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The current non-compliance with United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements protecting transnational public goods, military aggression among WTO members, violent suppression of human and democratic rights, global health pandemics, climate change, ocean pollution, overfishing, and other biodiversity losses reflect 'governance failures' (e.g. to limit 'market failures') and 'constitutional failures' (e.g. to protect human and democratic rights and the sustainable development goals). The geopolitical rivalries among totalitarian governments and democracies render constitutional UN and WTO reforms unlikely. They entail 'regulatory competition' (e.g. among neoliberalism, state capitalism, and ordo-liberal constitutionalism) and plurilateral responses aimed at limiting abuses of power (like collective countermeasures against Russia's illegal wars and war crimes) and at protecting transnational public goods (like plurilateral 'climate change mitigation clubs', appeal arbitration among WTO members, regional human rights and security agreements). The power politics disrupting the UN and WTO legal systems is bound to promote regionalization of economic law, re-globalization of supply chains, and geopolitical rivalries resulting from conflicting value priorities and neglect for the human rights underlying the sustainable development goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In times when intricate concerns for social and ecological justice are becoming ever more prominent in global environmental discourses, conflicts between minorities' rights and environmental policies present delicate trade-offs that demand ingenious balancing by regional human rights courts. Such conflicts tend to boil down to oppositions between 'indigenous' or 'traditional' practices set against 'modern' ideals, thereby displaying and performing important normative, epistemic and political implications. To legitimise and strengthen their cases, parties resort to expert interventions. While the involvement of experts speaking on behalf of minorities can bolster the communities' legal protection, the shared assumptions, rhetorical style and professional sensibility of intervening experts can trigger unintended consequences for the identity and (self-)perception of the peoples they represent. The case-law analysis presented here instantiates how networks of experts with shared institutional ties intervene before courts, use specific discursive strategies to further their representatives' claims and reinforce the normative salience of their interventions through cross-jurisdictional and cross-cultural referencing. Drawing on insights from discourse analysis, (legal) anthropology and cultural geography, the article develops a critique of the politics of expert-based approaches to conflict management in regional human rights settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution uses the examples of Great Britain's withdrawal from the EU (Brexit) and US withdrawal from multilateral trade and environmental agreements for exploring political, economic, environmental, social, and legal reasons driving the backlash against economic integration agreements. In both examples, populist battle-cries for 'taking back control' and for lowering regulatory standards were followed by governmental attempts at evading parliamentary control over executive foreign policy powers to violate, or withdraw from, multilateral agreements. Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, President Trump's mercantilist power politics, authoritarian state-capitalism (e.g. in China), and European ordo-liberalism reflect systemic divergences that may justify broad interpretations of WTO 'exceptions' (e.g. for WTO trade remedies and climate change mitigation). Europe's multilevel, democratic constitutionalism protecting 'social market economies' was comparatively more effective in limiting protectionism and carbon emissions inside Europe's common market. The EU's 'new green deal' for a carbon-neutral 'green economy' was made possible by stronger, social, and democratic support based on 'constitutional interpretations' of Europe's ordo-liberalism assisting adversely affected workers, producers, traders, investors, and other citizens to adjust economic and environmental activities to climate change mitigation. EU leadership for WTO-consistent climate change rules requires 'greening embedded liberalism' by interpreting the WTO 'sustainable development' objectives in conformity with the 2015 Paris Agreement, the UN 'sustainable development goals', and human rights (e.g. as legal basis for climate change litigation in Europe). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'environment' is a substantively indeterminate concept that has borne different meanings throughout time and translated different visions of the (legal) relationship between Man and Nature. Over the past centuries, the normative concern for environmental protection emanated from distinct legal, cultural and socio-economic narratives. In providing a genealogy of these multiple and overlapping frames, this article not only sharpens our historical understanding of the legal nexus between two proliferating regimes in international law (environmental law and human rights law), but also critically engages with how environmental protection was progressively translated as an anthropocentric conceptual and operational legal framework. Like Narcissus, humans have been obnibulated by their own interests when thinking about environmental protection. The anthropocentric focus has led environmental law to gradually align and intertwine with human rights, resulting in a synergistic conceptualization of their interactions. Through this prism, environmental protection automatically reinforces human rights. This synergistic mantra has allowed environmental protection to gain momentum by associating it with a grander moral scheme. The focus on synergies, however, overshadowed the existence of conflicts inherent to the relationship between environmental protection and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy and constitutionalism are communitarian methodologies. My arguments for limiting market failures, governance failures, and related injustices in the global division of labour by using the universal recognition of human rights for reinterpreting the 'international law of states' as 'multilevel governance of public goods' protecting citizens—and by learning from republican, democratic, and cosmopolitan constitutionalism—have never pleaded for 'radical individualism' and 'rights-absolutism'. This response to my Chinese critics uses 10 methodology and research questions for challenging their claim that Chinese traditions of Confucian ethics offer a sufficient substitute for the lack of democratic constitutionalism and of effective human rights law inside the People's Republic of China. In view of the dangers of totalitarianism, Asian lawyers should participate in 'JIEL debates' on how Confucian ethics and communitarian legal traditions in many Asian countries can be reconciled with stronger protection of human rights in international economic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The power-oriented General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) traditions of 'member-driven governance' risk undermining the dispute settlement system of the WTO and its judicial administration of justice. US President Trump, the 'Brexit', and non-democratic rulers challenge multilateral treaties and judicial systems by 'populist protectionism' prioritizing 'bilateral deals'. This contribution uses the example of the US blockage of the WTO Appellate Body system for illustrating the 'republican argument' why public goods (PGs, res publica) cannot be legitimately protected without judicial remedies, rule of law and democratic governance. Adversely affected governments, citizens, and courts of justice must hold power politics more accountable and publicly challenge illegal WTO practices so as to protect transnational 'aggregate PGs' (like the WTO trading and legal system) for the benefit of citizens. WTO members should use their power of majority voting for authoritative interpretations of WTO law supporting 'judicial administration of justice' in multilevel governance of the world trading system. Multilevel judicial control of trade regulation legitimizes 'member-driven governance' by protecting rule of law as approved by parliaments when they authorized ratification of the WTO Agreement and its legal implementation for the benefit of citizens, their equal rights and social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aims: Our aims were to evaluate the distribution of troponin I concentrations in population cohorts across Europe, to characterize the association with cardiovascular outcomes, to determine the predictive value beyond the variables used in the ESC SCORE, to test a potentially clinically relevant cut-off value, and to evaluate the improved eligibility for statin therapy based on elevated troponin I concentrations retrospectively. Methods and results Based on the Biomarkers for Cardiovascular Risk Assessment in Europe (BiomarCaRE) project, we analysed individual level data from 10 prospective population-based studies including 74 738 participants. We investigated the value of adding troponin I levels to conventional risk factors for prediction of cardiovascular disease by calculating measures of discrimination (C-index) and net reclassification improvement (NRI). We further tested the clinical implication of statin therapy based on troponin concentration in 12 956 individuals free of cardiovascular disease in the JUPITER study. Troponin I remained an independent predictor with a hazard ratio of 1.37 for cardiovascular mortality, 1.23 for cardiovascular disease, and 1.24 for total mortality. The addition of troponin I information to a prognostic model for cardiovascular death constructed of ESC SCORE variables increased the C-index discrimination measure by 0.007 and yielded an NRI of 0.048, whereas the addition to prognostic models for cardiovascular disease and total mortality led to lesser C-index discrimination and NRI increment. In individuals above 6 ng/L of troponin I, a concentration near the upper quintile in BiomarCaRE (5.9 ng/L) and JUPITER (5.8 ng/L), rosuvastatin therapy resulted in higher absolute risk reduction compared with individuals < 6 ng/L of troponin I, whereas the relative risk reduction was similar. Conclusion: In individuals free of cardiovascular disease, the addition of troponin I to variables of established risk score improves prediction of cardiovascular death and cardiovascular disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In numerous publications, John Jackson emphasized 'the strong link between interna- tional law and national constitutional systems, which must be understood in order to 1 understand the international economic system'.1 This short contribution in memory of John endorses--and elaborates on--Jackson's proposition that 'international lawyers must morph into constitutional lawyers' and adopt a 'constitutional approach to inter national law'.2 John's regular visits to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at Geneva and the European Union (EU) institutions at Brussels, like his participation in trade law conferences all over the world, illustrated his 'cosmopolitan commitment' (as a 'citizen of the world') to building a stronger international legal and mutually beneficial trading community. Yet, his 'constitutional mind-set' remained rooted in the unique US constitutional law system rather than in rights-based 'cosmopolitan consti- tutionalism' or market-based 'economic cosmopolitanism'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluations of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) among Canada and the European Union (EU) and of the ongoing EU-US negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) depend on their legal, economic, and political methodologies for multilevel governance of public goods (PGs) like a transatlantic market. In contrast to the American and European post-war leadership for democratic governance of PGs (as