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We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world examples.

All over the world, constitutional theory has been experiencing developments which have been studied under the rubric of dialogic constitutionalism , dialogic justice or dialogic judicial review. These novelties seem to have the capacity to challenge traditional ideas and assumptions concerning the system of separation of powers, the organization of checks and balances, and more particularly judicial review. This article critically assesses the recent development of this dialogic practice through examples mainly coming from Latin America. It maintains that, beside the genuine reasons we have to celebrate the coming of dialogic constitutionalism, we also have reasons for concern, particularly if we are not willing to modify the basic structure of the system of checks and balances on which it is usually based. Fil: Gargarella, Roberto. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina