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In this paper I seek to answer some basic questions about the process of globalization in the defense industry and the security considerations that result from it. I concentrate on two major groups of players; states and firms. In the first section I briefly lay out the definition of globalization that is commonly used in analyzing defense issues and then look at what the phrase really means in terms of the defense trade. The following section examines the manifestations of globalization in the defense trade, which are many and profound. There is a particular focus in this section on the effects of globalization on defense production, but there is also some discussion of the effects of globalization on the defense trade; the ?sharp end? of the issue. The next section examines the effects of globalization on security for the state and the firm Throughout this paper the phrase ?defense trade? is used rather than ?arms trade? this reflects the fact that much of what is now traded does not look like a defense good; it is a component, a software code, a training package or simulator, even a computer. Today?s trade is less in finished defense goods than in the components of a system. The phrase ?defense trade? captures this dynamic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies George W. Bush?s narrative; the relationship between U.S. national security and information technology after the painful experience of 9/11. Bush?s phrases of national security and information technology are in the nucleus of international and national political challenges, yet they are in many ways problematic and controversial. I am asking if they even are a central part of the problem of global war on terror itself. Nevertheless my intention is rather to try to understand what I suggest as Bush?s narrative of ?nightmare? by generating questions from political philosophy that challenge and open up these fundamental phrases. As President Bush is boldly able to simplify the complex phenomenon of terrorism, his acts will raise a question more fundamental in the West: how far he can go with the phrases. Colonizing a cyberspace with totalitarian surveillance activities maintains a paradoxical silence; a vast amount of information without knowledge. In this sense, President Bush has taken in his ?ride? American national security culture to the new frontiers. This has a potential to lead to the deterritorialization of national security. Using Lyotard?s thoughts, the paper discovers questions of putting the phrase ?take the battle to the enemy? into practice. On an information technology level of analysis this can be seen as total accident, in Paul Virilio?s terms, with the pragmatism of permanent cybersurveillance (Patriot Act) of the Americans and not just terrorists. It is a logical step for modernity to define information technology as a tool in this battle in which ?freedom does not come free?. On a narrative level of analysis, I suggest that phrases of information technology should be turned into recognizing a differend. These phrases put forward the unpresentable which, even though it opens up a question of the concept of ?enemy?, reveals how the United States in its travel is struggling not with the enemy but with itself. Bush?s disputable phrases of information technology occupy an important place in U.S. national security culture because of their contradictory relation between state and individual to western expansion of freedom. This is enabled in Bush?s narrative which is legitimated by a possible ?nightmare?. By ?discovering? this ?frontier? in Bush?s universe, we can better understand the modern project grounding its legitimacy in the imaginable future ? and not in 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthony A. Loh Department of Political Science Vanderbilt University (615) 343-6046 Email: anthony.a.loh@vanderbilt.edu The events of 9/11 helped expose the underlying incompatibilities between an emerging American hegemony and the Westphalian system of international relations. In much of International Relations literature, the assumption is that the international system is given, while the distribution of power can take the form of multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity. Yet in the aftermath of the Iraq war of 2003, the United States has clearly consolidated its post-Cold War triumphant gains in political, economic and military leverages over the rest of the world, including its allies in Western Europe. It has sought to fill the void left by the former Soviet Union. A new systems structure appears to be emerging that is centered on the United States, and anti-hegemonial coalitions that could sufficiently balance it are becoming more difficult to assemble, although sub-state actors like Al Qaeda cell groups have risen to attempt to check the hegemon through insidious means and transnational networks. It is time for Waltzian claims to receive yet another nuanced revision or perhaps a complete rejection. At the highest level, systems structure may no longer be anarchical, whereas at the lowest (sub-state) level, it remains to be so. This paper explores the significance of these structural changes for international politics. There has been a near-explosion of IR literature on the United States becoming a new imperium. The central question addressed here is how this new American imperium differs from traditional-type territorial empires and what is its significance for U.S.-East Asian relations in the 21st century. The paper looks at the potential shifts in U.S. policies in South and North Korea, Japan, Singapore, Philippines, Taiwan, and China. These East Asian states have been watching closely the military and political outcome of the 2003 Iraqi war. The implications of American unilateralism ? with its doctrines on regime change and strategic preemption ? worry them. Some of them are authoritarian regimes and are regarded by the United States as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. The shift in post-9/11 U.S. strategy from containing peer competitors to dealing with terrorist threats have lifted some pressures on China, but the neoconservative agenda to remake the international order will be sure to bear on regional security and stability. How will the United States deal with North Korea in light of the Iraqi campaign of 2003? Some East Asian states have already seen the need to revise their traditional relationships with the United States. South Korea, in its drive for reunification, might abandon its reliance on U.S. security umbrella and turn to China as the new power broker. Japan, America’s staunchest ally in the region, might choose to remilitarize rather than continue to rely on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Still other East Asian states might be polarized into pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. camps, especially since there is little cohesiveness among them to begin with. The limits of U.S. military power are particularly felt in the East Asian context. Yet the question that concerns all of East Asia is how the U.S., with its global military supremacy, would exercise its political rule as a neoimperial power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We must feel safe. We must feel safe not just from the threat of terror, but also from the threat of due process abuse. We must feel safe from the threats of armed terrorists; but also, from the fear that would surely follow if M1-A tanks were parked at our intersections. We want our safety; and we want our freedom. It’s about trust: who, how much, when, and maybe even how. In searching for the answers to these questions, there are certain components we must understand. Only through informed decisions can outcomes succeed. This paper addresses some of the essential elements to consider ? hopefully helping us debate the issues from an informed view point and allowing us to reach consensus in what is surely the greatest challenge of our time. There are four essential elements to consider. They are the 4-Rs: resources, rights, and restrictions resting on a foundation of risk management. We must ensure a delicate balance ? a three-legged stool: one leg representing cost [resources] (dollars, people, equipment, training); one leg representing the due process freedoms [rights]; and the third representing the degree of convenience (or lack thereof) [restrictions] we can live with. The stool must rest on a foundation of risk management: threat assessment, risk assessment, and cost/benefit assessment. We must understand the issues of each to ensure we build a capability that will allow appropriate balance; ensuring the stool does not tip too far in any one direction. As we go through the discussion, these 4-Rs will always run just below the surface; behind the decision. This paper examines these issues in a way applicable throughout the United States, but