recalled in Section I), the CETA fails to adequately protect democratic governance, rights of citizens, and judicial remedies in transatlantic market regulation (Section II). TTIP negotiators likewise prioritize economic and utilitarian group interests in order to limit opposition to a successful completion of TTIP; this risks undermining 'republican governance' and rights of citizens as limitations on the longstanding governance failures in the Transatlantic Partnership since the 1990s (Section III). Rather than complying with the EU Treaty requirements to base external free trade agreements (FTAs) on the 'constitutional values' that successfully govern market regulation and competition throughout Europe, trade negotiators abuse their 'executive monopoly over transatlantic negotiations so as to limit their own legal, democratic, and judicial accountability vis-à-vis citizens. Civil society and parliaments should resist such 'disconnected Westphalian governance' and insist that international treaties with legislative functions' for protecting transnational PGs must be governed democratically and protect transnational rights and remedies of citizens so as to enable the 'democratic principals' to hold governance agents and their limited 'constituted powers' more accountable for the ubiquity of 'market failures' and 'governance failures' that continue to distort transatlantic relations, rule of law, and consumer welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section I explains why the human rights obligations of all UN Member States call for a new philosophy of international economic law (IEL) in order to protect rights of citizens and their democratic demand for transnational public goods (PGs) more effectively. Section II discusses five different conceptions of IEL and the need for their ‘legal integration’ so as to promote more ‘public reason’, democratic participation, legal coherence, and ‘proportionality balancing’ in multilevel governance of transnational PGs. Section III argues that the ‘functional institutionalism’ underlying UN and WTO law—albeit necessary for limiting ‘prisoner dilemmas’ and other collective action problems in multilevel governance of international ‘aggregate PGs’—must be embedded into ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ in order to protect human rights and other ‘aggregate PGs’ more effectively through ‘participatory’ and ‘deliberative democracy’, democratic accountability mechanisms, and stronger legal and judicial remedies of citizens compensating for the inadequate parliamentary control of multilevel economic regulation. Transforming ‘disconnected UN/WTO governance’ into ‘cosmopolitan republicanism’ requires ‘responsible citizenship’ and cosmopolitan rights protecting individual autonomy (e.g. ‘market freedoms’), democratic autonomy and other ‘aggregate PGs’ (res publica). ‘Constitutional’ and ‘legislative balancing’ of economic and non-economic rules must be complemented by case-specific ‘judicial balancing’ and justification with due respect for ‘principles of justice’ (including cost-benefit analyses). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This contribution argues that the perennial negotiations on adjustments of the law of the WTO (e.g. by means of the Doha Round negotiations) and of UN law (e.g. adjustments of the IMF quota and voting system, UN climate change regulations) reflect systemic problems of multilevel governance of international public goods (PGs) that call for reviewing traditional regulatory approaches at national and international levels of governance (as discussed in Sections II and III) so as to better respond to the ‘collective action problems’ of multilevel governance of international PGs (as discussed in Section IV). The concluding Section V draws policy lessons from the WTO agreements adopted at the WTO Ministerial Conference at Bali. Rather than lamenting about ‘fragmentation’ of UN and WTO law, bilateral, regional and other plurilateral agreements can be justified as necessary instruments for reforming international law for the benefit of citizens; the ‘consistent interpretation’—and ‘judicial comity’—requirements of national and international legal systems call for interpreting such agreements in conformity with the UN and WTO legal obligations of contracting parties as integral parts of multilevel governance of ‘aggregate PGs’ demanded by citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

International customary law requires interpreting treaties and settling related disputes ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and the human rights obligations of states. Yet, in contrast to UN law, European economic law and related adjudication by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and European courts, international trade and investment agreements and related adjudication tend to avoid references to ‘principles of justice’ and human rights. This contribution argues for a more coherent ‘judicial methodology’ in multilevel economic adjudication in order to promote ‘judicial comity’ and transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens. As the incorporation of human rights into positive international law entails the recognition of individuals as legal subjects, judicial regard to human rights and other ‘principles of justice’ is indispensable for determining the ‘object and purpose’ of modern international economic law (IEL) (i). By acknowledging the ‘dual nature’ of modern legal systems (ii) and the common core of ‘principles of justice’ underlying multilevel guarantees of equal freedoms and sovereign rights to protect public interests, economic adjudication could become more legitimate and more coherent (iii). The ‘methodological individualism’ underlying human rights law (HRL) and constitutional democracies justifies a presumption of conceptualizing private and public economic regulation as integral parts of IEL aimed at protecting reasonable self-interests and equal rights of citizens (iv). The ‘consistent interpretation principle’ recognized in national and international legal systems confirms the need for ‘de-fragmenting IEL’ based on ‘normative individualism’ (v). Economic adjudication derives its constitutional legitimacy from protecting ‘constitutional justice’ as a constitutive principle not only of HRL but also of modern trade and investment adjudication (vi) It requires respect for legitimate ‘constitutional pluralism’ (vii) and transnational cooperation among courts so as to protect rule of law not only in terms of rights of governments but also for the benefit of private economic actors (viii). Judicial rule-clarification (ix) and judicial ‘system building’ are necessary parts of judicial protection of transnational rule of law so as to improve the ‘incomplete’, fragmented and often power-driven IEL system for the benefit of citizens as the ultimate sources of values and democratic owners of governance institutions (x). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section II discusses six different conceptions of justifying international economic law (IEL). Section III argues that the ‘dual nature’ of modern IEL requires limiting ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of ‘international law among states’ through protection of ‘cosmopolitan rights’ and judicial remedies of citizens in IEL. Section IV explains why past doctrinal disputes among legal positivists, natural law advocates, and social conceptions of law have lost much of their relevance for interpreting IEL. Section V suggests that protecting transnational ‘aggregate public goods' requires constitutional approaches to IEL. Section VI explains the need for comparative institutional research so as to improve the functioning of horizontally and vertically interdependent public goods regimes. Section VII discusses why ‘cosmopolitan public goods regimes' have protected rights and transnational rule of law more effectively for the benefit of citizens than the prevailing ‘Westphalian conceptions’. Section VIII argues that the inadequate parliamentary and civil society control of multilevel economic regulation must be compensated by multilevel judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights protecting ‘participatory’ and ‘deliberative democracy’, ‘access to justice’, ‘active liberty’, and human rights in IEL. Section IX concludes that the permanent fact of ‘reasonable disagreement’ requires respect for ‘constitutional pluralism’ in IEL in accordance with the ‘subsidiarity principle’. The legitimate diversity and competing conceptions of ‘principles of justice’ justify judicial deference via-à-vis diverse conceptions of human rights, economic cosmopolitan rights, corresponding ‘duties to protect’ and ‘corporate responsibilities’ as relevant context for interpreting IEL. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This symposium summarizes the main conclusions of an interdisciplinary conference on Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods at the European University Institute, Florence, in Spring 2011 and reproduces 4 of the altogether 15 conference papers.1 This ‘Introduction’ identifies areas where global public goods theories need further research. The ‘keynote speech’ by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy gives a unique policy perspective on ‘Global Governance: From Theory to Practice’. Inge Kaul’s paper on ‘Global Public Goods Theory: Explaining the Underprovision of International Public Goods and Corrective Strategies’ offers a summary—by one of the leading researchers on public goods theory—of the main ‘collective action problems’ impeding multilevel governance of interdependent public goods. ‘The G-20 and Global Economic Governance: Lessons from Multilevel European Governance?’, by Jan Wouters and Thomas Ramopoulos, discusses the policy question of whether reforms of the G-20 meetings can and should be inspired by European experiences of multilevel governance. Daniel Esty and Anthony Moffa explore ‘Why Climate Change Collective Action has Failed and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the Trade Regime’. One major conclusion of the symposium is that economic and political ‘public goods theories’ neglect law and constitutionalism as instruments for producing ‘aggregate public goods’. Remedying this neglect requires integrating legal and constitutional theories into public goods research. Reconciling, on the one hand, the power-oriented ‘ethos of diplomats’ focus on promotion of ‘national interests’ through ‘rule by law’ with, on the other hand, the justice-oriented ‘ethos of constitutional democracies’ focus on cosmopolitan rights protecting individual and democratic self-development through ‘rule of law’ remains the biggest challenge in protecting international ‘aggregate public goods’ in the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How should citizens evaluate the ever more important case law of international economic courts and their sometimes inadequate responses (e.g. by investor-state arbitration) to ‘the governance gaps created by globalization (which) provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation’?1 Section I recalls that the customary law requirement (as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) of settling ‘disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes, … in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’, including ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (Preamble VCLT), reflects the constitutional functions of courts to interpret and apply law in conformity with ‘rule of law’, justice and human rights as constitutional restraints on the ‘rule of men’ and their ‘rule by law’. Section II explains why some of the governance problems of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are due to power-oriented conceptions of ‘principal-agent’ relationships as ‘member-driven governance’ without regard to the constitutional functions of WTO bodies to provide collective public goods with due respect for citizens as ‘democratic principals’. Sections III and IV recall how the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Court developed diverse ‘constitutional methods’ of interpreting treaties among European states as ‘constitutional instruments’ protecting fundamental