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States adopt public "naming and shaming" as a rhetorical coercion strategy in-lieu of kinetic force in order to get other countries to comply with accepted norms. However, the effectiveness of this strategy has been uneven and at times has failed to elicit the response desired by the rhetorical coercer. The South China Sea dispute is a good example of rhetorical contestation as an important undercurrent in US- China competition. By tracing rhetorical exchanges--from the Obama administration's subtle rhetorical coercion to the Trump administration's overt naming and shaming strategy--this article shows that the US-China rhetorical contestation over the South China Sea has evolved from an initial implication contest into a framing contest, both of which are considered as "unstable outcomes" in rhetorical contestation. Such outcomes show that far from backing down, China has been able to resist and strategically counter American naming and shaming. This was accomplished in three ways. First, by exploiting the ambiguity of the international law frame. Second, by portraying the United States as an "outsider". Third, by appealing to its audience--the littoral states of Southeast Asia--with a publicly sustainable new narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although nearly twenty joint development agreements have been signed since the 1950s, only a few have been implemented and even fewer have achieved successful commercialization. This article discusses the conditions leading to the implementation failures of joint development agreements. Applying the Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis method to nineteen joint development agreements between 1958 and 2008, this article argues that the only causally-related condition associated with the failed implementation of joint development agreements is the deterioration of bilateral relations, often arising from the maritime boundary dispute that the joint development agreement was supposed to resolve. Other possible hypotheses, such as lack of economic incentives, energy independence, domestic opposition, third-party intervention and disagreements over the details of the project, do not show any correlated pattern with the failure to implement such agreements. The finding provides policy implications for the current boundary disputes in the South China Sea: improved bilateral relations is the prerequisite for the effective implementation of joint development ventures, and not the other way around. Littoral states should also not pursue joint development agreements as a false pretext to secretly consolidate their maritime boundary claims, or to confirm the status of a "dispute". Furthermore, successful negotiations for a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea may help to create a conducive atmosphere for claimant states to agree on the joint development of offshore hydrocarbon resources. [End Page 418] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article utilizes the elements of leadership, political performance and national interests to understand China's foreign policy decision-making process. In contrast to a state-centred analysis, this article assumes that the supreme leadership's view of political performance is the most important factor when it comes to foreign policy decisionmaking. It contends that so-called national interests are often manipulated to serve particular political agendas. Specifically, this article explores whether the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative or advancing China's interests in the South China Sea can be better utilized to improve Chinese President Xi Jinping's political performance. The comparison between the two issues incorporates the dimensions of feasibility, significance and morality. In the final analysis, this article finds that the OBOR is likely to be better utilized to enhance Xi's political performance, which yields some salient implications for future trends in China's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's massive reclamation work in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea between 2013 and 2015 was a turning point in US policy towards the South China Sea. China intends to use the artificial islands it has constructed -- and the infrastructure it is in the process of installing on them -- for military purposes. While for many years the United States largely positioned itself above the long-simmering territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes between China and five Southeast Asian countries, the prospect of China using its buildup in the southern reaches of the South China Sea to establish greater control of its near seas, in the process diminishing US access to the waters and airspace of the world's most critical waterways, prompted a reassessment in Washington about the South China Sea being part of larger US core interests, and its grand strategy in the Western Pacific. Washington has responded to China's reclamation and construction spree with a new, active strategy that aims to deter China from taking further actions at its reclaimed features that would alter the existing military balance of power in the region and make China pay a "net effect" for its behaviour -- should it continue to pursue an aggressive course of actions -- by engaging more actively with Southeast Asian partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically analyses an intuitive and influential conceptual framework by which to understand state strategy in territorial conflicts. According to this framework, a state in a territorial dispute can pursue one of three general strategies: threaten or use force; offer territorial concessions; or delay. This article argues that it is problematic to regard these three candidate strategies as mutually exclusive. It is argued that not only can a strategy of escalation be compatible with one of delay, but many uses of force can be employed instrumentally in service of delaying. The framework, this article contends, does not so much capture "strategy" as it does certain aspects--or outcomes--of strategy, which while appropriate for certain analytical tasks is less so for others. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident is examined and China's strategy during the event is scrutinized with a view towards assessing the strengths and weaknesses of applying the framework to an analysis of narrower scope. Lastly, it is argued that a framework for conceptualizing state strategy in territorial disputes should not be confined to three alternatives; it should be more broadly constructed, allowing for more nuance and taking seriously all the domains of statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia's new president, Joko Widodo, is new to foreign affairs and seemingly has little interest in diplomacy, a marked contrast with his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who sought a role as an international statesman. Instead, Jokowi--as he prefers to be known--has declared that he will focus on domestic affairs as part of a broad reform programme, with a particular emphasis on strengthening Indonesia's maritime infrastructure and reasserting the authority of the state. However, an activist presidency in these areas, even if intended only as a domestic effort, will create unintended foreign policy challenges for Indonesia because the country's economic and maritime interests are so closely intertwined with those of its neighbours. This article examines Jokowi's statements on foreign affairs, offers a survey of his foreign affairs advisers and places the president in the country's historical and political context. It then examines potential flashpoints in Indonesia's relationships with its neighbours over Jokowi's agenda. It argues that under Jokowi, foreign policy is likely to become less clear, less conciliatory and less cooperative, with negative