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The World Bank today faces parallel challenges to its operations and governance. The institution has since its founding provided financing on favourable terms to developing country governments to support national development efforts. Alongside these country demands, there are now calls for a new set of mandates and activities associated with global public goods. Advocates would have the Bank allocate large sums toward climate mitigation, pandemic response and preparedness, and other activities that may or may not align with national priorities in developing countries. The ability of the World Bank to strike an appropriate balance between country demands and global goods depends on the institution's shareholders. Yet, the deterioration in the bilateral relationship between the United States and China now threatens to undermine effective governance at the institution. This paper considers the challenge of competing demands on World Bank resources and the degree to which a resolution could depend on an agreement between the United States and China, one that sets the strategic direction of the institution and addresses the growing impasse on the question of China's shareholding in the Bank. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Professor Henry Tye (戴自海) is a world-renowned expert in theoretical particle physics, string theory and cosmology. He was recently the IAS Professor at the Jockey Club Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), and is the Horace White Professor of Physics (Emeritus) at Cornell University. He has a lot of experience in research status in both China and the United States. Recently, NSR invited Professor Yi-Fu Cai (蔡一夫) from the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) to interview Prof. Tye on his personal views on the future of theoretical physics, his own experience, and his advice to young researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the earliest years of the Internet’s creation, cyberspace has been distinguished from other types of political space because of three unique qualities: (i) its ability to mobilize users, particularly “outsiders” including those who have not been easily included in political systems using conventional means; (ii) its ability to quickly provide large quantities of information of uncertain or unregulated quality; and (iii) its ability to shrink distances between users, in some sense rendering conventional physical geography irrelevant. This paper presents three lenses for interpreting the significance of these developments: utopian, liberal, and realist. Evolving doctrines of cyberwarfare as put forth by China, Russia, and the United States in particular stress the ways in which cyberspace presents a unique security threat which may present greater advantages to nonstate actors engaged in unconventional warfare. Differing economic, political, and security policies derive from each lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese Revolution, Korean War, and McCarthyism loomed large over Kennedy administration assessments of Chinese intentions in Vietnam. The president and his advisors disagreed over the exact nature of the Chinese threat, but they uniformly believed in a dangerous, expansionist China. Their assessments promoted cautious escalation in Vietnam, where Kennedy sought to avoid “losing” another Asian country to Communism without provoking another war like Korea. This, in turn, promoted Chinese militancy. Central to Kennedy administration thinking was the idea that Vietnam served as a test case for Beijing’s more radical foreign policy line vis-à-vis Moscow. This article traces the development and influence of such assessments. It also argues that the China factor informed Kennedy and Johnson administration notions of credibility. Holding back or reversing Communist gains in Asia by supporting Saigon offered these administrations the chance to kick once and for all the “who lost China” stigma that had haunted the Democratic Party since 1949. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

"Forced technology transfer" is a central issue in the ongoing U.S.–China trade row. The phrase encompasses a number of different practices, but the most significant according to various commentators involve measures that require foreign investors in China to partner with domestic entities as a condition of making an investment, either by forming a joint venture or affording Chinese investors a controlling equity stake. These "corporate structure requirements" empower prospective Chinese partners to bargain for technology transfer as a condition of forming a new venture or otherwise enable them to learn the details of foreign technology through participation in the business enterprise. Foreign investors are free to reject such requirements and forego the associated investment opportunities, and in this sense any technology transfer pursuant to China's requirements is "consensual." For ease of reference, this essay refers to these corporate structure requirements as CSR. The analysis to follow examines the economics of CSR from both the national and global welfare perspectives. It indicates how CSR may undercut the national welfare of the USA even if it is profitable for U.S. investors. The global welfare implications of CSR, however, are much less clear, which offers an explanation for the absence of any constraints on CSR in typical trade agreements. A clear role for restrictions on CSR does emerge, however, in investment agreements that seek to eliminate investment protectionism by requiring "pre-establishment national treatment" for foreign investors. This analysis has immediate policy implications for the ongoing trade dispute with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As climate change continues to melt Arctic sea-ice, the Northwest Passage will likely see more international cargo shipments in the future. Since China is the world's largest trading and shipping state, a significant portion of that traffic can be expected to involve Chinese companies. For this reason, it is widely assumed that China will eventually side with the United States in its longstanding dispute with Canada about the legal status of the Northwest Passage and assert that the waterway constitutes an "international strait". This assumption may prove to be incorrect as China has practical and legally strategic reasons to side with Canada, especially because of similarities between the Northwest Passage and the Qiongzhou Strait. This article thus suggests it may be mutually beneficial for both Canada and China to recognize each other's "internal waters" positions in these two waterways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses China's nuclear arms control policy during the U.S.-China rapprochement. It examines why and how Chinese policy changed during the 1970s when the nation became a nuclear power, and how the changes in U.S.-China and Sino-Soviet relations influence and constrain China's nuclear arms control policy. It explores the complicated role of the U.S. in changing China's nuclear arms control policy without the intention of forming a strategic alliance with the nation. It also discusses the U.S. cooperation with the U.S. to deter the Soviet Union's disarmament proposal at the United Nations.

The article focuses on diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the period of 1972 to 1975; specifically, the failure to resolve issues associated with the PRC's refusal to honor claims regarding private American property seized by the PRC and the resulting U.S. Treasury's freeze of PRC assets. The article considers the pre-existing U.S. relations with Taiwan, political stability in China, the effects of the Cold War and related U.S. and PRC attitudes towards to Soviet Union, the Vietnam War, both of the U.S. administrations of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Chinese leaders Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong.

The article compares the U.S. intelligence and foreign policy analysis of November 12, 1970 presented by the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) National Intelligence Estimates regarding China with similar contemporary analyses done by Donald Zagoria, John Paton Dalies, and Allen Whiting. The author wonders why the CIA failed to predict the possibility that China would welcome diplomatic relations with the U.S. Sino-American diplomatic relations were resumed by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger soon after the report was issued. The author proposes that the CIA was "static" in regards to their analysis, and that such problems with shortsightedness have continued to plague the intelligence community in the U.S. to the present.

The article focuses on peace, development and cooperation in China. It highlights the diplomacy of China which serves to the domestic development and contributes to world peace. It explores the Cold-War mentality, the worship of military, and the unilateralism. It emphasizes China and the U.S. relations, strategic partnership of cooperation between China and Russia, and overall strategic partnership between China and Europe.