1. Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?
- Author
-
William Jack and Jean O. Lanjouw
- Subjects
ECONOMIC LAW ,PRICE LEVELS ,CUSTOMS ,RETURNS TO SCALE ,TAX RATES ,TAX ,FREE MARKET ,WORLD TRADE ,COST INCREASES ,TAX CREDITS ,Marginal product ,Economics ,FAIR ,CONSUMER DEMAND ,INCOME ,MACROECONOMICS ,ADVERTISING ,PRODUCTIVITY ,SALE ,RESEARCH INVESTMENT ,LICENSES ,RAMSEY PRICE ,R&D ,Property rights ,PROCUREMENT ,E-MAIL ,PRICE CONTROL ,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ,Marginal cost ,MARGINAL COST ,COUNTRY MARKETS ,PRICE DISCRIMINATION ,INCOMES ,MONOPOLY PRICE ,MARGINAL COSTS ,Development ,TAX STRUCTURE ,Trade agreement ,SALES ARRANGEMENTS ,PROPERTY RIGHTS ,PRICING MODEL ,INSTITUTION ,NEW PRODUCTS ,DEVELOPING ECONOMY ,ELASTICITY ,ECONOMIC COOPERATION ,PRICE INCREASE ,INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE ,PATENTS ,PRICING POLICIES ,INCOME LEVELS ,COST OF CAPITAL ,LEGAL ISSUES ,MARKETING ,ECONOMIC RENTS ,INNOVATION ,PRICE CONTROLS ,CONSUMERS ,DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ,MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION ,MARGINAL COST PRICING ,DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ,Intellectual property ,DEMAND ELASTICITY ,WTO ,INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ,E-MAIL ADDRESS ,SOCIAL VALUE ,UTILITY FUNCTION ,INCENTIVE EFFECTS ,MANUFACTURING ,POSTAL SERVICE ,TAXATION ,RESULT ,INCOME TAX ,Public economics ,ARBITRAGE ,PRICE STRUCTURES ,MONOPOLY ,BENCHMARK ,USES ,CONSUMER SURPLUS ,REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ,SUPPLIERS ,Incentive ,LICENSE ,PRICE REGULATION ,DIFFERENTIAL PRICING ,INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ,Economics and Econometrics ,FORMAL ANALYSES ,PUBLIC POLICY ,Price discrimination ,INNOVATIONS ,SOCIAL COSTS ,FIXED COSTS ,RAMSEY PRICES ,PUBLIC FINANCE ,SENIOR CITIZEN ,TARGETS ,POSTAL SERVICES ,Accounting ,DAMAGES ,SOCIAL COST ,INNOVATION POLICY ,PRICE STRUCTURE ,SALES ,REGULATORS ,PRICE CEILINGS ,RESULTS ,ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ,INCREASING RETURNS ,MARGINAL REVENUE ,VOTERS ,PROFIT MARGIN ,SAVINGS ,MONOPOLY PRICES ,Marginal utility ,INVENTION ,TAX SYSTEM ,Finance ,MARGINAL UTILITY - Abstract
A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not related to that which will be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the international patent system as embodied in the world trade organization's agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
- Published
- 2005
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