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This article explores two questions. What generates the political division over climate change policy in the United States? How is the division over climate change policy related to the broader polarization of contemporary American politics? I argue that the geographies of America's dual economy—the knowledge economy and the carbon economy—and exposure to the climate crisis intersect to generate a new axis of conflict, which I call the carbon–climate cleavage. This cleavage produces political division over climate change and provides materialist elements that accompany the sociocultural factors that shape contemporary polarization. I demonstrate the existence of the cleavage and its impact using data on economic geography, political attitudes on climate change policy, and support for Trump in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. The empirical analysis indicates that carbon economy communities oppose climate change policy and support Trump, while knowledge economy residents support climate change policy and oppose Trump. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growth of the American financial services remains a bit of a puzzle. The standard approach, the deregulation hypothesis, posits that the industry expanded in response to national deregulation. Yet, when viewed in a comparative context, US finance was deregulated significantly less than other national financial systems and yet grew significantly more than most. We propose the global deregulation hypothesis as a solution to this puzzle. The hypothesis posits that American finance grew in response to deregulation in Europe and the emerging market economies. The article develops two theoretical mechanisms that link global deregulation to US financialization. It reports statistical tests that support two central implications of the global deregulation hypothesis. First, global deregulation is positively associated with the growth of US financial services, while US deregulation is not. Second, global deregulation is not systematically related to the growth of financial services in other industrial democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors generate financial fragility in open economies? Existing research assumes that the development of these conditions is more likely to emerge under some configurations of domestic economic and political attributes. We examine the development of financial fragility through the ontological lens of the new interdependence approach, which assumes that global factors can be as important as local factors in generating outcomes. We analyze global financial conditions from 1978 to 2009 and argue that contemporary global finance is an oscillating system that generates boom and bust capital flow cycles. The phases of this cycle are a consequence of the scale of US net borrowing on global markets: when the United States is a large net importer of foreign capital, other economies struggle to attract foreign capital and are substantially less likely to develop fragile financial positions; when US net capital imports fall, other economies receive an abundance of foreign capital, and financial fragility becomes more likely. In contrast, we find little evidence that cross-national variation in political institutions or financial systems explains why fragility develops, although some regional interdependencies are evident. We conclude that global conditions drive the probability of crises occurring someplace in the system, while local outcomes appear to be idiosyncratic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did some developing country governments accumulate large foreign debt burdens in the late twentieth century while others did not? I hypothesize that variation in foreign indebtedness is a product of the impact of regime type on government borrowing and investment decisions. Autocratic regimes will borrow more from foreign lenders and invest fewer of these funds in public goods than democratic regimes. Consequently, autocracies are more likely to develop large foreign debt burdens than democracies. I test this hypothesis by estimating error correction models against a sample comprising 78 developing countries between 1976 and 1998. The analysis suggests that autocratic governments accumulated substantially larger foreign debt relative to their national income than democratic governments. The analysis has implications for the likely consequences of contemporary debt relief initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]