consequences for Indonesian leadership in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article serves as an introduction to the South China Sea dispute, as well as the themes and challenges highlighted by articles in this special issue. It draws attention to the complexity of a dispute that is no longer just about territory but also broader maritime rights, an evolving maritime regime, resources, and increasingly, the role of China as a rising power in East Asia vis-à-vis the United States as the status quo power. It especially highlights how the intersection of US-China issues with what has historically been a regional dispute has significantly raised the stakes for all concerned. It is the conclusion of contributing authors that mismanagement of the South China Sea will carry high, even unacceptable, costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This survey of official and quasi-official Chinese-language naval literature provides some new insights regarding Beijing's evolving strategy in the South China Sea. Most importantly - and contrary to conventional wisdom - a surprising diversity of viewpoint is evident in Chinese naval circles that likely reflects the wider debate among Chinese strategists more generally. Thus, it is important to note that a major theme in many of these writings is the need for Beijing to adopt a cautious and compromising policy. Other themes revealed in this literature include a distinct threat perception, as well as concern that China could be cut out of the resource benefits of the South China Sea. Finally, a troubling pattern of escalation is evident in the literature with writings after mid-2010 assuming a disturbingly vitriolic character, perhaps even suggesting that Beijing's military policy in the South China Sea could take an ominous turn in the future. The final point should raise some major questions regarding the present direction of US policy in the region. As the US is looking to "step up its game" in the South China Sea area, Washington (and other regional actors) must realize that the "game" may develop in a variety of destabilizing ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The South China Sea, and the Spratly Islands in particular, have become the focus of tension between the uncertain limits of China's rise and the discomfort of its Southeast Asian neighbours at the prospect of becoming China's backyard. The regional concerns of Southeast Asia overlap with the global concerns of the United States. The tension has been reframed by the global crisis of economic uncertainty that began in 2008 and sharpened by rhetorical confrontations in 2010. Because of the limited utility and adverse consequences of decisive unilateral action by any party, the dispute is likely to continue as a symbol of discord until it is defused by multilateral guidelines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses Vietnamese strategies to constrain China in the South China Sea. It tests Brantly Womack's theory of asymmetry as a framework for analysing bilateral relations. Mature asymmetry exists when the weaker state gives deference to the more powerful state in return for the stronger state's recognition of the weaker state's autonomy. Vietnam attempts to achieve this balance through a process of "struggle and cooperation" with China on key issue areas. Vietnam pursues three strategies to manage its relations with China: codification of bilateral relations through high-level visits by party and state leaders; enmeshment of China in a web of cooperative relations including economic ties; and self-help, particularly military modernization. This article analyses the bilateral mechanisms that structure political, economic and defence relations. The party mechanisms include summit meetings, exchange visits by party commissions and ideological seminars. State-to-state relations are managed by a Joint Steering Committee at deputy prime minister level and comprise a dense network of ministerial exchanges. Defence relations are managed at ministerial level and include senior high-level visits and a range of defence cooperation activities including joint ship patrols and naval port visits. The article concludes with a discussion of tensions arising from territorial and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. In summary, the "tyranny of geography" dictates to Vietnam that it judiciously apply the levers of cooperation and struggle through various party state, military and multilateral structures in order to better manage its relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unresolved maritime claims to all, or parts, of the South China Sea involve Vietnam, Malaysia. the Philippines. Brunei, Taiwan, and China, and have hindered the development of the hydrocarbon resources there. Rising oil prices and China's voracious appetite for energy have stimulated greater interest in the exploitation of the area's oil reserves. Despite the uncertainty, ASEAN countries have involved energy companies in exploration and drilling in their respective claims. Cooperation arrangements between national oil companies including Chinese have been negotiated which hold out the prospect of greater security, even in the absence of a settlement of the maritime claims. Energy cooperation may stabilize the South China Sea providing a secure operating environment for oil exploitation. In time, the way could be prepared for further steps which would involve the claimants in negotiations over a resolution of the maritime claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the positive and negative aspects of the Chinese U-shaped line (maritime boundary) in the South China Sea as well as certain points of interest that are more ambivalent. Positive aspects of the line include the observation that the line is not an attempt by both Taipei and Beijing to absorb international boundaries within a national framework. Negative aspects of the line include the burden it creates on the Chinese navy. It also addresses questions such as the nature of the relationship between the U-shaped line and Chinese Communist Exclusive Economic Zones, arguing that the non-contradictory relationship must be seen as a form of double insurance that both Taipei and Beijing are investing in. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vietnam's interests in the South China Sea may be divided into traditional national security interests, and interests linked to the broader category of human security. This article examines Vietnam's policy in the South China Sea and its use of the Law of the Sea. Vietnam has doggedly upheld its claim to the whole of the Paracel and Spratly areas (Hoang Sa and Truong Sa) and has spent considerable resources in modernizing its naval and air forces. However, there seems to be a move away from a narrow focus on national security to a more broad-based concern for human security. This is connected with a trend towards a greater regional, less nationalist approach, which may give Vietnam a key role in resolving the multiple disputes in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the development of Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in the South China Sea during 1995-98. Emerging trends; Security and stability issues arising from the dispute; Basis of the claims made by China in the South China Sea; Dispute over the Mischief Reef; Personalities behind China's South China Sea policy making; Post-independence security environment in the Philippines.

Considers the impact of an informal initiative which promote maritime co-operation for ocean governance in the South China Sea, while discussing how jurisdictional disputes in the region is analyzed. Details on the dispute concerning sovereignty over the Spartly Islands and maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea; Failure to question basic assumptions in analyzing the disputes; Reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.