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This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states cooperate with its policies: the use of different forms of power in obtaining cooperation from other states in exercising economic sanctions against a target state. Most of the literature on cooperation operate on the level of bargaining power where the policy changes are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the US (leader/patron state) in their cooperation and non-cooperation with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis and the US War Against Iraq, respectively. In that regard, I attempt to show that the three levels of power (Krause 1991) is a much better and more comprehensive framework in understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US. There are three main objectives of this study: (1) to shed more light on the cooperation process, (2) to challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that states? cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the bargaining level, and (3) to challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the rational choice, in the discipline. This study attempts to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even when this does not look as the best interest to that state, i.e., that state?s first preference is not to cooperate or that state does not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Similarly, this study also aims at showing why a client state does not cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be the best interest to the client state. My working hypothesis is that Turkey?s cooperation (or non-cooperation) with the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using solely a bargaining model which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either empirical non-quantifiable, or empirical quantifiable data. Lisa Martin?s (1992) game theoretical model is a good framework to look at the relationship between the two states on the bargaining level. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels of power, i.e., it focuses on bargaining power, and omits structural power and hegemonic power. A comprehensive framework of different forms of power relationship between a patron state and a client state is needed to explain the cooperative/non-cooperative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was to declare war on terrorism. The aspects of this war that have received the most attention have been the unilateral and military nature of the US response. What has been overlooked is another part of the Bush administration’s reaction: an effort to reconfigure the international norm of sovereignty as it applies to state sponsors of terrorism. The US has adopted the view that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their sovereign right to autonomy over their territory. This has been accompanied by an effort to persuade or compel the international community to accept this view as well, as can be seen in US efforts to garner international support in the military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq. This raises several theoretical questions, which this paper will try to address. First, is this merely a hegemon acting to reshape the international community to suit its national interests? Realists and neoliberal institutionalists disagree about the value of international institutions; will a dominant state reject institutions that it doesn’t think serve its interests, or will it try to modify them to avoid the costs of creating replacements? Constructivists and proponents of the English School argue that the shared rules, interests, and values of the international society of states will influence the behavior of its members. US behavior over the last two years includes elements that support each of these views; it has adopted a with us or against us approach, but at the same time has worked to persuade other states to revise the norm of sovereignty. Second, can a state unilaterally reshape international norms? The US appears to be trying to change shared understandings of when states retain the sovereign right to non-intervention by other states. The US is tacitly arguing that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their right to internal autonomy, because they have not fulfilled the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty. (This effort on the part of the US is not entirely new; during the 1990s the US government tried to shape international attitudes toward rogue states, but without arguing that these states had forfeited sovereignty.) While some studies have examined the role of individuals and international organizations in shaping international norms, the role of the state in reshaping international norms deserves further attention. This paper will contribute to this inquiry. It will examine the efforts the US has made to persuade other states to adopt a similar stance toward state sponsors of terrorism, and responses by other states and the international community in forums such as the UN and regional organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will compare the socialisation processes involving a liberal democratic norm set undertaken first (and highly successfully) in post-war West Germany, with the current socialisation process of democratic norms in Iraq. The paper will utilise a newly developed framework entitled ‘complex socialisation’ based on Social Identity Theory and self- and other categorisation processes for an analysis of the two cases of democratic norm socialisation. Both cases are processes of socialisation, where the norm promoting agency (the United states (and allies))has been in a hegemonic position and has held a hegemonic idea-set vis-a-vis a collapsed or failed idea-set. In both cases goal oriented institution-building has been undertaken with firm political commitment to the process of democratisation. All of these are regarded as necesarry conditions for successful socialisation. Yet, by using the predictions that can be generated from the framework of ‘complex socialisation’, it seems unlikely that the current process in Iraq will be as successful as the democratisation process in post-war West Germany, even assuming sufficient funding, because different self- and other categorisation processes are at work, which are likely to lead to different, and arguably less effective, socialisation strategies based on social learning through coercion rather than persuasion through reasoned argument. As such the mission to democratise Iraq may well be an impossible one, despite the encouraging historical examples of other post-conflict democratisation processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coercive diplomacy has generally focused on scenarios where there is a hegemon present (generally the United States) and the target state is a non-WMD power. But this seems to be a very restrictive model and needs to be examined in the present-day context. One of the basic characteristics of the successful conduct of coercive diplomacy is a high degree of credibility of the threat that would be carried out in the absence of the target state’s acquiescence to the demands of the hegemon. In the