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Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) develop a formal model of common law evolution. They show that more polarized preferences on the bench induce greater refinement of the common law. Specifically, they predict more polarized courts will distinguish more precedents while adjudicating contemporary disputes. I provide an empirical test of that prediction. Using data on total precedents distinguished, as well as concurring opinions filed, by the U.S. Supreme Court in conjunction with a recent measure of ideological polarization on that court, I demonstrate, empirically, that increases in ideological polarization are associated with greater numbers of precedents distinguished, greater numbers of precedents distinguished per case, greater numbers of concurring opinions filed, and greater numbers of concurring opinions per case filed. The substantive significance of this finding is substantial. This result provides direct evidence in support of the claim that more polarized courts lead to more refined, nuanced common law. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central concept of interest in judicial politics literature is the content of Supreme Court opinions. Theories of bargaining, judicial hierarchy, the separation of powers, and judicial appointments all make predictions about, or at least have implications for, the content of judicial opinions. However, because of the qualitative complexity of judicial opinions, the field has not been able to produce reliable, systematic measures of judicial opinion content. In Clark and Lauderdale (2008) we develop a model of opinion location in “doctrine space” that uses information about which precedents are cited to support an opinion. In this paper, we extend that model to capture more features of the opinion-writing process, such as the selection of which precedents to cite and the existence of multiple dimensions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of a state of war on deference to the executive branch by federal appellate judges is examined. This study concludes the mid-level federal courts are actually more skeptical of the executive in non-criminal cases during wartime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests the formal model of congressional-judicial relations developed in Clark (2007). It shows that court-curbing legislation serves as a link between the public and judicial elites, and shows how Congress can mediate between those actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper demonstrates that the ideological of panel judges affects the probability of en banc review and that panels are less likely to trigger en banc review if they make decisions that run against their perceived ideological biases. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]