Search

In May 2003 the European Union (EU) declared its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) fully operational. Simultaneously the EU appeared terminally divided over the conflict in Iraq and transatlantic divisions were emerging highlighting different priorities and approaches to international security. Given that the ESDP was already a contentious political issue within the EU and for transatlantic relations, this paper questions whether the fall out from Iraq will fatally undermine the development of this policy. It will argue that with clear leadership the EU can develop the capacity to be an effective regional security organisation and that the security preferences and approaches on either side of the Atlantic are not mutually exclusive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the constitutive relationship between the discourse of war and the conduct of war. Once introduced into the political-military discourse, words can shape a battlefield, and be battled over themselves. This terminological phenomenon has so far received scant academic attention and represents a gap in the war studies literature. This paper will attempt to bridge this gap by examining how the discourses devised for political or military utilitarian reasons can have a much greater, and in many ways different, impact than was originally intended when the discourse was first introduced. Discourse can take on a life of its own forcing political and military leaders and their associated institutions to fall into what I term the “discourse trap,” in which action is motivated or constrained primarily by the discursive constructs that have been created. In some instances, governments are forced to adopt polices and practices in order to justify or abide by their own discourse. In other instances, the discourse, perhaps out of sheer repetition, creates a new reality, even if this was not the original intention, and can seriously impair strategic and operational performance. The discourse trap is very evident in the dozens of characterizations US officials have used in relation to their irregular adversaries in Iraq. This paper will argue that the lack of terminological clarity and consistency has had significant negative repercussions for US strategy and operations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1999-2000 Presidential campaign, future President George W. Bush faced strong criticism and even ridicule for his lack of foreign policy experience. His answer was that although he personally might have been inexperienced in world affairs, he enjoyed the support of ?one of the finest foreign policy teams ever assembled? (Bruni 2000). Two years later, this team, now occupying top governmental positions, began showing signs of internal tension between the ?hawks?, such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the ?doves?, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell. The source of this rift was the President?s policy toward Iraq. This division was illustrated by the fact that Colin Powell and his Deputy Richard Armitage opposed a hasty, unilateral military intervention, whereas Donald Rumsfeld and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz viewed Saddam Hussein as an ?imminent threat? against the US, and thus supported military actions against the Iraqi dictator (Rennie 2002; Borger 2002). Although not as publicly visible as Rumsfeld and Powell prior to the Iraq war, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice quietly contributed to President Bush?s 2002 National Security Strategy, which advocated the acceptability of preventive and unilateral military strikes against the United States? enemies. After the war, however, Rice emerged as an outspoken advocate for extensive American involvement not only in Iraq but in the Middle East as a whole (Mann 2004). During the second George W. Bush Presidency Rice replaced Powell as Secretary of State.This recent example illustrates common divisions within the foreign policy apparatus, as laid out by the work on bureaucratic politics (Allison1969, 1971; Halperin 1974). Here advisors working in the Department of Defense are expected to be less inclined toward cooperation and more likely to see the world as a hostile environment than those working in the State Department. This paper empirically tests the supposition that there is a correlation between the psychological characteristics of foreign policy decision makers and the bureaucratic role that they play. The bureaucratic politics literature suggests that advisors working in the national security/military arena see the world as a more conflictual place than those working for the diplomatic apparatus, and that they are more likely to see direct confrontation as the best policy tool to achieve their goals (Allison and Halperin 1972; Smith 1984; Wallace 2005). The substantive research question investigated in this paper is: Are there significant psychological differences between policymakers across the security - diplomacy divide within the American foreign policy making apparatus? I explore the connection between security/defense and diplomacy roles and individual personalities through a quantitative analysis of the psychological traits (op code and LTA) of 12 Presidential advisors (Secretaries of State, Defense Secretaries and National Security Advisors), in the process integrating theories from both bureaucratic politics and political psychology. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed paper presents the findings of a comparative research project on changing collective norms regarding security and defence policy in Britain, France, Germany and Poland. Are lessons learnt from history nationally distinct or do we find evidence of a common discourse revolving around the European experience of the wars of the first half of the 20th Century? The paper considers evidence from a media content analysis surrounding the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, quantitative empirical evidence from questionnaire responses from elite actors and public opinion polls to measure differences between as well as within countries. One key finding is that there has been a convergence across Europe towards accepting that military instruments are sometimes necessary to protect foreign civilians from organised violence. On the other hand, the paper finds substantial differences in national attitudes rooted in collective identities regarding the use of force to promote values, material or political interests, or pre-empt threats. The paper argues that national strategic cultures thus limit the European Union to the role of a cautious humanitarian power (as epitomised in previous ESDP missions) unless it develops more flexible forms of intergovernmental cooperation on security and defence matters. A European Union that attempts to do more and live up to some of the aspirations set out in official documents will risk failure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ongoing military operations in Iraq demonstrate that major combat operations do not always end in decisive victory or defeat. Instead, they can lead to sustained insurgencies that entangle the intervening power in protracted, and potentially very costly, conflict. This paper examines ways in which countries conducting major combat operations ? especially those involving regime change ? can shape their conventional military campaigns to reduce the chances that an insurgency will arise in the aftermath. The paper argues that three factors are particularly helpful in preventing insurgencies from arising: having an official surrender or peace settlement; prewar planning for comprehensive demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs so that they can be quickly implemented when the shooting stops; and preparing intervening military forces to maintain public order until indigenous forces are capable of doing so. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional military approaches to planning and conducting counter-insurgency (COIN) have frequently failed to achieve effective courses of actions; particularly in the early stages of the campaign. Insurgents? organizing principles tend to be amorphous rather than hierarchical and their center of gravity is seldom physical. In this paper the author? Wing Commander Harry Kemsley, RAF Chief of Strategy JFACHQ?presents his concept of a Joint Agile Missions Group. The group creates civil/military task forces that employ ?netwar? concepts as a paradigm for organizing COIN operations. The foundational premise of the concept is that a network vs network strategy is likely to be more effective at COIN than traditional notions that employ a hierarchical military that relies principally on physical effects. The paper draws its evidentiary base from ongoing operations in Iraq and ongoing anti-terrorist operations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My research paper deals with the U.S. Foreign Policies concerning about the human rights situations in North Korea and Iraq. It attempts to compare the cases of North Korea and Iraq. Moreover, the study investigates the relations between U.S. military action and human rights protection as a main reason of intervention. Ultimately, it tries to predict the future of North Korea based on the Iraqi case.... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a government makes a major commitment to a foreign or security policy, how do these policy makers respond upon receiving adverse feedback? That is, what response do governments make to signals that their program investment is not realizing the intended objectives? Theories ranging from organizational behavior to political psychology predict an escalation of commitment. Frequently observed foreign policy actions appear consistent with that expectation. By contrast, control theory suggests that deviation from a goal triggers corrective behavior and adjustments. Although infrequent, instances of redirection do occur as suggested by Sadat's journey to Jerusalem to propose peace with Israel or LBJ's rejection of General Westmoreland's request for more troops after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. This paper furthers the author's efforts to specify the conditions under which one response is more likely than others. It also examines the circumstances under which policy failure contributes to organizational learning. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Gulf War South Korea and Japan had to solve a dilemma that they faced. As important allies of the United Stated in Asia they were expected to assist the US in the War in Iraq. Their dilemma was should they assist the United States and accepts its request to send military troops to Iraq and by doing so they will support their ally. Or should they limit their commitment to the alliance with the US only to Asia and not to support the US in the War in Iraq. By doing so, they might reflect on the alliance with the US and they would undermine the alliance and might even expect some kind of retaliation from the US.The security alliance with the US is an important element in the defense policies of both Japan and South Korea. Without the alliance, both states would have to change their defense policies and they might need to increase their defense budget. In the Japanese case, the modification to its defense policy would be even greater then the one that South Korea would have to do.The alliance with the US carries a ?price tag?. In previous years that included the support of the US against the communist block and financial support as well. The first Gulf War (1990-1991) summand both states with the question if they should assist the US in the war against Iraq. Japan decided not to send any forces to assist the US in the war in Iraq due to constitution limitations on using forces outside the Japanese territory. Later on Japan send few sweeping mines ships to the area after the war ended. Japan was criticized by the US and other states for not participating in the war. Japan paid 13 billion $ for the war and later was accused for trying to buy her part in by using a "checkbook diplomacy". Korea's very limited involvement in the first Gulf war was not criticized, as Japan was.This paper analyzes the decisions of Japan and South Korea to send their forces to Iraq in the second Gulf War. Both allies were asked by the US to support her in the war in Iraq. The US forces are stationed in both states for the purpose of defending them against any attack from hostile states such as North Korea for example. The US expected that both allies will cooperate and supports its mission in Iraq. Both allies had to make the decision if the alliance with the US is limited only to the East Asian region or the alliance includes other areas outside the East Asian parameter. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent decline in the number of veterans in Congress has drawn concern from both experts and scholars who argue that such changes in the demographics of Congress could have significant effects on American foreign policy. While scholars find strong evidence of distinct policy preferences between political elites with military experience and those that have not served, the effects of military service are not apparent in the voting records of congressional representatives on foreign and defense policy. If elites with military experience do have distinct policy preferences from their civilian counterparts, why has the gap in these policy preferences failed to manifest itself in congressional policy positions? To answer this puzzle, I present a new way of conceptualizing and measuring military experience intended to capture the nuances of military service more accurately than a dummy variable, the standard method of measurement. This new measurement is an index that includes branch of service, years of military service, combat experience, and active duty service. In addition, I propose that the effects of military service will be most pronounced on issues where this experience is most applicable: during times of war. By applying this new conceptualization to the Iraq War, I find the impact of military service is indeed significant on specific issues associated with war oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent issue of ISQ, Peter Howard argued that realism would have expected the United States to invade North Korea rather than Iraq in 2002, and that only a language-based constructivist approach to international relations can explain why the U.S. chose to invade Iraq instead. I present a rational and empirical analysis suggesting that this approach is totally unnecessary to explain this decision, and that it was completely rational for Iraq to be a preferred target over North Korea. The language analysis interprets realism too narrowly, and in fact unreasonably. I present predictions from statistical models of war duration and fatalities that show that a war with North Korea would be predicted to be dramatically longer and more dangerous than a war with Iraq. Given similar fears in both cases, the United States chose the target that was expected to be easier, that is, the target with lower (expected) costs of war. This is perfectly consistent with rational choice/expected utility theory. The analysis suggests that the constructivist language games followed the rational choice between targets rather than influenced that choice; policy differences in this case can in fact be explained by ?mainstream? theory. [Note: I do not intend in this paper to defend decisions concerning Iraq or North Korea. Rather, it responds to the argument that between the two potential targets, North Korea should have been the selected target. While invading either state may have been misguided, statistical evidence suggests that North Korea would have been an even more difficult target for the United States to tackle.] ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is generally recognized that American military and political leaders drew a series of lessons from the Vietnam experience, and that these lessons powerfully shaped American foreign and defence policy for decades to come. Many now argue that recent American actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have at last exorcized the ghosts of Vietnam. Is this true or false? And were the lessons of Vietnam (a) sound and (b) salutary? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When considering the nature of US hegemony and power, the influence of the US military is stereotypically viewed in terms of combat capability and its use to either deter aggression or defeat adversaries. Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforce this distinctively realist perspective of US military power. However, the US military might also contribute to a more democratic, and thus more peaceful, international system through constructivist type mechanisms. US foreign policy assumptions and military strategies based on engagement, suggest that US military contacts, and the normative influence they might exert, have a positive effect on promoting professional militaries as well as socializing foreign military officers to democratic norms and practices. This study spans the years 1972-2000 and uses survival/hazard analysis techniques to explore the socializing influence exerted (or not) through US military engagement activities on the political identity of states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the US foreign and defense policy and actions have been dictated by the hegemonic and pre-emptive strategies. Its direct involvement in the expulsion of Iraqi Ba’athist regime from Kuwait in 990, invasion of Afghani ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

?To me, the war between the United States and Iraq seems as if it takes place involving some other country, perhaps even on some other planet.? (Kerry)"The Taliban is one problem in Iraq." (Teresa)Since the 1960?s, young citizens, particularly college students, in the US have been looked to as barometers of resistance to war and the makings of empire. The current generation of college students has been largely absent, however, in expressing resistance to the war or outrage over the actions of the US government. In this project I collect both written and oral narratives from US college students about how they think about the war on Iraq. How can we explain their low rates of enlistment in the military, their failure to engage in large-scale anti-war protest, or their disinterest in the events of the war? How are subject positions such as race and gender implicated in this apparent disconnection towards world affairs, or in an unquestioning acceptance of the government?s accounts of the necessity of war? And, how do citizens of empire accustomed to militarism and the accompanying ideas about the proper practice of gender in wartime continue to maintain a sense of themselves as citizens without meeting the former requirements of citizenship ? that is, military enlistment? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the war with Iraq finally began on March 20, 2003, the opening shots came in the form of an intense aerial bombing campaign intended to evoke ?shock and awe? from the Iraqi regime. While the arrival of ground troops quickly followed, the broader US strategy included high reliance on surgical bombing strikes throughout the country. With the advancement in guidance technology coupled with a decreased toleration for casualties, aerial bombing has increased in prominence as a tool of coercion in the international arena. How successful are such campaigns, and what are the prospects for the future?Few studies of the efficacy of aerial bombing have employed techniques of quantitative analysis, the most notable exception being Reiter and Horowitz (2001). Drawing on data collected by Pape (1996) and augmented by Reiter and Horowitz, I explore the factors that affect the length of these campaigns. Initial findings suggest that as time passes, further damage done via strategic bombing does little to change the outcome of the conflict. This runs counter to the punishment logic of areial coercion (going back to Douhet), which suggests that the longer a bombing campaign lasts, the more damage done to the target state?s resources, thus diminishing the options available to the target government. Campaigns that are successful tend to last 6 months or less, so why have many of these campaigns dragged on for multiple years? Clodfelter (1989) notes that the US bombed many of the same sites in Vietnam repeatedly, long after any strategic value was destroyed. When do we say enough's enough, and when do we continue to re-arrange the same rubble? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]