also within the context of recent efforts undertaken in the state of Alabama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses an emerging interaction between bilateral and multilateral security arrangements for conflict resolution in Asia since the 1990s by emphasizing the correlation of Asian hegemony management with foreign policy strategies of the US, China and Japan. As protracted conflicts of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have threatened regional prosperity and stability, regional security institutions have become an important policy concern in the post-Cold War era. Detecting nascent multilateral institution-building in Asian regional security, this paper asks how and why US-led bilateral alliances interact with multilateral security arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN-Plus-Three. In order to examine this puzzle, the paper focuses on three points: (1) foreign policy strategies of three countries, (2) domestic interests concerning the feasibility and legitimacy of supplementing bilateralism with multilateralism in Asian security, and (3) impacts of Asian hegemony management on establishing regional security institutions. The paper compares the three countries’ preferences to regional security by focusing on the relationship between bilateralism of the US-led alliances and multilateralism. It then tries to demonstrate that both the dynamics of Asian hegemony management and the policy preferences concerning bilateralism and multilateralism are essential in understanding regional security arrangements in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on the paper Disarmament, Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Couterproliferation: In Search of Synergy and Policy Coherence that was presented at the combined International Security Studies Section, ISA, and National Security and Arms Control Section, APSA, meeting at Richmond, VA in October 2002. That initial paper examined the development of the four title policy elements against the emerging international security environment as a foundation from which to examine US Government internal policy, process, and organizational factors for arms control as a policy arena. The follow-on paper proposed here would depart from the same conceptual and process development, but it would examine the external position, emphasis, and priority of the four title elements in US external foreign and security policy and its implementation. The focus here will be on analyzing and critiquing the shift from, for example, nonproliferation to counterproliferation, and from relatively more collective approaches to arms control policy to a more unilateral emphasis. A preliminary outline would be something like the following: Policy Evolution (place, role, and priority in US policy) Disarmament and Arms Control Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation; Bush Administration Policy and Rationale No Place for Disarmament, An end to Arms Control Counterproliferation first, Nonproliferation in a Supporting Role; Policy Relevance and Recommendations; Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation CBW Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation Conventional and Emerging Arms Control Arenas; Crafting and Implementing a Coherent and Synergistic Approach to Arms Control [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As we await a final report from the commission investigating the terrorist attack on the US in September 2001, we know enough now to determine whetehr or not the failure to detect and thwart the surprise was the fault of America’s multi-billion dollar intelligence system or something else. The purpose of this paper will be to evaluate the intelligence activities surrounding 9/11, determine what failed and why, and draw lessons for the future from this extraordinary event. The paper will comment as well on the steps that have already been taken to prevent such surprises in the future and the laws that have been passed to protect national security, perhaps at a great cost to human rights and personal freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As more states gain access to orbit, the possibility of deliberate interference, accidents and misperception has increased and now threatens the common interest in the peaceful use of outer space. Only a few states have even a rudimentary tracking capability necessary to operate safely in an increasingly populated environment. Even the United States, upon which the world relies for essential orbital information, has identified reducing the gaps in its space situational awareness as a crucial priority for U.S. space programs?the US network only tracks objects larger than 10 cm (about the size of a baseball), does not provide continuous tracking and cannot determine the cause satellite failures. Although the United States has a strong interest in developing rules of the road for space regarding traffic control and reducing orbital debris creation, the United States has yet to commit to the expanded data sharing that would be necessary for such activities. Some U.S. intelligence agencies fear that cooperation might compromise sensitive national security information. This paper considers proposals to share satellite-tracking information in support of space traffic control and debris mitigation efforts. The paper concludes that expanding cooperative monitoring of activities in outer space to mitigate the risks from increasingly crowed orbital environment and to build confidence would enhance, rather than undermine, U.S. national security interests as well as the common interest in the peaceful use of outer space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the form and content of nation-shaping in the US post 9/11. The attacks of 9/11 provide a touchstone for tensions between global integration on the one hand, and nationalist identification and mobilization on the other. In the US, the state has clearly seen its power and centrality fortified as concerns for ‘homeland security’ take center stage. In the process, the nation, or national community, has emerged as a key vehicle for legitimizing the state, and national identity or American nationhood are functioning as a central mechanism for marking boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. The paper draws upon Roxanne Doty’s notion of statecraft to analyze the top-down dimensions of nation-shaping that occur when the American state invokes the nation as a justification for its expanding role in defending political and cultural boundaries. Meanwhile, the politics of American nationhood also filter up as individuals and groups in society use national identity and membership in a national community to secure a rightful place as protected citizens of a hegemonic state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing three theoretical approaches to congressional-presidential interplay in foreign policy, this paper argues that the most useful and convincing theoretical explanation of congressional deference to the George W. Bush administration national security policy focuses on three variables: a) Congress?s perception of the existence of a global threat to U.S. national security; b) presidential success in foreign affairs; and c) the presence of an undivided government in Washington (with both Congress and White House controlled by the same party). Of the three variables, a) seems to be the most significant important. Thus, this paper concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have created the conditions for a Cold War-like consensus in the United States. The general agreement that international terrorism is a global threat that needs to be fully assessed by the U.S. government reverts back to the Cold War pattern with respect to national security affairs of a dominant presidency and a compliant Congress in U.S. legislative-executive relations. In the near future, Congress may assert its foreign policy powers to a greater degree if the White House experiences difficulties with the global war on terrorism or if the Democratic Party regains control of the Senate and/or the House of Representatives. However, it seems that as long as Congress perceives that U.S. national security is threatened by the ?global and urgent threat? of terrorism, the presidency will be able to concentrate national security powers in its own hands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the demographic representations of threats in the post Cold War security context. Fears of differential fertility between regions, countries and ethnic groups have long been a focus of U.S. national security interests. Today, these fears center on differences in population growth rates between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, Hindus and Muslims in South Asia, and more generally Islamic countries and the West. Youth bulge theories predict that a high proportion of young males within a country predisposes it toward political violence. In the current war on terror defense and intelligence strategists are pointing toward youth bulges as an instigator of violence, especially in the Middle East. The paper also examines the gendered nature of these strategic doctrines as well as their integration into other international and domestic security models, e.g. environmental conflict theory, the superpredator explanation of juvenile crime, and racial profiling. It analyzes their relationship to migration issues and changing demographic realities such as mortality from the AIDS pandemic, slowing of population growth worldwide, and the gray dawn of population aging in the West. Are there subtle differences in the understanding and articulation of these threats among different political interests, e.g. conservative unilateralists and liberal multilateralists? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States, Globalization and the National Security State The suicidal terrorist attacks of September 11 were an audacious demonstration of how the dark side of globalization could directly impact on the security of the US. According to President Bush, September 11th changed the strategic thinking of the US. But it is evident that a new strategic era actually began with the end of the Cold War. What happened on September 11 is that the intra-state violence of the post-Cold War period finally caught up with the US. This paper will seek to explore whether the Bush administration has really come to terms with a radical change of context in the global security environment. While acknowledging new developments in US thinking about security in the post-Cold War world, this paper argues that a Cold War phenomenon known as the national security state, in which defence and foreign policy interests essentially merged to protect the state from the threat of military force, remains largely intact. Indeed, the ideas of US global primacy and pre-emptive war, adopted by the Bush administration in 2002, have reinvigorated and extended the concept of a US national security state. It will be shown that the impact of globalization on the US worldview has been limited, amongst other things, by America’s sole superpower status, the re-positing of the Republican Party during the 1990s and the traumatic effect of September 11. As a result, President Bush’s America remains an old fashioned partisan great power, rather than a truly global power. And given the US’s enormous structural power in military and economic terms in the post-Cold War world, it could be argued that Mr Bush’s new exceptionalism is becoming a major obstacle to fashioning an international consensus on security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

PLEASE NOTE: This paper is still undergoing the required prepublication review by the U.S. Department of Defense. Upon completion of that review and clearance for public release, the paper will be posted in its entirety. You may also request a copy of the paper by emailing Dan Gressang at either Daniel.Gressang@dia.mil or Gressang@aol.com. Upon clearance for release from DoD, the paper will be emailed to you. Thank you for your patience. Bringing strategic level and tactical level analysis and prediction together are not easy tasks. Yet it is in strategic and predictive analysis that we need for effective threat recognition and effective homeland defense and security. And it is strategic and predictive analysis which are the least developed and leveraged at all levels of government. Terrorists are hard targets, constantly adapting, constantly changing, constantly threatening us and our interests in a variety of ways. The target ? terrorists ? is here, there, everywhere and nowhere. The threat seems to change daily, certainly with each new attack. Effective preparation demands broad cooperative efforts involving local, state, and national authorities. It demands the incorporation of law enforcement, intelligence, public health, first responder, and policy perspectives. It requires broad consensus on mission, goals, objectives, and processes if it is to be successful. It must, above all else, be dedicated to the predictive, the anticipatory so that threats can be identified before violent acts have a chance to highlight our shortcomings in security. Responding and reacting to terrorism is a necessary practice of government. Effective homeland defense and homeland security, however, revolve around anticipation of those threats and around efforts to disrupt and deter. Disrupting and deterring terrorists while securing the homeland from attack from within or without, in turn, requires the effective cooperation and coordination across jurisdictions, across perspectives, across levels of government. This paper examines one such effort, the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, and uses it to draw some operative lessons for building and operating an effective multi-jurisdiction analysis and warning effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Case studies on Clinton Administration national security policymaking are an important area for policy relevant research. During the 1990s, there were various attempts by the Clinton Administration to innovate in national security policymaking. Innovations were attempted in peace operations, the interagency process, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Were the 1990s Clinton policy leadership efforts in stopping the threats of WMD proliferation in North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq all policy failures that could have been prevented? Could more effective Clinton Administration policy leadership have made US counterproliferation efforts more successful? This paper focuses on the Clinton Administration?s Counterproliferation Policy Initiative in the 1994 North Korean Agreed Framework Case. The case uses coercive diplomacy theory to examine the existence of a theory-practice gap in assessing Clinton Administration top-down leadership in the 1994 North Korean crisis. This paper?s findings suggest a relatively effective linkage of theory and practice, however, the result is a short term rather than long term policy success. Additional case studies are necessary to further assess the effectiveness of Clinton era executive leadership patterns in Counterproliferation Initiative policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deployment of military forces abroad has been a major component of US grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War. From providing security to the United States, its interests, and its allies, there are multiple reasons for maintaining forward deployments. It has been from this conict and economic perspective that the Field of international relations has typically approached the issue of military deployments. Beyond the work in political science, others have argued that the presence of American military personnel abroad creates a series of negative externalities that local communities suffer from. In this paper, we put some of these claims to the test by looking at the effect that military deployments have had on crime rates within the host state. More precisely, we examine whether or not US military deployments are significantly asso- ciated with higher levels of criminal activity across a large subset of possible crimes, including theft, physical and sexual assault, and murder. To that end, we employ cross-national crime statistics from the United Nations as well as recently collected data on US troop deployments to examine the impact that a US military presence has on a host country. Consequently, this paper contributes to a greater understanding of the impact that US military deployments, and US foreign policy more broadly, have had on other countries. By extension, this study will also enhance our understanding of the micro-level factors that might affect relationships between alliance partners by examining the roots of domestic opposition to a foreign military presence within a host country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research that taps into the biological basis of human cognitive potential has been active in the past decade. Outside of academia, multiple US government agencies, particularly the ones in security communities, also have rising interests in the research and development of cognitive neuroscience applications. In light of this, certain questions need to be investigated: why are the security communities interested in the research of cognitive sciences? What kinds of potential benefits and problems do the research and application of cognitive sciences bring? How do discoveries in cognitive science and neuroscience research relate to the way that human behaviors are theorized in politics and war? The advances in cognitive sciences and their security applications present complex problems, yet the definition of these problems continues to remain