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Scholars of international law compliance have not identified an approach that covers the full gamut of international norms. Realist, rationalist and constructivists explain certain facets of the compliance puzzle but fall short in many areas.I propose a comprehensive theory of international law compliance that focuses on the structure of the agreements by distinguishing between international promises and international pledges. Starting with the premise that all international law is horizontal and that compliance is likely to be weak, I argue that compliance will be the greatest with respect to promises rather than pledges. Promises - like contracts - typically involve a reciprocal exchange of benefits or withholding of sanctions that are amenable to measurement. Such agreements are usually high on the legalization scale (precision, obligation, delegation). They also affect reputations far more. Cheating will still occur, but it will be both more subtle and more rare. Pledges, on the other hand, involve commitments of internal reform that are not reciprocal and non-compliance has few externalities. States enter into these agreements for domestic purposes, primarily, or to misrepresent themselves to outside audiences. The commitments naturally score low on the legalization scale and compliance is likely to be superficial unless driven by domestic forces. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies social-psychological theories of opinion formation to international norm dissemination by testing several hypotheses as they apply to the ECHR’s influence on British public opinion. The key finding is that while policy elites and policy professionals are more likely to be influenced if they are engaged in European affairs, the same logic shows that the public at large is insensitive to the Court’s influence. Methods include historical analysis, small-sample surveys and large-sample experimental designs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]