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Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.

Consistent with the increasing focus on issues of equity in developing countries, I extend the literature analyzing the relationship between economic inequality and individual health to the developing world. Using survey data from Bangladesh and Kenya with economic status measured by a wealth index and with three different geographic definitions of community, I analyze six competing hypotheses for how economic inequality may be related to stunting among children younger than 5 years old. I find little support for the predominant hypothesis that economic inequality as measured by a Gini index is an important predictor of individual health. Instead, I find that the difference between a household's wealth and the mean household wealth in the community is the measure of economic inequality that is most closely related to stunting in these countries. In particular, a 1 standard deviation increase in household wealth relative to the community mean is associated with a 30–32 percent decrease in the odds of stunting in Bangladesh and a 16–21 percent decrease in the odds of stunting in Kenya.

A simple method is proposed for projecting future deficits in a defined benefit or defined contribution pension scheme. The annual pension deficit rate is expressed in terms of the elderly dependency ratio (determined by demographic factors), the average retirement age, and a few parameters describing the scheme. An illustrative application to China demonstrates that if the average age at retirement gradually increases from the current low level to age 65 for both men and women in 2050, the annual pension deficit rate would be greatly reduced or even eliminated under various plausible demographic regimes over this period. With all else equal, a transition to a two-child policy (assuming this would raise fertility) would also lower the deficit rate in comparison to keeping the current fertility policy unchanged, although the effect would be seen only after 2030. The effect of potentially faster mortality decline in raising future deficits is appreciable and starts earlier than the effects of fertility change. The proposed method may also be used to gauge the magnitudes and timing of impacts on future pension deficits of alternative assumptions regarding levels and age/sex composition of international migration.

People's childbearing intentions change over the course of their reproductive lives. These changes have been conceptualized as occurring in response to the realization that an individual is unlikely to achieve his or her intended fertility, because of constraints such as the "biological clock" or lack of a partner. In this article, we find that changes to child-bearing plans are influenced by a much wider range of factors than this. People change their plans in response to the wishes of their partners, in response to social norms, as the result of repartnering, and as the result of learning about the costs and benefits of parenthood; there are also differences between the factors that influence men's and women's decision-making. In a departure from existing studies in this area, we use a flexible analytical framework that enables us to analyze increases in planned fertility separately from decreases. This allows us to uncover several complexities of the decision-making process that would otherwise be hidden, and leads us to conclude that the determinants of increases in planned fertility are not simply equal and opposite to the determinants of decreases.

The literature on fertility and happiness has neglected comparative analysis. We investigate the fertility/happiness association using data from the world values surveys for 86 countries. We find that, globally, happiness decreases with the number of children. This association, however, is strongly modified by individual and contextual factors. Most importantly, we find that the association between happiness and fertility evolves from negative to neutral to positive above age 40, and is strongest among those who are likely to benefit most from upward intergenerational transfers. In addition, analyses by welfare regime show that the negative fertility/ happiness association for younger adults is weakest in countries with high public support for families, and the positive association above age 40 is strongest in countries where old-age support depends mostly on the family. Overall these results suggest that children are a long-term investment in well-being, and highlight the importance of the life-cycle stage and contextual factors in explaining the happiness/fertility association.

This essay drafts a new interdisciplinary agenda for research on population and development. Starting from Kingsley Davis's 1963 formulation of change and response, Davis's analytical categories are broadened to include inertia as well as change and to encompass both demographic and non-demographic responses at the micro, meso, and macro levels. On that basis the essay proposes what can be called a comprehensive demography, an approach drawing principally on micro-level methodologies like those employed in anthropological demography. Like anthropological demography, comprehensive demography questions the rationality of actors, emphasizes cultural infuences, and stops short of the postmodernist extremes of anthropology. But it also takes explicit account of higher-level social, economic, and political factors bearing on demographic behavior and outcomes. The conclusion raises some epistemological issues. Illustrative examples are offered throughout to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, mainly referring to sub-Saharan africa and the Caribbean and often drawn from the authors' own fieldwork.