recent war with Iraq, the United States maintained its credibility by carrying out its threat to use force. But there is a lot more at stake here. Since September 11, 2001, the idea of regime change in certain countries has become more and more attractive to several sections of the Bush administration, in spite of a lack of a clear policy on this. Besides Iraq, there are several other countries where coercive diplomacy might be applied by the U.S. with the objective of regime change and/or a change in the WMD status of the target state. Iran, Syria, and North Korea are seen as future candidates. The ostensible objective for this course of action by the United States (either unilaterally, or in conjunction with members of the international community) is to reverse the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by these countries. This paper examines if and how coercive diplomacy can be carried out in a situation where the target state has reached a certain level of WMD capability and weaponization. Besides the Gulf campaign this year, the other recent example of coercive diplomacy was seen in South Asia after the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. In that situation, India launched a massive mobilization of troops on the border with Pakistan, demanding an end to support for separatism in Kashmir. The mobilization ended almost a year later with questionable results. Nuclear deterrence in the Indian subcontinent was the main reason why India couldn’t go ahead with its threat. This is a very clear contrast with the Iraq example. A scenario where both sides have weapons of mass destruction would impede on the credibility of the threats of the hegemon. This weakens the tangibility of power enjoyed by it. With the help of potential cases like Iran, North Korea, this paper looks at how the effectiveness of coercion by the hegemon is damaged in such circumstances, and tries to propose a model through which future cases of coercive diplomacy could be examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper contends that private military contractors supporting American military operations in Iraq will come under intense international scrutiny. Various factors have led to the substantial private presence and the Iraq case reveals shifts in international dynamics from state to private actors. However, the private presence raises concerns that will have to be considered due to the fishbowl qualities of the Iraq case. How the state/contractor relationship is managed will likely have a significant impact upon American policy in Iraq and upon how American military hegemony is perceived, produced, and applied in the future. Indeed, there are many problems and it is not entirely clear that the United States is prepared to handle the effects stemming from its heavy reliance upon military contractors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq put us in presence of two different conceptions of post-conflict state reconstruction. While the former is UN based, and follows the path of consensus and institution building, the latter is US based, and seems to be following a process determined by the occupying power in Iraq. Hence, comparing both paths of state building allows for the comparison of a consensus based state building process, which basic assumption is the establishment of a liberal democracy Vs. a hegemony based state building process, which might but does not necessarily result in the establishment of a democratic regime. In this paper, I first discuss the different models of post conflict reconstruction, before I compare the UN sponsored process of state building in Bosnia Herzegovina and the US sponsored process put in place in Iraq. My conclusion refers to the comparison of both models of state building in post conflict societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the nature and intersections of power, ideology, and knowledge by analyzing the history of the nationalist aspirations and political struggle of the Kurds. I analyze the different strategies and outcomes of the Kurdish movement in three countries where the vast majority of all Kurds reside ? in Iran, Iraq and Turkey ? through the lenses of several theories and approaches to civil and ethnic conflict: deprivation/ psychological/ grievance based, rationalist/ structuralist, and discursive/ constructivist. I embark on this exercise to explain the central puzzle: (1) what explains the durability and perseverance of separate Kurdish identity and struggle for self-determination given that historically Kurds have always been divided between several different nations and there has never been an independent Kurdistan (which resulted in an absence of some important unifying characteristics among the Kurds living in different countries, such as language and culture); and (2) why the states they inhabit have consistently treated their struggle as a major threat to their hegemony (sovereignty and integrity). As I draw conclusions about different outcomes in the three countries, I attribute the most explanatory power to a combination of two variables: relative state strength and international factors (both regional and global). Finally, I draw some tentative conclusions about the prospects for future configuration of the Kurdish situation with particular attention given to the recent developments in Iraq and the changing situation in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For those American allies that were non-combatants in the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. drive to rid the world of Saddam Hussein posed a variety of political and legal challenges. Their status also presents a puzzle for analysts. Realism and notions of hegemony if not pragmatism would suggest these countries might well have joined at least nominally in the ?coalition of the willing.? For an ally such as Canada, sitting out a war not only waged by the U.S. but also joined by Britain and Australia, the puzzle only deepens. This paper considers a number of factors, including a preference for using diplomatic instruments over military force, a belief in the need to secure United Nations authorization of military interventions, concerns about the apparent motives and justifications for the invasion, and strong domestic opposition from both publics and political elites. In the process, it suggests Canada was an unannounced quasi-member of the coalition and came much closer than acknowledged publicly to offering political support to if not joining the American-led invasion. The analysis suggests that while international norms acted as considerable constraints on Canadian policy, the implications of hegemonic power were important as well. [A copy of the paper can be obtained from the author: munton@unbc.ca [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses narrative analysis, research on magical thinking and positioning theory to examine the narrative constructed by the Bush administration after 9/11/01 to position the invasion of Iraq as legitimate and necessary. It argues that the ‘War on Terror’ is the creation of a new myth, which absolves America from the responsibility of questioning its own policies, or reciprocity in our historical relationship