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Despite calls over the years for the Asia-Pacific region, or some subset of it, to develop a regional security regime, no deliberate action to achieve this has been taken. This paper considers the possible ends of a regional security regime and the means towards achieving them. The ends themselves would differ according to whether any regime focused on security, traditionally and narrowly conceived, on comprehensive security or on human security. No matter which approach is taken, if the regime is to be successful in any sense beyond that of rhetoric, some of the region's cherished norms such as non-intervention as that is currently interpreted will have to be at least modified, if not completely scrapped. Even if the region collectively decides it needs a security regime and can agree on its ends, there are many alternative ways of achieving the ends and the processes of working out detailed rules will be difficult and time-consuming. None of this is to say that establishing a regional security regime will be impossible. It is to say that it will involve a lot of work, and a lot of compromise by state policy-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Illegal cross-border fishing is an important maritime security issue in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian states, along with other states with interests in the region, have created three new multilateral fisheries- relevant arrangements of agencies with overlapping but different memberships: the Regional Program of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing; the ASEAN-Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center Strategic Partnership; and the Coral Triangle Initiative. Each of these multilateral arrangements has the potential to help Southeast Asian states deal with fisheries-based security issues more effectively by building polycentric coalitions and capacity. So far, however, they have had a limited impact. This is partly because they are still principally technical support bodies rather than management organizations. In addition, states need to make greater strides towards settling outstanding border disputes and address fisheries overcapacity and overfishing in waters under their jurisdiction. States are unable to address these problems adequately because the fishery sector is typically low in national priority. Moreover, national interest in fisheries remains concentrated on immediate food and economic needs, and, in international relations, on jurisdictional rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines why Asia's multilateral defence diplomacy has been a relative laggard when compared to other forms of institutionalized security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. It argues that explanations that stress the "catalytic role" of external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution of power or threats are underdetermining. Rather, Asia's new multilateral defence diplomacy reflects strategic emulation on the part of ASEAN elites, who localized ideas initially put forward by outsiders in order to maintain ASEAN's central place in the regional security architecture. Its rise has also been helped by the changing role of militaries h7 some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much to historical contingency, in particular the interests of two influential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The final part of the article briefly assesses the future prospects and influence of regional multilateral defence diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]