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A multidisciplinary wound care team was developed at the Medical College of Pennsylvania Hospital in 1993 to standardize wound management, appropriately allocate resources, prevent the occurrence of hospital-acquired decubitus ulcers, and effectively manage existing pressure ulcers. This report presents 4 years of prevalence survey data (n = 690 patients over 4 years), which affords an outcome analysis regarding the efficacy of the multidisciplinary wound care team. A significant reduction in the number of patients with pressure ulcers, hospital acquired pressure ulcers, and patients with hospital acquired ulcers occurred. There was, also, a significant improvement in skin integrity documentation, and in the implementation of nutritional assessments. These findings suggest that the multidisciplinary wound care team has been an effective means of gaining some control of decubitus ulcers, which are associated with increased patient morbidity and have an adverse economic impact on hospitals.

It is a common practice for anesthesia to substitute for one another, especially for short breaks during long surgical procedures. The assets and liabilities of this practice of relief have not been examined previously. In the course of gathering 1,089 reports of preventable errors and failures associated with anesthesia management, we identified 96 which involved a relief anesthetist. This subset was examined in search of common characteristics and patterns of cause and discovery of errors. In 28 incidents, the relief anesthetist discovered an error or the cause of an error. In 10 incidents, the process of relief was identified as having contributed to the commission of an error. Although 70 of the 1,089 incidents were associated with substantive negative outcomes, e.g., death, cardiac arrest, or extended ICU stay, none of those incidents was caused by a relieving anesthetist. There is a strong implication that relief is beneficial more often than not even aside from the presumed beneficial effect on the vigilance of the primary anesthetist (the latter effect was outside the scope of this study). From the descriptions of the causes and discoveries of errors in these relief-related incidents, guidance can be drawn for the safe and effective conduct of the intraoperative exchange of anesthesia personnel.

We evaluated and compared the acute hemodynamic effects of perfluorooctylbromide-100% (PFOB), a fluorocarbon emulsified in lecithin without pluronic-F68 (F68), to those of a standard iodinated contrast agent, renografin-76% (R76), and Fluosol-DA 20% (Fluosol), a fluorocarbon emulsified in part by F68. Five open chest dogs were instrumented to evaluate hemodynamic changes after iv injection of PFOB (1 ml.1 g/kg) and R76 (1 ml.0.37 g of iodine/kg). Fluosol (1 ml.0.2 g/kg) was given to two of the five dogs at the end of their study. Fluosol caused transient hemodynamic collapse in both dogs. R76 caused the known transient effect of hypotension (-15.4 +/- 3.3%) followed by hypertension (6.5 +/- 2.7%) and an increase in aortic flow (29.3 +/- 3.9% at 30 sec). PFOB caused minimal, clinically insignificant decrease in aortic flow (4 +/- 1% at 10 sec).

A modified critical-incident analysis technique was used in a retrospective examination of the characteristics of human error and equipment failure in anesthetic practice. The objective was to uncover patterns of frequently occurring incidents that are in need of careful prospective investigation. Forty-seven interviews were conducted with staff and resident anesthesiologists at one urban teaching institution, and descriptions of 359 preventable incidents were obtained. Twenty-three categories of details from these descriptions were subjected to computer-aided analysis for trends and patterns. Most of the preventable incidents involved human error (82 per cent), with breathing-circuit disconnections, inadvertent changes in gas flow, and drug-syringe errors being frequent problems. Overt equipment failures constituted only 14 per cent of the total number of preventable incidents, but equipment design was indictable in many categories of human error, as were inadequate experience and insufficient familiarity with equipment or with the specific surgical procedure. Other factors frequently associated with incidents were inadequate communication among personnel, haste or lack of precaution, and distraction. Results from multi-hospital studies based on the methodology developed could be used for more objective determination of priorities and planning of specific investments for decreasing the risk associated with anesthesia.