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Underprovision in the suppy of transnational collective goods is one of the central problems of international governance and well documented in areas such as collective defense or climate control. But why do some states accept what appear to be disproportinate and inequitable burdens in the provision of transnational collective goods? Traditional burden-sharing models emphasize free-riding opportunities to explain burden-sharing patterns in the provision of public goods. Alternative models question traditional public good assumptions and seek to identify country-specific benefits that can help to explain a country's willingness to contribute to a collective good. From these models, the paper develops a number of competing hypotheses that claim to explain the variation in countries willingness to contribute to refugee protection efforts at the global and the regional level. To test these hypotheses at the global level, it uses a UNHCR data set on international refugee resettlement efforts. At the regional level, the paper uses resettlement figures based on the Dublin Convention which assigns responsibility for asylum seekers in Europe to particular signatory states on the bases of previously agreed distribution rules. The results support those who question the public goods assumptions that are prevalent in the established literature on international refugee protection. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some states appear to make much larger contribution to the provision of international public goods than others? Traditional burdens-sharing models that emphasise free-riding opportunities in the provision of international collective goods more often than not appear to be unable to explain such variations. An alternative model based on insights from international trade theory suggests that where countries possess a comparative advantage in the provision of certain public goods, countries may engage in the trade of such goods. The implications for attempts to regulate burden-sharing at the international level are clear: any imposition of quotas in the provision of public goods such as refugee protection will constitute a restriction on trade are thus ex-post inefficient. The paper seeks to test this model in the area of refugee protection. Here it can be assumed that states can contribute to refugee protection in several ways: proactively, through peace-keeping/making and reactively, by providing protection for displaced persons. According to this model countries are expected to specialise according to their comparative advantage as to the type and level of contribution they make to international refugee protection. Specifically, one might expect that a marginal increase in a state?s pro-active refugee protection efforts will correspond to a marginal decrease in its reactive contributions. If such policy trading does indeed take place, one should be able to observe such equilibrium effects both across different countries and over time. This suggests a pooled time-series. The trade model, however, assumes that the contributions in public goods that are traded are jointly endogenous. As Ordinary Least Squares estimates will therefore be biased, we use an instrumental variables approach to derive unbiased estimates for our pooled time series analysis of 20 countries over a 20 year period which should enable us to approximate ?relative prices? in the international market place for public goods. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries have been faced with significant and very unequal responsibilities as a result of highly fluctuating inflows of asylum seekers into their territories. National (unilateral) policy responses in this area have often failed to achieve their objectives while producing significant externalities for other states. In an attempt to deter 'non genuine' asylum seekers, states have engaged in the competitive introduction of increasingly restrictive deterrence measures that have driven down protection standards and brought states into jeopardy of breaching their obligations under international law. As unilateral policy responses have become increasingly seen as inadequate, unfair and ultimately unsustainable, policy makers have increasingly advocated multi-lateral approaches to deal with the policy challenges posed by asylum seekers and refugees.. Against this background, the paper will analyse the rationale, mechanisms and effectiveness of international burden/responsibility-sharing in this policy area. Building on theoretical insights from the literature on international public goods, the proposed analysis will focus on four distinct approaches to international asylum/refugee burden-sharing: regulatory (policy sharing), distributive (resource-sharing), re-distributive (people-sharing) and a market-based approach (based on the idea of countries' comparative advantages in contributing to international public goods). By comparing and contrasting these four approaches, the paper aims to explore the driving forces and obstacles to international burden-sharing initiatives in this area and assess their past record and future potential in achieving a more equitable and sustainable system of international refugee protection. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]