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The article examines the British government's responses to visits of United Nations (UN) Special Procedures. It draws on the work of sociologist Stanley Cohen to show that the British government conforms to a predictable classification of responses on and to international organisations when challenged on human rights violations. Topics discussed include Cohen's states of denial, accountability, and engagement.

On the centenary of the Paris Peace Conference, the lecture explores Britain's pivotal role in the development of a rules-based global order. It reveals how Britons fashioned the practices and norms of new international institutions, including the League of Nations, to manage relations between states, markets, and civil society. The lecture uncovers why economic, social, and environmental issues took on as much importance as the more familiar concerns of border protection and weapons' control. It draws on the correspondence of key internationalists, including women and student activists, who wanted to institutionalize global order in a way that advanced the needs of women, children, and the family as the concern of global security, and shows how preference was given to business groups and central bankers. The lecture exposes the connected history of the First World War with the global order forged to build peace, underlining the important role of the blockade, and the multilateral relationships it engendered. It reveals how British dominance after 1919 encouraged it to use the League of Nations a multilateral hub to manage Britain's relations with Europe and with its empire, and the legacy of this history for international relations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states enter into treaties? In literature on the investment treaty regime, the dominant answer is that investment treaties provide credible commitments to foreign investors. This narrative provides valuable insights but cannot account for the historical origins of the treaties, where drafters explicitly decided to exclude "strong" dispute settlement provisions. Unlike modern-day investment treaties, the early investment treaty regime did not allow investors to file claims against host states through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Using historical evidence from three major capital-exporting states—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany—the article shows that this was a conscious design choice. Rather than providing formal dispute settlement, sanctions, and penalties to make credible commitments, Western states intended investment treaties to serve as salient focal points for the informal resolution of investment disputes. The substantive obligations were expected to fulfil their coordinating role without the shadow of judicialized dispute settlement. The argument is not just of historical interest but has broader implications for literature on international economic law dominated by the credible commitment narrative, as well as the current political backlash against ISDS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores early British Christian-humanitarianism towards the Greeks following the 1822 Chios Massacre. Scholars of the Greek revolution have previously acknowledged the massacre as a pivotal moment for British attitudes towards the Greeks, although few have elaborated significantly on this humanitarian shift. This article focuses on what the massacre was and public and political reactions to it in Britain. It also investigates how perceptions of 'Christian' Greeks, compared to 'Islamic' and 'barbarian' Ottomans, encouraged British sympathy. Essentially it argues that the massacre 'humanized' the Greeks to the British, leading to an early type of Christian-humanitarian intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign policy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers like China. We have addressed this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting, but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative perceptions of Chinese global leadership and be more suspicious of China as a military threat. In contrast, those who espouse a Remain identity—that is, believe that Britain would be better served within the EU and with more immigrants—are more likely to prefer closer engagement with China and to have a more positive outlook overall on China's place within the global community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union has ramifications beyond the UK and the EU. This article analyses the impact of the Brexit referendum on the UK's political capital in the United Nations Security Council; a dimension of Brexit that has received little attention thus far. Drawing on extensive elite interviews we show that the UK has considerable political capital in the Council, where it is seen as one of the most effective actors, but the reputational costs of Brexit are tarnishing this image. With case-studies on the UK's role in Somalia and Yemen we show how the UK has been able to further its interests with dual roles in the EU and Security Council, and the risks posed by tensions between trade and human rights after Brexit. We also analyse what it takes to be influential within the Security Council and argue that more attention should be paid to the practices of diplomacy. Influence is gained via penholding, strong diplomatic skill and a well-regarded UN permanent representative. The UK accrues political capital as a leader on the humanitarian and human rights side of the Council's agenda, but this reputation is at risk as it exits the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK's departure from the European Union (EU) represents a major shift in the diplomatic strategy of one of Europe's leading economic, diplomatic and security players. This article limits its focus to the UK's European diplomatic strategy. The article argues that the UK's future relationship with the EU will condition the UK's broader diplomatic approach to Europe. But in exiting the EU the ambitions and modalities of the UK's other bilateral and multilateral relationships in Europe will undergo a recalibration. With the UK government having struggled since June 2016 to provide comprehensive detail on its ambitions for its future economic, political and security relationship with the EU, the development of the broader aspects of the UK's post-Brexit European diplomatic strategy has been retarded. However, through analysis of key speeches, government white papers, and other supporting documents and statements (and the experience of negotiating Brexit with the EU27), the outlines of a nascent post-Brexit UK European diplomatic strategy can be discerned. Whether this strategy will be adequate to provide the UK with a significant degree of influence on Europe's international relations and whether it gives the UK sufficient ability to addresses the key challenges that it will face in Europe is less certain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines the response of Great Britain to the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) Ostpolitik and the role of Great Britain in the Berlin Four Power talks with the U.S., France and the Soviet Union from 1968 to 1971. It discusses the aim of the negotiations to address issues of total ban on FRG's official and political activities in West Berlin and the freedom of movement of goods and civilians via the FRG and West Berlin land access routes. It highlights the consultation of Great Britain with the U.S. and France on Western rights and responsibilities in Berlin, as well as its planning for the talks including presentation of its papers "Access to Berlin" and "Association Between the Federal Republic and Berlin" and insistence that Western Allies must negotiate with the Soviets.

In 1927 Michael McDonnell, a diasporic Irish Catholic, was appointed Mandatory Palestine's Chief Justice, being directed to institute firm British-style legal-judicial foundations for future self-governance. This entailed common, equal status for Arab and Jewish Palestinians, implicitly de-privileging the Jewish National Home. McDonnell was resisted in this by the British Mandate's Anglo-Jewish, pro-Zionist Attorney General, Norman Bentwich. McDonnell prevailed but only at the cost of being characterized lastingly as a pro-Arab, Catholic anti-Semite. McDonnell's continuing defence of a supreme, independent judiciary antagonized the Palestine Executive of High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope, who tried to co-opt rather than subordinate Zionist interests. Consequent frictions culminated in 1936 with McDonnell adjudicating against supra-legal British repression of Palestine's great Arab rebellion. For this he was dismissed and ostracized, subsequently publishing critiques of British policy in fringe right-wing organs. Yet McDonnell professed explicitly non-racist views, reflecting a liberal-minded, constitutional Irish nationalist equation of Palestine with Ireland, seeing comparable settler-colonial abuses and native distress as remediable only by transcendentally impartial justice. Britain reneging on these principles led McDonnell, like those Irish imperial servants noted in India, to identify with colonial subjects against colonialism. His case is one of empire as a system of domination being challenged from within, although his removal foreshadowed emerging imperial counter-insurgency's tendency not only to repress subject populations but deny civil-progressive alternatives for managing post-colonial transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2010, the then British Foreign Secretary William Hague delivered Canning House's annual lecture on the topic of Britain's relations with Latin America. In launching the so-called 'Canning Agenda', Hague pledged to 'halt the decline in Britain's diplomatic presence in Latin America'. 'It is now time', Hague went on, 'for an advance to begin'. This article represents the first scholarly analysis of this policy. In particular, it assesses British efforts to enhance its economic ties with the countries of Latin America; the status granted to Latin America in Britain's strategic world-view in the post-Brexit era; the impact on Britain of other external powers in the region; and the political relationships between Britain and the countries of Latin America. The article draws on interviews with the key policy-makers involved in the Canning Agenda, including William Hague, Sir Hugo Swire, Jeremy Browne, and several other officials and diplomats from Britain and throughout Latin America. It concludes that while an identifiable effort to enhance Britain's economic and political standing in Latin America is discernible since 2010, major impediments to achieving this goal persist across the range of areas explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of balancing are under assault. On theoretical and historical grounds, realists and non-realists challenge the claim that states balance against shifts in aggregate material capabilities. In addressing these claims, this article presents a more granular and finely tuned theory of balancing. It contends that states do, in fact, balance effectively. While foreign policy leaders regularly ignore aggregate power developments, they do disaggregate power to identify threatening states and target their balancing against specific threatening elements. Targeted-balancing theory explains why some historical cases coded as under-balancing are really instances of appropriate balancing; why a more powerful state's military buildup, or alliance formation against a weaker state, can constitute balancing; and why some instances of non- or missing-balancing against a more powerful state do not undermine balance-of-power theory. I provide support for my claims through an analysis of Britain's balancing against Germany and Italy between 1936 and 1939. Rather than under-balancing, or failing to balance altogether, London target-balanced against the specific threatening elements of German and Italian power. Given that power is rarely fungible across elements, London ranked other components of their power as secondary, and even last, in terms of Britain's rearmament priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the choice, reception and afterlife of both the Chinese and the British gifts given during Britain's first embassy to China. Earlier studies have tended to fault the Qing court for understanding the gifts they received as tribute and failing to appreciate the scientific items given by the British. However, gift-giving was a highly charged political issue in the domestic politics of both countries at this time and the terms in which the argument was conducted differed widely. This paper argues that the Chinese term that has been translated into the English 'tribute' did not have the same resonance in China, and that instead the gifts were received by both sides as part of the negotiations that accompanied the embassy. The most successful gifts in this context were those with an accepted monetary value in the existing trade between the two countries, notably high-quality textiles. British military gifts were also of importance in shaping the outcome of the embassy. However, attempts to use the gifts to present the culture or wider philosophical outlook of the giver were much less successful in this diplomatic context. After the embassy ended the vast majority of gifts given by both sides became exotic items in royal collections where they added to the glory of the recipient rather than that of the donor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, steamships were the main tool of British informal imperialism in what is now southern Iraq. Despite that centrality, steam shipping on the Tigris was primarily characterized by environmental and political precariousness. This article explores the steamship business of the Lynch Company, which operated on the Tigris beginning in 1861. It examines the political controversies surrounding irrigation and the expansion of the steam fleet as windows on the complex relationship between ecological