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I INTRODUCTION The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ('Charter') is one of now three Bills of Rights in Australia. The Charter is based on what [...], This article revisits s 32(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). In particular, the article examines the potential ability of the courts to deploy s 32(1) to reach 'strained' constructions and 'depart' from legislative intention. This article disputes the following three propositions from the post-Momcilovic v The Queenjurisprudence in the Victorian Court of Appeal. Firstly, s 32(1) does not allow for a departure from the 'ordinary meaning' of a statutory provision (an ordinary meaning usually denotes a literal and grammatical, ie not strained, meaning). Secondly, s 32(1) does not allow for a departure from, or overriding of, legislative intention upon enactment. Thirdly, the qualifications placed on s 32(1) are such that it will not usually permit the 'reading in' or 'reading down' of words as techniques used to reach strained constructions. The article also argues that issues as to s 32(1)'s strength and methodology appear to have been conflated in the recent jurisprudence. It concludes that as the jurisprudence currently stands, s 32(1)'s ability to reach strained constructions is weaker than the principle of legality. This is inconsistent with s 32(1) being at least equal to the principle of legality.

The term 'principle of legality' has most commonly been associated with one particular common law interpretive principle--the presumption that Parliament does not intend to interfere with fundamental common law rights, [...]

The power of Victorian government agencies to refuse to process voluminous Freedom of Information ('FOI') requests is contained in s 25A(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic). During [...]

I INTRODUCTION In the present 'age of statutes', Parliament frequently enacts legislation which confers discretionary powers on administrative and judicial decision-makers. These are commonly known as statutory discretions. Francis Bennion [...], Parliament frequently enacts legislation which confers broad discretionary powers on decision-makers. Such statutory discretions are not at large--they are confined by principles of statutory interpretation. In Victoria, the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ('Charter') has a role to play in interpreting statutes. Section 32(1) of the Charter provides that so far as it is possible consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights. A question therefore arises as to whether discretions conferred by Victorian statutory provisions must be interpreted so that they may only be exercised compatibly with the human rights protected by the Charter. This article explores the issue. The answer is not as straightforward as it might first seem.