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This article argues that there are inflections of modernism in André Bazin's realist aesthetics and that he should be considered an early champion of post–World War II modernism in cinema. Within classical film theory, which took its point of departure in the silent cinema era, modernism is taken to be incompatible with realism. Moreover, both modernism and realism are seen to rely on the principle of medium specificity in this context, whereas Bazin argued that aesthetic progress in cinema is intrinsically related to the medium's capability to be impure. Recently, we have seen several attempts at connecting Bazin's aesthetics with high‐modernism in the visual arts. However, I argue that it is more instructive to focus on their differences. This comparison is relevant for developing a deeper understanding of the form of modernism at stake in Bazin's aesthetics, especially when it comes to the question of the spectator's role in the constitution of meaning. Furthermore, Bazin's proto‐modernist aesthetics must be discussed with an eye to his ardent support of what he considered a new avant‐garde in narrative cinema and his lasting, but often misunderstood, interest in ambiguity as an aesthetic category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the interpretation of African sculpture as part of the genre of primitive art in France between World War I and World War II. Particular focus is given to how French colonialism and the dominance of Paris, France as the center of the global art world during this period influenced French perceptions regarding the significance of African sculpture. Other topics explored include definitions of aesthetic modernism, art critiques regarding the concept of primitivism, and literature on material culture studies.

Larry Shiner has risen to an impassioned defence against my criticisms of an iconic figure, claiming that I have 'misrepresent[ed] Kristeller's central aim' and therefore missed 'the real shortcomings of Kristeller's essay' and 'obscure[d] substantive issues behind simplistic dichotomies'. These, and a series of disagreements over countless small details, take up the first part of his reply. He then proceeds to summarize his own book's achievements in correcting Kristeller's shortcomings. Shiner acknowledges difficulties in Kristeller's formulations, but accepts their purport and actually expands the reach of Kristeller's thesis. Whatever else one might wish to say about these charges (which are quite impressive as a list but each disputable taken in turn), Shiner remains an unrepentant exponent of Kristeller's views. I realize that dogmas die hard, and it is only to be expected that if one challenges the central tenets of a legacy one will meet with entrenched reactions. Given the word-limit I have been allotted for my counter-reply, I will confine myself to the more substantive issues as these concern Kristeller's arguments, reserving for a possible future occasion any difficulties I may have with Shiner's own theses. My response will take the form of a series of questions followed by my own proposed answers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the interactions between aesthetics and semiotics and the implications of these interactions for the aesthetics of architecture. It states that the task of establishing whether architecture is in itself a semiological system is complicated in no small degree by semiology's own identity problem and the case appears now strong now weak according to which of the provisional definitions is being used to pull it through. It adds that defending an aesthetics of architecture as providing a more valid theoretical instrument than semiotics for the elucidation of its productions, and a sounder basis for the practice of the art, might be taken as a reversion to some deserted position of Modernism.