vulnerability and the practice of empire and diplomacy, arguing that the states of environmental and geopolitical precariousness in which steamships operated reinforced one another, eventually coming to define the British steam enterprise on the Tigris. This precariousness helped make steamships major geopolitical actors, shaping British-Ottoman relations as well as local trade and development policies. The persistence of environmental challenges meant that the Lynch steamships, along with their Ottoman counterparts, simultaneously shaped and were incorporated into local trade and shipping networks, as well as the tribal prestige politics of raiding. On local and international levels, environmental and political issues were intertwined, and steam shipping was crucial to both. The precarious technology that formed the crux of informal imperial intervention on the Tigris is indicative of a kind of empire in which the environment significantly shaped the possibilities of imperial intervention. Precariousness--both environmental and political--came to define technology and empire in late Ottoman Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the lack of an obvious threat to Britain, the Blair government invaded Iraq in 2003 alongside the United States. This article draws on securitization theory and social identity approaches from social psychology to propose that the democratic political identity vested in Britain's domestic society facilitated the Blair government's effort to construct Iraq as a threat, but in other ways constrained the ability of the Blair government to pursue the use of force without substantial domestic political costs. Using a multimethod approach, the article examines the discourses in the lead up to the invasion to support the central argument as well as to explore the domestic security authority held by United Nations. In so doing, the article addresses not only the British case, but also larger questions regarding the factors that shape the construction of an issue as one of security and the appropriate policy responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major public debate on the costs and benefits of the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union is presently under way. The outcome of the referendum on 23 June 2016 will be a pivotal moment in determining whether the EU has a future as a component of the UK's European diplomatic strategy or whether there is a major recalibration of how the UK relates to Europe and more widely of its role within international relations. Since accession to the European Economic Community the UK has evolved an uncodified, multipronged European diplomatic strategy. This has involved the UK seeking to reinforce its approach of shaping the security of the continent, preserving a leading diplomatic role for the UK in managing the international relations of Europe, and to maximize British trade and investment opportunities through a broadening and deepening of Europe as an economically liberal part of the global political economy. Since accession the UK's European diplomatic strategy has also been to use membership of the EU to facilitate the enhancement of its international influence, primarily as a vehicle for leveraging and amplifying broader national foreign and security policy objectives. The strategy has been consistent irrespective of which party has formed the government in the UK. Increasing domestic political difficulties with the process of European integration have now directly impacted on this European strategy with a referendum commitment. Whether a vote for a Brexit or a Bremain, the UK will be confronted with challenges for its future European strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1898, the Philippines ceased to be a Spanish colony and were annexed by the United States, ignoring the Philippine expectation to gain national independence. Based on novel archival sources this article re-examines the experience of that imperial transition in the Philippines from British perspectives. As the British had strong interests in the Philippines, when the Spanish-American War broke out, the British government sent a naval squadron to Manila in order to protect the lives and properties of its subjects, but also to report on everything that was taking place in the islands. The officers in that squadron became privileged observers of the transfer of sovereignty from the Spanish to the Americans, a process that extended from 1898 to 1903, and which the British saw not as a war for the independence of the Philippines, but rather as the handoff between two colonial governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the loss of their empires, Britain and France have been seen as states in historical but still only relative decline: no longer great powers but not typical of the large category of middle-range powers. Despite financial constraints and limited size they retain their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council and continue to display the ambition to exert global influence. At times, London and Paris deal with this anomaly by acting in harness but at others their foreign policies diverge dramatically, not least because of the contrasting domestic traditions from which they emerge, and because of their differing roles within the European Union. This article assesses the capacity of these two notable states to maintain a leading role in international politics given their own uneasy relationship and the significant constraints which they now face, both external and internal. The article is a revised version of the Martin Wight Memorial Lecture, held at Chatham House, London, on 3 November 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at international relations between the U.S. and France that lead-up to the Iraq War from 2002-2003, focusing on the efforts to seek United Nations (UN) approval for an invasion of Iraq. The author offers a counterfactual thought experiment based on numerous interviews and declassified documents which he says that French President Jacques Chirac would not have blocked UN approval under slightly different conditions. Other topics include U.S. President George W. Bush's foreign policy, claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and the UN's approval to improve the U.S. domestic support.