Population momentum is the main driver of global population growth today, and this makes an appreciation of momentum critical to understanding contemporary worldwide growth dynamics. This article traces population momentum along with two recently defined measures of momentum decomposed—stable and nonstable momentum—across the demographic transition. We use historical data and population projections from 16 countries to illustrate some previously ignored empirical regularities of the demographic transition in both the developed and the developing world. We also demonstrate the dynamic nature of stable and nonstable momentum, as changes in stable momentum lead to predictable changes in current and future nonstable momentum. These results suggest that momentum, which by definition is measured at a point in time, can also be considered as a process that unfolds over time.

The extended family has been recognized as a major safety net for orphans in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the mortality crisis associated with HIV/AIDS may drastically reduce the availability of relatives and thus undermine traditional forms of mutual support. In this article, the microsimulator SOCSIM is used to estimate and project quantities such as the number of living uncles, aunts, siblings, and grandparents available to orphans. The model is calibrated to the setting of Zimbabwe, using data from demographic and Health Surveys and estimates and projections of demographic rates from the United Nations. The article shows that there is a lag of more than ten years between the peak in orphanhood prevalence and the peak in scarcity of grandparents for orphans. The results indicate that a generalized HIV/AIDS epidemic has a prolonged impact on children and orphans that extends well beyond the peak in mortality. A rapid increase in the number of orphans is followed by a steady reduction in the number of living grandparents for orphans. Consequently, the burden of double orphans (both of whose parents have died) is likely to shift to uncles and aunts. In Zimbabwe, the number of living uncles and aunts per double orphan decreased between 1980 and 2010, but it is expected to increase progressively during the next few decades. Changes in kinship structure have important social consequences that should be taken into account when seeking to address the lack of care for orphans.

While marriage rates are relatively stable among better-educated men and women, they are rapidly declining among those with low educational attainment. This development has been recognized in the US as a new socioeconomic pattern of marriage. This article uses census data to show that socioeconomic marriage differentials are also increasing in Australia and New Zealand. These differentials have previously been noted independently of each other and of the international picture. In synthesizing the antipodean data, the article documents the new socioeconomic marriage pattern as an international phenomenon. This article further considers the extent to which the available explanations for the new marriage pattern fit the antipodean setting. In general, the factors identified as important in the North American setting are applicable to both Australia and New Zealand. In particular, the poor marriage prospects of men with low educational attainment appear to be common to these post-industrial economies with minimalist welfare states.

Nearly every European Country has experienced some increase in nonmarital childbearing, largely due to increasing births within cohabitation. Relatively few studies in Europe, however, investigate the educational gradient of childbearing within cohabitation or how it changed over time. Using retrospective union and fertility histories, we employ competing risk hazard models to examine the educational gradient of childbearing in cohabitation in eight countries across europe. In all countries studied, birth risks within cohabitation demonstrated a negative educational gradient. When directly comparing cohabiting fertility with marital fertility, the negative educational gradient persists in all countries except Italy, although differences were not significant in Austria, France, and West Germany. To explain these findings, we present an alternative explanation for the increase in childbearing within cohabitation that goes beyond the explanation of the Second Demographic Transition and provides a new interpretation of the underlying mechanisms that may influence childbearing within cohabitation.

This note revisits the author's June 2009 PDR article, "Reconsidering the Northwest European family system." Using an array of contemporary and historical census microdata from around the world with simple controls for agricultural employment and demographic structure, I detected no significant differences in complex family structure between nineteenth-century Western Europe and North America and twentieth-century developing countries. This article adds two new measures designed to detect stem families and joint families. The results suggest that Western Europeans and North Americans have had a long-standing aversion to joint family living arrangements, and that this pattern cannot be easily ascribed to demographic and economic conditions.

The ethnic minority populations in the UK are growing substantially through immigration, a youthful age structure, and in some cases relatively high fertility. Their diverse demographic and socioeconomic characteristics have attracted considerable academic and policy attention, especially insofar as those distinctive characteristics have persisted in the generations born in the UK. No official projections of the UK ethnic populations have been published since 1979. This article provides projections to 2056 and beyond of 12 ethnic groups. Given overall net immigration and vital rates as assumed in the office for National Statistics 2008-based Principal Projection, and the ethnic characteristics estimated here, the ethnic minority populations (including the Other White) would increase from 13 percent of the UK population in 2006 to 28 percent by 2031 and 44 percent by 2056, and to about half the 0-4 age group in 2056. Alternative projections assume various lower levels of immigration. Possible implications of projected changes are discussed.