Search

This paper traces motivational influences from the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq to patterns of Islamist terrorism in Western Europe. The paper analyses the circumstances of two successful terrorist attacks in Western Europe occurring after the invasion in March 2003. First, we survey the mass casualty attack attributed to a group of al-Qaida associated radical Islamists in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and secondly, the slaughter of a Dutch filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam, also by an al-Qaida inspired terrorist network. These terrorist attacks were launched in the context of intensified counter-terrorism efforts on the global scene, and the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The paper situates these acts of terrorism within the broader theory of so-called "spillover effects" from armed conflicts to international terrorism. The argument in this paper is that although there were no Iraqi insurgents involved in these two attacks, the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the terrorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the quantitative conflict literature employs data sets that draw a large portion of their cases from 1945-1990. This historical period coincides with the U.S.-Soviet bipolar competition and security arrangements associated with that competition. A debate within the democratic peace literature has emerged between those who view the democratic peace as a general phenomenon, and those who see democracy?s effect on international conflict as largely a function of the particular circumstances of the Cold War alignment. The critics of a general relationship between democracy and war focus specifically on the role of the United States as a leader of one of the bi-polar alliance blocks The possibility that observed relationships between democracy and war could be dependent on the particular historical circumstances of the Cold War raises the question: To what extent are other empirical findings about international conflict also a function of the hegemonic influence exercised by the superpowers during period? Using ordinal logistic regression to examine the pattern of third party joining this paper re-examines the extent to which the relationship between democracy and intervention as well as the relationships between variables commonly used to explain third party interventions in the conflict literature, such as proximity, power status, democracy, trade and alliances, are a function of the intervention choices of the United States during the Cold War. The paper finds that the intervention choice of the United States is by far the most important predictor of the intervention choices of other third parties to interstate wars. And that accounting for the intervention choices of the United States ?explains? away much of the general relationships observed in earlier studies. Interestingly enough though reduced in substantive importance, a statistical the relationship between shared democracy and joining remains even after accounting for U.S. intervention choice in this period. This finding suggests that the relationship between shared democracy and third party joining is not entirely dependent upon the exercise of American leadership during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I seek to answer some basic questions about the process of globalization in the defense industry and the security considerations that result from it. I concentrate on two major groups of players; states and firms. In the first section I briefly lay out the definition of globalization that is commonly used in analyzing defense issues and then look at what the phrase really means in terms of the defense trade. The following section examines the manifestations of globalization in the defense trade, which are many and profound. There is a particular focus in this section on the effects of globalization on defense production, but there is also some discussion of the effects of globalization on the defense trade; the ?sharp end? of the issue. The next section examines the effects of globalization on security for the state and the firm Throughout this paper the phrase ?defense trade? is used rather than ?arms trade? this reflects the fact that much of what is now traded does not look like a defense good; it is a component, a software code, a training package or simulator, even a computer. Today?s trade is less in finished defense goods than in the components of a system. The phrase ?defense trade? captures this dynamic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing American dominance and power in the world has frustrated various countries, societies, and individuals, and some have argued that this anger at American hegemony was the cause of September 11th. These people, such as Benjamin Barber, argue that Western cultural and economic imperialism are reshaping the world at the expense of various other cultures. As the American empire grows, it spreads its culture throughout the world, creating a more homogeneous world. This paper will focus on the growth of the American empire by examining American foreign policy and the use of force during the Clinton administration. From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. intervened or initiated the use of force in several places, including the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, and Haiti. Why did the Clinton administration make these foreign policy decisions? Was it part of an attempt to spread American hegemony throughout the world or not? Or, as many have argued, were Clinton’s foreign policy decisions a result of his domestic problems and his own personal ambitions and goals? This paper will seek to understand what motivated President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions to initiate the use of force or to intervene in the intrastate conflicts of other countries from 1993 to 2000. In order to answer this question this paper will focus on one possible theory?diversionary war theory. Diversionary war theory is based on the idea that leaders of nation-states will use foreign conflict involvement to divert domestic attention away from internal problems. Many have criticized this theory, including Blainey 1998 and Levy 1989, but others have found evidence of a moderate link between variables like leader popularity and the diversionary use of force, such as Ostrom and Job 1986, James and Oneal 1991, and Morgan and Bickers 1992. Clinton faced a number of domestic distractions during his Presidency, most significantly his ongoing difficulties involving his alleged affair, and he may have felt the need to use foreign policy to divert attention away from these problems. Clinton has also has been quoted a number of times as saying that domestic politics is more important to him than international politics, and he may have used foreign policy to divert attention away from his domestic problems. This paper will focus on three specific independent variables: presidential approval, economic measures, and the media focus during the six months prior to the decision to use force or intervene. As the U.S. continues its dominance in the world, it is important to understand the motivations behind American foreign policy. Many people in the world today are less than satisfied with the U.S. hegemonic role in the world, because some of them believe that the U.S. is acting only in its own self-interest with no regard for how their actions affect the rest of the world. It is important to understand the reasons behind American foreign policy in order to determine whether the U.S. is a selfish and self-interested nation. This is a small step towards that goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on the question of how the dominant free-market model of globalization-a model I call globalism-has been impacted by 9/11 and the war on terrorism. Can globalism survive in our post-9/11 world? The paper makes the case that it cannot--at least not in its pre-9/11 form. In order to save at least some of its original agenda, free-market globalization is currently being transformed into a globalism with an American face-a much more imperialistic and militaristic variant than its more economistic predecessor. Military operations and ideological propaganda maneuvers have become as important-or even more important-than global trade initiatives. The paper examines and analyzes some of these ideological maneuvers. Undermining the establishment of a multilateral global community, the new globalism with an American face is instead raising the specter of an American global empire unilaterally imposed on the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies George W. Bush?s narrative; the relationship between U.S. national security and information technology after the painful experience of 9/11. Bush?s phrases of national security and information technology are in the nucleus of international and national political challenges, yet they are in many ways problematic and controversial. I am asking if they even are a central part of the problem of global war on terror itself. Nevertheless my intention is rather to try to understand what I suggest as Bush?s narrative of ?nightmare? by generating questions from political philosophy that challenge and open up these fundamental phrases. As President Bush is boldly able to simplify the complex phenomenon of terrorism, his acts will raise a question more fundamental in the West: how far he can go with the phrases. Colonizing a cyberspace with totalitarian surveillance activities maintains a paradoxical silence; a vast amount of information without knowledge. In this sense, President Bush has taken in his ?ride? American national security culture to the new frontiers. This has a potential to lead to the deterritorialization of national security. Using Lyotard?s thoughts, the paper discovers questions of putting the phrase ?take the battle to the enemy? into practice. On an information technology level of analysis this can be seen as total accident, in Paul Virilio?s terms, with the pragmatism of permanent cybersurveillance (Patriot Act) of the Americans and not just terrorists. It is a logical step for modernity to define information technology as a tool in this battle in which ?freedom does not come free?. On a narrative level of analysis, I suggest that phrases of information technology should be turned into recognizing a differend. These phrases put forward the unpresentable which, even though it opens up a question of the concept of ?enemy?, reveals how the United States in its travel is struggling not with the enemy but with itself. Bush?s disputable phrases of information technology occupy an important place in U.S. national security culture because of their contradictory relation between state and individual to western expansion of freedom. This is enabled in Bush?s narrative which is legitimated by a possible ?nightmare?. By ?discovering? this ?frontier? in Bush?s universe, we can better understand the modern project grounding its legitimacy in the imaginable future ? and not in 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stood steadfast with the United States in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks against the United States, the alliance invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history. Since then, NATO has taken a variety of steps to engage more fully in the global war on terrorism, including a declaration that tacking terrorism was NATO’s new mission. On a more concrete level, alliance members adopted a package of measures during the Prague Summit in November 2002 that are designed to strengthen NATO’s preparedness and ability to take on the challenges associated with terrorism. But