Search

In this article I examine why Vietnam, a state possessing neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear power plants, adopted nuclear security purely as a preventive measure against nuclear terrorism. Although nuclear security emerged as a norm specifically related to countering nuclear terrorism following 9/11, it has received diverse responses from states. Nuclear weapon states, and states that possess nuclear materials (encompassing the United States, Japan and Canada) have actively advanced nuclear security as they face the threat of nuclear terrorism. In contrast, states without nuclear power plants have been unwilling to do so as they do not identify nuclear terrorism as a national threat. However, among these states, Vietnam began to adhere to the norm in 2012, and by 2014 was even recognized as one of the most progressive states in the nuclear security field. Drawing on Vietnamese regulations, elite statements and interviews conducted with Vietnamese officials, I endeavour to show that Vietnam actively changed its stance after nuclear security began to be diffused as an independent norm, in isolation from the other nuclear norms it had previously been grafted onto. Further, I discuss the merits of these strategies as barriers and facilitators for norm adoption in the case of Vietnam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an important article, McIntosh and Storey (2018) challenge the "acquisition-use presumption" that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would inevitably seek to detonate it in an attack. They argue that a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons has more attractive options than conducting a direct nuclear attack, that organizational politics mean that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would be unlikely to seek to detonate it, and that a nuclear attack would escalate the threats the terrorist organization faced. I argue that these arguments are ultimately unpersuasive and that the acquisition-use presumption remains a valid basis for theorizing about the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a response to Mark Bell's "Defending the Acquisition-Use Presumption" by the authors of the original article "Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the contemporary literature on nuclear terrorism focuses on the question of whether a terrorist organization could acquire a nuclear weapon. This assumes that once a terrorist group acquires a weapon, they will, at some point, attempt to detonate it in an attack. This article calls that assumption into question by using a strategic perspective to examine the likely behavior of a nuclear-armed terrorist organization. We identify and assess the most likely options available and conclude that a nuclear terrorist attack is the least likely outcome—even for terrorist groups with nuclear capability. This results from three drawbacks of actually detonating a nuclear weapon: the costs associated with an attack, the benefits forfeited in terms of the options foreclosed by using the weapon, and the relative strategic value of alternative courses of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first results of an in-depth evaluation of the practical potential of common household Israeli salt as a retrospective dosemeter in the event of a nuclear accident or terror attack are presented. Ten brands of salt were investigated with emphasis on four of the bestselling brands that constitute 76 % of the total consumer market. Eight of the ten brands show similar glow curves with two main glow peaks at maximum temperatures of ~176°C and ~225°C measured at a heating rate of 1°C s-1. Chemical analysis of three major brands indicates substantial impurity levels of 200-500 ppm of Ca, K, Mg and S and significant differences of additional ppm trace impurities, which lead to an ~50 % difference in the TL response of the three major brands. Fading in the dark is in significant but under room light is of the order of 35 % per day. The dose response is linear/supralinear with the threshold of supralinearity at ~0.01 Gy reaching maximum value of ~4 at 0.5-1 Gy for two of the major brands. The precision of repeated measurements is ~10 % (1 SD), but the accuracy of dose assessment under field conditions requires further study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The second Nuclear Security Summit on 26-27 March 2012 in Seoul provides an important opportunity to gauge international consensus on the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, and to evaluate progress in the development of multilateral cooperative efforts to prevent it. However, the 'nuclear security' agenda has long been complicated by the complexity of the issues it covers and diverging perceptions of the risks and threats in this area. Further complications involve the politics that have constrained the development of formal cooperative approaches and the patchwork nature of the existing multilateral policy architecture. While the Summit is unlikely to go very far in mitigating these complications, it will nonetheless provide impetus to multilateral efforts to strengthen the international regulative framework in this area and, in the process, to develop the norm of nuclear security. Beyond Seoul several priorities stand out. Nuclear safety and nuclear security need to be approached in a more balanced way by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it must also be allowed to adopt a more joined-up, and less stove-piped, approach to nuclear governance across the safeguards, safety and security fields. Developing countries that are concerned by growing demands for strengthened nuclear security arrangements need greater reassurance from those proposing them that these will not undermine their rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue civil applications of nuclear energy. Greater progress also needs to be made in universalizing the key nuclear security conventions and their amendments, and attention should be given to how momentum and