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International commodity price shocks may have large impacts on producers in developing countries. In this paper, a unique household panel data from Ethiopia is utilized to show that a decrease in international coffee price has strong pass-through to the consumption of households that rely on coffee production as a main source of livelihood. It also results in decreases in on-farm labor supply (particularly male labor supply) and induces reallocation of labor towards non-coffee fields, but has negligible effect on off-farm labor supply. The decline in consumption has significant consequences on child malnutrition: children born in coffee-producing households during low coffee price periods have lower weight-for-age and weight-for-height z -scores than their peers born in non-coffee households. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Smallholder agricultural commodity suppliers in developing countries are often vulnerable to global commodity price fluctuations. Using panel data on farmers from an area of Tanzania where most farmers grow coffee, this study finds that global coffee prices matter for household outcomes, through their effects on farmgate prices, coffee sales and revenues, and household expenditures. The article documents that households cope with coffee price busts by increasing enterprise ownership, an effect that is greater for households without access to other means of coping. Comparisons of mean outcomes of enterprises operated by coper households (which operated an enterprise only in periods of low coffee price) with those of stayer households (which operated an enterprise throughout the sample period) indicate that the former are less likely to be profitable or to hire workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-collectivization period, rural Chinese households were required to sell part of their grain output to the state at a below-market price; however, increases in this quota price beginning in 1993 generated substantial positive income shocks. These income shocks also varied cross-sectionally in accordance with crop composition given that quotas were systematically larger for rice-producing households, generating a quasi-random source of variation in the size of the shock driven by climatic variation in suitability for rice cultivation. Households induced to experience relatively larger income shocks show evidence of decreased agricultural investment, increased investment in non-agricultural businesses, and increased migration as households gain increased income, consistent with the hypothesis that credit constraints may have constrained some households from entering non-agricultural production ex ante. In addition, there is evidence that these households were concentrated among households who had not previously diversified out of agriculture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do income shocks affect armed conflict? Theory suggests two opposite effects. If labour is used to appropriate resources violently, higher wages may lower conflict by reducing labour supplied to appropriation. This is the opportunity cost effect. Alternatively, a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation. This is the rapacity effect. Our article exploits exogenous price shocks in international commodity markets and a rich dataset on civil war in Colombia to assess how different income shocks affect conflict. We examine changes in the price of agricultural goods (which are labour intensive) as well as natural resources (which are not). We focus on Colombia's two largest exports, coffee and oil. We find that a sharp fall in coffee prices during the 1990s lowered wages and increased violence differentially in municipalities cultivating more coffee. This is consistent with the coffee shock inducing an opportunity cost effect. In contrast, a rise in oil prices increased both municipal revenue and violence differentially in the oil region. This is consistent with the oil shock inducing a rapacity effect. We also show that this pattern holds in six other agricultural and natural resource sectors, providing evidence that price shocks affect conflict in different directions depending on the type of the commodity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]