freedoms and social rights of European producers, investors, traders and consumers. Sections V and VI argue that the worldwide context of international economic law (IEL) differs from multilevel European constitutionalism and requires WTO and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute settlement bodies and investor-state arbitral tribunals to exercise more judicial deference and respect for the diversity of constitutional principles in WTO Members and their regulatory discretion. Section VII concludes that national, regional and worldwide economic courts should promote common conceptions of rule of law and ‘constitutional justice’, following the ‘solange method’ of multilevel cooperation among national and international courts in Europe, in order to protect transnational ‘rule of law communities’ for mutually beneficial economic cooperation among citizens across frontiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article replies to criticism of an article that the author previously published in this journal. The imputations that the author considered the economic policies of the German Nazis between 1933 and 1945 their worst crime or that he did not believe in the human right to strike are both rejected. Criticisms of multilevel constitutions such as that used in European Union jurisprudence are also addressed. Questions about international trade agreements are also addressed.

Since the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1922, governments have consented to, and actively used, an ever larger number of international and transnational courts, quasi-judicial dispute settlement bodies and ad hoc arbitral tribunals for the settlement of disputes over the interpretation and application of rules of international law. Such judicial clarification of disputed interpretations of incomplete, intergovernmental agreements reduces not only the negotiation costs of governments by delegating the clarification of contested facts and legal claims to independent third-party adjudication. Judicial decision-making at intergovernmental, transnational, national and private levels also supplements rule-making and offers citizens judicial remedies for defending their rights and interests. Modern international economic law increasingly complements intergovernmental, legislative, and administrative governance by multilevel ‘judicial governance’ so as to protect rule of law more effectively for the benefit of citizens (Section I). This contribution criticizes the one-sidedly power-oriented perceptions of WTO law as ‘international law among states’ (Section II) and the related perceptions of international judges as dependent agents of states (Section III). Civil society, parliaments and democratic governments should encourage national and international judges to cooperate in their legal task of interpreting citizen-oriented international economic law ‘in conformity with principles of justice and international law’, as explicitly prescribed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The legal coherence of multilevel judicial governance depends on protecting principles of procedural as well as substantive justice and a common conception of ‘rule of law’ not only in intergovernmental relations among states, but also vis-à-vis their citizens engaged in, and benefiting from, international trade (Sections IV–VIII). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on the report of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Consultative Board Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi on the methods of resolving the institutional challenges of the organization. The author believes that the document is limited since it only tackles on the realizable reforms instaetd of the substantial changes that could be made. Moreover, he mentions the need to think about the institutionality of the solving the WTO challenges.

In July 2004, the annual conference on Preparing the Doha Development Round: WTO Negotiators Meet the Academics at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence discussed the role of Developing Countries in the Doha Round: WTO Decision-Making Procedures and WTO Negotiations on Trade in Agricultural Goods and Services. As in the 2002 conference1 and 2003 conference, leading academics presented ten papers on the pertinent subjects of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and WTO negotiators commented on these reports, eliciting stimulating discussions among WTO ambassadors, other practitioners from developed and less-developed WTO member countries, economists, political scientists and legal academics.2 This mini-symposium reproduces [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In June 2003, the annual conference on Preparing the Doha Development Round – WTO Negotiators Meet Academics was held at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence and discussed Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading System – Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the WTO. As in the 2002 conference, academic experts presented reports on subjects related to the Doha Development Round negotiations, and WTO negotiators commented on these reports, leading to stimulating discussions among WTO ambassadors, other practitioners from developed and less-developed WTO member countries, economists, political scientists, and legal academics. This short conference report, written by the workshop organizer, summarizes the main arguments made during the discussions, without disclosing the identity of WTO negotiators since their statements presented their personal views and not necessarily their government’s official position. The summary is followed by six conference papers, and by four written comments, that served as a basis for the discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Presents a rejoinder to a comment from Philip Alston on an article about human dignity, poverty and empowerment of individuals. Core of human rights; Discussion of an empirical and normative hypotheses on interrelationships between human rights and constitutionalism; Interpretation of human liberty rights.