high-level political buy-in to the nuclear security agenda can be maintained in the future both as part of, and beyond, the Nuclear Security Summit process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the ever increasing threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism, active development of nontoxic new drugs and other countermeasures to protect against and/or mitigate adverse health effects of radiation is ongoing. Although the classical LD50 study used for many decades as a first step in preclinical toxicity testing of new drugs has been largely replaced by experiments that use fewer animals, the need to evaluate the radioprotective efficacy of new drugs necessitates the conduct of traditional LD50 comparative studies ( FDA, 2002 , Federal Register 67, 37988–37998). There is, however, no readily available method to determine the number of animals needed for establishing efficacy in these comparative potency studies. This article presents a sample-size formula based on Student's t for comparative potency testing. It is motivated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) requirements for robust efficacy data in the testing of response modifiers in total body irradiation experiments where human studies are not ethical or feasible. Monte Carlo simulation demonstrated the formula's performance for Student's t, Wald, and likelihood ratio tests in both logistic and probit models. Importantly, the results showed clear potential for justifying the use of substantially fewer animals than are customarily used in these studies. The present article may thus initiate a dialogue among researchers who use animals for radioprotection survival studies, institutional animal care and use committees, and drug regulatory bodies to reach a consensus on the number of animals needed to achieve statistically robust results for demonstrating efficacy of radioprotective drugs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear terrorism poses a grave threat to national security, a fact dramatically demonstrated on 11 September 2001 by Al-Qaeda's attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These strikes revealed the vulnerability of Western societies to foreign terrorist threats and underscored the real possibility that terrorist groups might use nuclear weapons against cities in the United States or Europe. This article analyses the nature of this threat and possible remedies within the context of a new multilateral instrument, the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This Convention furnishes a legal basis for international cooperation to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. It criminalizes the possession of, use of, or threat to use radioactive devices by non-state actors, their accomplices, and organizers if intended to produce death, serious bodily injury or environmental or property damage. The agreement further encourages increased exchanges of information and greater collaboration between governments in the pursuit of terrorist suspects. But the effectiveness of this instrument depends on the degree to which state parties respect, abide by and enforce its provisions Key in this regard is strengthening security of fissile materials stored in nuclear facilities. If governments fulfill their duties in this Convention, the agreement will work well and accomplish its purposes. To the degree that governments fall short of meeting their obligations, specific protections against nuclear terrorism in the Convention will be eroded, and the risk of nuclear terrorism will remain high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review article examines four recent American books relating, in very different ways, to the rise of unilateralism and neo-conservatism in the United States. Richard Perle and David Frum, former advisors to George W. Bush robustly present the‘neo-conservative’ case. Max Boot, another unilateralist, argues from the experience of American history that small wars have often been as important as big wars in projecting American power; and he suggests that this experience has a present-day relevance. Ivo Daalder (who served in the Clinton administration) and his co-author James Lindsay, set out to explain the‘Bush revolution’ in foreign policy and put it in context. They insist that Bush is not a mere tool of his advisors, who are in any case not homogenous. His foreign policy strategy is indeed new, although it has given rise to certain unresolved problems. Robert McNamara (a former US Defense Secretary) and James Blight, share the fear of nuclear terrorism but argue that it can only be contained through the universal elimination of weapons of mass destruction, under the supervision of a possibly reformed UN. They oppose the unilateral use of force by the US except when America itself is attacked. They also argue that the US must change its posture from‘deterrence’ to‘reassurance’ and show more empathy in addressing the concerns of other countries and communities.The review concludes that America is now deeply divided over its foreign policy and that events, rather than arguments, may decide the outcome of the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism poses considerable threat throughout the world.Aim To provide occupational physicians with an understanding of this threat and its main forms and what action can be taken to counter this threat.Methods Presenters at a conference on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism were asked to contribute their evidence-based opinions in order to produce a review article.Results This paper presents a summary of the different forms of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism and the effective counter-measures and also provides a review of current scientific literature.Conclusion The threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism is present throughout the world and is one that occupational physicians should be aware of, as well as the action that can be taken to counter it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]