This paper offers a theory of military retrenchment by states in relative decline. I argue that a declining state will choose to withdraw foreign military deployments and security commitments when there exists a suitable regional 'successor' to which it can devolve its current responsibilities. The degree of a successor's suitability and the strategic importance of the region to the declining state interact to determine when and how rapidly retrenchment will occur. Importantly, this devolutionary model of retrenchment predicts significant variations in retrenchment patterns across a declining state's multiple regional commitments. It advances the literature by producing nuanced predictions of precisely where, when, and how quickly retrenchment will occur. This paper assesses the theory empirically through an examination of Great Britain's varying regional retrenchment strategies prior to World War I. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents three distinct interpretations of how parliamentary war powers affect British foreign policy more generally, based on a detailed analysis of the debate preceding the vote in parliament in August 2013 on whether Britain should intervene in the Syrian civil war. The first interpretation treats parliament as a site for domestic role contestation. From this perspective, parliamentary war powers matter because they raise the significance of MPs' doubts about Britain's proper global 'role'. The second interpretation treats parliament as a forum for policy debate. There is nothing new about MPs discussing international initiatives. But now they do more than debate, they decide, at least where military action is involved. From this perspective, parliamentary war powers matter because they make British foreign policy more cautious and less consistent, even if they also make it more transparent and (potentially) more democratic in turn. The final interpretation treats parliament as an arena for political competition. From this perspective, parliamentary involvement exposes major foreign policy decisions to the vagaries of partisan politicking, a potent development in an era of weak or coalition governments, and a recipe for unpredictability. Together these developments made parliament's war powers highly significant, not just where military action is concerned, but for British foreign policy overall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the summer of 2014 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged as a threat to the Iraqi people. This article asks whether the UK and Australia had a 'special' responsibility to protect (R2P) those being threatened. It focuses on two middle-ranking powers (as opposed to the US) in order to highlight the significance of special responsibilities that flow only from the principle of reparation rather than capability. The article contends that despite casting their response in terms of a general responsibility, the UK and Australia did indeed bear a special responsibility based on this principle. Rather than making the argument that the 2003 coalition that invaded Iraq created ISIS, it is argued that it is the vulnerable position in which Iraqis were placed as a consequence of the invasion that grounds the UK and Australia's special responsibility to protect. The article addresses the claim that the UK and Australia were not culpable because they did not act negligently or recklessly in 2003 by drawing on Tony Honoré's concept of 'outcome responsibility'. The finding of a special responsibility is significant because it is often thought of as being more demanding than a general responsibility. In this context, the article further argues that the response of these two states falls short of reasonable moral expectations. This does not mean the UK and Australia should be doing more militarily. R2P does not begin and end with military action. Rather the article argues that the special responsibility to protect can be discharged through humanitarian aid and a more generous asylum policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS's) beheading videos in the United Kingdom and the United States. These videos are highly illustrative demonstrations of the importance of visual imagery and visual media in contemporary warfare. By functioning as evidence in a political discourse constituting ISIS as an imminent, exceptional threat to the West, the videos have played an important role in the re-framing of the conflict in Iraq and Syria from a humanitarian crisis requiring a humanitarian response to a national security issue requiring a military response and intensified counterterrorism efforts. However, this article seeks to problematize the role and status of ISIS's beheadings in American and British security discourses by highlighting the depoliticizing aspects of reducing a complicated conflict to a fragmented visual icon. The article concludes by emphasizing the need for further attention to how the visibility of war, and the constitution of boundaries between which acts of violence are rendered visible and which are not, shape the political terrain in which decisions about war and peace are produced and legitimized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a time of rapid, globalized communication, what are the possibilities for truly meaningful cross-cultural political dialogue? Optimists contend that we may now speak of transnational public spheres-of spaces in which people reach across national boundaries to engage one another on issues of common concern. Skeptics, on the other hand, maintain that political, cultural, and linguistic barriers continue to preclude truly meaningful transnational discourse. And in the wake of 9/11 and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, many express specific skepticism about the potential for Western and Muslim societies to bridge such divides. Yet little systematic empirical research investigates the realities of cross-national dialogue, particularly between Western and non-Western societies. Using an original dataset produced via content analysis of British and Pakistani newspapers, we examine the discursive links formed during a quintessential transnational media event: the 2005-2006 Danish Muhammad cartoon controversy. Comparing the frames deployed and actors engaged in each of these countries, we find clear evidence of genuine transnational engagement between Muslims and non-Muslims. And though the scope of our data limits our findings, they nonetheless provide a sense of cautious optimism regarding the potential for the formation of transnational public spheres. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than 6 million Britons travelled to southern Africa during the Second World War as evacuees, to convalesce, for military training and en route to the battle fronts of Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East. Wartime travel provided more Britons than ever before with first-hand experience of white privilege and the lifestyle it provided in the settler colonial societies of southern Africa, convincing many to relocate there permanently. Wartime memoirs and letters reveal the ways in which the war both led to the strengthening of existing personal relationships between the UK and the settler colonies of southern Africa and the formation of new ones, including marriages. They also suggest that, for many, the heightened experience of the war and the exhilaration of living through extraordinary times made the return to normal life in Britain difficult. Southern Africa, with its combination of the familiar and the exotic, was an appealing alternative. Though the vast majority returned to the UK after the war, this collective first-hand experience influenced broader perceptions of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia as places of abundance, hospitality, and opportunity. This case study draws attention to the way the wartime travel provided more Britons than ever before with