Search

Infants have asymmetrical exposure to different types of faces (e.g., more human than other-species, more female than male, and more own-race than other-race). What are the developmental consequences of such experiential asymmetry? Here we review recent advances in research on the development of cross-race face processing. The evidence suggests that greater exposure to own- than other-race faces in infancy leads to developmentally early perceptual differences in visual preference, recognition, category formation, and scanning of own- and other-race faces. Further, such perceptual differences in infancy may be associated with the emergence of implicit racial bias, consistent with a Perceptual-Social Linkage Hypothesis. Current and future work derived from this hypothesis may lay an important empirical foundation for the development of intervention programs to combat the early occurrence of implicit racial bias.

The other-race effect (ORE) in face recognition refers to better recognition memory for faces of one's own race than faces of another race-a common phenomenon among individuals living in primarily mono-racial societies. In this article, we review findings suggesting that early visual and sociocultural experiences shape one's processing of familiar and unfamiliar race classes and give rise to the ORE within the 1st year of life. However, despite its early development, the ORE can be prevented, attenuated, and even reversed given experience with a novel race class. Social implications of the ORE are discussed in relation to development of race-based preferences for social partners and racial prejudices.

A comparison of the literatures on how infants represent generic object classes, gender and race information in faces, and emotional expressions reveals both common and distinctive developments in the three domains. In addition, the review indicates that some very basic questions remain to be answered regarding how infants represent facial displays of emotion, including (a) whether infants form category representations for discrete classes of emotion, when and how such representations come(b) to incorporate affective meaning, (c) the developmental trajectory for representation of emotional expression at different levels of inclusiveness (i.e., from broad to narrow or narrow to broad?), and (d) whether there is superior discrimination ability operating within more frequently experienced emotion categories.

Previous research has demonstrated that organizational principles become functional over different time courses of development: Lightness similarity is available at 3 months of age, but form similarity is not readily in evidence until 6 months of age. We investigated whether organization would transfer across principles and whether perceptual scaffolding can occur from an already functional principle to a not-yet-operational principle. Six- to 7-month-old infants (Experiment 1) and 3- to 4-month-old infants (Experiment 2) who were familiarized with arrays of elements organized by lightness similarity displayed a subsequent visual preference for a novel organization defined by form similarity. Results with the older infants demonstrate transfer in perceptual grouping: The organization defined by one grouping principle can direct a visual preference for a novel organization defined by a different grouping principle. Findings with the younger infants suggest that learning based on an already functional organizational process enables an organizational process that is not yet functional through perceptual scaffolding.

Three- to 4-month-old female and male human infants were administered a two-dimensional mental-rotation task similar to those given to older children and adults. Infants were familiarized with the number 1 (or its mirror image) in seven different rotations between 0 degrees and 360 degrees, and then preference-tested with a novel rotation of the familiar stimulus paired with its mirror image. Male infants displayed a novelty preference for the mirror-image stimulus over the novel rotation of the familiar stimulus, whereas females divided attention between the two test stimuli. The results point toward an early emergence of a sex difference in mental rotation.

Experience plays a crucial role in the development of face processing. In the study reported here, we investigated how faces observed within the visual environment affect the development of the face-processing system during the 1st year of life. We assessed 3-, 6-, and 9-month-old Caucasian infants' ability to discriminate faces within their own racial group and within three other-race groups (African, Middle Eastern, and Chinese). The 3-month-old infants demonstrated recognition in all conditions, the 6-month-old infants were able to recognize Caucasian and Chinese faces only, and the 9-month-old infants' recognition was restricted to own-race faces. The pattern of preferences indicates that the other-race effect is emerging by 6 months of age and is present at 9 months of age. The findings suggest that facial input from the infant's visual environment is crucial for shaping the face-processing system early in infancy, resulting in differential recognition accuracy for faces of different races in adulthood.

Little is known of the neural processes that underlie concept-formation abilities in human infants. We investigated category-learning processes in infants both by using a common behavioral measure and by recording the brain's electrical activity (event-related potentials, or ERPs). ERPs were recorded while 6-month-olds viewed cat images during training, followed by novel cat images interspersed with novel dog images during test. The data indicate that distinct neural signals correspond with learning of a category presented during familiarization, preferential responding to a novel category, and representation of category exemplars at multiple levels of inclusiveness. The results suggest that fundamental components of the neural architecture supporting object categorization are functional within the first half-year of postnatal life, before infants acquire language and young children engage in formal learning of semantic categories. The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for models of category learning and development.

It has been demonstrated that older infants (6- to 7-month-olds), but not younger infants (3- to 4-month-olds), use form similarity to organize stimuli consisting of X and O elements. We investigated whether utilization of form similarity is governed by maturation or experience by contrasting how infants perform when familiarized with a single exemplar versus multiple exemplars depicting a particular organization. In Experiment 1, 3- to 4-month-olds failed to organize alternating columns or rows of squares and diamonds or Hs and Is, respectively. In Experiment 2, same-aged infants familiarized with all three patterns (X-O, square-diamond, H-I) displayed evidence of organization. The results suggest that 3- to 4-month-olds can use form similarity to organize visual patterns in a concept-formation task. The findings imply that perceptual organization based on form similarity is learned through experience with multiple patterns depicting a common arrangement, rather than immediately apprehended in an individual pattern.

Given evidence demonstrating that infants 3 months of age and younger can utilize the Gestalt principle of lightness similarity to group visually presented elements into organized percepts, four experiments using the familiarization/novelty-preference procedure were conducted to determine whether infants can also organize visual pattern information in accord with the Gestalt principle of form similarity. In Experiments 1 and 2, 6- to 7-month-olds, but not 3- to 4-month-olds, presented with generalization and discrimination tasks involving arrays of X and O elements responded as if they organized the elements into columns or rows based on form similarity. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that the failure of the young infants to use form similarity was not due to insufficient processing time or the inability to discriminate between the individual X and O elements. The results suggest that different Gestalt principles may become functional over different time courses of development, and that not all principles are automatically deployed in the manner originally proposed by Gestalt theorists.