with Iraq. It further explores the deep cultural tendencies within the American national identity that rose to the surface as the narrative itself emerged. These dualistic tendencies contributed to the uptake of the narrative and its eventual hegemonic positioning. This deterministic explanatory narrative pushed the country into an intractable conflict â€" a war now in its fifth year. For a brief moment after the events of 9/11/01, Americans seemed ready to reflect and engage in the critical thinking that would not strip the 9/11 narrative of its complexity and relational nature. As the narrative unfolded, however, character essentializing, impoverished moral themes and linear plots replaced complexity. In short, we came to understand ourselves as essentially, fundamentally, different from them. But are we? The second part of this study explores that question by examining the interface of the macro narrative with the micro narratives of individual soldiers caught in the story’s uptake. Specifically, the paper seeks to discern the location of any shifts in thinking regarding the presenting narrative and the presumption of its moral justification through interviews with veterans from the Iraq War. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the potential expansion of Iran?s influence in Iraq through the country?s Shia population. Despite their predominance, it will argue that Iraq?s Shia leadership remains divided both politically and militarily, answering to numerous internal political, social and regional restraints. This paper will also question the willingness of Iraq?s Shia to cede autonomy to Iran. Iraq's Shia leadership derives their position from local rather than Iranian support. They question the direct role of the clergy in government, and are less internationally-isolationist. Although Iraqi groups have benefited from Iranian support, it will be argued that Tehran's influence over Baghdad?s new government is limited, and that the Shia use Iran to balance the influence of the occupying forces. Finally, it will suggest that Tehran's involvement in Iraq may end up influencing Iran more than it does Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1945, the United States has been considered the world hegemon, providing international security and economic stability. Its hegemony was established with the widespread consent of secondary nations and via multilateral mechanisms. The Bush administration?s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 frustrated many U.S. allies, which had been supporters of America?s hegemonic order. A growing academic debate centers on whether the U.S. is abandoning its previous commitments and positioning itself as the next world empire. Building on the comparative history of empires, this paper questions the feasibility of building an American empire without the consent of other nations. The argument is presented in two parts. Part one examines the role of consent in empire-building, showing that empires have required at least the tacit consent of other nations if they are to sustain their rule over the long-term. Part two investigates the growing discontent with U.S. imperial ambitions in light of recent developments in the Middle East. The paper concludes by showing that the U.S. is at the crossroad of defining its new role in the world. It either will return to hegemonic strategy with the multilateral support from its allies or will pursue its imperial interests unilaterally. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The control of urban societies is a pervasive theme in contemporary military operations, regardless of whether they concern counter-terrorism, security assistance, regime change, or reconstruction. So too is the notion of fractal war, or war that is at once local and global. The incoherence of the USA’s plans for the reconstruction and civil administration of post-conflict Iraq, however, raise fundamental questions about America’s understanding of the requirements of urban societies, the significance of hegemonic status, and the limitations of a political culture shaped by technology. The challenges of administering Iraq thus set the context for this paper, but the theoretical and operational problems associated with the task are discussed in the light of past policy choices and probable future requirements. The implications for the US of the increasing probability of low-level chronic urban violence by youthful and highly motivated adversaries on the political periphery are specifically addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several major theories, both realist and liberal, were advanced during the 1990's to explain the persistence of US hegemony, namely why no countervailing military coalition has formed to the US. These theories need to face the challenge of accounting for the diplomatic opposition of several major powers to the US with regard to the 2003 war in Iraq, which some observers consider to be a soft form of balancing. In this paper I will examine how the various theories of US hegemony account for this diplomatic conflict, and what expectations may be deduced from them with regard to the development of US relations with the other major powers in the aftermath of the war, and to what extent these expectations have been met since 2003.The analysis will show that the approach that best accounts for US relations wth other major powers in connection to the war in Iraq and in its aftermath is balance of threat theory in combination with liberal insights. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In February 2003, an unprecedentedly virulent dispute pitted the US against Russia, France, and Germany, abetted by China, over whether to endorse America’s decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. At the crux of the dispute lay a fundamenta ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 20th the so called Second Gulf War (or Iraq War) broke out .Why the war happened ? In the name of democracy Bush claimed to liberate the Iraq people from overthrowing the totalitarian dominance of Sadame As what we have seen and heard from G.Bush, he pursed democracy through War. But war is just the antidemocratic means which brings so much bad influence such as humanitarianism disaster and the pollution of the environment. In fact, launching the war is the reflection of hegemony. With the end of the Cold War ,the U.S. became the only pole which has no opponent to match him in strength. He can launch the war to Iraq with the opposition of the majority of the UN members . He can pursue democracy through hegemony. As we all know democracy and hegemony are just like water and fire . But in reality they can get together to serve for the interests of state . We don’t like Sadame either but we hate war more .Put the national interests of U.S. aside we should try to find out a way to avoid war and of course at the same time help the democracy flower grow more and more beautiful . However we humanity and our society is developing .I believe that a democratic peaceful world will come into being though it is still a dream to us . To make the dream coming true we should do our best to opposite hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]