Search

This paper will address the allied occupation of Japan from 1945-1952 as a public policy issue. It articulatesand explores the general concept of institutional continuity during an occupation; more precisely, this paper will look at resiliency in terms of the prewar political authority of the bureaucracy. At its most basic, an important pre-surrender institution—the Japanese bureaucracy—can endure and resist substantive change during a system altering transformative period: Bureaucratic resilience during an occupation. One would expect that a celebrated democratization process that began with a military occupation would be peopled with those who seek to dramatically alter a variety of institutions; instead, one discovers a more accurate blend of continuity and change—hence, the challenge. At the most general level, I am identifying instances where institutional continuity can be recognized and then observing this condition and offering the implication for budding democracy. Specifically, with a finer focus on Occupation-era Japanese bureaucracy, this paper will first introduce this concept of resiliency. This introduction is followed by short discussion of the concept resiliency in relation to the Japanese bureaucracy; then, it presents them in relation to the following four topics: It maps the landmarks of (1) the purge process in Japan, (2) the enduring and problematic role of the Emperor, (3) the secretive crafting of the postwar constitution that celebrates democracy and curbs Japan's military, and (4) the role of Japanese bureaucratic reforms in the construction of postwar political power. Goal: To understand Japan during this uncertain times, the resiliency of institutions. Use of secondary sources &archival material. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military rule, military occupation, and land grabs for military bases (even if sanctioned by international executive agreements or legislatively ratified treaties) vitiate and undermine democratization. On the one hand, democratic theorists from John Locke to Robert Dahl contrast pluralist theory with rationales for authoritarian governance. On the other hand, historical pluralism evinces elitist practices. A focus on the diversity of power sharing is missing or underdeveloped. To what extent do anti-militarist social movements demonstrate the ability of popular activity from below to outstrip elitist liabilities embedded in much pluralist theory? And how effectively have civil society organizations in Asia opposed the continued, expanded and renewed presence of the U.S. Armed Forces? This paper focuses on civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the larger anti-militarist social movements within which they have contended in the Philippines and Japan (especially, Okinawa). The paper further distinguishes among DJANGOs (Development, Justice and Advocacy Nongovernmental Organizations) and POs (People's Organizations) with only passing attention to QUANGOs (Quasi Nongovernmental Organizations) supported by government funding and sponsorship. Amplifying a preferred future for a totally demilitarized Okinawa, trend analysis and focused structured comparisons identify likely and unlikely obstacles and opportunities to a totally demilitarized Okinawa by 2025. Similarities and differences between the two cases appear policy-relevant! In turn, that identification generates prescriptions useful in guiding practical activities of organizations advocating removal of foreign military bases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese diplomacy has been traditionally lacking in accountability. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in Japan hasn?t felt necessity to explain its foreign policies to the people. Indeed Japan is a democratic country, but as far as foreign policies are concerned, democratic political procedures such as accountability, deliberation, and transparency are not easily visible.The notion of public diplomacy is not necessarily new one in Japan.　However it is not over emphasis to say that MOFA and the government has just recently begun to realize the importance of public diplomacy. They have to explain their foreign policies not only to the people in Japan but also to foreign people. People may raise some questions about foreign policies. Dialogue between the government and people has begun to be regarded as a necessary step. In this paper I would like to confirm significant change in Japanese diplomacy based on some concrete cases, then exploring whether or not public diplomacy will bring a paradigmatic change of foreign policies in Japan. If public diplomacy will be relevant to democratize foreign policies, the influence is not likely to be limited to Japan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political life in modern Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is traditionally characterized by a strong central government, influential economic elites, and a relatively homogeneous society. In such settings we would not expect to find much local democratic innovation, but the case of foreign workers in these countries challenges this assessment. Relatively unskilled foreign workers in present-day East Asia face a range of hardships, and existing governments? programs provide little support. Media portrayals of illegal workers ? as in several other industrialized democracies ? reinforce popular suspicion and fear of these foreigners. Yet, host countries? citizens themselves have formed numerous local associations aimed at assisting illegal foreign workers. I evaluate this trend in light of a pragmatic account of political motivation: associative activism. My account makes explicit the process through which some activists, who initially work in concert chiefly to solve specific local problems, eventually form broader political ambitions as they exert pressure on dominant features of the public sphere, especially processes of political representation and opinion formation. These associative efforts illustrate how civil society groups in East Asian countries can play an increasing role in redefining membership rules and state responsibilities for their residents. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]