ambiguous. This paper explores the ways through which the emerging research and security applications in the cognitive sciences impact how one theorizes about politics and war. Particularly, by emphasizing the "human" element of armed conflicts, this paper shows that certain discoveries in cognitive sciences present potential challenges to some existing assumptions made about combatants in terms of human costs, soldier's morale, and cognitive autonomy. It is suggested that these assumptions have limited scope and utility in light of today's scientific progress and may need further consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the global health implications of security-oriented regulation of laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organisms. The challenge with such regulation, implemented to address government concerns about biological weapons use, is to maximise security benefits while minimising interference with legitimate scientific research conducted for therapeutic ends. The biotechnology sector performs basic research on infectious diseases, produces vaccines and other drugs, and instructs health professionals on how to use them. Too much biosecurity regulation might cripple commercial and academic enterprise in the life sciences and thereby diminish the ability of public health systemsâ??particularly their diagnostic and patient care elementsâ??to respond to an infectious disease outbreak. It may also hinder valuable international collaborations on addressing local and transnational infectious disease threats. On the other hand, the potential application of gene technology for offensive purposes highlights the powerful position held by scientists with access to pathogens and knowledge of what makes them dangerous. The paper compares biosecurity regulatory schemes in the United States and Australia, and offers more general observations about health and security trade-offs in a global context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'National Vision' of the Bush Administration with regard to homeland security aimed to 'prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terror while facilitating the legal flow of people, goods, and services'. International implications of homeland security measures have resulted in the emergence of new class of foreign policy makers: Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and other units in the Department of Homeland Security whose exposure to international partners increased considerably. This paper challenges a reader to make a certain conceptual shift and look at homeland security as a foreign policy issue as well as the internal security one. The analysis of transatlantic homeland security progresses in two steps. First, it explores the post-September 11th development of homeland security cooperation between the US and the EU in order to identify challenges to the transatlantic governance of homeland security. Then, the attention is paid to internal challenges stemming from domestic politics on each side but also to external ones posed by the international environment and third parties. Issues under discussion in this paper include aviation security and customs cooperation which represent most impressive but at the same time most problematic dimension of the contemporary transatlantic homeland security cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, Norwegian strategic culture has been about national defence, presupposing a close or special relationship with the United States. During the Cold War this was also the case in other small and medium sized European countries. The paper analyses the various types of US hegemonic power at work in Norway and how they are converted into influence over the specific content of Norwegian strategic culture and security policy, using a practice-based approach. Within IR theory, hegemony is generally understood as the power of one state to generate consent and support from other states through a combination of coercion, incentives and references to shared norms. In Norway, US influence is based on benevolent hegemony and ideational hegemony and institutionalized in bilateral military practices that have been developed over time. The paper argues that the reproduction of these practices in social structures is shaping Norwegian strategic culture. In principle, the lack of an immediate threat against Norway after 1991 could have loosened Norwegian-US ties and encouraged, firstly, a strategic culture more detached from territorial defense, and, secondly, a more European type of strategic culture. Though Norway participated in the US-led military operation in Afghanistan and had a military presence in post-war Iraq, these contributions were withdrawn in late 2005. To what extent does this indicate a breech away from a declining US hegemonic influence and a development towards a distinct Norwegian strategic post-Cold War strategic culture where the bilateral relationship is less central? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will assess the manifold efforts to securitize global environmental change (GEC) as security dangers and concerns for national and human security that poses a new survival dilemma for those who are highly socially vulnerable due to the impact of natural hydrome¬teo¬¬rological hazards whose number and intensity has increased and is predicted to grow further due to the anthropogenic climate change. In the U.S. nearly as many people died due to the impact of Hurricane Katrina in August 2006 as of the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001. But the perception of these two cases as security concerns has differed not only between many governments within NATO but also among the people in Europe and in North America. The securitization of GEC has fundamentally differed and prevented so far effective global counter measures to adapt to and mitigate against the consequences of this new security threat where the enemy is us: our production and consumption patters as well as ways of life. Climate change as a new human and national security danger and concern poses new global equity problems between those countries and people that have contributed most to GEC and the survival of those poor people â€" especially in the South â€" whose livelihood and survival is directly threatened and who lack the resources for counter measures. The key thesis of this paper is that the turn towards the anthropocene requires a fundamental reconcep¬tua¬lizing of security as a result of a multi-, inter- and transdiciplinary process where natural and social scientists cooperate contributing to an anticipatory learning to prevent that the business as usual scenarios on climate change become reality with all its impact on global security policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to understand and empirically analyse the neo-conservative project and its influence on US foreign policy and its 'new imperial' turn. The nature, evolution, and long-term implications of the post-9/11 shift in US foreign policy are addressed from a perspective stressing the interplay between structure and agency, and, crucially, incorporating an ideological dimension. With the help of Social Network Analysis a neo-conservative (two-mode) network is identified starting from affiliation with the neo-conservative advocacy group Project for A New American Century. On the basis of both qualitative and quantitative (yet relational) data it is analysed how this multileveled network, spanning the private institutional, governmental, and corporate/financial level, has influenced US post-9/11 foreign policy, with a focus on grand strategy and the global 'War on Terror'. Taking a transnational political economy perspective as a point of departure it is analysed to what extent this neo-conservative project can interpreted as a 'hegemonic project' understood as containing: a political formula and a geopolitical strategy and how this is related to the reigning (neoliberal) accumulation strategy. In this respect it is also explored to what extent and how the neo-conservative project can be related to the neo-liberal project and how it differs from, or implies a transformation of the neoliberal project. The paper ends with a theoretical reflection on how to interpret the empirical findings with respect to some key questions concerning the the dialectical relationship between the interstate system on the one hand and global capitalism on the other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates threat information coordination between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and integrates a new piece to this complex relationship: the public. A common criticism after the attacks on 9/11 was how the "wall" between law enforcement and intelligence blocked effective coordination of incoming intelligence information. As a result the focus of intelligence efforts is increasingly being directed inward - toward the American domestic population and - "downward" - toward regional and local initiatives. This paper looks at domestic intelligence activities in Los Angeles in order to investigate the role of the public in the changing relationship between civil liberties and security. Los Angeles is used as a starting point and exemplar for other national domestic intelligence activities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the intensification of anti-immigration measures in Minnesota, first, as effective performances of biopolitical statecraft, i.e., as speech-acts that produce local agents of "national security" whose role is to secure "American society" against the perceived threats posed by foreign bodies. Blurring the boundaries between war and law enforcement, these agents defend the body politic against the parasitic and insidious bodies of immigrants by mapping local spaces and communities (thereby rendering potentially hazardous bodies visible), by inoculating, weakening, or purging bodies deemed hazardous (e.g., through surveillance, incarceration, deportation, and killing, and by threatening all of these tactics), and by regulating the everyday lives of Minnesota residents. Secondly, the paper analyses these orders and orderings as effects of the nationalist or, more accurately, nation-statist backlash against the boundary-blurring movements and migrations animated by the post-nationalist economic logic of global capitalism. Drawing on Foucault's recently translated lectures, I argue that the resurgence of nationalist populism in Minnesota, and in the U.S. more broadly, restages a xenophobic, "neo-racist" fantasy. The new populist movement strives to domesticate the U.S. war machine in order to police and defend the borders, internal and external, of an imagined American nation. Finally, drawing on Derrida, Althusser, and Lacan, I demonstrate the ways in which anti-immigrant populism is fueled by failure, and particularly by the failure to realize the fantasy of ethno-national harmony through representational practices and physical violence. I argue that the "American nation" cannot be defended because, in the last analysis, it does not exist. It is anxiety stemming from its absence, I suggest, that fuels the productive activities of the police state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly it seeks to address the burgeoning literature developing on discourse analysis within the discipline of IR (Doty, 1996, Larsen, 1997, 1999, Milliken 1999, Fierke 1998, Campbell 1998, Hansen 2006). In particular, I turn to the relevance of this approach for conceptualising traditional agent-structure and self-other relations as dialectical. Theorising the relationship between identity and recognition will thus become imperative throughout the paper. Taking these finding as a starting point, the second section moves to outline patterns of continuity and change systematically introduced into the Bush administration’s foreign policy discourse since September 2001. Essentially I maintain that the democratic language constructed therein has created a legitimacy crisis for the US by exposing a glaring gap between its words and deeds. Using discourse analysis as a tool, the analysis offers an alternative angle from which to explain and understand the tension created by such inconsistencies. Harnessing this approach, moreover, provides a lens to observe how these variations have opened up the space for alternative interpretations of current US foreign policy objectives. In sum, I seek to illustrate how the concept of democracy has changed from a widely accepted term into a paradox that the Bush administration has had to defend within its ambitious foreign policy goals. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of ‘Homeland Security’ is becoming increasingly evident in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which is defined as ‘the protection of a clearly defined territory of a political community from security threats’. However, this political community is still in the making in the European Union. Consequently, this policy-making area in the EU is characterised by the most complex of decision-making procedures. This paper argues that these institutional arrangements are not just an expression of the national sovereignty of member states. They are also an expression of the aforementioned political process attempting to construct a ‘homeland’ for different political communities by ensuring their security from external security threats. Firstly, it will argue that it is vital to analyse actor behaviour in the process of ‘constructing security threats’. Secondly, however, despite the importance of member states in the European Union, institutional actors such as the European Commission or the Council Secretariat are increasingly gaining in importance. This paper argues that institutional actors have been vital in the construction of a ‘European Homeland Security’ area. Since September 11, the first and foremost security threat to enable the construction of a ‘European Homeland’ has been terrorism. It is argued that the construction of this ‘security threat’ has been utilised by EU institutions in order to establish the creation and the securing of a ‘European Homeland’, which ultimately drove forward the process of European integration. This can be observed empirically in counter-terrorism policy within the EU, as well as in transatlantic cooperation with the US on this matter. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has undergone several reforms since its inception in 1947. The IC generally undergoes fundamental change in reaction to perceived intelligence failures. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a large amount of scholarly literature on intelligence failures and reform proposals. This literature focuses mainly on internal organization, cultural, and leadership deficiencies. However, the literature has yet to incorporate insights about the beliefs and reasoning processes of the IC into their arguments. This is problematic given that cognitions, which are beliefs and reasoning processes, underlie all political behavior. The purpose of this paper is to help remedy this by positing and testing a cognitive theory of IC behavior. I argue that by incorporating the worldview of U.S. intelligence into research on intelligence failures and reform proposals, we will better understand the limits of reform in general. This is because the cognitions that the IC holds about world politics are partly responsible for shaping its identity. Moreover, its identity is meant to help satisfy these beliefs. I utilize the operational code construct to measure the IC’s worldview and test several hypotheses using the VICS method of content analysis and an ANOVA test. After data analysis, the paper concludes with a general summary and a discussion on what the findings add to the literature. I also explain how the framework developed in this paper can be applied to the comparative study of intelligence reform and counterintelligence threat analysis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Security Council is designed to be the central coordinating body of the U.S. government on matters of national security and foreign affairs. That being the case, understanding the conditions under which it performs poorly is a matter of great importance. Several of those who have observed or studied the organization have stated that its lowest points, those periods during which it was most prone to dysfunction and most clearly failed to work as designed, occurred during the first presidential terms of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. This paper probes the causes of those decision-making failures. Drawing upon the concepts associated with the literatures on leadership trait analysis, leadership style, small group processes, and organizational design, this paper systematically examines what led the NSC to perform so poorly in these two eras. By both contrasting the NSC as it existed in these periods to how it performed in other time periods, and by comparing these two periods to each other, this research aims to provide prescriptive recommendations that may point the way to avoiding similar failures in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite renewed interest in international security cooperation after 9-11, security coordination between Mexico, Canada and the United States has been limited. Lack of policy coordination between these three countries is no surprise. They all have developed different security doctrines and practices that are not likely to be changed in the near future. Hence, this paper will analyze the security policies of three North American countries from the end of World War II to the September 11 attacks. Post-World War II analysis will allow me to analyze how structural conditions regarding bipolarity interacted with the domestic conditions of