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Disaster studies have made important progress in recognizing the unequally distributed consequences of disasters, but there has been less progress in analyzing social factors that help create "natural" disasters. Even well-known patterns of hazard-creation tend to be interpreted generically - as representing "economic development" or "capitalism" - rather than through focusing on the more specific dynamics involved. We illustrate this point with two recent and well-known cases of flooding - those in the upper Mississippi River Valley and in the Katrina-related devastation of New Orleans. In the former case, damage was caused in part by building the very kinds of higher and stronger flood walls that were shown to be inadequate in the latter. In the New Orleans case, a more important factor in the death and destruction was the excavation of a transportation canal. In both cases, and many more, the underlying causes of damage to humans as well as to the environment has involved a three-part pattern, supported by the political system - spreading the costs, concentrating the economic benefits and hiding the real risks. In very real senses, these have been floods of folly, created not just by extreme weather events, but by deadly and avoidable patterns of political-economic choices. Comparable patterns appear to deserve greater attention in other contexts, as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental harms involve a "double diversion" -- two forms of privilege that deserve greater attention. The first involves disproportionality, or the privileged diversion of rights/resources: Contrary to common assumptions, much environmental damage is not economically "necessary" -- instead, it represents privileged access to the environment. It is made possible in part by the second diversion -- the diversion of attention, or distraction -- largely through taken-for-granted or privileged accounts, which are rarely questioned, even in leftist critiques. Data show that, rather than producing advanced materials, major polluters tend to be inefficient producers of low-value commodities, and rather than being major employers, they can have emissions-to-jobs ratios a thousand times worse than the economy as a whole. Instead of simply focusing on overall/average levels of environmental problems, sociologists also need to examine disproportionalities, analyzing the socially structured nature of environmental and discursive privileges. Doing so can offer important opportunities for insights, not just about nature, but also about the nature of power, and about the power of the naturalized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing sociological analyses express differing expectations about state control over economic actors and the political feasibility of environmental regulation. Recent literature on the environmental state sees environmental protection as becoming a basic responsibility of postindustrial states, with economic actors no longer having the autonomy they once enjoyed. In contrast, much of the work in environmental sociology expects commitments to environmental state responsibilities to be largely symbolic. Scholars working from this perspective tend to see environmental damage as proportionate to economic prosperity. To assess the differing expectations, we analyze actual environmental performance among the most prosperous nation-states focusing on national-level emissions of carbon dioxide. The strongest predictors of emissions are found to be measures of ecological efficiency, which tend to be associated with potentially less symbolic policy decisions. For the future, there is a need to move beyond broad assertions, devoting greater attention to the conditions under which states are more or less likely to impose constraints on economic actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on risk perceptions in a broader perspective to include not only the individual perceivers and the risks they perceive, but also the institutions that are responsible for risk management. Recreancy can involve failings in either or both of the aspects of trust emphasized by Barber (1983)-- technical competence and fiduciary responsibility--but the term is also intended to describe cases where the failing is neither a matter of (individual) incompetence nor one of self-interest. While recreancy involves the performance of actors who occupy positions of societal trust, it is most appropriately measured not in terms of those actors' perceptions, but, through the assessments of others who have fewer vested interests in describing the legitimacy of their own actions. Risks of death have been dropping significantly for more than a century, but during that lime, there has been a dramatic growth of societal interdependence and hence of the potential for recreancy the failure of institutional actors to carry out their responsibilities with the degree of vigor necessary to merit the societal trust they enjoy.

The 1983 Supreme Court decision on Three Mile Island held it would be almost impossible to distinguish between persons suffering genuine psychological stress and those who merely opposed the facility. While this argument was treated as factual by the justices, it is merely a hypothesis. This article provides an empirical test of the hypothesis, using the only other nuclear host community known to have experienced as much opposition as Three Mile Island. If the Supreme Court hypothesis were correct, attitudes toward the facility would be almost perfectly correlated with stress symptomatology. In fact, the strongest attitude-stress correlation in this community was -.096, even though simple sociodemographic variables showed far stronger correlations with the stress measures. By contrast, the broader literature reveals growing support for the alternative hypothesis implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, namely that the risk of technological accidents may indeed be a significant predictor of psychological stress. The findings have implications for both policy and future research. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]