Search

This paper critically contrasts Laudan's normative naturalism with Friedman's arguments about the importance of a priori concepts in scientific methodology. I do not take issue with Laudan's claim that taking philosophy and science to be continuous does not preclude a normative role for the philosophy of science. The main focus of criticism instead is Laudan's assertion that if normative philosophy employs the methods found in the sciences themselves, then this precludes any a priori or philosophical justification of methodological rules. I make the case that not only are such justifications possible, they are central to any proper philosophical understanding of scientific methodology, and must figure prominently in any plausible version of normative naturalism. To make this case I sketch Laudan's position and his reasons for the ban on a priori justification. I then contrast Laudan's position with Friedman's recent studies on the prominence of relativised constitutive a priori principles within science and show that this view can serve as the basis of a contrasting variation of naturalised philosophy of science. I elucidate Friedman's position in order to identity some prima facie difficulties with Laudan's ban on the a priori in our understanding of science but also to provide an example of a competing variation of philosophical naturalism. Finally, I further highlight the difficulties that attend Laudan's position through a case study, the central methodological role of renormalisation in quantum field theory.

Debate in the philosophy of science has recently been much concerned with the controversy over the body of doctrines that goes by the name 'social constructivism.' While the school has generated little enthusiasm among philosophers of science, in one form or another it dominates the broader field of science-studies. In spite of its unpopularity among philosophers of science Arthur Fine has argued that an attenuated form of constructivism can be useful within the context of a deflationary approach to science. Fine maintains that the deflationary doctrine, the view that global positions on the realism question ought to be eschewed, can accommodate some constructivist interpretations. In this paper I show that, in most cases, social constructivist interpretations of scientific practice cannot be reconciled with the goals of deflationary philosophy of science. I also demonstrate that to the extent constructivism can be made consistent with deflationary goals it will not resemble Fine's and that it will be far more limited in its applicability than philosophers sympathetic with Fine might think.