each country. The second period to be analyzed, pre-September 11, will illustrate how structural changes are not immediately translated into new security doctrines, at least not in the near future. Policy adaptation tends to be slow and not always progressive. This paper will be structured in five sections. The first three sections will examine each country’s security doctrines during the Cold War period, focusing on the interaction between international and domestic politics. The fourth section will compare and contrast how each country reacted differently vis-à-vis the end of the Cold War. Finally, the last section will evaluate the implications of these findings and its impact on North American security cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates about the legality of pre-emptive and preventive wars became urgent and vigorous after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent United States national security doctrine which embraced pre-emptive and preventive war. This paper contributes to these debates by assessing the frequency with which states engage in pre-emptive and preventive wars. International law is formed by both statute and custom, and this is the first article to assess the custom of states with regard to pre-emptive and preventive war. Using databases that cover the seventy-nine major interstate wars from 1816 to 1997, I find that states engage in pre-emptive and preventive wars between 19 and 33 percent of the time, with revisionist wars comprising the rest. The best estimate is that 29 percent of major interstate wars are pre-emptive and/or preventive.In the paper, I discuss statutory and customary international law, discuss my methodology, and present my findings and their implications for international law. I use the COW, MID, and NMC databases to explore not only how many wars are pre-emptive and preventive, but also to check on how well my coding actually provides robust findings. For example, those who start pre-emptive and preventive wars are far less powerful and win far less often than those who start revisionist wars. Not only is this an interesting finding on its face, it implies a level of desperation in these initiators, and helps confirm that I am correctly coding pre-emptive and preventive wars in the first place. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Borders have historically served the purpose of defining the modern nation-state, delineating the territorial extent of its monopoly on the means of coercion and establishing the boundaries of national identity. Yet, borders are also a protective buffer at the fringes of the state, and a zone of ambiguity where state authority is frequently challenged. In times of war, particularly, borders become strategic bulwarks for national defense against intrusion, an epidermal layer that insulates the state’s core and demonstrates the state’s capacity to use and defend itself against violence. Even in times of peace, however, borderlands frequently suffer from violence, insecurity, and lawlessness because the states coercive authority and control are constantly challenged and subverted by transnational forces. This paper uses the U.S.-Mexican border experience to examine the theoretical dimensions of the state in relation to its borders, and the ways in which border violence and security challenges illustrate the manifestations and limits of state power. This paper pays special attention to U.S. and Mexican responses to violence amidst the heightened security concerns of the post-9/11 context and invigorated Mexican efforts in the war on drugs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent conceptual debate has been over “(re-)defining security.” While pushing to the mainstream a variety of issues that can impact the physical safety of a given population, the debate can also lead to analytical problems by lumping many different indicators of threat into one all-encompassing concept. Unfortunately, the debate has often manifested itself over definitional squabbling instead of a true empirical analysis of what the public and policymakers determine to be security threats. It is in practical applications (how states act or think they need to act) that definitions over what constitutes security truly matter. Public opinion literature has looked at how citizens view threats and how this may influence governmental leaders, but not enough work links these findings to the debates on the meaning of security. This paper bridges that divide by analyzing a new data set, the Survey of Attitudes and Global Engagement (SAGE), which asks U.S. citizens about what they perceive as security threats and whether they feel that the use of force is an appropriate response. This paper will 1) examine the degree to which the perceptions of the “new” components of threat have influenced the public, and 2) note any disconnect that may exist between what people perceive as threats and what they are actually willing to risk war over. Thus we can see whether the redefining security debate is purely academic or whether it has influenced Americans’ thinking, which could then have important implications for the behavior of U.S. foreign policy officials. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National security, securitization and the Thai sex industry: is there a link? I will argue that there is a link between the US/Thai national security, securitization and the Thai sex industry beginning in the 1960s. The paper will analyse Thailand's sex industry; its inception through the R & R contract between the United States and Thailand. Additionally, it will examine how the World Bank influenced and encouraged its continuance, during the 1970s, under the auspices of Thai development policy: tourism. In both instances, the US's foreign policy drove the introduction and further development of the Thai sex industry. Furthermore, as the US rose to become a post-World War 2 superpower, its focus was to fight any additional rise of communism throughout the world. Three decades on, the US still seems intent on further influencing the industry but this time reducing the demand for it. Moreover, this recent US plan still perceives that national security issues are at stake. However, in this instance the US is couching its concern in humanitarian discourse, as anti-prostitution feminist groups lobby the US Congress to recognize prostitution as a human rights violation. Is this move presenting an existential threat to the Thai sex tourism industry and is there any possibility for agency? The feminist groups are the securitizing actors attempting to make prostitution in Thailand a securitization issue. The analytical framework for this paper will draw on both the Copenhagen School's approach to security and securitization and a critical theory perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study discusses President George W. Bush's narrative of 'different kind of war' presented to the military audience and the narrative's relationship to information, knowledge and information technology. One way for the military to step up efficiency for its military operations is through buzzwords such as 'transformation' and 'revolution in military affairs' in order to solve problems. Words, phrases and images are powerful 'weapons' in the current era of 'precision warfare' for the President. Effects of his 'different kind of war' are based on requirements to change the thinking and actions of American national security, which can be seen all over the world, and therefore questioned. The President's totalizing narrative of 'civilization's fight,' requesting more efficiency and performance in the form of speed and precision also raises questions over the relationship between narrative knowledge and technological knowledge, in the past, the present and future, virtual reality and local reality. This paper suggests that the President's metanarrative legitimates his military actions in Iraq because it is based on efficiency, progress, freedom and liberty which are actually legitimizations not to be disagreed upon on the narrative level. The President's 'different kind of war' narrative does not necessarily increase public knowledge but instead increases the pool of information and information technology. This paper tries to go beyond the deconstruction of President Bush's narrative in order to understand his stories through the American Revolution and exceptionalism. What this study postulates is that the changing faces of the enemy and the urgency to speed up military transformation are perpetual means the President uses with help of the past to show his version of the future, the American Dream, in the present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this particular paper, I try to analyze and understand the contemporary logic of international politics -- particularly the logic of power politics. Particular interest is placed on theoretical approach of