beyond the rhetoric and posturing, is the alliance really ready?in terms of having the appropriate command and force structure?to tackle this new threat? If the last major alliance effort to address a change in the threat environment is any indicator, NATO may not be ready to decisively face down terrorism for quite some time. In the 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO recognized the significant changes in the threat environment brought about by the end of the Cold War. New threats, ethnic and religious strife chief among them, were noted by the alliance in public documents and pronouncements. Accordingly, the alliance recognized that new command and force structures would be necessary to meet the new threats. Nevertheless, it took the alliance another 12 years before it had those command and force structures?centered on NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDCs)?in place to deal with new post-Cold War security challenges. Why did this change in command and force structures take so long after the alliance recognized the changed security environment? My paper will argue that although external threat factors initiate reviews of NATO doctrine and force structure, the outcomes of those reviews are delayed and decisively shaped by organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics factors. By extending this model to the current focus on the terrorism?arguably as great a watershed in the threat environment as the end of the Cold War?the clearest implication is that NATO may not be prepared to respond to this new security challenge in the short run because it may lack appropriate processes, structures, and forces even though it recognizes the inadequacy of its existing security tools. Extending the model further, the paper will argue that NATO is likely to stumble through the short term, employing ad hoc or stopgap tactics and solutions as was seen in the alliance’s response to Balkans crises in the 1990s. Like state actors in the international environment, NATO seems ready and able to fight the last war, but not necessarily the next one. The paper will argue that if NATO wishes to remain relevant to security in the twenty-first century and provide for European security?particularly in the war on terrorism?it will have to develop more effective means for evolving its doctrine and its force structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States embarks on the 21st century committed to retaining a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, deploying sophisticated missile defenses, and developing new (and more usable) battlefield nuclear warheads. This stance - combined with the Bush administration’s enshrinement of pre-emptive military action as a keystone of American policy after the September 11th attacks - is puzzling and worrisome for much of the international community. An analysis of contemporary U.S. nuclear weapons policy thus fits well with both elements of the 2004 conference theme of Hegemony and its Discontents. My paper will develop a new explanation for contemporary U.S. behavior through a comparison with American nuclear policy during the Cold War. Then, as with now, many scholars and policy analysts were puzzled by U.S. behavior because they viewed large and threatening nuclear forces as not only unnecessary for preserving American security, but also upsetting to international peace and stability. However, I will show that U.S. nuclear policy during the Cold War and today is understandable through the lens of a theory I call technological opportunism. The core argument is that states rarely view new technological developments - such as missile defense and warhead technology - as a means to preserve the status quo or signal benign intentions; instead, even purportedly defensive technologies are most often seized upon by states and their leaders as potential opportunities to gain military and political advantage over their rivals. My approach to understanding this topic is largely positivist and material, but I am sympathetic to ways in which a more reflectivist - or, specifically, a constructivist - approach can shed light on U.S. behavior in this case. In particular, the ways in which American policymakers have typically conceptualized their country’s identity as a nuclear superpower and assigned meaning to concepts such as security and technology have clearly shaped and been shaped by nuclear policy decisions. In sum, I believe my paper will deal with key themes raised by the 2004 Call for Proposals, including the nature of U.S. hegemony and power in world politics and the relationship between ideas and political practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) could be seen as an assertion and reinforcement of the hegemony of the United States over the Internet. By United States I mean not just the US Government, but also its industry, its technology and in many respects the values associated with a liberal democratic order in communications. The paper will describe and investigate the nature of his hegemonic system, making it clear that simplistic notions of US dominance imposed on an unwilling world don’t get one very far. What we see instead are several self-reinforcing cycles of the sort that made Silicon Valley the world capital of IT innovation and Hollywood the world capital for filmmaking: network effects and agglomeration economies and first-mover advantages. The hegemonic system did not follow traditional national lines. The Internet protocols were victorious in a standards war that pitted TCP/IP against protocols (OSI) that were backed not only by European governments and European telecommunications operators, but also by the US Department of Commerce and many US telephone companies. The early Internet community was international in scope; although it was centered in and mostly populated by US computer scientists, it embraced several European and Asian institutes. These non-US technologists were outside the mainstream in their own countries and both the US and the non-US technologists often showed more allegiance to their own epistemic community than to their governments. Nevertheless, when it came time to privatize and commercialize the Internet the US government did retain the ability to control the terms of the governance transition because US military and civilian contractors were operating the centralized naming and numbering spaces. More significantly, despite its initial promise that it would fully privatize ICANN, the US reneged and retained indefinitely an unusual form of unilateral contractual control over what is ostensibly an international organization. Not much later, concerns about security and terrorism post 9-11 reinforced the decision to keep a US grip on the root of the Internet, making the relationship between ICANN and the USG a delicate matter. In addition to clarifying the historical emergence of US dominance of the Internet this paper will have three parts: * First, by way of factual background, it will analyze the institutional relationships between ICANN and the US government. * Second, it will explore and describe the ways in which assertions of the identity of a distinct Internet community interact with regional/cultural and national identities in the politics of ICANN. In developing this analysis, a critique of academically romantic notions of diversity and difference will emerge. * Third, it will explore the extent to which ICANN’s creation was a direct challenge to the hegemony of traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), especially the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It will pay particular attention to the efforts of the ITU to undermine ICANN’s legitimacy and assert a role for traditional IGOs in Internet governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early days of the Cold War, prominent students of American foreign policy firmly rejected the notion that the United States could initiate preventive wars against its adversaries. Preventive war is a persistent theme in the history of international politics. Unlike a conflict fought over a specific disputed issue, preventive war is fought to prevent the erosion of relative power to a rising adversary (even though that adversary does not pose an imminent threat). The logic of preventive war simply asserts that it is better to fight a war today under more favorable circumstances than to face a possible war in the future after an adversary has achieved military gains that raise the likely costs and risks of war for the dominant state. Despite the apparent rationality of initiating military conflict under these conditions, preventive war presents serious normative problems that have traditionally been considered too odious for a democratic state to overcome. Morgenthau, Kennan, Brodie, and Kissinger, among others, all argued that for democracies, launching preventive wars is taboo. More recent scholarship claims that no democracy has ever fought a preventive war because democratic public opinion simply considers preventive war, in the absence of a clear impending threat, to be morally abhorrent (even against a morally abhorrent adversary). ..ASA-Events of the past year, however, fundamentally challenge this claim about democracy and preventive war. Less than a year after President Bush declared that America would not tolerate unbalanced dictators seeking weapons of mass destruction, the United States was engaged in a preventive war against Iraq that ended with the destruction of the Iraqi regime and American occupation. Coupled with the president’s National Security Strategy of September 2002 that articulated a general vision of fighting pre-emptive wars in such cases, this event generated broad speculation and debate over whether America would turn its military might next against Syria, Iran or North Korea. In this period of weak international constraints on how America uses its power abroad, the potential for domestic constraints becomes crucial for understanding the degree to which American hegemony will be restrained in coming years. This paper examines several aspects of this issue. First, it measures the extent of anti-preventive war sentiment that actually exists in the United States as reflected in Congress and among the American public. Evidence for this question was generated from content analysis of the congressional debate over war with Iraq and public opinion surveys before the war. Second, it examines a related question: does congressional and public support for war with Iraq mean that the logic of preventive war has fully trumped the normative limits that may have prevented the United States from engaging in this particular form of war in the past? The paper presents evidence showing that domestic support for war cannot be explained outside the context of the terror attacks of September 11. It was not the purported threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction development that motivated majority support, but the link the administration drew between Iraq and terrorists that moved many to accept war. Third, the paper examines whether 9/11 has produced a shift in domestic attitudes about preventive war that extends beyond the Iraq case. To what extent do members of Congress and the public accept the general logic of preventive war as articulated in the administration’s pre-emption strategy? To what degree does anti-preventive war sentiment still exist in the U.S. after the Iraq war? To what extent are members of Congress and the public willing to support the logic of preventive war in other cases? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. economic interests emerged as one of the central themes of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. Many analysts offered what I call a strong American power interpretation of the crisis, in which U.S. actors initiated, guided and ultimately benefited from the economic liberalization of developing Asia. A competing resistant domestic political economy approach responded that developing Asia largely resisted international pressure during the late 1990s because of the resilience of domestic political and economic systems. Nearly all analyses of the Asian crisis and its aftermath, therefore, favoured explanations emphasizing either U.S. structural power or particular mediating characteristics of Asian political economy. This paper looks beyond these positions and advances an alternative perspective on the consequences of the Asian crisis. The paper argues that the structure of American economic interests?specifically the different interests of foreign policy-makers and business?holds more explanatory power in understanding the Asian crisis than models of coherent American power or domestic political obstructions in Asia. The paper advances the conceptual proposition that the interests of American policy-makers and American firms must be separated. Liberalization can be implemented in crisis economies because of strong U.S. pressure without the reforms necessarily being advantageous to U.S. business than to other foreign or domestic actors. In practice, a disjunction has emerged since the financial crisis between aggressive U.S. government actions and beliefs and cautious steps taken by the U.S. business sector. Reform in developing Asia has been led and supervised, above all, by the American government and a supporting set of U.S. accounting, consulting and financial firms. Korea and Thailand, as two countries subject to intensive demands for economic reform and with strong foreign commercial interest in their markets, are particularly relevant cases for assessing how U.S. interests fared in developing Asia. To varying degrees, Korea and Thailand have accepted an American-style accounting system, competition and tax policies and technical standards, as well as overhauling almost all of their national regulations dealing with foreign investment. Yet the winners in the investment sector have not been principally American-owned firms; rather, U.S. firms have trailed other foreign firms and national firms in direct investment and merger and acquisition activity. The paper argues that two factors are particularly important explanations for diverging U.S. economic interests in the post-crisis period. First, U.S. firms have adapted their business models in developing Asia. Both in manufacturing and finance, traditional ownership-based investment in Asian assets has been replaced as the dominant U.S. corporate strategy by new forms of foreign investment, such as outsourcing and non-retail banking. Korea and Thailand are relatively insignificant to this form of U.S. economic activity in Asia. Second, U.S. policy-makers hold an outdated conception of U.S. investment in Asian markets and incorrectly assume that economic opening privileges U.S. firms. U.S. policy-makers expected American business to increase their direct investments in Asia. The policy community failed to recognize new forms of U.S. foreign investment and their implication during the Asian crisis. The paper will proceed in four parts. The first section will synthesize scholarship on U.S. interests and the Asian crisis into the aforementioned two-fold typology (the strong American power and resistant domestic political economy models). The second section will establish an analytical framework to understand how a disjunction between U.S. foreign policy and corporate interests is a theoretically possible outcome to the Asian crisis. The third section will document empirically the depth of market reform and the level of U.S. firm penetration in Korea and Thailand from 1997 to 2003. The fourth section will explain the crisis outcome on the basis of new forms of American international business activity and on U.S. policy-makers misconceiving the nature of U.S. private sector interests in developing Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After fifty years of Cold War division, East Asia has gained greater coherence and substance as an emerging economic, even political, entity. This paper examines the role of hegemony in East Asia’s ongoing post-Cold War reorganization. In particular, where the US and Japan once claimed much of East Asia?s economic and political attention, long-term trends suggest an ongoing reorientation on the part of East Asian states around China?s growing economic and political presence and that China will increasingly become the center of gravity for East Asia I focus on the US, Japan, and China as the three powers that have or are most likely to assume the hegemonic organizing role detailed in international relations theory. The paper examines these major powers, with a particular focus on their shifting relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Though a coalition of weaker powers, ASEAN has played an important, if not unusual, role in defining and at times, leading regional processes. This was especially the case for much of the 1990s; however, financial crises, as well as ASEAN?s political and economic limitations, have also forced the organization to look outside itself for additional economic and political leadership. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the 1990-1997 period, a period characterized by much uncertainty about the post-Cold War priorities and policies of major powers. In particular, I describe how the United States as retrenching hegemon, Japan as reluctant hegemon, and China as rising hegemon set the stage for new thinking about intra-East Asian relations. Their shifting relations underscore political and economic interdependencies between Northeast and Southeast Asia that had been less apparent during much of the Cold War. It is during this period that we find ASEAN playing the important role of facilitator in negotiating changing relations. The second part of the paper then turns to a discussion of developments since 1997, addressing the roles played by 1) the 1997-9 financial crisis and 2) the US war on terrorism in shaping East Asia’s reorganization. This period is characterized by notable Chinese activity and Beijing?s intensified engagement of Southeast Asian states, individually and collectively. Taken together, the paper shows that major powers have shaped in critical ways the contours and organization of an evolving East Asia. East Asia has become more organized ? formally and informally, politically and economically ? but thus far, that process has been defined more by market forces and competitive dynamics between the major powers. In other words, if East Asia is becoming more coherent and organized, it is becoming so more by accident than necessarily by hegemonic design. Recent Chinese policies suggest that China may wish to assume a larger leadership role; however, the question remains whether the United States or Japan would accept China in such a role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines biological, chemical, and nuclear warfare preparedness exercises in the United States. The paper argues that not only are biological warfare preparedness exercises designed to test for weaknesses in the internal security and public health apparatus, but are also explicitly designed forms of information warfare and perception management that are targeted at both reassuring the population of the ability of the state to respond to weapons of mass destruction incidents, and to communicate a message of deterrence to potential enemies, be they domestic or transnational terrorist networks, criminal organizations or states. The paper locates the current counterterror and homeland security mobilization in a broader historical context by comparing current preparedness exercises and guidelines to civil defense exercises and guidelines of the Second World War and Cold War. In the paper I utilize the Darkwinter and TOPOFF (Top Officials) 1 and 2 preparedness exercises that have taken place in the last several years as case studies. I examine: the discourse used by the planners and participants in these exercises at both the federal, state and local levels; media coverage of these exercises; and public opinion data to determine the effectiveness of these preparedness exercises in meeting their proclaimed goals. The case studies are designed to answer the question included in the title of the paper; do these exercises demonstrate prudence or panic? Are the exercises necessary tests of the capacity of internal security apparatus and public health system (the first responders) to cope with imagined scenarios that are likely to occur? Or are the exercises staged events and perception management that are largely ineffective at either testing the capacity of the government to respond to such threat, assuring the general public and participants in the exercises, and communicating a message that will deter potential enemies? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper draws on IR regime theories and outlines possible implications of EU Enlargement for US-EU relations in the areas of environmental and trade relations. In particular, the paper highlights the role of bilateral and (global) multilateral negotiations and institutions. Lastly, the paper will assess recent examples of EU-US cooperation and discord around trade and environmental issues, offering a preliminary assessment of which aspects of regime theories appear to explain changing EU-US relations better than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at analyzing the recent changes in the US foreign doctrine and Brazil’s strategy of international relations under thenew government that took power in January 2003. The U.S. and Brazil agendas and strategies are discussed in light of the FTAA process. Several questions are addressed in the paper, including: How can the ganeda be reconciled to accommodate national interests and at the same time to keep the momentum of the FTAA process? How can US hegemony be accommodated in a more cooperative hemisphere? How does Mercosur fit in with the FTAA project? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthony A. Loh Department of Political Science Vanderbilt University (615) 343-6046 Email: anthony.a.loh@vanderbilt.edu The events of 9/11 helped expose the underlying incompatibilities between an emerging American hegemony and the Westphalian system of international relations. In much of International Relations literature, the assumption is that the international system is given, while the distribution of power can take the form of multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity. Yet in the aftermath of the Iraq war of 2003, the United States has clearly consolidated its post-Cold War triumphant gains in political, economic and military leverages over the rest of the world, including its allies in Western Europe. It has sought to fill the void left by the former Soviet Union. A new systems structure appears to be emerging that is centered on the United States, and anti-hegemonial coalitions that could sufficiently balance it are becoming more difficult to assemble, although sub-state actors like Al Qaeda cell groups have risen to attempt to check the hegemon through insidious means and transnational networks. It is time for Waltzian claims to receive yet another nuanced revision or perhaps a complete rejection. At the highest level, systems structure may no longer be anarchical, whereas at the lowest (sub-state) level, it remains to be so. This paper explores the significance of these structural changes for international politics. There has been a near-explosion of IR literature on the United States becoming a new imperium. The central question addressed here is how this new American imperium differs from traditional-type territorial empires and what is its significance for U.S.