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Background Klebsiella pneumoniae is a human, animal, and environmental commensal and a leading cause of nosocomial infections, which are often caused by multiresistant strains. We evaluate putative sources of K. pneumoniae that are carried by and infect hospital patients. Methods We conducted a 6-month survey on 2 hematology wards at Addenbrooke’s Hospital, Cambridge, United Kingdom, in 2015 to isolate K. pneumoniae from stool, blood, and the environment. We conducted cross-sectional surveys of K. pneumoniae from 29 livestock farms, 97 meat products, the hospital sewer, and 20 municipal wastewater treatment plants in the East of England between 2014 and 2015. Isolates were sequenced and their genomes compared. Results Klebsiella pneumoniae was isolated from stool of 17/149 (11%) patients and 18/922 swabs of their environment, together with 1 bloodstream infection during the study and 4 others over a 24-month period. Each patient carried 1 or more lineages that was unique to them, but 2 broad environmental contamination events and patient–environment transmission were identified. Klebsiella pneumoniae was isolated from cattle, poultry, hospital sewage, and 12/20 wastewater treatment plants. There was low genetic relatedness between isolates from patients/their hospital environment vs isolates from elsewhere. Identical genes encoding cephalosporin resistance were carried by isolates from humans/environment and elsewhere but were carried on different plasmids. Conclusion We identified no patient-to-patient transmission and no evidence for livestock as a source of K. pneumoniae infecting humans. However, our findings reaffirm the importance of the hospital environment as a source of K. pneumoniae associated with serious human infection., A One Health genomic survey of Klebsiella pneumoniae demonstrated transmission between patients and their ward environment but no evidence to implicate livestock as a source of K. pneumoniae or their mobile genetic elements encoding antibiotic resistance.

BACKGROUND: The spread of USA300 methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) across the United States resulted in an epidemic of infections. In Europe, only sporadic cases or small clusters of USA300 infections are described, and its prevalence in England is unknown. We conducted prospective surveillance for USA300 in the east of England. METHODS: We undertook a 12-month prospective observational cohort study of all individuals with MRSA isolated from community and hospital samples submitted to a microbiology laboratory. At least 1 MRSA isolate from each individual underwent whole-genome sequencing. USA300 was identified on the basis of sequence analysis, and phylogenetic comparisons were made between these and USA300 genomes from the United States. RESULTS: Between April 2012 and April 2013, we sequenced 2283 MRSA isolates (detected during carriage screening and in clinical samples) from 1465 individuals. USA300 was isolated from 24 cases (1.6%). Ten cases (42%) had skin and soft tissue infection, and 2 cases had invasive disease. Phylogenetic analyses identified multiple introductions and household transmission of USA300. CONCLUSIONS: Use of a diagnostic laboratory as a sentinel for surveillance has identified repeated introductions of USA300 in eastern England in 2012-2013, with evidence for limited transmission. Our results show how systematic surveillance could provide an early warning of strain emergence and dissemination.

BACKGROUND: Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has typically been used to confirm or refute hospital/ward outbreaks of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) identified through routine practice. However, appropriately targeted WGS strategies that identify routinely "undetectable" transmission remain the ultimate aim. METHODS: WGS of MRSA isolates sent to a regional microbiological laboratory was performed as part of a 12-month prospective observational study. Phylogenetic analyses identified a genetically related cluster of E-MRSA15 isolated from patients registered to the same general practice (GP) surgery. This led to an investigation to identify epidemiological links, find additional cases, and determine potential for ongoing transmission. RESULTS: We identified 15 MRSA-positive individuals with 27 highly related MRSA isolates who were linked to the GP surgery, 2 of whom died with MRSA bacteremia. Of the 13 cases that were further investigated, 11 had attended a leg ulcer/podiatry clinic. Cases lacked epidemiological links to hospitals, suggesting that transmission occurred elsewhere. Environmental and staff screening at the GP surgery did not identify an ongoing source of infection. CONCLUSIONS: Surveillance in the United Kingdom shows that the proportion of MRSA bacteremias apportioned to hospitals is decreasing, suggesting the need for greater focus on the detection of MRSA outbreaks and transmission in the community. This case study confirms that the typically nosocomial lineage (E-MRSA15) can transmit within community settings. Our study exemplifies the continued importance of WGS in detecting outbreaks, including those which may be missed by routine practice, and suggests that universal WGS of bacteremia isolates may help detect outbreaks in low-surveillance settings.

BACKGROUND: Klebsiella pneumoniae is a human, animal, and environmental commensal and a leading cause of nosocomial infections, which are often caused by multiresistant strains. We evaluate putative sources of K. pneumoniae that are carried by and infect hospital patients. METHODS: We conducted a 6-month survey on 2 hematology wards at Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, United Kingdom, in 2015 to isolate K. pneumoniae from stool, blood, and the environment. We conducted cross-sectional surveys of K. pneumoniae from 29 livestock farms, 97 meat products, the hospital sewer, and 20 municipal wastewater treatment plants in the East of England between 2014 and 2015. Isolates were sequenced and their genomes compared. RESULTS: Klebsiella pneumoniae was isolated from stool of 17/149 (11%) patients and 18/922 swabs of their environment, together with 1 bloodstream infection during the study and 4 others over a 24-month period. Each patient carried 1 or more lineages that was unique to them, but 2 broad environmental contamination events and patient-environment transmission were identified. Klebsiella pneumoniae was isolated from cattle, poultry, hospital sewage, and 12/20 wastewater treatment plants. There was low genetic relatedness between isolates from patients/their hospital environment vs isolates from elsewhere. Identical genes encoding cephalosporin resistance were carried by isolates from humans/environment and elsewhere but were carried on different plasmids. CONCLUSION: We identified no patient-to-patient transmission and no evidence for livestock as a source of K. pneumoniae infecting humans. However, our findings reaffirm the importance of the hospital environment as a source of K. pneumoniae associated with serious human infection.