conclusions on the conferences are that the Stockholm Conference seemed to have a rather direct effect in terms of institution building and agenda setting. Similarly, the Rio Conference is seen by Chinese decision-makers as a turning point in its environmental policy. The time elapsed since WSSD is quite short, but again examples are mentioned as to its direct and positive effect. As these are short term events organized every ten (or twenty year), they need to be reinforced by other international institutions. It seems quite clear that UNEP has filled this gap quite effectively through various form of assistance while CSD has been useful not the least through the reporting procedures. Apart from secondary sources in Chinese and English, this paper builds on extensive interviews with Chinese decision makers over a period of many years. At this stage this paper essentially gives an empirical account of China and these UN institutions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and India are two major rising powers in Asia. The two countries fought a border war in 1962 and since then border negotiations have been going on. Studying the relationship between these two major powers in Asia has significant implications for the future of Asia. This paper focuses on three major Chinese foreign policy decision makers –Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping—their operational code beliefs and belief changes during the 1960s and examines their belief changes and the impact of belief changes on the Chinese decisions to fight a war with India after breaking up with the Soviet Union. The 1960s was a hard time for the newly founded PRC, however, the Chinese leaders made the hard decision to break up with its ally and big brother, and fight a war with India who was the head of the non-aligned movements. As three major decision makers, do they have the same belief changes in making those strategic moves? This is an interesting question in helping us to understand the Chinese foreign policies during the Cold War time and also to look into the future of Sino-Indian relations. By examining the international and domestic situations of the Sino-Indian War in 1962, this paper compares the results of the narratives with an operational code analysis of three Chinese leaders and their subjective games. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While secrecy is a major component of security policies, it is not in the nature of security argumentsto remain hidden, as they are powerful means of legitimization. This means that masscommunication and other means of mediating securitization arguments and moves are quiteimportant for securitizing actors. On another hand, in democratic societies, the media and othermeans of mass communication may also become sites of contesting or resisting securitizationmoves. Even though securitization is a powerful means of legitimization, the success of even themost authoritative securitization moves is not guaranteed.If this is the general landscape in democratic societies, what is the case in non-democratic politicalorders? What is the role of the media in securitization processes taking place in societies where forexample the press is not free? Is the media a mere bullhorn in these contexts, or can authoritativesecuritization moves be resisted even in these environments? The paper examines these questions inthe context of the People's Republic of China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews social activism for a better environment in China is the past 15 years. It is not merely a historical review, but also a discussion of competing interpretations of the political revelance of this movement and the new social-political forces it has generated. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is the only country of the traditional nuclear powers whose nuclear arsenal is growing in size and capability. It is diversifying its delivery systems, modernizing its missiles, and building up its overall warhead arsenal. Further, it is engaged in a substantial buildup of conventional missiles. These are certainly facilitated by the economic and general military rise of China. It is less clear that China's strategic arsenal has in turn supported the general rise of China. That is, what benefits has China received given its enhancements of its strategic forces? This paper will begin by charting the changes in China's strategic arsenal, and compare that broadly to other regional and global players in this arena. It will then examine the ways in which nuclear weapons and strategic forces in general are thought to enhance the power of nations and assess the degree to which that has occurred for China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are regions embedded in autocratic political spheres able to maintain their autonomy, democracy and freedom? This paper examines this question through an analysis of the political and socio-economic impacts of China's integration of Hong Kong. Recent theories of democratization have emphasized the democratizing potential of international linkages to Western countries. The case of Hong Kong represents an interesting "reverse" test for such theories. Will integration with an autocratic central government overwhelm progress toward democracy in Hong Kongâ??or might Hong Kong's historical linkages to the West have a democratizing impact on the Chinese polity? To answer this critical question, we evaluate several key performance indicators, including World Bank governance data, for China and Hong Kong in the post-1997 period. In spite of serious constraints on Hong Kong's polity and flaws in their democratic institutions, the data yield the surprising conclusion that the transition to Chinese authority has not undermined governance in Hong Kong; on the contrary, indicators for voice and accountability have shown a marked improvement during the past ten years. We seek to explain this surprising result and conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for China, Taiwan and cross-strait relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between terrorism and human rights from the perspective of the People's Republic of China (PRC). China's continuing support for the war on terror has had implications not only for its relations with other states but also for the relationship between the Chinese government and its people. It demonstrates how China has used its support for the international war on terror both to cope with an immediate domestic problem, ethnic nationalism in Xinjiang, and to lay an internationally sanctioned basis for dealing with future domestic instability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most analyses of the development in post-Cold War Chinese security policy presume or picture the Chinese security policy as reflecting a coherent security strategy being either revisionist or status quo oriented. In contrast, my departure point is that the development in the Chinese post-Cold War security policy shows both revisionist and status quo oriented characteristics, and that the development in the policy has a highly reactive character. I argue that it is possible to identify a pattern in what the Chinese post-Cold War security policy is reacting to, and how the policy develops as a reaction to these factors. Thus, my overall objective is to identify the most important factors that influence the development in post-Cold War Chinese security policy and in which way. For achieving this objective, I construct and apply a so-called contingent realist argument about the development in a rising power's security policy under unipolarity. In this paper, I present the theoretical argument and conduct a preliminary case study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis 1995-96. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China continues its shift from being an energy exporter to one of the greatest importers in the world, Beijing's foreign policy is becoming increasingly sensitive not only to the international energy market, but also to the security of its energy trade routes. Since 2003, there has been increased talk within the Chinese government of a "Malacca Dilemma", the problem of potential trade bottlenecks in the South China Sea region which could conceivably be blocked, creating a potential political and economic crisis for China. This thinking has greatly affected China's diplomacy in Southeast Asia but also with other energy producing regions in the developing world. This paper will examine the geo-strategic question of the Malacca Dilemma and its effects on Chinese energy policy and its 'new diplomacy', including whether its policies will bring it into greater opposition with the West as it too seeks to secure energy sources from the Middle East and beyond. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looking at China's international activities over the past few years, it is beyond question that the scope and volume of the country's diplomacy are growing rapidly, just as the variety and sophistication of China's actors and instruments. This paper looks at the ongoing development of China's diplomacy from the concept of 'catalytic diplomacy'. It considers the still modest but growing engagement of 'unofficial' players in China's diplomacy and the changing nature of its methods and means. It concludes that catalytical trends can be discerned but that it is too early to speak of 'catalytic diplomacy' in China's case. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the discussion regarding how transnational activism functions via information advocacy, strategic coalition, social movement, or world civic politics to change state and corporate behavior has been fruitful, this literature is insufficient in elaboration of the impact of transnational activism on the long-term development of the robustness and capacity of domestic civil society. This paper hence reviews the literature of transnational activism and aims to present a series of hypotheses regarding the impact transnational NGOs (TNGOs) may bring on local NGOs in China. These hypotheses will be tested by comparing activities of three animal conservation campaigns in China-- the Giant Panda, the Yunnan Golden Monkey, and the Tibetan Antelope conservation movements. Through looking into the internal dynamics of transnational activism and dissecting TNGOs' success and failure in terms of empowering local communities and fostering the long-term development of local NGOs' capabilities in agenda setting, TNGOs and local NGOs may better understand and play their roles in helping voice the local and eventually boost the civil society in China. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will delve into the three main dimensions of explicit and implicit security management and discuss the relative achievements and shortcomings vis-à-vis the establishment of stable and secure ASEAN-China relations in these three areas. I will begin with an overview of the changing discourse on security in the post Cold War era before turning to the three case studies. The first case will look at the management of traditional security with regards to the disputes in the South China Sea. The second case elaborates on non-traditional security based on the example of environmental and energy security in the GMS. The third case focuses on what I call here the umbrella dimension of security management: ASEAN’s and China’s partly complementary and partly competing attempts at contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a multilateral order in line with the two sides’ security interests and strategies. An assessment of the so-called ASEAN Way of informal, consensus-oriented and non-confrontational diplomacy – the main pillar of multilateral dialogue cooperation not only in Southeast Asia but also increasingly the entire Asia-Pacific mega-region and in Asia-Europe relations – will feature prominently in the following. I will argue that ASEAN has become progressively inefficient at managing security due to an ever growing gap between political vision and reality as well as ASEAN’s mythical believe of being able to weather today’s international challenges with a very modest set of soft institutions that has not seen any significant amendments for the past four decades. While ASEAN’s international status as a collective actor and credibility as an organization has suffered from its inability to reform the ASEAN Way, other actors, mainly China, have markedly benefited to the extent that the PRC is gradually assuming ASEAN’s traditional role as the architect of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. Security management in ASEAN-China relations seems to be all the more promising and effective the less the specific approach is solely based on norms and procedures enshrined in the ASEAN Way and the more it is guided by pragmatic policy strategies in well-defined issue areas, particularly in the area of non-traditional security. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]