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Input Method Editor (IME) is an indispensable component on current smartphones. With its assistance, the number of key presses is reduced, and non-Latin characters could be inputted. Furthermore, modern IMEs integrate several personalized features like reordering suggestion lists and predicting the next words based on user's input history. Such optimization improves the user experience but turns the IME dictionary into a pool of user privacy. Previous works have discussed the privacy risks coming from malicious IMEs. Indeed, they could cause security and privacy issues if installed by common users, but their impact is limited as the majority of IMEs are well-behaved. However, whether legitimate IMEs are bullet-proof is not answered before. In this paper, we make the first attempt to study the security implications of IME personalization and the back-end infrastructure on Android devices. In the end, we identify a critical vulnerability lying under the Android KeyEvent processing framework, which can be exploited to launch cross-app KeyEvent injection (CAKI) attack and bypass the app-isolation mechanism. By abusing such design flaw, an adversary can harvest entries from the personalized user dictionary of IME through an ostensibly innocuous app only asking for common permissions. Our evaluation over a broad spectrum of Android OSes, devices, and IMEs suggests such issue should be fixed immediately. All Android versions we examined (from very old 2.3.4 to the latest 6.0.1) and most IME apps we surveyed (11 out of 18) are vulnerable. User's private information, like contact names, location, etc., can be easily exfiltrated. Up to hundreds of millions of mobile users are under this threat. To mitigate this security issue, we propose a practical defense mechanism which augments the existing KeyEvent processing framework without forcing any change to IME apps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Input Method Editor (IME) is an indispensable component on current smartphones. With its assistance, the number of key presses is reduced, and non-Latin characters could be inputted. Furthermore, modern IMEs integrate several personalized features like reordering suggestion lists and predicting the next words based on user's input history. Such optimization improves the user experience but turns the IME dictionary into a pool of user privacy. Previous works have discussed the privacy risks coming from malicious IMEs. Indeed, they could cause security and privacy issues if installed by common users, but their impact is limited as the majority of IMEs are well-behaved. However, whether legitimate IMEs are bullet-proof is not answered before. In this paper, we make the first attempt to study the security implications of IME personalization and the back-end infrastructure on Android devices. In the end, we identify a critical vulnerability lying under the Android KeyEvent processing framework, which can be exploited to launch cross-app KeyEvent injection (CAKI) attack and bypass the app-isolation mechanism. By abusing such design flaw, an adversary can harvest entries from the personalized user dictionary of IME through an ostensibly innocuous app only asking for common permissions. Our evaluation over a broad spectrum of Android OSes, devices, and IMEs suggests such issue should be fixed immediately. All Android versions we examined (from very old 2.3.4 to the latest 6.0.1) and most IME apps we surveyed (11 out of 18) are vulnerable. User's private information, like contact names, location, etc., can be easily exfiltrated. Up to hundreds of millions of mobile users are under this threat. To mitigate this security issue, we propose a practical defense mechanism which augments the existing KeyEvent processing framework without forcing any change to IME apps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]