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Simon Rippon, revising an earlier argument against kidney sales, now claims that offers involving the performance of invasive acts, when extended to people under pressure, constitute a kind of rights violation, Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands. Since offers involving kidney sales so qualify, Rippon finds prima facie reason to prohibit them. The present article levels four independent objections to Rippon's argument: the account of Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands implausibly condemns kidney donation as much as kidney sales; the normative importance of having autonomous veto control over bodily incursions does not plausibly underwrite a right to not be extended invasive offers under pressure; Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands can easily be transformed into innocuous offers; and the prohibition has greater welfare costs than Rippon acknowledges., (© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For commercial re-use, please contact reprints@oup.com for reprints and translation rights for reprints. All other permissions can be obtained through our RightsLink service via the Permissions link on the article page on our site—for further information please contact journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Much evidence suggests e-cigarettes are substantially less harmful than combustible cigarettes. Assuming this is true, we analyze the ethical case for a policy of e-cigarette availability (ECA) as a tobacco harm reduction strategy. ECA involves making e-cigarettes available to allow smokers to switch to them, and informing smokers of the lower risks of e-cigarettes vis-à-vis smoking. After suggesting that utilitarian/consequentialist considerations do not provide an adequate ethical analysis, we analyze ECA using two other ethical frameworks. First, ECA is supported by a public health ethics framework. ECA is a population-level intervention consistent with respecting individual autonomy by using the least restrictive means to accomplish public health goals, and it supports equity and justice. Second, ECA is supported by four principles that form a biomedical ethics framework. By reducing smokers' health risks and not harming them, ECA fulfills principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. Because ECA allows smokers to make informed health decisions for themselves, it fulfills the principle requiring respect for persons and their autonomy. Here, we consider whether nicotine addiction and thus ECA undermine autonomy, and also discuss the ethical warrant for special protections for youth. Finally, ECA can also advance justice by providing a harm reduction alternative for disadvantaged groups that disproportionately bear the devastating consequences of smoking. Policies of differential taxation of cigarettes and e-cigarettes can facilitate adoption of less harmful alternatives by those economically disadvantaged. We conclude that public health and biomedical ethics frameworks are mutually reinforcing and supportive of ECA as a tobacco harm reduction strategy. Implications: Making e-cigarettes and information about them available is supported as ethical from multiple ethical perspectives., (© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco. All rights reserved.For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

In July 2014, the roboticist Ronald Arkin suggested that child sex robots could be used to treat those with paedophilic predilections in the same way that methadone is used to treat heroin addicts. Taking this onboard, it would seem that there is reason to experiment with the regulation of this technology. But most people seem to disagree with this idea, with legal authorities in both the UK and US taking steps to outlaw such devices. In this article, I subject these different regulatory attitudes to critical scrutiny. In doing so, I make three main contributions to the debate. First, I present a framework for thinking about the regulatory options that we confront when dealing with child sex robots. Secondly, I argue that there is a prima facie case for restrictive regulation, but that this is contingent on whether Arkin's hypothesis has a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Thirdly, I argue that Arkin's hypothesis probably does not have a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Consequently, we should proceed with utmost caution when it comes to this technology., (© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press; All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Focusing on the UK as a case study, this article argues that having the choice to enter into an international commercial surrogacy arrangement can be harmful, but that neither legalisation nor punitive restriction offers an adequate way to reduce this risk. Whether or not having certain options can harm individuals is central to current debates about the sale of organs. We assess and apply the arguments from that debate to international commercial surrogacy, showing that simply having the option to enter into a commercial surrogacy arrangement can harm potential vendors individually and collectively, particularly given its sexed dimension. We reject the argument that legalizing commercial surrogacy in the UK could reduce international exploitation. We also find that a punitive approach towards intended parents utilizing commercial rather than altruistic services is inappropriate. Drawing on challenges in the regulation of forced marriage and female genital cutting, we propose that international collaboration towards control of commercial surrogacy is a better strategy for preserving the delicate balancing of surrogate mothers' protection and children's welfare in UK law., (© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press; All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Objective: The widespread sale of complementary medicines in community pharmacy raises important questions regarding the responsibilities of pharmacists when selling complementary medicines. This study reviews the academic literature that explores a pharmacist's responsibilities when selling complementary medicines., Methods: International Pharmaceutical Abstracts, Embase, PubMed, Cinahl, PsycINFO and Philosopher's index databases were searched for articles written in English and published between 1995 and 2017. Empirical studies discussing pharmacists' practices or perceptions, consumers' expectations and normative studies discussing ethical perspectives or proposing ethical frameworks related to pharmacists' responsibilities in selling complementary medicines were included in the review., Key Findings: Fifty-eight studies met the inclusion criteria. The majority of the studies discussing the responsibilities of pharmacists selling complementary medicines had an empirical focus. Pharmacists and consumers identified counselling and ensuring safe use of complementary medicines as the primary responsibilities of pharmacists. No formal ethical framework is explicitly employed to describe the responsibilities of pharmacists selling complementary medicines. To the degree any ethical framework is employed, a number of papers implicitly rely on principlism. The studies discussing the ethical perspectives of selling complementary medicines mainly describe the ethical conflict between a pharmacist's business and health professional role. No attempt is made to provide guidance on appropriate ways to resolve the conflict., Conclusion: There is a lack of explicit normative advice in the existing literature regarding the responsibilities of pharmacists selling complementary medicines. This review identifies the need to develop a detailed practice-specific ethical framework to guide pharmacists regarding their responsibilities when selling complementary medicines., (© 2018 Royal Pharmaceutical Society.)

Luke Semrau argues that the documented harms of existing organ markets do not undermine the case for establishing regulated systems of paid kidney donation. He offers two arguments in support of this conclusion. First, Semrau argues that the harms of kidney selling are straightforwardly amenable to regulatory solution. Second, Semrau argues that even in existing black markets, sellers would likely have experienced greater harm if the option of selling a kidney were not available. This commentary challenges both of Semrau's claims. I argue that there is no reason to believe that kidney sellers benefit from the current black market trade in organs, and highlight a number of potential issues regarding the effectiveness and feasibility of Semrau's proposed market regulations., (© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

This article argues that the English legislative regime is ineffective in regulating international surrogacy, particularly with regard to commercial payments. It suggests that if English law views surrogacy as exploitative, we have a responsibility to protect women both in England and abroad, and the only way to do so effectively is to create a domestic system of regulation that caters adequately for the demand in this country. This requires a system of authorisation for surrogacy before it is undertaken; ex-post facto examinations of agreements completed in other jurisdictions, after the child is already living with the commissioning parents, cannot be seen as an acceptable compromise, as authorisation will inevitably be granted in the child's best interests., (© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Because it is often argued that surrogacy should not be treated as contractual, the question arises in which terms this practice might then be couched. In this article, I argue that a phenomenology of surrogacy centering on the notion of trust provides a description that is illuminating from the moral point of view. My thesis is that surrogacy establishes a complex and extended reproductive unit--the "surrogacy triad" consisting of the surrogate mother, the child, and the intending parents--whose constituents are bound together by mutual trustful commitments. Even though a trust-based approach does not provide an ultimate answer to whether surrogacy should be sanctioned or prohibited, it allows for at least some practical suggestions. In particular, I will argue that, under certain conditions, surrogacy is tenable within familial or other significant relationships, and I will stress the necessity of acknowledging the new relationships and moral commitments that result from this practice., (© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Many still oppose legalizing markets in human organs on the grounds that they are morally repugnant. I will argue in this paper that the repugnance felt by some persons towards sales of human organs is insufficient to justify their prohibition. Yet this rejection of the view that markets in human organs should be prohibited because some persons find them to be morally repugnant does not imply that persons' feelings of distress at the possibility of organ sales are irrational. Eduardo Rivera-Lopez argues that such instinctive distress is an appropriate response to the (rationally defensible) perception that certain kinds of arguments that are offered in favor of legalizing organ sales are "in an important sense, illegitimate." Having argued that repugnance should not ground the prohibition of markets in human organs, I will also argue that the moral distress that some feel towards certain arguments that favor such markets is not rationally defensible, either., (© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Introduction: Sexual health is the result of a complex interplay between social, relational, intrapsychic, and medical aspects. Sexual health care professionals (SHCP) may face several ethical issues. Some SHCP prescribe Internet pornography for both diagnosis and therapy and some others directly sell vibrators and sex aids in their offices., Methods: Five scientists, with different perspectives, debate the ethical aspects in the clinical practice of the SHCP., Main Outcome Measure: To give to the Journal of Sexual Medicine's reader enough data to form her/his own opinion on an important ethical topic., Results: Expert #1, who is Controversy's Section Editor, together with two coworkers, expert psycho-sexologists, reviews data from literature regarding the use of the Internet in the SHCP. Expert #2 argues that licensed professionals, who treat sexual problems, should not sell sexual aids such as vibrators, lubricants, erotica, and instructional DVDs to their clients. On the other hand, Expert #3 is in favor of the possibility, for the patient, to directly purchase sexual aids from the SHCP in order to avoid embarrassment, confusion, and non-adherence to treatment., Conclusion: Evidence and intelligence would suggest that both the Internet (in selected subjects) and the vibrators (in the correct clinical setting), with the due efforts in counseling the patients and tailoring their therapy, are not-harmful, excellent tools in promoting sexual health., (© 2012 International Society for Sexual Medicine.)

The current commercial health information technology (HIT) arena encompasses a number of competing firms that provide electronic health applications to hospitals, clinical practices, and other healthcare-related entities. Such applications collect, store, and analyze patient information. Some vendors incorporate contract language whereby purchasers of HIT systems, such as hospitals and clinics, must indemnify vendors for malpractice or personal injury claims, even if those events are not caused or fostered by the purchasers. Some vendors require contract clauses that force HIT system purchasers to adopt vendor-defined policies that prevent the disclosure of errors, bugs, design flaws, and other HIT-software-related hazards. To address this issue, the AMIA Board of Directors appointed a Task Force to provide an analysis and insights. Task Force findings and recommendations include: patient safety should trump all other values; corporate concerns about liability and intellectual property ownership may be valid but should not over-ride all other considerations; transparency and a commitment to patient safety should govern vendor contracts; institutions are duty-bound to provide ethics education to purchasers and users, and should commit publicly to standards of corporate conduct; and vendors, system purchasers, and users should encourage and assist in each others' efforts to adopt best practices. Finally, the HIT community should re-examine whether and how regulation of electronic health applications could foster improved care, public health, and patient safety.

James Stacy Taylor advances a thorough argument for the legalization of markets in current (live) human kidneys. The market is seemly the most abhorrent type of market, a market where the least well-off sell part of their body to the most well off. Though rigorously defended overall, his arguments concerning exploitation are thin. I examine a number of prominent bioethicists' account of exploitation: most importantly, Ruth Sample's exploitation as degradation. I do so in the context of Taylor's argument, with the aim of buttressing Taylor's position that a regulated kidney market is morally allowable. I argue that Sample fails to provide normative grounds consistent with her claim that exploitation is wrong. I then reformulate her account for consistency and plausibility. Still, this seemingly more plausible view does not show that Taylor's regulated kidney market is prohibitively exploitative of impoverished persons. I tack into place one more piece of support for Taylor's conclusion. (wc. 148).

In this paper I develop and defend my arguments in favor of the moral permissibility of a legal market for human body parts in response to the criticisms that have been leveled at them by Paul M. Hughes and Samuel J. Kerstein.

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective-and morally justified-means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where "market-place morality" is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves.

This paper canvasses recent arguments in favor of commercial markets in human transplant kidneys, raising objections to those arguments on grounds of the role of injustice, exploitation, and coercion in compromising the autonomy of those most likely to sell a kidney, namely, the least well off members of society.

As the gap between the need for and supply of human organs continues to widen, the aim of securing additional sources of these "gifts of the body" has become a seemingly overriding moral imperative, one that could-and some argue, should-override the widespread ban on organ markets. As a medical practice, organ transplantation entails the inherent risk that one human being, a donor, will become little more than a means to the end of healing for another human being and that he or she will come to have a purely instrumental value. With the establishment of organ markets, not only will the harms of instrumentalization be a reality-the ends of medicine will be further compromised and confused.

This article concerns the morality of establishing regulated kidney markets in an effort to reduce the chronic shortage of kidneys for transplant. The article tries to rebut the view, recently defended by James Taylor, that if we hold autonomy to be intrinsically valuable, then we should be in favor of such markets. The article then argues that, under current conditions, the buying and selling of organs in regulated markets would sometimes violate two Kantian principles that are seen as moral constraints. One principle forbids expressing disrespect for the dignity of humanity; the other forbids treating others merely as means. In light of the moral danger posed by regulated markets, the article advocates an alternative way of diminishing the current organ shortage, namely opt-out systems of cadaveric organ donation.

This article argues that an isolated embryonic stem cell basically represents a cultural artifact that has no equivalent to cells of the embryo, and that it is likely that the isolation of adult stem cells has a similar consequence. An isolated stem cell could thus be distinguished as something other than the stem cell existing as part of a human body. Since isolation of stem cells implies modification, product patents should, where the results carry enough novelty, inventive step, and potential for industrial application, as a matter of principle be a viable option for patent authorities. Questions of morality, which may affect the patentability, should also be viewed in light of the distinction between isolated result and body part. At the same time, it is essential that patent authorities do not accept broad patent claims that will be detrimental to research. Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest is found at the end of this article.

This essay argues that medical innovation proceeds most efficiently and effectively within a free market economy. Medical innovation is an expression of the technological project: the program through which we seek to control nature, to improve the quality and quantity of life. The Technological Project proceeds most efficiently with a free market economy because such a market both promotes competition and encourages innovation. As I argue, the market is a discovery process in which alternatives are tried, tested, and selected by consumer's choices. The alternatives to a free market-primarily central planning and a heavily regulated market-fail adequately to encourage medical innovation.