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This study attempts to investigate whether prospect theory or expected utility theory accounts better for states’ decision on accepting or rejecting the mediation offers from IOs or states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the consistency with which the Supreme Court employs constitutional comparativism in its decisions by looking at which countries and international organizations the Court references, across what issues, and how from 1995 to 2003. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have argued that security institutions help provide legitimacy or aid in signaling benign intent to foreign audiences. However, organizational decisions reflect member states’ preferences over foreign policy outcomes. Given that decisions reflect the preferences of potentially biased states, it is unclear when audiences will view decisions as legitimate or when leaders will choose to consult these institutions. I present a formal model of strategic information transmission between an international institution, a foreign policy maker, and a domestic audience. The institution serves as a device to inform the audience about the likely outcomes of their leader’s actions. The model demonstrates that leaders have incentives to consult “conservative” institutions, as their support convinces audiences that they should also support the policy. Leaders face incentives to avoid the disapproval of more “activist” institutions, as their opposition will tend to induce public opposition. I discuss the implications for three areas of international relations scholarship: the determinants of procedural multilateralism, multilateralism and public opinion, and institutional design. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper develops a model of bilateral bargaining with appealing to an international institution as an outside option. The results show that the expectation about the decision reached by the institution significantly affects the bargaining outcome. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional creation and design; international bargaining; two-stage process; European Development Fund ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the informal mechanisms for influencing policy used by powerful states in international organizations. The distribution of formal voting rights in international organizations rarely mirrors the distribution of geo-political power among the member-states, yet the powerful states still participate in the organizations, and frequently manage to capture a disproportionate share of the gains to be had through cooperation. I argue that it is often the informal mechanisms and procedures, existing outside the formal decision-making rules and procedures, that allow powerful states to exert their influence in the international organizations in which they participate. This paper identifies the various informal influence mechanisms available to powerful states, and then seeks to explain the conditions for their usage in these organizations. Focusing on the interaction of the United States and the United Nations General Assembly, this paper provides qualitative and quantitative analysis of the effect that U.S. pressure had on the policies and organization of the United Nations. Its conclusions help fill the gap between theories of international relations focusing on the role of relative power, and those focusing on the benefits and behavior of international institutions. By understanding how powerful states utilize their influence through these informal mechanisms, we can get a much greater understanding for the underlying dynamics of powerful state participation in these organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]