The 'Global Compact', launched by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999, calls upon business to 'support and respect the protection of international human rights within their sphere of influence and [to] make sure their own corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses'. This article calls for a complementary 'Global Compact' between the UN and UN specialized agencies, as well as with other worldwide public organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), so as to integrate universally recognized human rights into the law and practice of intergovernmental organizations, for example by requiring them to submit annual 'human rights impact statements' to UN human rights bodies and to engage in transparent dialogues about the contribution by specialized agencies to the promotion and protection of human rights. The globalization of human rights and of economic integration law offers mutually beneficial synergies: protection and enjoyment of human rights depend also on economic resources and on integration law opening markets, reducing discrimination and enabling a welfare-increasing division of labour. As a corollary, economic, legal and political integration are also a function of human rights protecting personal autonomy, legal and social security, peaceful change, individual savings, investments, production and mutually beneficial transactions across frontiers. The proposed 'integration approach' differs from the 1945 paradigm of 'specialized agencies' and state-centred international law focusing on the 'sovereign equality' of states rather than on human rights and democracy. It takes into account the regional experiences in Europe, that integration law enhances not only economic and social welfare but also the rule of law, the protection of human rights and democratic legitimacy at national and international levels of governance. As in European integration law, human rights should be recognized in global integration law as empowering citizens,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the different negotiation theories, highlighting the need for a comprehensive theory of effective international adjudication. Comparison between the different dispute settlement mechanisms; Effectiveness of legal remedies and international adjudication in international economic law; Improvement in international dispute settlement mechanisms in the United Nations law.

Examines the effectiveness of the international rule of law in connection with the world trade policy. Inconsistencies between the rule of law concepts in national law and European Community law and under the international law; Functions of the World Trade Organization dispute settlement and appellate review systems; Kinds of appellate review in international adjudiction.

Editorial. Highlights the centennial celebration of the 1899 Peace Conference and the 50th anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of victims of war and the conclusion of the United Nations (UN) Decade of International Law sponsored by the UN. Activities offered by the Academy of International Economic Law and Dispute Settlement established by the Law Faculty of the University of Geneva.

This article discusses the legal consequences of the 'human rights revolution' for public international law in general and WTO law in particular. The universal recognition of human rights calls for the constitutionalization of international law and foreign policies based on human rights and principles of rule of law, limitation and separation of government powers, social justice, 'democratic peace', and national as well as international constitutionalism. The eight core principles of constitutionalism must be applied in a mutually complementary manner at local, national, and international levels wherever power risks being abused. Constitutionalism is described as a bottom-up struggle for the protection of human rights and human dignity in the Kantian sense of maximum equal liberty for the personal development of every individual. The WTO guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law, compulsory adjudication of international disputes, and of a mutually beneficial division of labor are shown to be compatible with the six basic functions of human rights law. The emerging 'right to democracy' and the increasing focus on 'positive integration law' in WTO negotiations call for democratic reforms of WTO law and of its 'constitutional infrastructure' for the benefit of the citizens. UN human rights law must overcome its long-standing neglect of economic liberties, property rights and of competition law as a necessary complement of human rights. The universalization of human rights and of WTO law offer mutually beneficial synergies that require increased cooperation between human rights activists, the WTO, and the world trade community for the benefit of the citizens and their human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human rights and liberal trade rules (including WTO rules) are based on the same values: individual freedom and responsibility (e.g. to adjust to competition); non-discrimination; rule of law; access to courts and adjudication to disputes; promotion of social welfare through peaceful cooperation among free citizens; parliamentary approval of national and international rules. The non-economic values of WTO law are no less important for the human rights and welfare of citizens than the economic welfare effects of liberal trade. Like the EC, the WTO can and should become an advocate not only of economic freedom, but of human freedom more generally. This article argues in favour of constitutional reforms of WTO law so as to take civil society and human rights more seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Editorial. Relates the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) into the broader context of international law. Interrelationships between general international law, international economic law and WTO law; Inadequacies of the Hobbesian view of international law; Human rights revolution; Contribution of the international economic law to the reform of international law.