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Theories of balancing are under assault. On theoretical and historical grounds, realists and non-realists challenge the claim that states balance against shifts in aggregate material capabilities. In addressing these claims, this article presents a more granular and finely tuned theory of balancing. It contends that states do, in fact, balance effectively. While foreign policy leaders regularly ignore aggregate power developments, they do disaggregate power to identify threatening states and target their balancing against specific threatening elements. Targeted-balancing theory explains why some historical cases coded as under-balancing are really instances of appropriate balancing; why a more powerful state's military buildup, or alliance formation against a weaker state, can constitute balancing; and why some instances of non- or missing-balancing against a more powerful state do not undermine balance-of-power theory. I provide support for my claims through an analysis of Britain's balancing against Germany and Italy between 1936 and 1939. Rather than under-balancing, or failing to balance altogether, London target-balanced against the specific threatening elements of German and Italian power. Given that power is rarely fungible across elements, London ranked other components of their power as secondary, and even last, in terms of Britain's rearmament priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a theory of military retrenchment by states in relative decline. I argue that a declining state will choose to withdraw foreign military deployments and security commitments when there exists a suitable regional 'successor' to which it can devolve its current responsibilities. The degree of a successor's suitability and the strategic importance of the region to the declining state interact to determine when and how rapidly retrenchment will occur. Importantly, this devolutionary model of retrenchment predicts significant variations in retrenchment patterns across a declining state's multiple regional commitments. It advances the literature by producing nuanced predictions of precisely where, when, and how quickly retrenchment will occur. This paper assesses the theory empirically through an examination of Great Britain's varying regional retrenchment strategies prior to World War I. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the writing of an official history of World War II (WWII) by British historian Llewellyn Woodward and the controversy that prevented the work from being published. The author provides a brief overview of Woodward's career as an academic historian, explains that Woodward was commissioned to write a history of British wartime foreign policy that was to be for official use only, and explores the political significance of British official histories and documentary publications.

This article analyses British policy towards Iraq during the period following the Second World War until the 1958 Iraqi revolution. Using British archival sources it demonstrates how Britain covertly tried to stem the rise of communist and nationalist anti-imperialist sentiments in Iraq through an insistence on employing ill-fitting anti-communist propaganda designed as a Cold War weapon with which to counter Soviet influence. Failing to appreciate the level of indigenous politicization, because of their own rigid ideas about the nature of the 'Iraqi mind', British officers were incapable of devising local responses to the growing threat of anti-imperialism, instead inadvertently handing over the initiative to Iraqi political groups to set the agenda. In this way Britain gradually lost the battle for hearts and minds in Iraq despite maintaining a huge propaganda apparatus in the country and the wider region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political efforts of American and British labor movements during World War II, focusing particularly on the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The author explores the impact of national foreign policies upon the labor movements and considers whether national interests or the interests of the trade unions are considered most important by the unions. Other subjects considered include the trade union movement, internationalism, the International Labor Organization, international labor standards, interactions between the TUC, AFL, and the Soviet International Federation of Trade Unions, and union leaders Sir Walter Citrine and William Green.

The author comments upon various reports published within this special issue on the history of labor unions and foreign relations, including one by Elizabeth McKillen on labor during World War I, one by Geert Van Goethem on government policies regarding American and British labor movements during World War II, and one by Daniel Garcia on class relations within the U.S. armed forces at the end of World War II. Some of the subjects explored include the public opinion of the working-class in the U.S. regarding foreign policy, the study of international labor movements, and the inability of marginalised groups within the U.S. to influence political decision making.

The article focuses on diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Great Britain during the Berlin Crisis of 1961-1962. The author argues that American foreign policy was influenced by the personal relationships between Anglo-American politicians, diplomats, and other officials that went beyond the interactions between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Other notable people discussed include British ambassador to the U.S. David Ormsby-Gore, U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk, British foreign secretary Alec Douglas-Home, and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. The American two-part policy involving diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union and the buildup of NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) conventional weaponry are considered.

British foreign policy in the 1930s is often considered utilizing the paradigm of appeasement. This, however, is an inadequate and retrospective tool, as it narrows the range of issues that can be dealt with and analyses them only as they can be considered to be pro- or anti-appeasement. Looking at the career of Sir Orme Sargent, one of the most important men in the Foreign Office during this period, it becomes clear that many of the major decisions of the period were taken in the light of whether they were consistent with the principles of the new international order established in 1919 rather than whether they contributed to the ‘appeasement’ of such countries as Germany, Italy and Japan. It also reveals that there were sharply different opinions in the Foreign Office about such matters, particular with regard to how to square France’s desire for security with Germany’s insistence on being treated as an equal, whether France’s network of alliances (particularly with Soviet Russia) damaged or enhanced Britain’s own security and whether the latter could be achieved by means of collective action within the precepts of the League of Nations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines unpublished private letters exchanged in 1938-1939 between British diplomat Geoffrey Thompson and U.S. ambassador to Spain Claude Bowers for their insights into the diplomatic relationship between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the months before the outbreak of World War II. Differences between the United States and Great Britain over how to confront fascism in Europe are discussed, as are the Munich pact between Great Britain and Germany, and the British policy of appeasement.

The article discusses the diplomatic mission of United States Colonel Bonner Fellers to Cairo, Egypt in 1942 during World War II and the security breach that occurred with Fellers's communications back to the U.S. government in Washington, D.C. The author highlights the relationship between the British and American governments in the security issues that involved massive amounts of intelligence concerning British troops in Africa being leaked to the Axis countries, particularly Germany. The author also draws attention to the special nature of the relationship between the U.S. and British governments.

The article discusses the impact of the report on the Falkland Islands Review by Lord Oliver Franks in Great Britain. The parliamentary developments under the British government is evident due to this report because the committee warned against the exercise of hindsight in reaching judgments.. However, the reports implied the majority of the weaknesses of the government that need for a review of the Falkland Islands because the management of events should be monitored prior to the Argentinean capture of the islands had been agreed before the British repossession took place. To address the obstacles written in the review, the political committee struggled to make recommendations on the type of system to be used and to make changes in the legislative assembly.