direct experience of imperial sites and suggests that this contributed to the continuing significance of empire, and especially the Dominions in post-war Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The international system is returning to multipolarity-a situation of multiple Great Powers-drawing the post-Cold War 'unipolar moment' of comprehensive US political, economic and military dominance to an end. The rise of new Great Powers, namely the 'BRICs'-Brazil, Russia, India, and most importantly, China-and the return of multipolarity at the global level in turn carries security implications for western Europe. While peaceful political relations within the European Union have attained a remarkable level of strategic, institutional and normative embeddedness, there are five factors associated with a return of Great Power competition in the wider world that may negatively impact on the western European strategic environment: the resurgence of an increasingly belligerent Russia; the erosion of the US military commitment to Europe; the risk of international military crises with the potential to embroil European states; the elevated incentive for states to acquire nuclear weapons; and the vulnerability of economically vital European sea lines and supply chains. These five factors must, in turn, be reflected in European states' strategic behaviour. In particular, for the United Kingdom-one of western Europe's two principal military powers, and its only insular (offshore) power-the return of Great Power competition at the global level suggests that a return to offshore balancing would be a more appropriate choice than an ongoing commitment to direct military interventions of the kind that have characterized post-2001 British strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whichever party or parties form the next UK government, a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is expected to begin soon after the general election in May. The review might be a 'light touch' exercise-little more than a reaffirmation of the SDSR produced by the coalition government in 2010. It seems more likely, however, that the review will be a lengthier, more deliberate exercise and one which might even last into 2016. For those most closely engaged in the process the challenge is more complex than that confronted by their predecessors in 2010. The international security context is more confused and contradictory; the UK's financial predicament is still grave; security threats and challenges will emerge that cannot be ignored; the population's appetite for foreign military engagement appears nevertheless to be restricted; and prevailing conditions suggest that the risk-based approach to national strategy might be proving difficult to sustain. Two key questions should be asked of the review. First, in the light of recent military experiences, what is the purpose of the United Kingdom's armed forces? Second, will SDSR 2015-16 sustain the risk-based approach to national strategy set out in 2010, and if so how convincingly? Beginning with a review of the background against which SDSR 2015-16 will be prepared, this article examines both enduring and immediate challenges to the national strategic process in the United Kingdom and concludes by arguing for strategic latency as a conceptual device which can complement, if not reinvigorate, the risk-based approach to national strategy and defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism is presented for the play "Doctor Faustus" by English dramatist Christopher Marlowe. Topics discussed include allusions in the play to the Greek myth of Helen of Troy, the meaning and use of the word "strumpet" in the play, and the ways in which the play alludes to diplomatic relations between England and the Ottoman Empire.

Historians have paid little attention to the Gascon expedition of 1512 in their examinations of Henry VIII’s foreign policy. This is a considerable oversight, as the 1512 campaign was Henry’s first attempt to recover his ancestral lands in France. This study offers an evaluation of England’s European relations in 1512. It provides an in-depth examination of the young king’s efforts to make his mark on the international stage, and considers how far Tudor armies were able to compete in continental warfare. The article also explores the extent to which Henry’s French ambitions in the early years of his reign differed from those of his predecessors. It argues that the Gascon expedition was a significant event, and that it provided valuable lessons for Henry’s subsequent campaigns in France. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the evolution of western policy towards the idea of pursuing negotiations with the Taliban, or 'reconciliation', in Afghanistan and the role that research and expert opinion played in that process. The official western position has evolved iteratively from initial rejection to near complete embrace of exploring the potential for talks. It is widely assumed that the deteriorating security situation was the sole determinant of this major policy reversal, persuading decision-makers to rethink what had once been deemed unthinkable. Moreover, given the politicized and sensitive nature of the subject, we might expect the potential for outside opinion to influence decision-makers to be low. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that it would be a mistake to underestimate the role that research and expert knowledge played-the story is more nuanced and complex. Research coalesced, sometimes prominently, with other key drivers to spur and shape policy change. Importantly, it often took experts to make sense of events on the ground, especially where the failure of the military approach was not recognized, understood or palatable to those in official circles. Research interacted with changing events, policy windows, the emergence of new personalities and the actions of various intermediaries to shape emerging positions. More broadly, the case of reconciliation in Afghanistan reveals the difficulties and challenges, but also the variety of opportunities and techniques, for achieving research influence in conflict-affected environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The referendum on whether Scotland should become an independent country will be held on 18 September 2014. This article reflects on the evolution of foreign governments' attitudes towards the referendum since its confirmation in October 2012, and on their expectations should a 'yes' vote result. With few exceptions, they have adopted a policy of non-intervention, treating the referendum as the UK's domestic affair. President Obama's expression on 5 June 2014 of his desire for the UK to remain 'a strong, robust, united and effective partner' may, however, be seen as a sign of increasing apprehension abroad. Concerns of foreign governments aroused by the referendum include the diminution of the UK's power and role in international affairs, the possible encouragement of other secessionist movements, and disturbance to international organizations and alliances. It is commonly assumed that Scotland would become a reasonably prosperous and reliable small state. But how would the rest of the UK (rUK), a much more powerful and populous country, respond to 'the loss of Scotland'? How would it affect the UK's already unsettled relations with the EU, including the prospect of a referendum on EU membership? Despite many uncertainties and a febrile political atmosphere, it is widely expected abroad that Scotland and rUK would settle into a cooperative relationship after a difficult transitional period, and that an independent Scotland would be accepted into the EU and NATO if it displayed flexibility on important issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented to the issue of the journal that discusses topics such as the relationship between British foreign policy and global security, national interest, and legitimacy.

