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Standard accounts on Turkey's foreign policy identify Molotov's communication of 1945 (better known as “Stalin's demands”) as the catalyst behind Turkey's post-WWII decision to strain its relations with the USSR and turn to the United States (US) for defense support. The aim here is to complement these accounts which have stressed the military and ideological threat posed by the USSR as the catalyst behind Turkey's foreign policy change, by offering an analysis that explores the conditions of possibility for such change. The aim here is not to question the seriousness of the risks involved in failing to stand firm against the USSR in the immediate post-WWII period. Nor is it to dispute the appropriateness of Turkey's search for “Western” allies at a time when its economic, political and military vulnerabilities were acknowledged by friend and foe alike. The following mediates through accounts that stress the military threat and those that emphasize the ideological threat and presents an analysis that looks into the production of representations of the USSR as a “threat” to Turkey and the context which allowed for the production of such representations of the USSR.

recurred throughout the Cold War. In Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, which builds on earlier contributions to the theory of strategic cooperation by Robert Jervis (1978), Robert Axelrod (1984), and Robert Keohane (1984), Andrew Kydd has formulated the most sophisticated and realistic game theoretic interpretation of trust and mistrust available today. He has also crafted a rationalistic explanation of the origins and decline of the Cold War. Kydd defines "trust" as the belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one's own cooperation. By contrast, "mistrust" is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one's cooperation to returning it (p. 7). Most research in economics, sociology, and political science has used repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games to model trust. In these games, the beliefs and preferences of players are common knowledge, which raises the issue of why trust is needed. Kydd's model of the security dilemma game incorporates uncertainty about the other's preferences and relative power, the advantages of defecting first, the potential losses from being betrayed, and the prospective benefits from conflict (pp. 30-34). Whereas previous models of trust centered on the other party's incentives to cheat, in Kydd's model, actors that place a high value on gaining at the other's expense are not only less trustworthy but also more suspicious of others (p. 39). In a related game theoretic interpretation of the spiral model, states are uncertain about the other's preferences and beliefs about their own trustworthiness. Inability to determine whether the other is defecting out of greed or out of fear can drive arms competition between states that would otherwise prefer the status quo. Kydd then applies his models to indepth historical narratives of the origins of the Cold War and the end of the US-Soviet rivalry. To provide evidence concerning beliefs and goals, he uses the most recent secondary sources, recorded conversations with former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, and published documents. In addition, he deduces from the spiral model how the United States and Soviet Union would have behaved if they had had particular preferences and beliefs about the other (pp. 76-77). Kydd's case study of the origins of the Cold War supports the standard US interpretation in which US plans for postwar collaboration were frustrated by Soviet ambitions. Mistrust of the Soviet Union was therefore justified. The United States was initially made uneasy by the Soviet violation of the Yalta agreements on Eastern Europe. The Truman Administration adopted a policy of political

Following a sumptuous feast (and copious amounts of vodka), the guests, gathered around a banquet table deep within the Kremlin's walls in May 1943, toasted SovietAmerican friendship. Premier Joseph V. Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov praised the Grand Alliance. Anastas I. Mikoyan, the Soviet commissar for foreign trade, Lavrenty P. Beria, the head of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del, NKVD), and Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, offered toasts, and the Anglo-Americans present-including the British ambassador to Moscow, Adm. William H. Standley, the reigning United States representative, and Joseph E. Davies, Washington's former ambassador-reciprocated. The American emissary from 1936 to 1938, Davies was there because President Franklin D. Roosevelt had sent him to arrange an introductory summit with Stalin, a meeting at which Roosevelt was sure all outstanding Soviet-American differences could be ironed out. Although Davies' presence was unusual, thus far the evening had been little different from similar receptions held by Soviet leaders for their Allied comrades during World War II. On this occasion, however, the former ambassador had brought with him a movie that both he and Roosevelt hoped would convince the Soviet dictator to eschew separate peace negotiations with Adolf Hitler and to remain within the tenuous Big Three

In conversations with the poet-biographer Felix Chuev, Molotov offers an incomparable view of the politics of Soviet society and the nature of Kremlin leadership under communism. Filled with startling insights and indelible portraits, the book is an historical source of the first order. "A mesmerizing and chilling chronicle." - "Kirkus Reviews".

Tw | SHE turning point in French foreign policy after the second world war was not the signing of the Atlantic Treaty. The impossibility of maintaining what had hitherto been the official policy of the Fourth Republic, to 'form a bridge' and play the role of mediation between East and West, was recognized by the French representative, at that time M. Bidault, at the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Moscow at the beginning of I947, and in the summer of that year at the Paris Conference when M. Molotov walked out after two days. At Moscow the Soviet Minister refused to support French views on the Saar. At Paris a few months later he attacked the proposal which was to become the Marshall Plan as the work of American imperialism. France's choice was made, in spite of the fact that for two years she had been trying not to take sides, and neither her leaders nor the public generally felt that it was really possible for her to adopt any other attitude. When the Atlantic Treaty was signed and ratified in I949 it was not therefore regarded as anything fundamentally new. It seemed a corollary of the Marshall Plan, a formal recognition of the established unity of Western Europe and the United States. After all, everyone knew that Western Europe was bare of military forces and that the Soviet army was not far from the Rhine-only the distance of one lap in the 'Tour de France', to use General de Gaulle's expression. It was not hard to conclude from these two facts that Europe's sole defence was the American guarantee, in other words the American Government's implicit promise that it would meet any invasion of Western Europe with a declaration of war. It seemed to follow that the main function of the Atlantic Treaty was to clarify and proclaim publicly a state of affairs which already existed. The chief doubt expressed was whether it was really better to have an explicit rather than an implicit agreement. Apart from the Communists only a few protests were made at this time against the dangers of the Atlantic Treaty, in particular by M. Gilson and M. Beuve-Mery, the first a philosopher with an international reputation, the second, director of Le Monde, in which newspaper both men expressed their views. What were the arguments of the opponents of the Atlantic Treaty? They have not changed in substance since I949 and it seems to me that they can be reduced to four essentials. The Atlantic Treaty would be looked on by Russia as provocative. It would give us no protection in 'Translated from the French by Anthea Mills.