-East Asian relations in the 21st century. The paper looks at the potential shifts in U.S. policies in South and North Korea, Japan, Singapore, Philippines, Taiwan, and China. These East Asian states have been watching closely the military and political outcome of the 2003 Iraqi war. The implications of American unilateralism ? with its doctrines on regime change and strategic preemption ? worry them. Some of them are authoritarian regimes and are regarded by the United States as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. The shift in post-9/11 U.S. strategy from containing peer competitors to dealing with terrorist threats have lifted some pressures on China, but the neoconservative agenda to remake the international order will be sure to bear on regional security and stability. How will the United States deal with North Korea in light of the Iraqi campaign of 2003? Some East Asian states have already seen the need to revise their traditional relationships with the United States. South Korea, in its drive for reunification, might abandon its reliance on U.S. security umbrella and turn to China as the new power broker. Japan, America’s staunchest ally in the region, might choose to remilitarize rather than continue to rely on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Still other East Asian states might be polarized into pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. camps, especially since there is little cohesiveness among them to begin with. The limits of U.S. military power are particularly felt in the East Asian context. Yet the question that concerns all of East Asia is how the U.S., with its global military supremacy, would exercise its political rule as a neoimperial power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We must feel safe. We must feel safe not just from the threat of terror, but also from the threat of due process abuse. We must feel safe from the threats of armed terrorists; but also, from the fear that would surely follow if M1-A tanks were parked at our intersections. We want our safety; and we want our freedom. It’s about trust: who, how much, when, and maybe even how. In searching for the answers to these questions, there are certain components we must understand. Only through informed decisions can outcomes succeed. This paper addresses some of the essential elements to consider ? hopefully helping us debate the issues from an informed view point and allowing us to reach consensus in what is surely the greatest challenge of our time. There are four essential elements to consider. They are the 4-Rs: resources, rights, and restrictions resting on a foundation of risk management. We must ensure a delicate balance ? a three-legged stool: one leg representing cost [resources] (dollars, people, equipment, training); one leg representing the due process freedoms [rights]; and the third representing the degree of convenience (or lack thereof) [restrictions] we can live with. The stool must rest on a foundation of risk management: threat assessment, risk assessment, and cost/benefit assessment. We must understand the issues of each to ensure we build a capability that will allow appropriate balance; ensuring the stool does not tip too far in any one direction. As we go through the discussion, these 4-Rs will always run just below the surface; behind the decision. This paper examines these issues in a way applicable throughout the United States, but also within the context of recent efforts undertaken in the state of Alabama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the informal mechanisms for influencing policy used by powerful states in international organizations. The distribution of formal voting rights in international organizations rarely mirrors the distribution of geo-political power among the member-states, yet the powerful states still participate in the organizations, and frequently manage to capture a disproportionate share of the gains to be had through cooperation. I argue that it is often the informal mechanisms and procedures, existing outside the formal decision-making rules and procedures, that allow powerful states to exert their influence in the international organizations in which they participate. This paper identifies the various informal influence mechanisms available to powerful states, and then seeks to explain the conditions for their usage in these organizations. Focusing on the interaction of the United States and the United Nations General Assembly, this paper provides analysis of the effect that U.S. pressure had on the policies and organization of the United Nations. Its conclusions help fill the gap between theories of international relations focusing on the role of relative power, and those focusing on the benefits and behavior of international institutions. By understanding how powerful states utilize their influence through these informal mechanisms, we can get a much greater understanding for the underlying dynamics of powerful state participation in these organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has a mixed relationship with multilateral treaties. The United States has often been one of the leading voices for multilateralism, and many Americans (both governmental and nongovernmental actors) have been active in the initiation and negotiation of these projects. However, when it comes time to seal the deal the United States is much more reluctant. There are nearly 150 multilateral treaties that the United States has signed, but has subsequently not ratified. Signing, but not ratifying, demonstrates an internal struggle among domestic political actors over the direction of U.S. foreign policy. But these domestic debates can have a tremendous effect on the policies of other states and the development of international law. These debates also reflect the merit of Ruggie’s (1993) thicker definition of multilateralism. The deliberations surrounding multilateral treaties often reflect something deeper than just trying to find a way to get three or more states to work together. It is important not to miss the ideational elements along with the economic reasons in understanding why certain multilateral conventions do not materialize. It is typically during ratification debates that the divisions in society over the merits of multilateralism versus unilateralism are revealed. These debates are less stark when the Senate is deciding on bilateral treaties. Using multilateral treaties signed but not ratified by the United States as the empirical referent, this paper explores the historical evolution of the idea of multilateralism and how its implementation is often stymied by domestic politics. I argue that American behavior often shows support for the idea of an international system built on generalized principles of conduct but it is often unwilling to accept the nature of the reciprocal bargains that would need to be struck if the provisions of the treaty were actually implemented. The paper first presents statistical evidence of America’s changing relationship with multilateral treaties through an examination of historical and subject matter trends. I then look more specifically at a number of cases drawn from the human rights and environmental fields, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on Biological Diversity, to show how the push-and-pull of the domestic ratification process affects the development of multilateral commitments. Because multilateral conventions are a major source of international law, the paper also considers the international legal consequences of American behavior. The paper also considers the validity and likely effectiveness of treaties that do not include the world’s major power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has the Iraq war impacted Chile,the so-called jaguar of Latin America and its strategic objectives in the world? In addressing this question, the proposed paper will focus on the differences that have arisen between the Chilean and American world views. Of special concern will be to discuss how Chile’s involvement with the United Nations -- Chile sits on the Security Council, has influenced its foreign policy. The paper will focus on the strategic considerations of Chile’s newly evolving foreign policy but will also examine the resultant impact of differences with the United States upon Chilean internal politics. It will conclude with a broader perspective on Mercosur and prospects for its future relations with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 -- the years were punctuated with think tank studies of the decline of American diplomacy. With the end of the Cold War, Congressional and public interest in sustaining America’s international presence dissipated. USIA and ACDA vanished in the interest of efficiency and policy management. Recruitment and training shrank. Open libraries and American cultural centers were closed, while embassies were fortified. America began to turn away from the world. Early in his tenure, Secretary of State Colin Powell promised to attend to public diplomacy and selected a trusted colleague to take charge. Before she was confirmed, terrorists struck the Twin Towers -- and the world changed. The term public diplomacy appeared on the front page of the Washington Post a few weeks later, and has since appeared in the popular press with increasing frequency. How could large majorities in the Islamic world show such hostility to the United States? How could they show support for bid Laden? What went wrong? Was it a failure of public diplomacy? Was there a coincidence between anti-Americanism as measured by respected pollsters and the decade-long decline of American public diplomacy? Could a few TV ads in the Middle East repair the deterioration of respect for America? Were decades of scholarly exchanges and professional visits undermined by America’s insensitivity to other cultures? There is broad agreement -- from the Council on Foreign Relations to the Heritage Foundation, from the State Department to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- that American public diplomacy has not met the challenge. The proposed paper will summarize the recommendations of the several studies and examine the response of the U.S. government including the Department of State and the Broadcast Board of Governors as well as other departments and agencies whose actions and voices are instrumental in the international dialogue. The paper will ask whether the U.S. government’s increasing appreciation for public diplomacy will reinvigorate its conduct and restore America’s influence with foreign publics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses an emerging interaction between bilateral and multilateral security arrangements for conflict resolution in Asia since the 1990s by emphasizing the correlation of Asian hegemony management with foreign policy strategies of the US, China and Japan. As protracted conflicts of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have threatened regional prosperity and stability, regional security institutions have become an important policy concern in the post-Cold War era. Detecting nascent multilateral institution-building in Asian regional security, this paper asks how and why US-led bilateral alliances interact with multilateral security arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN-Plus-Three. In order to examine this puzzle, the paper focuses on three points: (1) foreign policy strategies of three countries, (2) domestic interests concerning the feasibility and legitimacy of supplementing bilateralism with multilateralism in Asian security, and (3) impacts of Asian hegemony management on establishing regional security institutions. The paper compares the three countries’ preferences to regional security by focusing on the relationship between bilateralism of the US-led alliances and multilateralism. It then tries to demonstrate that both the dynamics of Asian hegemony management and the policy preferences concerning bilateralism and multilateralism are essential in understanding regional security arrangements in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State militaries are not only fighting forces, they are bearers of national identity. Cultural constructions of soldiering?ideas about what it means to be a soldier, who should be a soldier, and what soldiers should do or not do?help to create national identity by projecting ideals and defining roles for the nation. Militaries also have a long-standing close association with masculinity and the making of men. As such, militaries construct a gendered national identity and serve as a gendered symbol of the nation for domestic and international consumption. This paper explores how the US Congress is defining soldiering as an activity and an identity in the post-Cold War period, by analyzing congressional hearings on military service. Hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees give different groups a chance to present a vision of what soldiering means and what the military is for; they allow a view of the potential identities that are competing for national attention and of which ones are becoming dominant. This paper specifically examines the hearings held from 1991 to the present on a variety of issues related to gender and the military: the expansion of women?s roles, sexual harassment and misconduct, and the mixing of men and women in basic training. Within these hearings, Congress promotes a vision of the military in which the presence of women is a given, but there is a strict limit on their participation and an agreement that direct ground combat should be performed by men. The military, in the dominant view, is still fundamentally about warfighting and combat (as opposed to peacekeeping or other kinds of post-Cold War missions), and there is a concern for preserving aspects of military masculinity which support a warfighting mission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Typial counter-terrorism (CT) thinking focuses on the act of violence, or its associated threat, to identify and exploit associated avenues for meaningful response and reaction. Other CT thinking takes an alternative path in attempting to identify and define the causal factors of militancy and terrorism. Both approaches have led to noteworthy successes, yet both have significant shortcomings. Response and reaction strategies leave the initiative with the terrorist, ensuring government efforts are largely geared towards crisis response and management. Efforts to define terrorism’s causes suffer since there are no universally present conditions and factors upon which to direct preventive attention. As a result, terrorist violence is too often seen as largely unpredictable and unavoidable. This paper examines the possibility that a more thorough understanding of the communicative dynamic of terrorism can lead to significantly increased opportunities for both strategic prediction and preemption. Building on the premise that terrorism is, indeed, propaganda of the deed, this paper offers a preliminary theory of the rhetorical and symbolic aspects of terrorism, their role in determining and describing the evolutionary trajectory of the terrorist group, and how this understanding may open doors for more effective and lasting CT efforts. PLEASE NOTE: This paper is still udergoing required prepublication review by the U.S. Department of Defense. Once clearance release has been received, the paper will be available and posted in its entirety. You may also obtain a complete copy, once clearance release has been granted, by emailing Dan Gressang at either Gressang@aol.com or Daniel.Gressang@dia.mil [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Observers of the current world scene reach strikingly divergent conclusions when characterizing today?s world order. Although there is much talk of a unipolar power structure, many are not convinced identifying a multitude of power centers, which is only temporarily and superficially veiled by the extraordinary superiority of the U.S. military. Some perceive the United States as ?the New Rome,? while others see a hegemon in ongoing decline. In a more normative vein, some depict the unmatched power of the U.S., and the high-handedness that comes with it, as a threat to world peace and an obstacle to the solution of common problems such as the management of climate change; others argue just the opposite describing the U.S. as the ?indispensable nation? and U.S. power, and the willingness to use it, as the decisive factor for order and stability in the international system. These opposing views are not only a matter of factual and evaluative differences, i.e. differing opinions on what is the case or what states of affairs are desirable; rather, they are firmly rooted in the existence of a multitude of concepts of hegemony in International Relations ? conceptualizations and definitions of which many who employ them are hardly aware of. The aim of this paper is to develop a first an idea about how to make. use of this multitude of conceptualizations via a metatheoretically guided conceptual analysis in general. What should follow from this analysis is a systematic overview and categorization of the most influential approaches to the phenomenon of power concentration, or hegemony, in world politics. The literature on the topic will be analyzed using a set of guiding questions as for example ?Which conditions have to be met for a state to be considered a hegemon?? or ?How do hegemons behave and why??. The goal of the paper is not confined to unearthing the divergent theoretical ideas that are present in the current scholarly and journalistic discourse on hegemony and power asymmetry. By clarifying, reconstructing, and systematically comparing the concept of hegemony, the paper ultimately seeks to contribute to a better understanding of hegemony itself. Eventually, a reformulated and multidimensional concept of hegemony will be presented in order to provide coming research with a clear idea about its descriptive and normative connotations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares how the United States pursued United Nations Security Council resolutions in 1990 and 2002-2003 opposing actions by Iraq. It addresses the question of why the United States succeeded in building a coalition authorizing the use of force in 1990, but was unable to do so through the Security Council in 2003. The paper focuses on the role of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in the policy-making process, evaluating how the United States worked through its Mission at the United Nations to pursue its policy agenda. In the twenty-first century, as the United States works with other nations to advance its foreign policy interests, scholars and policy makers alike need to understand how the United States can operate in the United Nations most effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on the paper Disarmament, Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Couterproliferation: In Search of Synergy and Policy Coherence that was presented at the combined International Security Studies Section, ISA, and National Security and Arms Control Section, APSA, meeting at Richmond, VA in October 2002. That initial paper examined the development of the four title policy elements against the emerging international security environment as a foundation from which to examine US Government internal policy, process, and organizational factors for arms control as a policy arena. The follow-on paper proposed here would depart from the same conceptual and process development, but it would examine the external position, emphasis, and priority of the four title elements in US external foreign and security policy and its implementation. The focus here will be on analyzing and critiquing the shift from, for example, nonproliferation to counterproliferation, and from relatively more collective approaches to arms control policy to a more unilateral emphasis. A preliminary outline would be something like the following: Policy Evolution (place, role, and priority in US policy) Disarmament and Arms Control Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation; Bush Administration Policy and Rationale No Place for Disarmament, An end to Arms Control Counterproliferation first, Nonproliferation in a Supporting Role; Policy Relevance and Recommendations; Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation CBW Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation Conventional and Emerging Arms Control Arenas; Crafting and Implementing a Coherent and Synergistic Approach to Arms Control [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines (1) United States policies advanced by the Bush administration and the leadership of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives toward the establishment and use of the International Criminal Court; and (2) the responses of the European Union and the wider international community to U.S. efforts to achieve immunity from the Court’s reach for all U.S. nationals and more generally to prevent the effective functioning of an independent international criminal court. The paper analyzes alternative explanations for U.S. attitudes toward the Court and toward the enforcement of international humanitarian and human rights law, highlighting the different power positions and ideological orientations of international, transnational, and domestic actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once the most important whaling nation (70 percent of world whaling), the United States has become, in under a century, the champion of the struggle to save the whales. This paper reflects on the American role in the transformation of the International Whaling Commission into an anti-whaling regime. It seeks to analyse the American construction of a ‘green hegemony’ in this issue-area, paying particular attention to the external vs. internal dimensions of this process. Three aspects come under scrutiny: -Externally, the American position is at odds with its stance on most other multilateral environmental treaties. How did the whales become the chosen issue of the US’s international environmental policies? -The role of non-state actors. American environmental NGOs have proved particularly important in altering the negotiating position of the state at the table of the IWC. The paper explores how the state-NGO relationship impacts on the elaboration of an international environmental policy -Internally, the US position sits uneasily with the whaling cultures of its ‘first nations’, which continue to whale under the ‘aboriginal subsistence’ exception. How does this affect the continuance of the US’s position as hegemon? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a commonplace that the foreign policy behaviour of a state at time t is partly based on its assessment of the success or failure of policy in a similar area at time t-1, and this proposition clearly applies to some at least of the interventions/non-interventions of the 1990s ? thus, for example, it is generally argued that the US decision not to intervene in Rwanda in 1994 was largely taken in response to the failed intervention in Somalia in 1992/3. Such a pattern can be explained in ‘rational actor’ terms or, bracketing intentionality, via a cybernetic feedback model. The question to be explored in this paper is whether this pattern can also be understood in terms of notions such as ‘guilt’, ‘blame’ and ‘responsibility’. Does it make sense to argue, say, that the leading members of NATO could have had a ‘guilty conscience’ about their failure to act in Bosnia in 1992-5, and that this partially explains their willingness to act in Kosovo in 1999? Are terms such as ‘guilt and ‘blame’ only appropriate when applied to individuals as opposed to institutions? The aim of this paper is to investigate this question, using ‘The West Wing’ as a fictional reference point for considering the record of the 1990s. . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most analysts of US policy in Colombia argue that the US has switched from targeting communist guerrillas to a war on drugs and a new war on terror. This paper shows that contrary to these claims the US continues to back Colombian counter-insurgency efforts which essentially amount to a strategy of state-terrorism under a democratic façade (terrorocracy). Moreover, this policy continues to be pursued because the US has long employed counter-insurgency both to protect the economic interests of transnational capital, but more importantly to reproduce forms of (neo)-liberal political stability throughout the Third World. Counter-insurgency is thus the military strategy par-excellence for the policing and reproduction of global capitalism via localised proxy forces. This paper argues that in the case of Colombia both strategic US oil interests and the reproduction of liberal political stability drive US policy. Moreover, and in direct contradiction to the vast majority of analysts, this paper shows that integral to this policy of terrorocracy promotion is the strategic use and deployment of Colombia?s biggest drug traffickers and terrorists: the Colombian paramilitaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies major issues in American-Iranian relations in the last 25 years. The central question of this work is to what extent the American policy of containing Iran has been successful? Among the issues that are examined are: The effect of sanctions on Iranian internal politics. Iran’s political/military role in the region. The impact of Iran on the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. Iranian attempts to develop WMD capabilities. In addition to extensive secondary and media sources, American government documents are utilized in researching this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As we await a final report from the commission investigating the terrorist attack on the US in September 2001, we know enough now to determine whetehr or not the failure to detect and thwart the surprise was the fault of America’s multi-billion dollar intelligence system or something else. The purpose of this paper will be to evaluate the intelligence activities surrounding 9/11, determine what failed and why, and draw lessons for the future from this extraordinary event. The paper will comment as well on the steps that have already been taken to prevent such surprises in the future and the laws that have been passed to protect national security, perhaps at a great cost to human rights and personal freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development and regulation of high technology are defining features of modern capitalist economies. The U.S. and the European Union represent the richest markets for technological innovation, and transatlantic disputes over technology-related issues ? such as nuclear power, biotechnology, and information technology - make headlines on a regular basis. These disputes also reveal fundamental differences in thinking about risk management and the role of American hegemony in governing risk. America is often responsible for the creation and global diffusion of new technologies, and it deliberately attempts to impose its own free-market, science-based approach to the regulation of technology-related risks. Europe offers a competing approach, largely based on the precautionary principle, which involves a broader societal-based conception of risk. This paper investigates this principled debate by first developing a comprehensive analytical framework for the major competing approaches to governing such technologies. It then applies this framework to the question of America’s potential and real power (hegemonic or otherwise) to influence global technology governance. The paper also assesses the possible challenges America faces in this domain from Europe and other countries, particularly in the developing world. It concludes by examining the extent to which the U.S. and Europe will be able to reconcile their differences and thus facilitate a global regime for balancing knowledge diffusion and technology regulation, possibly through the use of technological fixes, public-private partnerships, and transnational actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional descriptions of state behavior (and, in particular, realism) focus on power and national interests as explanatory variables. Constructivists take a different view, looking at how state interests and identity are constructed and communicated. This paper looks at a difficult case for realists ? large-scale superpower military failure ? and answers the question: How do superpowers explain failure? The paper discusses the cases of two failures: the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. How do leaders of superpowers present a lost war, and, in particular, how do they use television to tell the story? The answer to this question involves understanding why leaders believed they had to explain anything at all, and how they shaped the manner in which the story was told. This, then, directly addresses the literature on constructivism and international relations. What is particularly interesting about these cases is how similar the stories were, despite the differences in political and media systems. The paper covers the time periods associated with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam (January 20, 1969 until March 29, 1973) and Soviet troops from Afghanistan (between Gorbachev’s announcement on February 8, 1988 to February 15, 1989). Extensive use of American archival data and memos, including daily news summaries completed by White House staff member Patrick Buchanan with handwritten comments and orders by President Nixon, give a fascinating picture of the American President’s media strategy and rationale. The Soviet case incorporates information obtained from interviews with Soviet leaders and television officials, recent archival data, and content analyses of Soviet television. The paper argues that leadership communication strategies, including how leaders frame the story of withdrawal from a failed war, must be understood by focusing on both domestic political considerations and concerns about international identity and the ability to project power. Policy legitimacy, public opinion, and elite bargaining are certainly important, but do not entirely explain why and how leaders account for failure. For example, leaders must balance domestic considerations with perceived international imperatives; Soviet and American leaders alike believed they had particular responsibilities related to interests and power in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper aims to explain the causal factors behind the changes in the behavior of radical Islamist groups towards hegemonic powers during and after the Cold War era. This should be achieved by comparing and analyzing the responses of the radical Islamist trend (the Salafi-Jihadi Current) in the Middle East to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan (1979-1989) during the Cold War and to the US military presence in the Arabian Peninsula (1991-Present) in the Post-Cold war era. The research question in this paper is: : In their declared ?war? against foreign military presence in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia as well as on the ruling regimes of the two states, why did radical Islamists internationalize their operations against the Post-Cold War hegemon and its allies as opposed to confining their operations to the local theatre during the Cold-War era? In other words, why were Washington and New York City targeted in the Post-Cold War period during the American presence in the Arabian Peninsula, but neither Moscow nor Dushanbe (Capital Tajikistan soviet socialist republic?close to the Afghan borders) were targeted during the Cold War? To answer that question, I shall focus on three independent variables. The first is the international political context and how the changes within it affected the radical Islamists? behavior and strategies. The second is the changing regional contexts, which involves the changes in the policies of Middle Eastern and South Asian regimes towards the ex-combatants of the Afghan conflict as well as the impacts of the Second Gulf War on the Middle East region. The third variable is the ideological one pertaining to an evolution in the Jihadi ideology leading to its radicalization and internationalization. The expected findings of the research will relate the post-Cold War regional and international changes to some of the causes of the conflicts between hegemons and radical Islamists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2003 war with Iraq marks the first time world public opinion has been strongly arrayed against the United States on a major issue. The world has disagreed with America on specific issues like the banning of landmines during the Clinton administration and South African sanctions due to Apartheid during the Reagan administration. But at no time were there concerted efforts involving mass demonstrations and world leaders allied against this nation. In addition, the events during March of 2003 involving the United Nations Security Council made it impossible for this country to muster even majority support for its resolution to go to war. These circumstances are even more acute when one considers that the United States enjoyed a tremendous wave of global sympathy after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 , and that many of the allies who oppose us now, like France and Germany, aided the campaign against terror in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. Further, a Pew Research poll released in 2002 indicated that the image of the U.S. had deteriorated in an extraordinary number of nations around the world in the previous two years. The primary question, then, is what went wrong? How may we trace world opinion and analyze it to answer this question, and what are the ramifications for present and future U. S. policy? How does the present American isolation from the international community affect its ability, and the ability of other nations, to promote cooperative global ventures and insure a peaceful and safe international environment. This paper studies these questions by describing the historical role of communication in the definition of communities. It then extrapolates how global communications will play a similar role in the definition of supra-national entities which will structure the relations among nations. Hypotheses are derived which test how discourse conventions in international media provide clues to the relevant entities in the post-Cold War era. These hypotheses follow primarily from a theory of global opinion processes and the emergence of an international community ; they are counterposed to Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory and the emergence of communities based upon primordial ties of ethnicity and religion . Hypotheses: Three general hypotheses guide this paper’s investigation of the model of community that will dominate the emerging international order: · Does the content of world opinion vary by civilization or global opinion theory? · Does the agenda for world opinion vary by civilization or global opinion theory? · Does the discursive construction of world opinion vary by civilization or does it follow a process of consensus or conflict according to global opinion theory? The project then uses the hypotheses for a case study of international media discourse on a particular issue-the impending conflict with Iraq. For this analysis, international newspapers from the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Iran will be analyzed. Methodology: The media analyses follow Herman and Chomsky’s assumption that newspaper discourse tends to reflect the dominant ideological and regime interests of the nation of origin . While the newspaper’s national origin does not determine its discourse, it does provide clues to how certain issues are discussed and certain terminology framed. An important example for this study involves the discourse on world opinion. Past studies have shown how use of this phrase varies with nation, region, and historical context, but that one may detect an international consensus forming when the meaning and agenda for world opinion converge across several nations’ newspapers . The paper analyzes discussion of these issues follows the pattern defined by global opinion theory or the clash of civilizations theory. It investigates whether the construction, agenda, and content follow global opinion or civilization models in the following ways: · The content of world opinion: newspaper references to world opinion are coded according to whether they represent a positive, negative, or neutral position on the issue which appears on the agenda. These results are then compared across newspapers. · The agenda for world opinion: previous research suggests that a world opinion has formed when a general consensus exists concerning: (1) the major issues on the agenda for world opinion; (2) the relative emphases these issues deserve over time; and (3) the dates, or time periods, in which these issues appear . All three of these factors are studied by comparing the dates and percentage of references among each of the international newspapers analyzed. · The construction of world opinion: previous research suggests that potential differences among national newspapers may occur in the frequency of their use of the components of world opinion in their references, and the manner in which they construct the concept of world opinion from these components. The construction of world opinion in different contexts is analyzed using factor analyses . A key question in each case is whether each of these factors tends to vary more within the civilization boundaries Huntington describes, or across these boundaries. If there is considerable variation between the two newspapers, but less between the newspapers and others in a previous study, the clash of civilizations theory is not supported. However, a more fundamental question is whether one can map a process of opinion formation and consensus that clearly isolates errant nations, as predicted by global opinion theory. Previous research has shown that these processes may be mapped by studying when the construction, agenda, and content of references to world opinion converge . The argument between these approaches is not merely academic. If the present controversies over war with Iraq have their source in primordial differences that pre-date the modern era, and the Cold War was merely an interruption in this conflict as Huntington implies, then there is little to be done to alleviate the problem. We must simply accept it as fact and endeavor to project our civilization’s values as pre-eminent in the world. If however the conflict is part of a greater struggle regarding the influence of world opinion, there are policy alternatives that can alleviate the apparent split between the United States and other countries. In either case, international communication provides clues to the predominant model of global organization, as well as potential means of solving problems of international cooperation and conflict resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the multiple disconnects separating neorealist international relations theory and the practice of foreign policy. Below, several of these that have already received great attention by scholars in the field are very briefly summarized. For example, neorealists carefully separate IR theory from foreign policy analysis. One cannot say much about the behavior of a single state, they repeatedly warn, based on a systemic IR theory. Foreign policy, neorealists acknowledge, is likely to reflect elements of domestic politics as well as international constraints. Then, much greater scrutiny is directed at an important disconnect that has not received close examination ? the divergence between the neorealist theory of international politics and the real world practice of American neorealists who often assume prominent roles in academic and policy debates about US foreign relations. Based on neorealist participation in these academic and policy debates, as well as the scholars? own explanation of their role in these controversies, the paper concludes that these neorealists arguably embrace reflective, communicative, and emancipatory notions of foreign policy decision-making. These are, of course, foundational theoretical concerns of constructivist and critical international relations theorists and are often disparaged by neorealists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization encourages the erosion of governmental sovereignty, forcing governments to share their authority with other actors. The lines between foreign and domestic affairs are not distinct and sub-national actors have felt the impact of external influences. The nineteenth century was no different. While it does not surprise students of the era that Americans did not consider the national government as final arbiter in domestic disputes, it is often forgotten that a similar pattern emerged with American foreign policy. Numerous factors combined to enhance local power in nineteenth century foreign policy. The ambiguity of federalism and the doctrine of states’rights, for example, encouraged rivalry between local actors and the national government. It is my contention throughout the paper that factors appeared to enhance the power of localities in the nineteenth century, but ultimately the national government prevailed. The political capital possessed by localities did not stop the national government from consolidating its power and, despite some manipulation by local actors, the national government emerged as the dominant foreign policy actor. The paper will examine local activism in the nineteenth century using a case study approach. The cases analyzed include: the Caroline Affair; the Aroostook War; and and the Alexander McLeod Affair. While a case study approach naturally limits the generalizations that one can make, the paper hopes to lead the reader in new directions, raising significant questions and points about local activism in nineteenth century American foreign policy. In addition, the paper will hint at possible lessons for American foreign policy today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Five periods of American-Afghan relations are examined in this paper: (1) the 1979 Soviet invasion and subsequent American responses, (2) the Taliban taking power, (3) the al Qaeda becoming established in Afghanistan, (4) the overthrow of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and (5) the attempts to build a peaceful Afghanistan. The developments in each period are examined, focusing on American governmental and also non-governmental actions. Often, particular American actions and non-actions have contributed to subsequent destructive developments. In this paper, plausible alternative policies that U.S. officials and private citizens might have undertaken that would have had less destructive consequences will be noted for each period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on recent changes in the organisation of Anglo-American occupational pension schemes, analysing these changes in relation to the structural power of finance. It offers a constitutive reading of the structural power of finance that stresses the discursive, decentred, calculative and productive features of power relations. The discourse and institutions of asset management are identified as key to the power relations at work in the investment practices of Anglo-American pension funds. Under asset management, occupational pension saving becomes a form of largely speculative investment that is only indirectly and marginally concerned with plant or production. The paper also explores the current crisis of ‘final salary’ pension schemes. It argues that the tactics of state managers and the corporate sponsors of schemes in the course of the crisis are framed by commitments to actuarialism and ‘shareholder value’ respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the conventional understanding of the formation of the Bretton Woods institutions, which emphasizes the preponderance of U.S. and English power in the form, design, and inclusive nature of the institutions. Andrew Moravscik’s Liberal theory offers an inside-out framework that cuts to the foundation of foreign policy decision making and provides the greatest purchase on explaining the style and substance of the Accords, besting both hegemonic stability theory and neo-liberal institutionalism. Applied to this instance of cooperation, Liberal theory both examines the alleged onset of American hegemony and demonstrates why the post-World War II superpowers’ preferences should be understood as superior and inextricably bound to a palpable domestic-level preference structure. This paper brings to bear extensive archival, biographic, and secondary-source research combined with quanitative methodology to analyze this instance of cooperation. I conclude that liberal theory has unappreciated purchase in the budding literature on informal institution building and calls for a synthesized approach to understanding institution construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bush is a liar and unless Americans own up to this fact America as a country will lose its credibility as a force for justice in world politics. The situation is so tenuous in fact that when Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the UN Security Council to demonstrate his irrefutable proof that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction, American diplomats asked that a tapestry depicting the horrors of war be covered up by the Security council flag?as if the artwork itself would be more convincing than Powell. As the art historian Robert Hughes notes, Guernica is the most powerful invective against violence in modern art. When the Fascists bombed the independent Basque republic’s capital city of Guernica in 1937, killing nearly 1,600 civilians, the world saw the action as a symbol of Fascist barbarism. Picasso’s artwork is unmistakable as Maureen Dowd notes, Mr. Powell can’t very well seduce the world into bombing Iraq surrounded on camera by shrieking and mutilated women, men, children, bulls and horses. But it seems unlikely that Powell could seduce anyone of war, unless that is they are already committed to war. The problem, according to columnist John Nichols, is that Substantial portions of the report that Powell used to support his critique of Iraq were lifted from an article written by a postgraduate student who works not in Baghdad but in Monterey, California, and who based much of his research on materials left in Kuwait more than a dozen years ago by Iraqi security