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The institutional developments in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) during the sovereign debt crisis were mostly studied with reference to intergovernmentalist theories. However, they can hardly explain the dominant role of the Eurogroup and Eurogroup working group (EWG) compared to the EU-27 formats in the Council, the ECOFIN and the Economic and Financial Committee. This article seeks to address this puzzle. Based on sociological-institutionalist theories, I argue that the distinction between euro area member states (EAMS) and non-EAMS structured how member state representatives organised EMU governance processes during the sovereign debt crisis. The reinforcement of the Eurogroup and EWG is interpreted as an explicit manifestation of this institutionalisation of differentiated integration (DI) in EMU. The empirical findings suggest that the two informal formats were transformed into viable euro area bodies providing the EAMS with the political authority, normative environment and administrative resources to design and implement policies independently. In this reinforced shape, the Eurogroup and EWG enabled a distinction between EU and euro area matters and provided EAMS with suitable instruments to manage their issues. The institutionalisation of DI has long-term implications for EMU reform processes and governance practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU) has mainly been understood as variation in participation in common policies. But DI also has implications for the nature and functioning of the EU as a polity. While temporary DI may facilitate deeper integration, permanent DI is liable to increase transaction costs and fragmentation. However, little is known about how such alternatives are assessed by decision-makers in the member states. This article uses novel quantitative and qualitative data to shed light on this question. It looks at the explanatory role of various types of opt-outs and at member states' dependence, capacity, and identity. We find that temporary and permanent differentiation are assessed differently in the member states but neither alternative is clearly preferred. Long-term involuntary opt-outs are related to negative assessments of both forms of DI. Surprisingly, voluntary opt-outs do not seem to lead to more positive assessments of DI. We also find that the temporary DI is preferred in smaller member states, while support for permanent DI is higher in larger member states. Finally, we find differences in the effects of dependency, capacity, and identity between older and newer member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on differentiated integration (DI) has by and large ignored the views of political party actors on DI. Drawing on 35 semi-structured interviews with party actors from seven member states and situated across the political spectrum, we show them to regard DI as divisive and deeply political. We also identify two little explored dimensions affecting their views: namely the wealth of their member state (MS) and its prior experience of DI. Interviewees from richer MS generally favour DI more than those from poorer MS, and those from MS that have not experienced sovereignty or capacity DI welcome DI more than those from MS that have. While the former tend to see DI as allowing both opt outs for MS unwilling or unable to integrate further and enhanced cooperation for MS able and desirous of doing so, the latter fear their MS being excluded and relegated to a second-class status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the intergovernmentalist account, differentiated integration is an institutional design helping to overcome negotiation deadlock caused by international heterogeneity. Heterogeneity of state preferences, dependence and capacity creates demand for differentiated integration. Whether differentiated integration will actually be realized, however, also depends on the supply of viable and mutually beneficial solutions for all participants in differentiation. The size of the integrationist group needs to be large enough to provide the collective good and achieve economies of scale; externalities between the differentially integrated groups must be weak; countries need to be in a favourable institutional bargaining position. The article focuses on theory, but also discusses empirical findings and policy proposals on differentiated integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses the future of Europe as one of differentiated integration. It argues that this future takes the form of member-states' overlapping participation in the EU's many policy communities, making for a soft-core Europe, as an alternative option to the hard-core around the Eurozone. The article contends that this multi-clustered Europe is the only feasible future, given the challenges facing the EU from its many crises, its problems of governance, and the difficulties of decision-making against a background of increasing politicization. But such differentiation is not without its problems, given EU decision-rules, the interconnectedness of policy arenas that can spell problems of spillover, and the need for deeper integration in some policy areas (e.g., migration) while others may benefit from less or more highly differentiated integration (e.g., Eurozone). Institutional reforms would also be necessary to ensure a positive future of differentiated integration: While the EU would continue to require a single set of institutions, it would need modified decision-rules to allow for more (and less) differentiation depending upon the area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) is a community based on the rule of law. EU member states have committed themselves to uphold the rule of law and to respect the primacy of EU law. Yet today, the EU legal order is threatened by the emergence of increasingly autocratic member state governments, particularly those in Hungary and Poland, who routinely violate the fundamental rule of law principles on which the EU is based. This article assesses whether the model of differentiated integration can be applied to help the EU address this rule of law crisis. In recent years, many analysts have called on the EU to embrace a model of differentiated integration as a way to address its many challenges, and some have suggested that versions of differentiation might help the EU resolve tensions with its member states concerning the rule of law. By contrast, this article will argue that differentiation in the rule of law and the theory of constitutional pluralism that some use to justify it are neither normatively desirable nor practically feasible models. In short, we must reject differentiated integration when it comes to rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to articulate conceptually the varieties of international co-operation in which states take part. In theories of international relations, international co-operation is generally analysed either through instances of multilateral collaboration (EU, UN, NATO), through bilateral alliances (Franco-German relationship), or through "minilateral" clubs (G7). Yet the literature does not offer a concept for linking these three models of international co-operation. Nevertheless, in practice, states simultaneously use varieties of international co-operation to address global public problems such as climate change, migration crises, and the fight against terrorism. To address this shortcoming, it is necessary to shift the focus from each type of international co-operation to their "interstices", in order to identify the relations between the types of international co-operation and their reciprocal effects on decisions taken by the state. It is to do this that the concept of "flexilateralism" has been developed. This neologism describes the policy through which a state simultaneously implements varieties of international co-operation to address a public problem. A state's "flexilateral" policy, or flexilateralism, is operationalised by revealing four varieties of international co-operation: bilateralism (co-operation between two states), minilateralism (co-operation within an exclusive group of states), multilateralism (co-operation within an inclusive group of states), and unilateralism (no co-operation). The concept of flexilateralism is applied through the case of France's defence procurement policy in the context of the Brexit negotiations. By taking seriously varieties of international co-operation, the concept of flexilateralism goes a step further to explain the policy-making and implementation of state's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]