U tNTIL some time after the end of the second World War those in charge of conducting foreign policy in this country and the United States did not consider it necessary to pay much attention to the theory of international Communism or, as it is alternatively called, Marxism-Leninism. Forrestal, who became the first American Secretary of Defence after the war, noted in his diary 1 in I945 that he could not find that any study of the subject had been made in any Government department. Matters were no different in Whitehall. The underlying assumption of Western statesmen in dealing with the Soviet Union was that, although the Soviet political system might have been originated by men who were full of utopian revolutionary ideas, its policies had long been formed by rulers whose purposes, outlook on the world, and conception of their own interests were not fundamentally dissimilar from those of politicians elsewhere. What upset this assumption in the years immediately after the war was the persistent activity of Soviet policy in promoting the establishment of Communist regimes in other countries and its intransigence over a wide range of questions in which mutually advantageous settlements of disputes appeared to be well within reach. Byrnes, who started out as American Secretary of State with such high hopes, admits in his memoirs 2 that nothing in his previous experience as a lawyer or a politician had prepared him for negotiating with Molotov. This was not simply or even mainly because of the personal qualities of Molotov; it was rather because Molotov, a Bolshevik of the first hour, has always been essentially the diplomat of an ideology, and Byrnes found himself confronted with aims and concepts which were not only antagonistic to his own, but also for the most part unintelligible to him. During the last ten years, as a result of the cold war and the disastrous outcome of the attempts to co-operate with the Soviet Union in world reconstruction after the military victory of the Allied coalition over Germany and Japan, there has been much more official interest, both in London and in Washington, in the serious study of Communism as a system of thought and its implications as a guide to action. The history of the Soviet Union, as distinct from the history of Russia, is now recognized as an important special field of modern historical study, and detailed work is being done on the vast mass of Russian Communist exegetic and

WHEN Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1973 the prospects for East-West economic relations were more problematical than for a quarter of a century. In 1947 every country in Europe-Germany and Austria excepted-participated in the plenary session at Geneva of the newly founded United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), while in Paris, Russian, French and British representatives met to discuss European acceptance of American economic aid. Marshall had made his momentous offer of June that year to Eastern as well as to Western Europe, and it was not obvious from what Molotov said at the tripartite conference that the Russians would turn it down. He argued in favour of a European agency of co-operation, not of co-ordination, on the grounds that European states, having only just regained their national sovereignty, were unwilling to fetter their incipient planning agencies with oversight by a superior organisation. The scope for pan-European collaboration was at the same time being put more explicitly by the Director of the Institute of World Economics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences: as a consequence of the war, effective national planning had begun in capitalist countries and in England there was even 'something of a Gosplan'; furthermore 'only American and Canadian banks and firms were able to provide credit to European countries [and] the rate of recovery depended in the first place on the export of American capital to Europe " Varga's concept of convergence was supported by such developments as a visit by staff of the French Monnet Plan to the State Planning Office in Prague for advice on indicative planning in a mixed economy, and the launching of a Polish reconstruction plan which was justly termed a 'mixture of Marx and Keynes'. The EEC, Molotov pointed out in Paris, was intended to facilitate whatever co-operation

N i r EARLY two decades have passed since the USSR abandoned the customary method of estimating crop yields, i.e. as harvested. Since I933, crop yields there have been estimated in the field prior to harvest. At first, the new system was applied only to grain, and a discount of about IO per cent was permitted for unavoidable losses. But even this discount was eliminated between I937 and I939. Since I939, the new method of crop estimating has been extended to all other crops. The law specifies, for example, that every potato or sugar beet, or part of it, left on or in the ground, must be included in the yield and harvest. In former times the yields and crops so established were frequently referred to in the USSR as 'biological', but later the official designation has become 'factual'.' Only the biological yields and crops are released by the Government, although the Government knows the real crops from the reports of the State and collective farms and machine-tractor stations. While the nature of the Soviet crop estimates is clear from the Soviet law, official reference books, and text-books on agricultural statistics, this fact is never mentioned in more general Soviet publications. On the contrary, the biological yields and crops are regularly spoken of as if they were real yields and crops, even in such pronouncements as those of the Central Statistical Office of the USSR and in speeches of the highest officials, including Stalin and Molotov. These pronouncements include comparisons with real yields and harvests obtained in other countries, or in Russia and the USSR prior to change in the method of crop estimating, with no adjustments whatsoever. The biological per hectare yields and biological crops obviously do not represent anything that can be eaten, fed, seeded, or otherwise used in full. In the nineteen-thirties, several investigations of harvesting losses were made in the USSR, all of them showing losses of more than IO per cent; in I938, for example, a loss of I7 per cent or more was indicated. Complaints of heavy harvesting losses are voiced even now; investigations are certainly made, but the results are never released.2 The biological yields