services. Thus, the covering of Geurnica represents a greater covering of the debates that are raging in the United States and around the world the direction of the war on terrorism. The covering of the Guernica tapestry summarizes the conflict between war and peace but also depicts the relationship between the forces on either side: those opposed to preemptive war are simply covered over. But power, like Machievelli’s fortune often acts in fickle ways, independent of those who claim it for themselves. Asking the question, are we safer today than we were on September 11th, 2001? This paper seeks to understand the rhetoric of what I refer to as the popular realists of the Bush administration and the theoretical and normative foundations of realism in international affairs (what I refer to as the sophisticated realist following the work Alan Gilbert). In order to understand the claims of realism it will be helpful to discuss the work of two scholars who attempt to save realism from itself. Alan Gilbert and David Goldfisher have recently attempted to look back into the past in order to discover the implications of various interpretations of realist and neo-realist international relations theory. Goldfischer and Gilbert argue similarly that realism has an ethical core that is often overlooked in the particular interest of ruling elite. In such a context of historical and political amnesia, it is easy to forget that important realist figures from Thucydides to Hans J. Morgenthau argue that corruption (lack of a concern for the common good) cancels the realist’s moral core (defense of national survival, the life of each citizen?against aggression ). This paper follows in three parts. First I discuss the popular realist position of the Bush administration in an attempt to make the best case for Bush by employing texts from Bush’s speeches. Second, I discuss the sophisticated realist position and its subsequent analysis of the popular realist position. Finally, I conclude with an analysis of realist security versus insecurity following from the Bush administration’s leadership and directorship of the war on terrorism. I also offer policy recommendations following from the sophisticated realist paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper will analyze the ways that Japan has approached nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in recent years. More specifically, in addition to the diverse approaches that have been taken by Tokyo and Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, my paper will examine the extent to which U.S. policies influence the disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives of the Japanese government in the international arena. Preliminary research suggests that Tokyo is placing more emphasis on nonproliferation than on nuclear disarmament, creating two major reasons for concern. First, the government of Japan, despite its continuing public campaign to promote nuclear disarmament while seeking the assistance of civil society organizations, would be especially sensitive to the policy concerns of Washington, which, as many critics argue, has developed hegemonic global interests. Second, Tokyo would be alienating itself from Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations that in recent years have increased their international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As more states gain access to orbit, the possibility of deliberate interference, accidents and misperception has increased and now threatens the common interest in the peaceful use of outer space. Only a few states have even a rudimentary tracking capability necessary to operate safely in an increasingly populated environment. Even the United States, upon which the world relies for essential orbital information, has identified reducing the gaps in its space situational awareness as a crucial priority for U.S. space programs?the US network only tracks objects larger than 10 cm (about the size of a baseball), does not provide continuous tracking and cannot determine the cause satellite failures. Although the United States has a strong interest in developing rules of the road for space regarding traffic control and reducing orbital debris creation, the United States has yet to commit to the expanded data sharing that would be necessary for such activities. Some U.S. intelligence agencies fear that cooperation might compromise sensitive national security information. This paper considers proposals to share satellite-tracking information in support of space traffic control and debris mitigation efforts. The paper concludes that expanding cooperative monitoring of activities in outer space to mitigate the risks from increasingly crowed orbital environment and to build confidence would enhance, rather than undermine, U.S. national security interests as well as the common interest in the peaceful use of outer space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America is widely recognized to be a powerful hegemon today. It is important to understand what the American approach to arms control might be like over the next twenty years. Will it mirror the departures of the current Bush administration, or will it go off on different trajectories? Using the broad definition of arms control that is found in the official U.S. State Department arms control and disarmament glossary, this paper offers a historically informed discussion of how the United States got to the point it is today in arms control and where it may go from here. This is not an attempt at prediction or forecasting so much as a discussion of plausible possibilities and relevant trends. Focusing on weapons of mass destruction, and especially on nuclear weapons, I conclude that arms control is not dead in American diplomacy but is evolving. The paper describes that evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are increasing claims regarding the attachments that Latin American immigrants have to the home country, and their potential roles as lobbyists for the home country. These claims are not based on systematic analyses of the immigrants but reflect instead the rhetoric and aspirations of home country leaders. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which such claims reflect immigrant attitudes and behavior. Specifically, it will draw on surveys of Latin American immigrants that examine how they view home country issues, their level of involvement in activities related to home countries, and the strength of their attachments to U. S. institutions and society. The paper will pay particular attention to attitudes and behaviors directly linked to politics as distinct from those tied to cultural and social realms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the form and content of nation-shaping in the US post 9/11. The attacks of 9/11 provide a touchstone for tensions between global integration on the one hand, and nationalist identification and mobilization on the other. In the US, the state has clearly seen its power and centrality fortified as concerns for ‘homeland security’ take center stage. In the process, the nation, or national community, has emerged as a key vehicle for legitimizing the state, and national identity or American nationhood are functioning as a central mechanism for marking boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. The paper draws upon Roxanne Doty’s notion of statecraft to analyze the top-down dimensions of nation-shaping that occur when the American state invokes the nation as a justification for its expanding role in defending political and cultural boundaries. Meanwhile, the politics of American nationhood also filter up as individuals and groups in society use national identity and membership in a national community to secure a rightful place as protected citizens of a hegemonic state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although UN peacekeeping has never found favour in the Bush Administration, the United States remains the most important Member State when decisions are made in the Security Council. The current war on terror has obviously changed the political circumstances in which such diplomacy is conducted, but how and to what extent? This paper will seek answers to these questions by exploring the nature and impact of contemporary US influence over Security Council decision-making on peacekeeping issues through two steps. First, it will discuss the various sources of US policy in Washington and how they interact in the policy-making process. Of primary interest in this section will be the inter-play between the executive and legislative branches of the US government. The second step will shift the focus from Washington to New York in an effort to discern the consequences of the Washington policy-process on the outcome of Council deliberations, especially in terms of the mandates and compositions of new missions. To this end, the paper will pay special attention to the cases of Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the possible mission to Sudan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current debate on the post-9/11 world is heavily concentrated on the foreign policy of the United States; that is, it is based on the reductionist approach (Waltz 1979). The nature and potential change of the international system has been ignored. It is clear that the current hegemony of the United States in international system justifies one to ask whether international system is changing from anarchical towards hierarchical. This is a big question of high theoretical, empirical and practical value. In order to find any answers to that question, a lot of extensive and intensive systematical research is required. Therefore, instead of suggesting a solid thesis, the present paper is a survey of ideas and findings on which the suggested project might be based on. First, the paper discusses the basic concepts of the systemic approach as introduced by Waltz (1979) as well as his analysis of the existing international system both before and after the end of the Cold War. Second, the problematic of the study of power in international system is briefly discussed. Third, major features of the current international system are examined. It is maintained that some clear features of hierarchical international system can be recognized; at least it is possible to share Tim Dunne?s (2003) view that even if the present tendencies do not establish ?a new global order but altogether they have forced us to confront its becoming.? It is claimed that the United States? position as the lead state of the emerging hierarchical system is based on its overwhelming military power (the ?command of the commons? as suggested by Posen 2003), the strategic doctrine and political will to use that power, and the justification obtained for war on terrorism from the 9/11 attacks. War does not disappear from the new system, but instead of anarchy, there is only one enmity; that between the terrorists (and the rogue states that support them)) and the defenders of freedom, of which the United States is the leader. ?War on terrorism? is the ordering principle of the new system; it is the United States?s function to define the terrorists, whereas the others? function is to support the United States in this war. Finally, it is suggested that more research into the basic issues of the new system is required, particularly on 1) theory and analysis of international system/politics in Waltzian sense, looking beyond his ideas by adopting more recent knowledge and approaches of the field; and 2) the bases and mechanisms of the present international system, with emphasis on military and ?constructionist? power, with main reference to international law and war on terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]