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This research paper seeks to examine the importance of the 2008 Olympic Games in regards to China's foreign policy options and subsequent future behavior, with particular emphasis placed on the Taiwan issue. The primary question addressed by this paper is whether or not China will use the 2008 Olympic Games as a means of demonstrating a responsible power identity. This paper asserts three hypotheses. First, China could forgo any gains to be made by hosting the Olympic Games and take defensive-oriented action against Taiwan as a means of protecting important national interests. Second, China could use the games as a propaganda tool and take offensive-action against Taiwan as a means of pursuing an expansionist agenda. Lastly, China could choose to take no action and use the Games to demonstrate a responsible power identity. These hypotheses are tested through three historical case studies: the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and the 1980 Moscow Games; the 1936 Berlin Games and the aggressive German expansion that began shortly thereafter; and the 1964 Tokyo Games and the 1988 Seoul Games in that both Japan and South Korea used the Games to build identities. This paper finds that although the third hypothesis is most preferable, certain factors might push China towards selecting an option closer to hypothesis one. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 22, 2008, Taiwan elected a new President hence not only its domestic politics but also its relations with China have entered into a new phase. Taiwan's new President Ma Ying-jeou suggested and proposed a series of political standing points and views which are quite different with those of former President Chen Shui-bian. Compared with Chen, Ma expresses more open views on many issues, particularly on his cross-strait policy. For instance, he re-started the cross-strait negotiations which had been stopped for several years under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Chen Shui-bian's rule. Taiwan therefore signed many historical agreements with China. Ma Ying-jeou suggests having more controllable and stable cross-strait relations under the insistence of Taiwan's sovereignty. However, although the cross-strait relations seem to progress towards a more positive direction, there are still some points that need to be clarified and investigated. The most outstanding point is China's attitudes to Taiwan; that is to say, China apparently separates political issues from economic ones. Therefore, this paper attempts to investigate cross-strait relations by means of examining their contacts and exchanges on trade, governmental, social and security issues. That is, the author wants to examine whether Ma's policies have changed the cross-strait relations and the prospects of cross-strait relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military threat was intensively used by China during Taiwan's presidential elections but is widely argued as counterproductive because it didn't prevent pro-independence candidates from winning the elections. To explain the logic of China's military threat and outcomes of the elections, this paper develops a formal framework in which China and the incumbent party has better information about the state of the world than voters and non-incumbent party. China's threat is interpreted as a way to transfer information to voters. Although she doesn't prevent the pro-independence party from being elected, China successfully prevents the winning party from declaring formal Taiwanese independence. In this way, China is always better off by issuing threats. In general, this paper not only attempts to improve our understanding of Taiwan Straight confrontation but also tries to shed new insight on the study of military threat in International Relations. It also offers a concrete game theoretic model to illustrate Putnam's two-level game metaphor. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]