security understanding in the context of contemporary world politics. The nature of the paper is primarily theoretical and conceptual. The paper is a critical reading of current world politics or more pertinently the contemporary power politics. Particular attention is paid to the national security thinking in the context of contemporary hegemon -- the United States. At the outset, the paper examines the nature of present-day power politics and describes the essence and fundamentals of national security conception. Secondly, in the paper is taken a critical stand on this dominant conception (national security) of International Relations in the light of critical security studies including some aspects of postmodern thought, too. In a subsequent chapter, critical analysis is supported and developed by the views outlined in the orientation of critical geopolitics. Third undertaking of the paper is to provide a platform for further study in which the aim is to reflect the overall and recent security debate within the discipline of IR, and particularly the criticality of it. Regarding the last task, which is not seriously tackled in this piece, the underlying presumption is that the critical security studies particularly, but also the orientation of security studies as such has failed to produce alternative approaches to world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that NATO can still play a useful role in providing security to its members after September 11. The alliance had been prepared for terrorist attacks politically and militarily and continues to adjust to a new security environment. As a consequence, it acted swiftly and decisively in response to September 11. In addition NATO generated two important "second image reversed" effects. First, its defense planning system coordinated and implemented common military goals and ensured interoperabililty among national forces. Second, its decisions changed the political discovered in member states. Using the example of Germany -- currently the most reluctant ally of the U.S. -- the paper shows that the discourse changed from "(self)interest" to reputation" after NATO invoked article 5. However, when important conditions are missing such as agreed contingency plans and pre-delegated authority NATO is weak and indecisive. This was the case when NATO discussed the war in Iraq and defending Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "The International Politics of Failing States" prepared for presentation at the "46th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii from March 1 to 5, 2005. The paper discusses the securitization of failed states with evidence from the U.S., Great Britain and Germany. The author says that the failed states discourse assists to create a bridge between development and security policy.

The demise of the Soviet Union left the United States in an acute crisis of representation. The United States requires a new discourse of danger, but lacks a significant Other. Challenges to the construction of US identity are plentiful, which intensifies and complicates the need to reformulate discourses of danger and secure the boundaries of the state’s identity. This paper examines and compares the United States’ (state and media) representations of different nationalist conflicts, particularly focusing on conflict in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while considering the constitutive effects of the structural distribution of knowledge. The aim is to explain how one nationalist conflict became a threat or danger to US national security, while the other did not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the role of ideas about security that are prominent in the Baltic Sea region, as a means of tackling the obvious power asymmetries in the region, in the context of enlarging the European security community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is reorganizing its national security policies. The new U.S. National Security Doctrine is trying to eliminate the heavy burden of nuclear deterrence and is insisting on shifting all single efforts to Homeland Defense. The task is driving the force toward what the U.S. has defined as the New War - the war against terrorism. Within the context of this war, Canada and Mexico have become key partners given they both belong geographically to the NORTHCOM area of operation and both countries will need to participate in the Smart Borders project. Thus, Canada, Mexico and the United States will need sooner than later to construct a cooperative security strategy, moving the region towards a Security and Defense Identity. This is difficult to define. The Iraq war has divided opinions and positions among countries in the Americas. Mexico did incline for a more pro-European position, seriously impacting U.S.-Mexican relations, given the different perceptions in the UN Security Council. This paper will assess its consequences in the context of the new security challenges in the continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional wisdom in the US and, probably, in the rest of the world is that the Bush’s administration new National Security Strategy and new doctrine of preemptive strike were a reaction to the attacks on 9/11. In this paper I argue that President Bush’s seemingly new national security strategy really encapsulates the consensual view over America’s proper role abroad that started taking placed since the end of the Cold war. This post-cold war national consensus over the country’s foreign policy is reflected not only in President Bush’s recently announced national security policy, but is also evident in the foreign policies of his two predecessors. In this regard, the events of September 11 acted more as a catalyst to a well formed foreign policy agenda, than as a formative experience in the nation’s life. I use a Gramscian analysis to recover the construction of this new national hegemonic ideology at home. To this effect, I look at how public morality, the interests of economic elites, and the role of the Christian Right interacted with each other to give rise to a new national identity in the US which led to the militarization of America’s foreign policy before 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will assess the potential for increased instability in Egypt and Syria, and its effect on U.S. security interests in the region. In the wake of terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 and U.S. response, the potential for heightened political violence within Egypt and Syria is high. This research will focus on three factors: 1) the indicators and catalysts of Egypt and Syria’s instability 2) the effect an unstable Egypt and Syria will have on U.S. National Security and, 3) the U.S. role in decreasing instability. As two of the most important Arab countries in the Middle East, the stability of Syria and Egypt is crucial for U.S. strategic interests in the region. Heightened political turmoil within these countries can adversely affect our regional objectives. This study has immediate utility for the military particularly in light of the terrorist attacks and potential of future attacks in the U.S. It is vital for the U.S. to maintain a strong relationship with our Arab and Muslim allies to combat global terrorism and to safeguard our regional interests. To accomplish these goals, we must understand the differing domestic environments of each country, and how the domestic situation influences each leader’s foreign policy towards the West, and the U.S. in particular. Moreover, the U.S. must evaluate 1st, 2nd, and 3d order effects of possible policy options. Pertinent to this analysis is understanding that Egypt’s state legitimacy and Syria’s state legitimacy are targets of terrorism. After the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak continued his policies of political deliberalization coupled with a widespread crackdown on Islamic militants and other opposition groups. His actions renewed a cycle of violence within Egypt. In Syria, Bashar Asad’s choices are limited by his illegitimate regime. How should the U.S. focus policy towards Syria, a country that has links to terrorist groups, and a regime that has all the constraints of a minority ruled regime. How should the U.S. focus future policy towards Egypt, a U.S. ally for over twenty years? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bill Clinton in 1998 set up the first institutions and strategies of a U.S. cyber-security policy. The focus at that time was very much on cyberterrorism. Under George W. Bush, the discourse over cyber threats took three new turns. The first one came immediately after the election, when suddenly nation-states like China received much more attention in the cyber-threat debate. The second turn came after the attacks on 11 September 2001, and brought cyberterrorism back onto the security political radar. Now, with Iraq and Norht Korea on top of the security agenda, the debate seems to turn back towards states as possible cyber enemies again. How are these discourse serpentines linked to the real problem, if at all? This paper will provide some insight on the possible reasons for the change in perception of the cyber threat. It will show that the debate over the danger from cyberspace in the general public as well as in the political elites is decoupled from the real-world cyber-threat developments and in a postmodern way really is a virtual debate. In the end, we will see that "cyber-" has more to do with discursive trends and hidden agendas than with electronic terrorism or digital enemies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Domestic policy actors are increasingly being incorporated into a globalizing policy process brought on by an expanding interconnected world system. Substantially, the necessary first step in advancing the study and conceptualization of globalization and its impact upon security policy is to document the interaction between domestic decision makers and the pressers of the global system. In order to investigate whether globalization trends are occurring within the US defense industrial establishment, this paper will examine the push under the Clinton Administration (and current Bush Administration) to pursue government and industry-led cooperative initiatives with foreign defense firms and policy counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the hypothesis that the social reproduction of affluence tends to intensify national and human in/security, a contradiction that is projected on a universal scale by US strategies of world order. In the context of the hierarchy of social and political forces in a global order configured by disciplinary neo-liberalism, an exploration of the US political economy is crucial. This is partly because American lifestyles are increasingly energy-intensive, consumerist, individualist and premised on forms of social Darwinism that entail restructuring of social institutions and patterns of social risk. This, along with the shock associated with the mega-terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as violence within US society, have led to generalized and growing perceptions of increasing insecurity. Here, one of the paradoxes of intensified globalization is that there appears to be an inverse correlation between the wealth held by individuals and their sense of personal security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I adopt a poststructuralist approach with the aim of developing a critical understanding of how the hegemonic status of realist theories serves to legitimize current U.S. national security policy. I focus on two main points. First, I explore how the realism prevalent in the theoretical discourse of IR in the United States is itself a political practice that is constitutive of a particular reality, rather than merely neutrally describing it. Second, I maintain that these realist discourses subjectively and artificially lock U.S. national identity into a Cold War-like national security focus. Indeed, in the wake of 9/11, realist discourses do not merely seek to explain but also serve to legitimate U.S. national security conduct and its hegemonic power. As such, the United States remains constructed as a national security state in realist discourses. I want to show how the idea of the U.S. as a national security state is being (re)produced by practices that would neither appear nor claim to do so. If the national security discourse that made the Cold War possible ? in American realist discourses at least ? is (re)applied to our own era, then a similar pattern of legitimizing and constituting a national security state will be reproduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

March 2003 Security is Now the Sturdy Child of Terror: Research After September 11 Part of the fall-out after 9/11 has been a challenge to U.S. science, and to scholarship in general. As the nation sees itself under attack, the temptation is great, in research, as in other parts of society, to foreground security without adequate reflection about its cost. A set of questions rarely examined seriously in the past, now become central: Who ought to decide which research topics will be taken up, and with which voice scholarly communities will speak in public? Who ought to decide? And how ought that decision be made? In this paper, I address that question in relation to the security studies scholarly community.. In light of the fact that its work is often used as public justification for, if not the real basis of public policy, this is a research community where the implications of research are writ large. Who ought to decide how to set, conduct, and make public this pivotal community’s research? And how ought those decisions be made? Philip Kitcher, in his recent Science, Truth and Democracy, develops a vision of moral scientific decision-making based on his concept of well-ordered science. Whatever institutions a society uses, Kitcher claims, these ought to approximate the decisions this vision supports. I argue that, especially in relation to the security studies research community, this model needs to be modified if viable institutions that can withstand post-9/11 debates are to evolve in the United States. Rhona Leibel Department of Practical Philosophy and Ethics Metropolitan State University St. Paul, MN 55106 651-793-1452 rhona.leibel@metrostate.edu [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional approaches for achieving security from biological weapons (BW) are coming under pressure because of two crucial developments: First of all, the biotechnology revolution is accelerating, with a profound implications for the development of improved and new BW. Secondly, terrorists have emerged as a viable class of actors for acquiring and using NBC weapons, especially BW. Despite these complex border-transgressing challenges for controlling the life sciences and their misuse for malign purposes by states and non-state actors, there is a lack of cooperative and coherent control efforts to govern the threats looming on the horizon. Negotiations by an Ad-Hoc Group of states parties (AHG) to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) on a legally binding protocol to the BWC collapsed in July 2001 when the US abandoned the negotiations. With improved national measures to control BW necessary, but insufficient and the strengthening of the global regime unattainable for the forseeable future, this paper will examine the role and potential of regional measures and institutions in enhancing the effectiveness of the BW control regime. It seeks to answer the question to which extent regional measures and institutions are capable of closing the both the structural and the implementation gaps that exist in case of the BW control regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines law enforcement and security challenges of the U.S.-Mexican border region in light of the emergent, but still inchoate policy regime following from the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Unlike long-standing challenges rooted in basic economic forces of supply-and-demand, the new national security challenges confronted in the post-9/11 context are the result of the deliberate intent to cause harm. In order to be effective in guarding against this new set of challenges, policy makers and enforcers have therefore begun to adapt existing mechanisms ?currently devoted to curbing market driven behaviors ? to preventing and reducing harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the trends of security regionalization since the end of the cold war, suggesting that the argument linking regionalization to superpower disengagement, while not wrong, misses an important insight by ignoring the more active and positive role of the global hegemon in promoting this process. My interest is three-fold: to examine the motivation and ability of the hegemon to aid the development of regional tools to manage regional security, the motivation of regional states to develop such tools, and the interaction between these different motivations. Many scholars now argue that this trend toward regionalization has come to an abrupt end following the 911 events, which have pushed the United States back to global engagement. My argument examines the incentives of the hegemon to encourage regional security cooperation, and the incentives of regional states to organize themselves on a regional basis. The argument then suggests that this is not likely to be the case: on the one hand, in the long-run the United States will have even more to gain from encouraging regional cooperation. On the other, regional states will have increased incentives to organize regionally in order to better face the aggresively active hegemon, with its unilateral tendencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]