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The increasing American dominance and power in the world has frustrated various countries, societies, and individuals, and some have argued that this anger at American hegemony was the cause of September 11th. These people, such as Benjamin Barber, argue that Western cultural and economic imperialism are reshaping the world at the expense of various other cultures. As the American empire grows, it spreads its culture throughout the world, creating a more homogeneous world. This paper will focus on the growth of the American empire by examining American foreign policy and the use of force during the Clinton administration. From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. intervened or initiated the use of force in several places, including the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, and Haiti. Why did the Clinton administration make these foreign policy decisions? Was it part of an attempt to spread American hegemony throughout the world or not? Or, as many have argued, were Clinton’s foreign policy decisions a result of his domestic problems and his own personal ambitions and goals? This paper will seek to understand what motivated President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions to initiate the use of force or to intervene in the intrastate conflicts of other countries from 1993 to 2000. In order to answer this question this paper will focus on one possible theory?diversionary war theory. Diversionary war theory is based on the idea that leaders of nation-states will use foreign conflict involvement to divert domestic attention away from internal problems. Many have criticized this theory, including Blainey 1998 and Levy 1989, but others have found evidence of a moderate link between variables like leader popularity and the diversionary use of force, such as Ostrom and Job 1986, James and Oneal 1991, and Morgan and Bickers 1992. Clinton faced a number of domestic distractions during his Presidency, most significantly his ongoing difficulties involving his alleged affair, and he may have felt the need to use foreign policy to divert attention away from these problems. Clinton has also has been quoted a number of times as saying that domestic politics is more important to him than international politics, and he may have used foreign policy to divert attention away from his domestic problems. This paper will focus on three specific independent variables: presidential approval, economic measures, and the media focus during the six months prior to the decision to use force or intervene. As the U.S. continues its dominance in the world, it is important to understand the motivations behind American foreign policy. Many people in the world today are less than satisfied with the U.S. hegemonic role in the world, because some of them believe that the U.S. is acting only in its own self-interest with no regard for how their actions affect the rest of the world. It is important to understand the reasons behind American foreign policy in order to determine whether the U.S. is a selfish and self-interested nation. This is a small step towards that goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Observers of the current world scene reach strikingly divergent conclusions when characterizing today?s world order. Although there is much talk of a unipolar power structure, many are not convinced identifying a multitude of power centers, which is only temporarily and superficially veiled by the extraordinary superiority of the U.S. military. Some perceive the United States as ?the New Rome,? while others see a hegemon in ongoing decline. In a more normative vein, some depict the unmatched power of the U.S., and the high-handedness that comes with it, as a threat to world peace and an obstacle to the solution of common problems such as the management of climate change; others argue just the opposite describing the U.S. as the ?indispensable nation? and U.S. power, and the willingness to use it, as the decisive factor for order and stability in the international system. These opposing views are not only a matter of factual and evaluative differences, i.e. differing opinions on what is the case or what states of affairs are desirable; rather, they are firmly rooted in the existence of a multitude of concepts of hegemony in International Relations ? conceptualizations and definitions of which many who employ them are hardly aware of. The aim of this paper is to develop a first an idea about how to make. use of this multitude of conceptualizations via a metatheoretically guided conceptual analysis in general. What should follow from this analysis is a systematic overview and categorization of the most influential approaches to the phenomenon of power concentration, or hegemony, in world politics. The literature on the topic will be analyzed using a set of guiding questions as for example ?Which conditions have to be met for a state to be considered a hegemon?? or ?How do hegemons behave and why??. The goal of the paper is not confined to unearthing the divergent theoretical ideas that are present in the current scholarly and journalistic discourse on hegemony and power asymmetry. By clarifying, reconstructing, and systematically comparing the concept of hegemony, the paper ultimately seeks to contribute to a better understanding of hegemony itself. Eventually, a reformulated and multidimensional concept of hegemony will be presented in order to provide coming research with a clear idea about its descriptive and normative connotations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The English School and its master concept ?international society? is currently enjoying a renaissance. The paper seeks to sustain this revitalization by suggesting how a firmer grasp of the School?s potential can be achieved by situating its contribution in the context of sociological World Society Theory. This move promises to heighten its theoretical reflexivity as well as its awareness of the non-political context of modern politics. The viability of an updated English School approach is discussed in the light of an empirical challenge: the implications of the unipolar power structure that privileges the United States in the contemporary states system. It can be argued that unipolarity introduces a degree of systemic hierarchy conflicting with central English School premises, i.e. the importance of shared intersubjective norms and anarchical state equality. The paper argues that unipolarity does indeed challenge evolving international society but also that it is unlikely to obstruct the emergence of a world order based on differentiated and interactive governance frameworks. A reflexive English School approach contributes fruitfully to our understanding of this development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the broadest sense, this paper will examine relationships between the functioning of global international organizations and the distribution of power among member states. Practically speaking, I shall concentrate on the United Nations and discuss the impacts of the three hegemonies, that is, (1) the economic hegemony of the OECD countries (or perhaps the G-7, if this is really what the economic power cluster amounts to), (2) the ideological hegemony of the liberal-democratic-neoliberal-West, and (3) the military hegemony of the United States. Overlapping membership among states constituting the three hegemonies amounts presently to what Gramsci would identify as a historical bloc (blocco), that within broad limits accounts for the main currents and directions of contemporary world affairs. This historical bloc also controls the United Nations, normatively, materially and programmatically. The paper will describe the hows and whats of this. Gramscian analysis, however, invites consideration of anti-hegemonic activities, and these, within the United Nations, account for much of the politics that play out within and around the organization. Because the politics of anti-hegemonism tend to render the United Nations a less than useful instrument of hegemonic imposition, global hegemony today is increasingly imposed via extra-UN devices and channels, thereby marginalizing the world organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, Norwegian strategic culture has been about national defence, presupposing a close or special relationship with the United States. During the Cold War this was also the case in other small and medium sized European countries. The paper analyses the various types of US hegemonic power at work in Norway and how they are converted into influence over the specific content of Norwegian strategic culture and security policy, using a practice-based approach. Within IR theory, hegemony is generally understood as the power of one state to generate consent and support from other states through a combination of coercion, incentives and references to shared norms. In Norway, US influence is based on benevolent hegemony and ideational hegemony and institutionalized in bilateral military practices that have been developed over time. The paper argues that the reproduction of these practices in social structures is shaping Norwegian strategic culture. In principle, the lack of an immediate threat against Norway after 1991 could have loosened Norwegian-US ties and encouraged, firstly, a strategic culture more detached from territorial defense, and, secondly, a more European type of strategic culture. Though Norway participated in the US-led military operation in Afghanistan and had a military presence in post-war Iraq, these contributions were withdrawn in late 2005. To what extent does this indicate a breech away from a declining US hegemonic influence and a development towards a distinct Norwegian strategic post-Cold War strategic culture where the bilateral relationship is less central? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of why states comply with international law lies at the intersection of international relations (IR) and international law (IL) scholarship. In addition, the domestic and international outrage at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay has brought U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions into the public discourse. Understanding whether these events were an anomaly or whether they reflect existing trends in U.S. compliance with the laws of war is crucial to understanding what is next for the United States in this current climate of warfare. It has become shorthand among some academics, policy-makers, and pundits to assume the Bush Administration has systematically ignored international law. This paper examines the sources of variation in U.S. treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) over time in order to compare and contrast the adherence to the international laws governing the treatment of prisoners during Operation Iraqi Freedom with previous U.S. conflicts abroad. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the empirical understanding about the correspondence between state behavior and legal rules. It empirically measures the normative force of international law by examining if there are noticeable patterns associated with variations in compliance. This broader debate about the importance of norms is consequential to a broad range of theoretical and policy issues in the new legal environment of the Global War on Terror. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ?war on terrorism? is both a series of institutional practices and an accompanying set of political narratives. Understanding how American counter-terrorism functions as an exercise in hegemony requires an appreciation of the ways in which the language of ?war on terrorism? has been produced, deployed, used and misused in public political rhetoric. In this paper, I argue that the language of the ?war on terrorism? is not simply a neutral reflection of policy debates and the realities of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Rather, it is a very carefully and deliberately constructed?but ultimately, artificial?discourse that is specifically designed to make the war seem reasonable, responsible, and ?good?, as well as to silence any forms of knowledge that would challenge the exercise of power. More than just ?public diplomacy? or propaganda, the effects of the discourse are to normalize, legitimize, and in a sense, actualize its institutional practice. The ?war on terrorism? is co-constituted by its discursive dimensions; it is a crucial element in the ongoing construction of American hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the evolution of the American foreign policy towards unilateral secession from the cold war to the post-cold war. It also produces empirical generalizations about the United States’ reaction to secessionist attempts, and general statements concerning the political process leading the US to grant international recognition to secessionist movements. Using a case-oriented research analysis of the secession of Bangladesh, and of Slovenia and Croatia, I demonstrate that the American policy of recognition has evolved over years. Short term power politics during the cold war was the crucial factor undermining the American policy towards secession. Though, the end of the cold war marked a shift in the U.S. policy of recognition. As empirical evidences show, the current unipolar order makes the United States very concerned about regional stability when dealing with secessionist issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By now the proposition that thd emergence fo the U.S. as a hyper-power has undermined the cooperative basis for many institutions has gained much currency. Michael Glennon’s Foreign Affairs Article makes the case that recent U.S. actions have essentially ended any pretense that the UN (particularly the Security Council) and the prohibitions embodied in the Charter matter any more. In fact Glennon’s argument goes byond that to suggest no effective rules apply with respect the use of force in the contemporary world--only narrow self interest however determined, provides restraint. While in form, a peculiar permutation of Realism, the argument misinterprets the record and ignores other important factors. The paper will present an alternative argument which suggests that the UN may have more resilience that Glennon allows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent crisis in the transatlantic relationship is the next stage in the dialectics of power that have characterized the relationship between the United States and Europe since the end of WWII. This time however the crisis has been deeper than anything seen before and this paper will seek to account for this in a broadly Gramscian framework. Three things are new this time: the determination of the United States to assert its authority within a less multilateral framework; the refusal by key European countries not to be coerced; and finally the post-Cold War context within which this is happening which makes the United States less willing to co-operate with Europe and Europeans less willing to be subordinated to the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the massive American advantage in military and political power, the formation of an anti-American balancing coalition is unlikely in the near term. But if not balancing, what? This paper considers four other avenues by which states attempt to resist US dominance: non-cooperation, rhetoric, terrorism & non-conventional weapons, and, for the European Union (EU), economics. First, even the United States, perhaps the most dominant great power in history, still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the basing rights or intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism or drug trafficking. States can resist by withholding cooperation. Second, other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against US policy in an effort to win the rhetorical war for hearts and minds at home and abroad. Countries rely in part on words to compensate for material inferiority to the United States. Third, a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities. They resort to two weapons of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non-conventional weapons. Fourth, the specific economic relationship between the EU and the United States does not fit the general pattern of US dominance and that opens the door to American-European economic confrontations. How the United States might mitigate resistance and whether resistance will ultimately lead to balancing are crucial questions to address. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how secondary states experience unipolarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two distinct if overlapping stories are presently unfolding with regard to US foreign policy. The first is an internal ideological conflict within the United States as to the appropriate manner of managing its relations with its rivals and enemies, and of wielding American power more generally. The second is that of inexorable decline in the United States' ability to bend other nations, whether rising great powers or those merely of middling power status, to its will. Whether or not the United States continues to pursue the agenda of comparative detente and realism that seems to have been Obama's hallmark, this latter inflexible external reality awaits anyone who would seek to reverse course. This paper argues that US foreign policy should be crafted so as to reflect acceptance that the core task of this generation of American leaders will be to maximally preserve national interests and national dignity while coming to terms with a decline in relative power. President Obama's approach to policy, still at times invoking the rhetoric of exceptionalism and liberal universalism, seems as close to accepting realist principles as American leadership has come in recent decades. Nevertheless, it may not go far enough. Full