In recent commentaries on British foreign policy, the New Labour and coalition governments have been criticized for lacking strategic thinking. Academics describe a 'strategy gap' and note that old ideas about Britain's role in the world, such as Churchill's 1948 reference to 'three circles', continue to be recycled. Parliamentarians bemoan the 'uncritical acceptance of these assumptions' that has led to 'a waning of our interests in, and ability to make, National Strategy'. This article argues that a primary problem has been the lack of consideration of how identity, strategy and action interrelate in foreign policy. Using the insights of role theory, the article seeks to address this by outlining six ideal-type role orientations that the UK might fulfil in world politics, namely: isolate, influential (rule of law state), regional partner, thought leader, opportunist-interventionist power and Great Power. By considering how variations in a state's disposition towards the external environment translate into different policy directions, the article aims both to highlight the range of roles available to policy-makers and to emphasize that policy often involves making a choice between them. Failure to recognize this has resulted in role conflicts and policy confusion. In setting out a variety of different role orientations, the author offers a route to introducing a genuine strategic sensibility to policy-making, one that links identity with policy goals and outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

British strategy-making has been subject to a sustained critique in recent years, from parliamentarians, retired members of the armed forces and scholars of strategic studies. This article examines the nature of this critique and the evolving character of strategic practice in Britain. It argues that the criticisms of British strategymaking are often misplaced, for two main reasons. First, many base their critique on a reductionist notion of unitary 'national interest' that fails to capture systemic patterns of complexity and contestation in the wider security environment and in Britain. Second, they underestimate or ignore the extent to which the UK strategic community is itself innovating in response to these themes, particularly since the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. This is not to argue that considerable challenges do not remain for strategy-making in Britain. Most notably, these include: how to translate strategic innovation in departments and elsewhere into a coherent national strategic agenda; how to do this while maintaining institutional coordination and a shared sense of strategic purpose across government (and beyond); how to sustain and consolidate institutional expertise and experience in a rapidly changing civil service and at a time of continuing public austerity; and how to articulate and legitimate security policy decisions among a general public that is both disengaged from elite strategic discourse and sceptical of the efficacy of military force. Even so, the article concludes by arguing that it is possible to see the outline of an emergent and distinctive theory of action in contemporary British strategic practice, characterized by principles of adaptivity, anticipation, self-organisation and nascent cross-governmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents abstracts on topics related to British foreign policy such as strategy, nuclear weapons control, and British interests in the Persian Gulf region.

How should ethics and values relate to the British national interest? The idea that ethical commitments to distant non-citizens should occupy a position within British foreign policy was a controversial element of Labour's foreign policy during the early part of their 1997-2010 tenure. Rather than undermining traditional national interest concerns, one of the defining themes within Labour's foreign policy was that values and national interests were becoming increasingly merged in a globalized world. The post-2010 coalition government has made distinct efforts to differentiate themselves from their predecessors, crafting a more pragmatic and national interest-based foreign policy approach. Despite this, significant continuities with Labour's 'ethical dimension' are evident and many associated policies and practices have survived the transition. Moreover, the suggestion that British values and interests are interrelated and mutually reinforcing has been re-asserted, with renewed vigour, by coalition policy-makers. The article traces the ways in which values and interests have become increasingly merged in the language of recent British foreign policy and examines the implications for our understanding of the UK's national interest. It argues that the idea of an almost symbiotic relationship between values and interests is fundamentally unhelpful and makes the case for greater disaggregation of the two. Although a zero-sum game need not exist between core national interests and ethical obligations abroad, the suggestion that they are mutually reinforcing obscures the tensions that frequently arise between these different realms of obligation. Using the examples of failed state stabilization and UK arms trade regulation, the article demonstrates how uncritical acceptance of the values-interests merger risks producing unstable policy formulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British government is in the process of re-energizing its relations with the Gulf states. A new Gulf strategy involving a range of activities including more frequent elite bilateral visits and proposals sometimes touted as Britain's military 'return to east of Suez' are two key elements of the overarching strategy. Such polices are designed to fall in line with British national interest as identified by the government-authored 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), which emphasizes the importance of security, trade, and promoting and expanding British values and influence as perennial British raisons d'etat. In the short term, the Gulf initiatives reflect and compliment these core interests, partly based on Britain's historical role in the region, but mostly thanks to modern day trade interdependencies and mutually beneficial security-based cooperation. However, there is yet to emerge a coherent understanding of Britain's longer-term national interest in the region. Instead, government-led, party-political priorities, at the expense of thorough apolitical analysis of long-term interests, appear to be unduly influential on the origins of both the Gulf proposals and the NSS conclusions themselves. Without a clear strategic, neutral grounding, both the Gulf prioritization and the NSS itself are weakened and their longevity undermined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 1968 Ernest May asked how the US government could gain access to 'long-headed' staffers to provide greater strategic depth to foreign policy. The challenge of long-term strategy persists: how should government be organized to support it, how can the right people be found to staff it and how can political leaders make time for