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The major U.S. allies seem to be content to let the United States shoulder the burden associated with assuring the security of the West and promoting freedom and democracy around the world, passively free-riding on the security provided by the U.S. taxpayer. A different explanation is available, if rarely discussed: Perhaps the Europeans and Japanese are not merely passive consumers of free US security guarantees; perhaps instead the decisions they have made with regard to their own defense are instead part of active, coherent, logical, rational grand strategies. Perhaps the choice to pursue strategic restraint on part of Europe and Japan is not merely due to the stability provided by U.S. hegemony - which is largely illusory - but also a conscious response to declining threat. This paper seeks to explain the grand strategies of most of the great and potentially great powers of the post-Cold War world. Far from being irresponsible international actors, our allies are acting quite rationally in a world virtually absent of serious threat. Most of the rest of the world is following a clearly recognizable path of restraint. We dismiss their strategic perspective at our peril. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many observers of US foreign policy do not seem to appreciate the growing influence that the regional unified combatant commanders (the CINCs) exert on what some feel is the emerging Pax Americana. A variety of factors ? from the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 to almost a decade of Republican congressional control to the evolution of communications technology ? have contributed to a rapid growth in CINC influence on decision making on both the micro or tactical level and on the macro or strategic level. This paper describes how and why their role is changing, and speculates on the impact that such a change is likely have on the balance between diplomacy and military force in American foreign policy. Since the modern unified commander is rapidly becoming as much diplomat as warrior, increased cooperation between the regional commands and senior levels of the State Department ? jointness between the bureaucracies ? seems necessary in order to coordinate all facets of U.S. foreign policy if it is to be effective in addressing the complex challenges it is likely to face as the war on terror unfolds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]