awareness and acceptance of the increasing limits on America's power will demand a profound cultural shift from the American body politic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing consensus that the United States is undergoing a period of political polarization, particularly among elites. The causes of this polarization remain underresearched. We argue that changes in the international distribution of power influence America's polarization. To demonstrate the argument, this paper analyzes changes in power and polarization quantitatively and qualitatively from 1945 to 2005. A key finding is that greater relative power on the world stage increases polarization and some of its correlates. The argument also gauges the extent of international influence on domestic polarization and makes novel predictions on when and why polarization will end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates about the impact of new technologies like the internet on the political realm frequently focus on issues of power. Some scholars argue that the internet enhances state power and those states which fail to adapt find themselves at the bottom of the digital divide. Others regard the internet as undermining the state by eroding sovereignty and instilling dependence upon a vulnerable network. Ultimately, understanding the complex relationship between new social technologies like the internet and state power is hampered by the absence in international relations of theories about technology. This paper argues that an interdisciplinary approach which blends international relations theories of power with the philosophy of technology leads to a range of new questions and answers about the relationship between new technology and power in international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent is there a decline in American soft powerâ€"its ability to influence other states by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie themâ€"within the United Nations? In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2004) makes the argument that there is a decline of American soft-power due to a rise in anti-Americanism. In this paper, I test Nye’s hypothesis by assessing the extent to which American’s soft power is on the decline within the UN. I measure soft power in terms of voting alignment on key issues of importance to the U.S. within the UN General Assembly and Security Council. I employ cross-national aggregate public opinion data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project and the United States Information Agency and from 1985 to 2005 as the key explanatory variable, and conduct a multivariate statistical analysis while controlling for U.S. foreign aid received and military alliances as competing explanations. The results of this study also shed light on the extent to which countries are engaging in “soft-balancing” against the U.S. and are resisting the unipolar dominance of the United States (Pape 2005; Voeten 2004). References:Nye, Joseph. 2004. The Decline of America's Soft Power. Foreign Affairs 83 (3).Pape, Robert A. 2005. Soft Balancing against the United States. International Security 30 (1):7-45(39).Voeten, Erik. 2004. Resisting the Lonely Superpower: Responses of States in the United Nations to U.S. Dominance. Journal of Politics 66 (3):729. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the United States consider their sovereignty as absolute and overriding, member states of the EU see theirs as de facto shared and de jure constrained by the rule of law. While facing an "hyperpuissance" invoking the preemptive war doctrine, the weaker EU is forced to rethink its role in the context of the declining military and strategic importance of the European Continent. My paper wants to address the following question: Can the EU prevent Hegemonic Preemption? 1. The EU can learn from the Canadian public diplomacy and develop more strongly and more broadly its own soft power policies. Some issues need to be addressed on that basis. 2. Soft power could prove very useful for emerging European diplomacy to perfect the tools and means of a distinct European public diplomacy towards the US - which at the present time is insufficiently developed. As long as divisions prevail, as is the case now, the EU has to improve on coherence of purpose and mechanisms to find new ways to promote its own views and values, increasingly challenged within the widening transatlantic divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "Image and Propaganda as a component of U.S. power, and the impact of the Vietnam War: From Vietnam to Iraq" that was prepared for presentation at the 46th Annual ISA Convention in Hawaii. It says that the image held of one nation by another may either facilitate or obstruct implementation of particular policies and actions. It also mentions that components such as state behavior and actions are just some of the factors which propaganda draws on to build the desired impression.

The article presents the conference paper titled "Hard Power, Soft Power and Smart Borders: Security on the U.S./Mexico Border" prepared for the "46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the effect of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the border relationship between the U.S. and Mexico. It provides a background on the Carrier Initiative Program that was launched by the U.S. Customs Service in 1984.

Neorealism defines a state’s power in terms of material capabilities. With today’s intersection of tyranny and technology leading to WMD proliferation, terrorist networks and threatening rogue states, the traditional notion of state security from a neorealist perspective may need to be scrutinized. At the very least, this requires an examination of different facets of power affecting international politics, which is often marginalized in international relations theory. In other words, how relevant is neorealist theory today, and what kind of relevancy does it possess, in the discussion of different types of power? Drawing upon works by scholars such as Lukes and Baldwin, and more recently Nye, this paper will examine principles of hegemony, polarity, neorealist predicted behaviors such as balancing, and therefore the meaning of US superpower status, if material capability is only one facet of a state’s power. This paper will then explore if, and how, varying forms of power can be applied to concepts such as Walt’s balance of threat and Gilpin’s notion of prestige. Within this discussion there emerges a paradox of power that must also be analyzed: that different types of power can be symbiotic in nature while simultaneously operating in opposition to the achievement of security goals. An understanding of different faces of power is salient to today’s political environment because it can elucidate the kinds of power needed to accompany effective counterterrorism and counterproliferation policy. Certainly the power of military capabilities will remain, but what kinds of power augment or detract from the desire for terrorism and proliferation in the first place? This paper will begin to address these issues and open the door for continued discussion over the role and nature of power in international relations theory and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After September 11 it was immediately apparent that the struggle over the interpretation of the events was crucial to the exercise of US power and hegemony. While neo-conservative ideas had been influential during the Bush administration, September 11 facilitated their application in the specific US response in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also ushered in a more ambitious agenda. This paper will examine the framing devices employed by the Bush administration, which were also echoed through various cultural responses. More specifically, the administration’s rhetoric was framed within certain contexts, which not only placed the events of 11 September within a benign ongoing narrative of US history and foreign policy, but it also acted as a motivational force for implementing a broad agenda, not entirely related to the attacks on the United States. A fairly nationalistic framework emerged that was evident in some aspects US culture, exhibited in the uneven use of the flag and in the photography relating to the atrocities. The cultural interaction with the hegemonic agenda will be examined. The narratives relating to US exceptionalism and nationalism were not necessarily shared by the entire culture, but could not be explicitly challenged in the wake of the attacks. Moreover, they were not necessarily conducive to understanding the attacks on the United States. This paper will examine the framing devices used in the post-September 11 period and the application of the hegemonic framework to the construction of US foreign policy. Finally, the paper will examine the relationship between the exercise of US power and the academic analysis of the atrocities and