longer-term policy-making given the challenge of the immediate? The policy planning staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have traditionally had the task of supporting longer-range, broader foreign policy. A small group of diplomats-later leavened by externals from the media, non-profit and private sectors-was meant to generate an improved approach to British interests and policy. As Robert Wade-Gery recalls of its role in the 1960s, there was a push to forge fresh links with outside thinking. Did it work? Former policy planners can be circumspect about its achievements. One former British planner said he felt like 'a spare part rattling around in a tin', while former American planners have written about the challenge of injecting fresh thinking when detached from decision-making. Other planners were dragged into operational work or speechwriting. Many planners nonetheless enjoyed the opportunity to think more broadly. Policy planning can be intellectually rich without being the source of actionable strategic thinking about the long-term national interest. This article suggests that a greater focus on people rather than systems might help to foster more strategic, anticipatory and innovative thinking about the national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the degree to which national political setting, namely domestic political opportunity structures, influences the transnational activities of women's groups in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The literature suggests that social groups are more likely to choose international activity when national institutions provide fewer opportunities for domestic activity (Keck and Sikkink 1998; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Using data about women's groups' activity from a content analysis of news wires from 1980 to 2008, we conclude that women's groups act in the domestic sphere significantly more than they act in the international arena-even when acting on transnational issues-and that groups choose international action when domestic opportunities are less hospitable to group action. Thus, we argue that the domestic sphere continues to be a major influence on social movement activity even as globalization and transnationalism increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the Spanish marriages episode of 1846 as a prism through which to examine the relationship between the leading foreign affairs writers for the increasingly powerful Times newspaper and the authors and servants of British diplomacy in the early Victorian period. The focus of this study is Lord William Hervey, the first secretary of the British embassy in Paris, a diplomat who well understood the power of the press over ministers, parliament and the people. Hervey's under-utilized private papers shed light on the divisions in British political and literary (press) society over the nation's policies towards France and Spain. They also paint a picture of an increasingly isolated foreign secretary, Viscount Palmerston, a Whig statesman who failed to carry his policy through the Whig cabinet and who failed to convince the Conservative Times of its supposed merits, despite the support of some overactive members of the British diplomatic community. This is a story of diplomatic failure; a rare study of how not to win friends and influence people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of humanitarian intervention as a tool of foreign policy in the Conservative-led Coalition. The first section of the paper provides historical context and assesses the traditional approaches to humanitarian intervention as an instrument of foreign policy of Conservative governments since the end of the Cold War. This analytical narrative considers the Major Government's response to the Bosnian War. The second section of the paper considers the Conservative-led Coalition's approach to humanitarian intervention in two ways: first by an examination of the influence of Blair's humanitarian intervention and secondly, by an evaluation of British involvement in the Libyan Revolution of 2011. The third and final section of the paper offers an explanatory interpretation of the Conservative-led Coalition's humanitarian intervention. This interpretation is predicated on an English School theoretical framework for understanding international relations and, in particular, advances the argument that the global worldview of David Cameron, William Hague and their liberal Conservative colleagues can be understood as solidarist. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The articles in this symposium examine Conservative Party politics in Coalition between 2010 and 2013, considering a number of key issues that have presented notable ideological and strategic challenges to the party leadership. These include the issue of European integration; managing territorial relations within the United Kingdom; the principle of humanitarian intervention in foreign policy; the debate over human rights; and party management concerns and electoral strategy. Together, the articles help to illustrate the ways in which the party has sought to achieve Conservative governing objectives whilst governing in partnership with the Liberal Democrats, and where principles have been sacrificed or compromised in the light of the more pragmatic business of governing. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A decade ago international peacemakers turned a blind eye when violence in Darfur, Sudan, first escalated into civil war. This article addresses the war's brutal beginnings, using a close reading of internal communications, interviews, and public statements to deepen our understanding of the predicament that key peacemakers found themselves in, and dug themselves into. For a long first year, when the majority of violent deaths in Darfur occurred, peacemakers employed a set of discursive strategies that intentionally depoliticized Darfur's conflict. Despite knowledge to the contrary, peacemakers carefully avoided connections between Darfur and the ongoing north–south peace negotiations they were championing to end Sudan's long second civil war. These ideational moves gave peacemakers a degree of cover for not responding directly to the conflict, but they also shaped the political calculations and opportunities of domestic actors in ways that further enabled armed violence, ultimately leading to policy failure. The problems of peacemaking in Sudan highlight the particular challenges that arise from negotiating peace. Negotiations give words a privileged place in taming the materiality of violence, yet this also leaves peacemakers liable to shaping new trajectories of political violence born out of local dissatisfaction with the prospects for peace. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How is the United Kingdom engaging with changing geopolitics of the Arctic in the twenty-first century? This article considers the UK's contemporary interest(s) in the Arctic at a time of unprecedented change in the northern latitudes of our planet. In particular, it focuses on the ongoing emergence of UK Arctic policy as an assemblage of processes involving various actors-government officials, scientists and other academics, environmental campaigners, journalists and the private sector-which not only define UK interests but also delimit what the term 'Arctic' means to, and demands of, the UK. The focus of the article is directed at the recent activities by the Ministry of Defence, the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee and the related work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to develop an Arctic Policy Framework, drawing on official government documents and a series of interviews conducted between 2010 and 2013 for evidence. The article concludes with the author's thoughts on tensions and contradictions that remain in the UK's policy towards the Arctic and the implications this might have at a time when global interest in the Arctic is growing rapidly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain's contemporary and future relationship with the British Antarctic Territory and the wider region is the subject matter of this article. In the aftermath of the ill-fated plans for a merger of British Antarctic Survey (BAS) and the National Oceanography Centre, it is timely to ask how the UK projects influence and secures its scientific, resource and strategic interests. The contemporary Antarctic is increasingly characterized by tension over resource management and conservation politics as Antarctic Treaty parties disagree, both in private and public, over the purpose of legal instruments and the regulation of activities such as fishing and marine conservation. While we do not predict the collapse of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), our analysis suggests that the effectiveness and legitimacy of the ATS is increasingly under challenge. The United Kingdom's position as a claimant state and original signatory to the Antarctic Treaty is complicated by the presence of counter-claimants (Argentina and Chile) and a wider preoccupation with other overseas territories, such as South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and the Falkland Islands. Polar science, carried out by BAS and other British agents, remains critical not only for maintaining the UK's 'soft power' but also increasingly for cementing a 'strategic presence' in the Antarctic. The article ends with a cautionary note: scientific excellence is no longer sufficient to guarantee geopolitical/strategic interests and there is growing evidence that claimant and non-claimant states alike are no longer regarding Antarctica as an area that will remain free of intensifying and diversifying resource exploitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents several abstracts on international relations topics including the status of the U.S. as a world power, Great Britain's policy towards the Arctic regions and the U.S. President John F. Kennedy's (JFK's) policy towards Latin America known as the 'Alliance for Progress'.

Transition in the Middle East, the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis and the United States' rebalance to Asia are key trends that will have an impact on transatlantic relations and European defence. As US priorities shift, a common European 'grand strategy' could encourage the development of a shared vision to help Europe order its priorities and begin to respond to the new, post-austerity context of world politics and shrinking defence budgets. Will these changes be enough to quicken Europe's currently shrivelled strategic thinking? In any scenario, given its relative weight and role as an interlocutor with the US, the United Kingdom will remain vital to any developing European security and strategy agenda, although its broader relations with the European Union will complicate this relationship. How it proceeds will also help to define the boundaries of this nascent European security order. This article charts these key global trends, relates them to current debates in European security and strategy and maps opportunities and constraints faced by Europe and the UK in developing a grand strategy in an increasingly 'American-lite' European neighbourhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the deepening of the UK's security and defence arrangements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In recent years there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity indicating far closer engagement between London and Abu Dhabi. Rather than being an innovative initiative of the Cameron government, the interaction has deeper roots, with this article uncovering the importance of the relatively unknown Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1996, signed by the Major government. Furthermore, the UK-UAE defence relationship is shown to have endured beyond the infamous UK withdrawal from 'east of Suez' in 1971. The current engagement is, however, more intense and potentially far-reaching than it had been in recent decades, with the defence sector being placed at the forefront of UK efforts to bolster the relationship with the oil-rich Gulf emirate. Using official statements from London and Abu Dhabi, this article suggests that the UK-UAE relationship has always remained intact, although it lost focus following the end of the Major government until the refocusing on the Gulf by the Cameron government. The article concludes with an assessment of the expectations of the UAE, and the strategic drivers underpinning UK policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do we approach the subject of British grand strategy today? This article seeks a new approach to this question. It argues that there is a gap of grand strategic significance between actually-existing Britain and the Britain its political elites tend to imagine. The colonial and imperial histories that helped constitute and still shape the contemporary United Kingdom have fallen through this gap. One consequence is a grand strategic vision limited to a choice of partner in decline-Europe or the US. Overlooked are the power political potentialities of post-colonial generations situated in multiple sites at home and abroad. In search of this potential, we lay the conceptual basis for a strategic project in which the British 'island subject' is replaced by a globally networked community of fate: 'Brown Britain'. This entails reimagining the referent object of British strategy through diaspora economies, diverse histories and pluralized systems of agency. What might such a post-colonial strategy entail for British policy? We offer initial thoughts and reflect on the often occluded social and political theoretic content of strategic thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents case studies of diplomatic engagement with foreign powers in light of the foreign policy of U.S. President Barack Obama as expressed in his 2010 document "National Security Strategy of the United States of America." Case studies include British concessions to Germany and Japan during the 1930s, as well as U.S. detente with the Soviet Union and renewed relations with China during the 1970s. The impact of trade policies on politics in the objects of engagement is noted.