US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when many decry the hegemony of the United States, the world’s only superpower, we overlook regional hegemonic powers and cultures. The People’s Republic of China is about to become such a regional hegemonic power, as evidenced by the modernization of PLA. This paper is an interdisciplinary comparative reflection--embracing culture, history, religion, geography as well as politics--on the responsive strategies of three societies at the margins--Tibet, Mongolia, Vietnam--in response to the hegemonic growth and behavior of China. These strategies are cultural as much as they are military, diplomatic, political or economic. The paper asserts that the three different strategies reflect the unique circumstances of the marginal societies. Ultimately, given the critical mass of China, none of the strategies may be successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like Woodrow Wilson in 1913, Bill Clinton arrived at the White House in 1993 with the stated intent of focusing primarily on domestic issues, relegating foreign policy to a secondary role. This led, at first, to an extremely chaotic foreign policymaking process that lasted for most of the 42nd President’s first term and produced very few positive results in international affairs. By 1995, however, a gradual shift in this process could be observed, and this ultimately led to a much more adroit handling of foreign affairs by Clinton and his administration during his second term. We maintain that this positive change was brought about not so much by external events as by a personal evolution on the part of Clinton himself, fostered and sustained by a better choice of foreign policy advisers and a more efficient National Security Council. Yet, even though this transformation in the handling of international affairs was not caused by external factors, it nonetheless had a determining impact on the course of world events. After the Cold War, the United States became the sole superpower in the international system. Still, as long as the President remained either uninterested in or unfocused on international affairs, the U.S. was unable to exert the full potential of its predominant position in the system. We will use the cases of Bosnia, where the United States refused to intervene until the summer of 1995 to show that as the Presidency gained a sense of focus on these issues, the actions of the United States took on a more assertive tone. This, in turn, resulted in the U.S. having a greater influence in the ongoing resolution of this foreign crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2002-03, the United States was unable to implement its chosen military strategies in several foreign countries. Instead, in reaction to foreign public opinion hostile to U.S. military presence, the U.S. had to significantly alter how it achieved its and its partners’ security objectives. This research project is designed to help us better understand why the U.S.?at the height of its economic, military, political and cultural power?has been unable to gain approval to carry out joint military operations with certain strategic partners on the partners’ territory in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). First, Robert Putnam’s two-level game is enhanced by factoring in public opinion research findings and identifying different two-level dynamics across three broad regime types (developed democracy, undeveloped democracy, and authoritarian). Drawing on structural theory by Robert Koehane, legitimacy and accountability are hypothesized to be the key causal mechanisms accounting for variation in the influence of domestic public opinion. Second, the role of foreign public opinion is added to the model, creating a two-level, two-arena game, which has yet to be incorporated into international relations theory on the making of foreign policy. Five cases involving at least one of each regime type are chosen to test the hypothesis that foreign public opinion influences the ability of the U.S. to station forces abroad in under-developed democracies but not in developed democracies or authoritarian regimes. Cases include: Turkey’s legislature denying the U.S. permission to station troops for an efficient and effective southward drive into Iraq during 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom; the Philippine legislature cutailing joint counterterrorism operations in the Mindanao area; Pakistani public protests against U.S. forces pursuing Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters into Pakistan; Germany’s role in the WOT; and recent discussions between Seoul and Washington regarding the relocation of major bases and of downsizing U.S. forces in South Korea, despite an increased threat from the North. Restrictions on U.S. troop placement might be anticipated if the foreign countries involved were not U.S. allies or military partners. But, these cases are particularly interesting because they involve long-term allies and/or partners. Moreover, one would expect permission to be denied if the foreign administrations did not hold similar strategic objectives with the U.S. Yet, once again, these states do agree with the U.S. on objectives and initially endorsed the joint military operations in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting in an era of hegemonic struggle, the first fifty years of American foreign policy provides a case study in how newly independent nations can come to grips with a hegemonic world system and seek to achieve their own place in that system. Particular attention will be paid to the dichotomy between pre-Jeffersonian and post-Jeffersonian policy up until the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. Frank Klingberg’s theory of cyclical American foreign policy mood provides the basis for this discussion of the primary driving factors in determining a young nation’s place in a global system. The study uses the author’s mood/interest framework to look at the period from 1776-1823 to see which of some 180 military, economic, and consensus variables best explain U.S. foreign policy actions in its first five decades. The degree of hegemonic sea power concentration and later the percentage of the President’s party in Congress appear to be especially important considerations. Economic variables are also important within the overall context. This suggests that a new country needs to pay close attention to the world power configuration and work to build consensus within their borders if they are to progress to the role of a powerful nation in the world system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military rule, military occupation, and land grabs for military bases (even if sanctioned by international executive agreements or legislatively ratified treaties) vitiate and undermine democratization. On the one hand, democratic theorists from John Locke to Robert Dahl contrast pluralist theory with rationales for authoritarian governance. On the other hand, historical pluralism evinces elitist practices. A focus on the diversity of power sharing is missing or underdeveloped. To what extent do anti-militarist social movements demonstrate the ability of popular activity from below to outstrip elitist liabilities embedded in much pluralist theory? And how effectively have civil society organizations in Asia opposed the continued, expanded and renewed presence of the U.S. Armed Forces? This paper focuses on civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the larger anti-militarist social movements within which they have contended in the Philippines and Japan (especially, Okinawa). The paper further distinguishes among DJANGOs (Development, Justice and Advocacy Nongovernmental Organizations) and POs (People's Organizations) with only passing attention to QUANGOs (Quasi Nongovernmental Organizations) supported by government funding and sponsorship. Amplifying a preferred future for a totally demilitarized Okinawa, trend analysis and focused structured comparisons identify likely and unlikely obstacles and opportunities to a totally demilitarized Okinawa by 2025. Similarities and differences between the two cases appear policy-relevant! In turn, that identification generates prescriptions useful in guiding practical activities of organizations advocating removal of foreign military bases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests a critical input into present thinking of friendship in IR. Interpretations of friendship vary from a quasi-anthropomorphic relationship between states in democratic security communities to an emotional attachment of the parties. There are also attempts to provide an analytic conception of friendship based on reciprocity and special relations between states, which is derived from an alternative to Hobbes’s understanding of human condition. In contrast, this paper does not try to conceptualize or offer an analytical interpretation of friendship. Instead, it examines the ways states enter into friendship (or simply use it) with each other. The paper draws on a number of friendship treaties concluded by early modern rulers and modern states (namely, Great Britain, Russia and United States). The focus on practices of friendship and on the habituation of self and other via friendship may bring into light the sides of international friendship (and even friendship per se) that might be incompatible with offered analytical conceptions. The argument that we make in this paper is that in addition to analytic and normative theorizing that pictures friendship as a relationship based on reciprocity and equality, friendship as practiced by the states also includes such features as hierarchy, social legitimation of inequality, assertion of power and sovereignty. The move that we make might help to fill the gap between skeptical views on friendship in IR and interpretations of friendship as virtuous and intimate relationship and to restore the plenitude of political friendship where its virtuousness does not overshadow its pragmatic or functional aspects. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper on the responses to terrorism is an analysis of normative trends in unilateral use of force with particular emphasis on the recent US-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. At a general level, it investigates the relationship between law and politics, and analyses how normative structures regulate applications of power and force. It extrapolates how the interaction between the principles and concepts of international law regarding the use of force and non-legal factors, i.e. differences in wealth and military strength affect the development of normative structures. In particular, the paper aims to enquire the extent recent military interventions have led to any normative change in admissible justifications for unilateral use of force. In this context, it also aims to analyse the repercussions of the contending interpretations of ‘self-defense’ for international security.The paper focuses the question at hand from an interdisciplinary approach, which combines aspects of theory and practice of international law with elements of international relations theory and methodology. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this paper is to analyse how President George W. Bush and his team attempted construct new sources of international order after September 11, 2001. Reviving the oft-overlooked concept of change, I shall highlight the centrality of social interactions in (re) shaping their controversial plans and actions. Focusing explicitly on the US foreign policy, I address the practical and ethical consequences arising from America’s undemocratic behaviour on the international stage. Here specific consideration will be given to how American actions in one sphere of influence have affected subsequent power dynamics and modes of behaviour. In short, I shall explore how state actions and re-actions not only cause but also constitute international codes of conduct. Acknowledging connections between power and order, this paper also re-examine how the most influential actors use their authority to redefine existing rules. In this vein, I shall deconstruct the legitimisation of ‘democracy’ as a form of socio-political statecraft. Essentially I contend that traditional IR theories and governmental agendas have reified this concept by presenting democracies as being the same in most contexts, i.e. peaceful and based on an American model. Rather than presuming this blueprint to be purely advantageous, the paper posits that such universal discourses overlook the contextual specificity and ideational dimensions of democracies. Seeking to overcome such limitations a constructivist framework shall be adopted throughout to show the centrality of inter-subjective rules. The inextricable links between recognition and legitimacy will also be explored as a means to challenge conventional wisdoms circulating in traditional IR literature and US foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I explore the uniqueness of American strategic culture as compared to several European states. I argue that one important source of difference is the American war experience. All other major powers reaching back to 1495 have experienced interstate war on their territories. With the arguable exception of 9/11, the United States has remained relatively insulated from the scourge of interstate war during its years as a major power. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the relatively low levels of war-related fatalities suffered by Americans. I argue that this unique war experience contributes to several peculiar outcomes. First is an American strategic culture resting on a firm belief in the efficacy of military force. Recent public opinion data shows that Americans are twice as likely to favor military force to pursue justice as Europeans. Second, the relative ease in war may help perpetuate an American anti-statist ethos. This is apparent in the limited nature of the American welfare state and American attitudes toward limiting the role of the state. This paper integrates several literatures including cross-national public opinion (Kohut and Stokes, 2006), war severity data (Clodfelter, 2002), war and social change (Marwick, 1975), conflict and social cohesion (Coser, 1956), American political development (Katznelson, 2002; Alesina et. al. 2001), and strategic culture (Johnston, 1995; Gray, 1999). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Great Powers have been historically regarded as significant in international society. As for English School scholars, Great Powers have been even one of major institutions to maintain order and promote well-being of international society. For instance, the end of slavery system and the end of slave trade (the early 19th century), the compliance with international law beyond western states (the late 19th century), self-determination (1960s), human rights (1980s) and democracy (21st century) can be seen as not only historical limited progress, but also as Great Powers’ explicate contribution to promotion of welling of international society. In the 21st century, as Great Powers, the US and UK have aggressively promoted and consolidated democracy. Increasing numbers of states have become democracies across international society, such as in America, Europe, Asia and Africa. Great Powers’ promotion of democracy and more states’ adoption of democracy are not simply coincident. In my paper, I will examine how Great Powers can have an impact on democratic development across international society in the awareness of three different structures of international society like pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist, and of three different types of Great Powers’ preponderance over lesser power states, like hegemony, primacy and dominance. In this paper, China, South Korea and Iraq are adopted to reveal their relatively different paths toward democracy on the basis of Great Power’s relatively various relationships with them under different structures of international society. Taken together, Great Powers have greatly influenced democratic development in international society in the 21st century. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivism underscores the significance of identity in international relations. Scholars from this theoretical tradition have pointed out how identity, interests, and action are interlaced. This paper starts at that point, and seeks to examine whether great power behavior is shaped by a pursuit of interests (as emphasized by the Realists) while at the same time also being influenced by a pursuit of its identity â€" that of a great power. The paper will consider the characteristics of such an identity in the case of two states: United States and Great Britain. These two cases will be explored to determine the extent to which their identities as great powers can also help us understand the actions undertaken by these states. In other words, were their actions driven by interests alone, or are they better understood as being motivated by interests plus by their identities as great powers? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pending rise of China has been one of the most debated issues in international relations during the last decade. This situation creates problems for surrounding East Asian states, the majority of which are currently allied with the United States. What happens if China becomes a regional or even world leader? Will East Asian states be forced to choose between two competing powers? This paper seeks answers to these questions by examining prominent realist theories in relation to small state behavior in the international system, and applying each to the context of China and its surrounding states in Northeast Asia. First, I begin with an overview of the literature dealing with the rising power of China. Second, I seek to correctly understand the fundamental basis of the small state debate by examining in detail Waltz?s balance of power theory. An analysis reveals a fundamental flaw in interpretation: Waltz?s balancing hypothesis pertains to situations of multipolarity, rather than the current situation of unipolarity in the international arena. Waltz?s theory, when applied, predicts states will automatically align with the rising power against the dominant power. Given this finding I offer some facts on small state behavior in East Asia that show this may not be the case. Next, I turn to Walt(1987)?s balance of threat theory and discover Walt, while often understood as prescribing balancing behavior for the international arena, is actually unable to provide predictions for either bandwagoning or balancing in East Asia. I analyze the limitations of Walt?s theory and conclude the ambiguity of his conditions of state behavior, problems in operationalization of state actions and the lack of recognition of the role played by credibility in threat perception, undermine the ability of his theory to fully explain small state action in the context of our situation. Finally, power transition theory is revealed to provide inadequate, albeit roughly accurate, explanations of events in East Asia because of its overwhelming focus upon major powers. This paper deals briefly with its limitations and offers suggestions for further research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both Realists and Institutionalists have radicalized their analyses and findingsin recent years.Whereas one camp no longer speaks exclusively of bipolarity and hegemony, but ofunipolarity and empire, the other no longer refers exclusively to international regimes andinstitutions, but to global governance and constitutionalization. And both can refer to realworld developments in support of their analysis. However, conceptual perspectives that cando justice to this dual development - i.e., the increasing dominance of the USA in theinternational system and the increasing significance of global norms - are lacking. The aim ofthis paper is to present such an integrated view and argue that a constitutional world polityand unipolarity are not the poles of a one-dimensional category. Instead, it is possible thatthe significance of international norms and imbalances in the international distribution ofpower increase simultaneously. To this extent, the talk of both a new empire and of the worldrepublic encompass real and relevant developments. However, it is not until they areconsidered in combination that an adequate picture emerges: in fact, according to the corethesis of this paper - a third phenomenon, a "legally stratified multilevel system" appears tobe emerging. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revisionist-status-quo dichotomy has been a dominant framework in analyzing the relations between a rising power and established great powers in general, and Sino-US relationship in particular. This paper intends to denaturalize this identity discourse and deconstruct its meaning in the first place. Although it is an effective heuristic cue for the established powers to manage a new entrant, it is not a value-free baseline for understanding the interactions between a rising power and the putative international society; it is even a biased standard for gauging the relations between China and the United States. In a great sense, this identity discourse is the source of misperception between these two great powers. The second part of this paper explains the rationale of China?s foreign policy by analyzing the "peaceful rise" discourse in Chinese academic and policy circles. This is a nationwide intellectual practice of conceptualizing China?s national interest and its future role in international society. This discussion reveals China?s rationale in dealing with two distinct sets of foreign relations: the relations between China and international society, as well as the strategic interactions between China and the United States. Almost all Chinese scholars? opinions confirm China?s desire to be a ?responsible major power?, and even a few hardliners express no more than ?defensive realist? concerns. Based on the above analysis, the third part of the paper further denaturalizes the socialized security dilemma between the US and China by analyzing their strategic interactions in East Asian area. Although the US, as the only superpower with the aim of maximizing influence in global and regional affairs, will naturally feel a threat from a newly rising power, the nature of the game between the two powers, in most situation, is cooperation and competition for providing public good to international society. Nowadays the transformative nature of international society as an intervening variable limits the chance that a state uses military force to solve disputes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how the emergence of modern technology has created a situation where American soft power may now be challenged. Joseph Nye has described soft power as the attractiveness of American values and culture to other nations and people. But American soft power was distributed globally because of the United States's monopoly over modern media technologies. In a globalized world, the fact that more and more countries are gaining access to cheaper technology to provide a challenge to American soft power. This paper looks at how this challenge is taking place and the implications for the continued success of American soft power. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceived as a contribution to the ongoing debate about the nature of the state of exception as well as to the discussion about the conception of the possibilities of desecuritization, this paper, based on the case of the United States after 9/11, aims at explaining the strategies adopted by dissenters. This paper will draw on the literature on securitization, social movement, power, domination and resistance, as well as electronic surveillance.The weeks that followed the attacks of 9/11 saw the adoption by the US Congress of a multiplicity of measures aiming at facilitating the fight against the terrorist threats. These measures, although leading to potential infringements on civil liberties, were adopted rather unanimously and with an obvious lack of debate. Incapable and/or unwilling to oppose the political will of the Executive branch, Congress had ceased to be the arena were political dissent about security matters could be voiced. It thus had to find other arenas to host it and emerge directly from the citizens.Nonetheless, the picture of the resistance deployed against these measures in the following months and even years depict an image quite different from the one expected. Indeed, dissent about security policies has taken diverse forms privileging distance between the citizens and the target of their actions, thus demonstrating the learning process involved in social movement strategy based on previous experiences of failure and success, as well as on context. This paper will present a set of factors that could justify the adoption of such a strategy by insisting on contextual reasons (competition of social movements of protest, unity in times of crisis, technicality of the measures opposed, possibility to resist locally) as well as longer term processes (development of surveillance techniques, evolution of police handling of protest demonstrations).We will explain that this strategy coupled with the tools allowed by the professionalization of social movement organizations led to local symbolic victories as well as nation-wide legal successes in courts.Eventually, this paper will develop a theoretical modelization to conceive the possibility for a progressive desecuritization of the national security policy regarding the handling of the terrorist threat, based on a reflexion on time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is the intention of this paper to set out a logical framework by which an appropriate course of public diplomacy is selected to meet the requirements of communicating within an ever-changing international system. The point of departure for developing this framework is to first ask the question of what these requirements are ? most notably with respect to advances and proliferation in information technologies; increased interactions amongst world cultures; and fluctuating power paradigms ? at the beginning of the 21st century. In the last 60 years, observers have noted the relationship between the United States? public diplomacy activities and the requirements of the day, sometimes matched well and others not. In these observations, dualities highlighting the extreme ends of these activities have emerged ? the contrast between propaganda and public diplomacy, for one, or the perennial dilemma of whether to employ more or less aggressive forms of public diplomacy. Central to this paper, however, is the duality of information/influence approaches to public diplomacy and its opposite number, engagement. With the aid of the logical framework, the paper intends to show that the pendulum of the international system has swung in favour of employing the engagement approach, with an examination of its implications to follow. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address a specific facet of the larger question of whether the U.S. will help manage a peaceful transition to a more powerful China. China?s capabilities, both economic and military, are rising rapidly and necessarily its resource demand is also increasing dramatically. Chinese efforts at resource security in South America and to a lesser extent Canada are causing the U.S. much consternation, particularly with respect to oil in Venezuela. This paper will investigate some of the more significant aspects of Chinese economic penetration into the less developed countries of the western hemisphere (eg., iron ore deals with Brazil and oil with Venezuela). The U.S.?s ability to maintain hegemony over South America has fluctuated since Franklin Roosevelt?s Presidency, but the beneficent relations of that time and the corresponding strategic benefits as interwar Japan and Germany encroached there have evaporated since the Bush administration took office. This paper will explore the strategic risks to the U.S. with greater South American economic ties to China. The paper will address whether the South American countries are balancing U.S. power, merely pursuing economic benefits from commercial competition and leverage vis a vis the U.S. and European customers, or beginning a fundamental strategic re-orientation away from the U.S. and toward China. For example, can Hugo Chavez really lead a coalition of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela against the U.S. and its Colombian and Caribbean allies? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"I was shocked to the point that I was blinded by sheer disbelief ? In the end, [the U.S.] completely disregarded the years of sacrifice made by Japan, forcing us to forgo the great nation status that we had striven so hard to establish in the Far East. But to do so for Japan was none other than committing suicide. We now had no choice but to rise." (Jidai no Ichimen [An Aspect of Time], 2 vols, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1985.) According to the memoirs of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, these were his immediate reactions upon reading the cable that had just arrived from the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. Included in the cable was a note from Secretary of State Cordell Hull that contained an explicit rejection of Japan's proposal to resolve the current U.S.-Japan crisis. The message of the so-called "Hull Note" was clear: Japan needed to first withdraw from China before the U.S. would consider any Japanese demands. It was the same unequivocal position that the U.S. had maintained since early 1941. Unquestionably, Washington was unwilling to make even the slightest compromise towards Tokyo; appeasement was clearly out of the question.If there ever did exist a point-of-no-return on the road to Pearl Harbor, it was certainly on this day of November 26, 1941, when Togo - the leading advocate for peace in the cabinet - gave away all hope. Of course, Togo was no pacifist. However, he also was cognizant of the fact that war with the U.S. was futile and would only spell disaster for Japan. If so, then what pushed Togo to the brink that he felt Japan had "no choice but to rise"? Was it, as most Japanese historians claim, because the "Hull Note" was so uncompromising in its stance that it basically amounted to an ultimatum? Moreover, why was Togo so utterly dismayed? His emotionally charged words reveal that the foreign minister was so taken aback by the note that he felt a overpowering sense of betrayal. Could it be that Togo had been expecting an altogether different reply from the U.S.? Was he privy to any intelligence that would suggest otherwise? In light of the new evidence on prewar Japanese sigint recently discovered at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the Diplomatic Record Office (DRO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan, the purpose of this paper will be the following: First, to illuminate the history of the hitherto highly obscure Japanese Black Chamber (Section 18),and two, to set forth a more logical and coherent explanation to Togo's volte-face in his policy towards the United States that ruptured all hope for peace. In conclusion, the paper will incorporate the new knowledge gained concerning Japanese prewar sigint and reveal how intelligence analysis had a detrimental impact on policy decisions a critical juncture. Through this undertaking, this paper will refute the longstanding understanding that the so-called "Hull Note" was the final straw that led to Pearl Harbor. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has become almost commonplace to depict contemporary state power as a decentred and diffuse set of practices that rely heavily on private sector techniques of governing. Intensifying and accelerating processes of globalisation, we are told so very often, have entangled state actions with the authority and activity of ?non-state? sites, from corporate firms to bond rating agencies and accounting houses. Yet, if we are to entirely accept that states and corporations have most effectively deployed the networked technologies, techniques and tactics of governing, how are we to understand contemporary practices of dissent and resistance? To what extent can these very techniques and tactics be inventively redeployed by those whose everyday lives are most damaged by them? This paper takes a central sphere of apparent decentred state governance border management and explores the extent to which the private risk management practices deployed are being contested by migrants and worker groups. Focusing on the USVISIT programme enacted by the US Department of Homeland Security in conjunction with consultants Accenture after 9/11, together with the related identity card and biometric programmes unfolding across Europe, the paper seeks to show that decentred state governance is less predictable and more contingent and contradictory than is often portrayed. Border governance programmes that identify and isolate vulnerable populations within the global political economy, then, are being contested within the everyday lives and experiences of precisely those people engaged in the most ?risky? of border crossings. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neorealist theorists, waiting for the imminent dissolution of the unipolar system, have paid insufficient attention to the relative power issues generated by this system. This paper argues that systemic unipolarity affects regional alliance behavior with the hegemon, and asks what intervening variables determine the choice of alliance (balancing, bandwagoning or confrontation) and subsequent policy outcomes.First, this paper argues that the unipolar balance of power has prompted the emergence of regional, mid-size powers rather than global peer competitors. These local superpowers are most interested in maximizing their own relative power in their own neighborhoods. Second, the decision by these medium powers whether or not to ally with the hegemon -- and the reciprocal decision by the hegemon -- depends on each state's perception of the others threat and interests. The greater the misperception of both threats and interests, the more likely the alliance will involve balancing in the best case scenario and confrontation in the worst.These hypotheses are tested through a recursive analysis of alliances between the U.S. and four medium size Middle Eastern regional powers - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. The paper concludes that misperception of threat and the misperception of interests are key intervening variables shaping the alliance formations between the U.S. and the Middle East regional powers, as well as the foreign policy outcomes in each direction. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sparked by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and fueled by the United States doctrine of preemption, recent years have seen an enormous debate on the limits (if any) on the inherent right of self-defense. Some even argue that this has led to repercussions that may be felt across the entire international (legal) system. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of political power in changing international law as well as possible future implications for the concept of self-defense. In order to do so I have chosen to focus on the recent development where binding resolutions of the UN Security Council increasingly amount to general law-making (specifically UNSC 1373 and UNSC 1540), and how that can be used by dominant states on the Council, such as the United States. In the paper, I will argue that the United States’ active promotion and use of chapter VII resolutions to lay down rules for the entire international community when it comes to counter-terrorism and non-proliferation is a novel and significant way in which political power can be transformed into legal obligation. At the moment, it is not clear if, or how, failure to meet the requirements laid down in these two resolutions will be sanctioned, but in the longer run, this may have unforeseen – and perhaps undesirable – consequences for the use of force in general, and preemptive self-defense in particular. This also becomes all the more apparent when discussed in terms of a possible emerging hegemonic international law, including a more conditioned conception of sovereignty. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While facing the US hyperpower, the weaker EU is forced to rethink its role in the context of the declining military and strategic importance of the European Continent. Our paper wants to address the following question: Can the EU rely on its Soft power to counter US Hegemony?1. The European ?civilian power? has been a key concept in the European doctrine ever since the 1970?s (and Deschenes? work). However the idea is only partially thought in terms of public policy. In that sense, the EU could learn from the Canadian and the American public diplomacy skills and develop more strongly and more broadly its own soft power policies.2. Soft power could prove very useful for emerging European diplomacy to perfect the tools and means of a distinct European public diplomacy towards the US ? which at the present time is insufficiently developed. As long as divisions prevail, as is the case now, the EU has to improve on coherence of purpose and mechanisms to find new ways to promote its own views and values, increasingly challenged within the transatlantic divide.3. The new European Constitution is the cornerstone of a renewed and enlarged Europe, in need of a unique voice. Therefore, this Constitution will be looked at, in light of its adoption by the member states ? or not ? as the potential key to a real and unique European Soft Power. 4. As a member state, France will be a good case study. Its public diplomacy has proved insufficient. This paper will deal with the reasons and motives of this insufficiency and try to see how this reflects on Europe?s Soft power. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the policy and normative implications of the recent interaction of transnational activism and Council governance. I show that proper understanding of these developments requires substantial conceptual modifications in the scholarship on the Council and on transnational activism. Both misleadingly posit either Council governance or transnational activism as counterpoints to power and interest-based politics. To remedy this limited scope of analysis, this paper interjects a critical framework that situates Council governance and transnational activism in the context of ongoing power relations and dominant normative frameworks. In the Council context, power relations refer to the dominance of the United States and, to a lesser extent, other great powers in shaping the CouncilÂ’s agenda. Similarly, the dominant normative framework consists of the liberal norms of contested elections, market economies, and human rights, which collectively comport with the values and interests of the United States and other prosperous states. This critical framework enables greater complexity in assessing the impact of transnational activistsÂ’ influence upon Council governance. I reject the assumption prevalent in studies of transnational activism, which holds that mobilization by transnational activists counters the influence of powerful actors and interjects more egalitarian and socially just norms into global governance. To be sure, transnational activists do, at times, exert such influence on the Council. Often, however, the broader political dynamics lead transnational activists to reflect and further an interventionist agenda of powerful states (especially elite economic and political sectors) that undermines the sovereignty of Southern states and holds little regard for the needs and wishes of the populations in the intervened states. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ann Stoler suggests that contemporary global politics operate through the racial grammar consolidated and deployed by the apparatuses of modern European colonialism. At the same time, she argues against the idea there is merely continuity between colonial and postcolonial contexts, suggesting instead that race is a discourse of vacillations, operating at different levels, moving between different political projects and seizing upon different elements of earlier discourses for new political ends. The emergence of the US as the single world power in the current process of globalization involves the re-fixing of racial identities, albeit taking place in the vibrant multi-cultural context of globalization. As the formation of racial identity is central in the emergence and maturation of the empire, we see a renewed significance to again, in new ways, projects of defining the racial/non-Western other. The paper will address these themes through the Immigration and Naturalization Services’ (INS) compulsory registration for new immigrants from specified and predominately Muslim countries as a discrete site of US racial discourse, arguing that the polyvalent mobility of racial discourses are not only about race, but of gender, global capital and nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The twin principles of pre-emption and global dominance announced by the US National Security Strategy (NSS), are the most recent expressions of a post-Cold War shift by the US away from hegemonic leadership based on multilateral neo-liberalism and alliance building, and toward a coercive politics of supremacy. This rupture has engendered a conflict amongst the ruling class in the US, reflected in agenda-setting organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations. The foreign policy establishment, as represented by the CFR, has been critical of Bush’s policies, on the grounds that pre-emptive war and global dominance cannot serve as tools for the creation of a stable world order for neo-liberal capitalism. As such, this view reflects the interests of certain fractions of capital and of the American ruling class. In contrast, the Bush doctrine serves a different, and narrower, band of corporate interests. By examining the conflict between the CFR and the Bush government this paper seeks to shed light on intra-class disputes over the shifting concept of an American Grand Strategy an the broader implications for hegemony and the nature of world order. In addition, given that the Bush doctrine has generated even more resistance than the previous model, and is likely to create more human insecurity, such a study may help point the way toward a strategy for counter-hegemonic forces. Some of the questions that animate this study are the following: What are the components of the Bush doctrine? How are the members of the Bush administration implicated in various corporate connections? What do these links mean for US foreign policy and hegemony? What are the implications of this new ‘grand strategy’ for the global political economy and a potential counter-hegemonic movement? How and in what ways does the CFR represent the views of a particular fraction of ruling class interests? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses fear as a driving force behind post-Sept 11 international relations. The most powerful nation on earth is also the most fearful nation. American security policy is driven by new kinds of fear, fear of the terorrist, fear of Islam, even fear of the UN. This in turn creates fears in the international community about the hegemon’s intentions and capabilities, manifested in a new interventionism. The main casualities of hegemonic fear and the global fear politics are multilateratilism and democracy which are increasingly challenged by unilateralism, coalitions of the willing and the ascendancy of the homeland security state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of U.S. military power (unilateral, to some) in the ?age of terror??and especially the claim that there were some humanitarian ends that the Bush administration sought to achieve by its invasion of Iraq?continue to challenge scholars and policy makers to develop ever nuanced criteria for assessing the legitimacy of interventions mounted for humanitarian reasons. This paper offers a five-tiered set of requirements to test whether interventions are legitimately ?humanitarian:? a triggering condition; exhaustion of alternative means; international legal compliance; an outcome probability test; and an international accountability requirement. Each will be examined in detail, and recent and historical cases will be used to explore important caveats, qualifications, and potential drawbacks or objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]